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Paths of Integration

Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004)

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(eds.)

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Immigrant Integration in Western Europe, Then and Now

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Introduction

In the 1990s, an interesting and heated discussion emerged among migration scholars in the United States on the question, if and to what extent the ‘new’ post 1965 immigrants to the US would experience integration and assimilation processes similar to those experienced by the equally massive immigration wave from Southern and Eastern Europe between 1880-1914.1 Thus far, this debate has had virtually no resonance in the European context. One reason for this may be that many scholars remain prisoners of their national histories.2 This limitation has led them to foster assumptions concerning the ethnic homogeneity of populations within European nation-states. Furthermore, the insight that emerged in the early 1980s among social and economic historians, that geographical mobility was a structural element of European history,3 did not change the dominant view that migration was a sign of crisis, caused by political (war, repression) or economic distress (over-population, famine). This belief was strengthened by the understanding of the modernisation process in the 19th century as a fundamental break with the past. Large-scale industrialisation and urbanisation, which caused millions to move from the countryside to cities, and the simultaneous massive emigration from Europe to the New World fitted well into this interpretation.

These factors help account for historians’ repeated neglect of the scale and impact of immigration on European societies from the Middle Ages onwards. One consequence of this neglect has been that mainstream historians and social scientists have neither acknowledged nor taken into account the fact that most Western European countries have experienced important migrations from the Early Modern period onwards, including the ‘classical’ American decades of mass immigration, 1880-1914, and the inter-war years. In other words, contrary to the assumptions of many scholars and commentators who stress the unprecedented character of recent developments, the European past does present many cases that lend themselves to a comparison with immigrations in post-war Western Europe.
This has become apparent since the late 1980s when an increasing number of studies began focusing on immigration to Western European countries in the 19th and 20th centuries. Notwithstanding this advance in scholarship, its results and implications have not yet influenced the reading of either national or European histories. According to the German migration historian Dirk Hoerder, the misinterpretation of the past looms large over the present:

Official recognition of a many-cultured past has been achieved in but few European states. In general, neither public, nor politicians are searching for a past different from the currently imagined national ones. Historians as gatekeepers, with few exceptions, share these nationalist and nation-centred approaches.

Instead, Europe is still considered by many primarily as an area of emigration to other parts of the world. In this view, it was not until the 1950s that Western Europe was confronted with large-scale immigration, caused by decolonisation and labour recruitment in Southern Europe, Northern Africa, and Turkey. Although we now know better, the idea that immigration is a recent phenomenon remains a stubborn presence in both the popular memory and academic scholarship. This may explain why the gulf between historians and social scientists is much deeper and communication even more sparing than in the American case. As a result, the scholarly research on integration processes is divided into two mutually isolated domains that seldom interact. The inevitable consequence is that there is no common ground for discussion and for the integration of research results and perspectives.

With this volume we hope to show that the issues and questions raised in the US debate are highly relevant for Europe as well and that the transfer of this debate might help to promote a dialogue between European historians and social scientists in the migration field. By presenting this first systematic comparison of migration and integration processes of past and present we aim to stimulate scholarly discussions on this topic and we hope to deepen our understanding of integration processes both in the past and present. Finally, it will be argued that European perspectives in their turn can enrich and put into perspective the American discussion on old and new migrants, which until now remains largely confined to its national frame of reference.

The US Debate

In the last decade, complaints have been voiced by various American migration scholars about the lack of inter-disciplinarity in their field.
The gulf between historians and social scientists is regarded as deep and enduring. Notwithstanding the increasing interest of sociologists and historians in each other’s disciplines, both with regard to perspectives and methods, the sub-fields remain distinct. As a result, historians often shake their heads wearily when social scientists label certain phenomena as new and unprecedented, because in their view continuities and similarities are much more apparent. Historians stress long term developments and often unmask apparently new trends, such as transnationalism, as old wine in new bottles. Sociologists, on the other hand, have the impression that their historical colleagues lack a sufficient theoretical framework and restrict themselves to mining the archives and other sources for information about immigrants without a coherent paradigm. This deadlock was eloquently summarised by Ewa Morawska some fifteen years ago and since then, the ‘mutual alienation’ seems not to have lessened, simply because the main causes – ongoing specialisation and academic parochialism – have not declined.9

In general, historians display a greater tendency to look over the fence than their sociological brethren.10 Most social scientists, as far as they ever integrate historical research into their analyses, tend to treat history as anecdote, background, often to ‘prove’ that the present fundamentally differs from the past.11

From a European historical perspective, however, the situation in the American migration field seems close to heaven. In contrast to their colleagues in the old world, American scholars from various disciplines at least engage in discussions of important themes, such as the debate on the differences and similarities between the old (1870-1914) and new (1970-present) immigration. Although the discussion on immigrant adaptation in the past and present is by no means over, it has structured the discussion by focussing on a number of particular themes and variables, which are considered as the key to our understanding of integration processes:

– the characteristics of immigrants;
– the nature of (transnational) networks and communities;
– the structure of the labour market of the receiving society;
– the opportunity structure of the receiving society.

At the same time, the sometimes intense interdisciplinary discussion has not produced a common viewpoint. Instead, the American debate has divided scholars roughly into two camps. On the one hand, there are specialists who stress the discontinuities in integration processes over time. They argue that not only the composition of immigrant groups has changed drastically (from Europeans to Asians, Africans, and Hispanics), but also that the structure of the receiving society differs greatly from that of circa 1900. In this respect, they point to new
forms of racial categorisation, the rise of the hour-glass economy, which leaves little room for gradual social mobility through un- or semi-skilled blue-collar work, and the emergence of transnational communities. Finally, they argue that immigration after 1965 – in contrast to the first period – is an ongoing process in which ethnicity is constantly rejuvenated by new arrivals. As a result, the influence of the original language and culture are expected to be much more lasting. The differences in both the composition of the immigrant groups and the receiving society are deemed to be so fundamental that the classical assimilation process is not likely to repeat itself. Instead, they predict that dark-skinned migrants will either experience a form of segmented assimilation into the American (black) lower classes, whereas others (like many Asians) will hold on to their ethnic culture much longer.

This view is criticised by both historians and social scientists who basically argue that the interpretation of the past is too positive, whereas the present is pictured too gloomily. They underline that the adaptation of Italians, Poles, Russian Jews, and others in the first half of the 20th century went less smoothly than is often assumed. Many of them experienced no – or only limited – social mobility and at the same time met with considerable (racial) discrimination and only gradually became ‘white’. Moreover, they argue that transnationalism is nothing new. The ‘old’ immigrants who came to the US in circa 1900 also remained in regular contact with their home communities through letters, newspapers, and frequent return migration.

Although those who stress continuities and similarities acknowledge that the post-1965 immigration is to some extent different (less physical resemblance to mainstream Americans, as far as ongoing immigration, changes in the economy, stronger transnational ties), they suggest that it is still too early to draw conclusions. Moreover, they tend to downplay these differences and point to the fact that integration processes have a dynamic of their own, which is to a certain extent independent from the context in which they take place.

**Immigration and Integration in Europe**

Despite the fact that the world has become a global village, certainly the academic version of it, this American debate has thus far not reached European shores. Although the theorising on modes of incorporation by scholars like Richard Alba, Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut has gained ground among European social scientists, the comparison between past and present immigrants in Western Europe is virtually non-existent. Thus far, studies by historians who have worked on immigration in Western European countries, like France,
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Great Britain, have barely been noticed in the social sciences and historians have seldom discussed at length the relevance of their analyses for current debates on immigration and integration. As argued before, this lack of interdisciplinary communication can first of all be explained by the different conceptualisation of the immigration history of most European countries. Furthermore, as in the American case, the assumption among migration scholars that past and present immigrations diverge greatly is quite strong. Many point to the deviant phenotypical and cultural characteristics of recent immigrants and the transnational phenomenon, and argue that comparisons would mainly highlight differences. Finally the context in which immigration and integration take place has changed considerably over the course of the 20th century. The power of the state to control immigration and intervene in the integration process has especially increased, even more so in Western European welfare states than in the US, so that it is plausible that integration follows different paths than in the past. To what extent are these claims convincing?

Immigration history

In contrast to the United States of America, Canada, Argentina, or Australia, prior to 1945, Western European states never considered themselves as immigration countries. Even in the second half of the 20th century, when immigration soared, the awareness among governments that they were de facto immigrant societies only very slowly gained ground in the face of political resistance. From the mid-1980s onwards, historians have hesitantly begun paying attention to this topic. This slow maturation was also influenced by the overarching interest of migration scholars in transatlantic migrations, which (often implicitly) were considered of much more interest than intra-European mobility. Only sporadically have scholars ventured to make comparisons between these two types.

The studies on migration within Europe that have been published since the late 1970s have made it clear that the reluctance to make structural comparisons between the past and the present is not due to an actual absence of immigration in the earlier decades of the 20th century. Immigration to Germany from Russia, Austria, Poland, Italy and the Netherlands after the 1880s was massive. The number of foreigners increased from some 200,000 in 1871 to 1,2 million in 1920. Similar trends occurred in France and Switzerland both before and after the First World War. Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands experienced lower rates of immigration until the Second World War, but considerable numbers of immigrants settled here as well.
Finally, we have to take into account the internal movements of people. Contrary to what is often assumed, internal migrants (be they the Bretons in Paris, the Irish in Liverpool, or the Poles from the Prussian East in the Ruhr district) also had to adjust to their new environments and experienced similar adaptation processes as foreign migrants. Although political scientists, as well as some historians, stress the difference between internal and external migrants and argue that the political and legal conceptualisation of ‘the alien’ from the 19th century onwards has created a different sort of migrant, there are enough points of comparison left both where migration mechanisms and modes of incorporation are concerned.

‘Race’, culture and colour

A second factor which explains the lack of comparisons over time in Europe is the often implicit assumption that intra-European migrants (let alone the huge numbers of internal migrants) were in cultural and physical respects much more similar to the population of the host societies. As the ‘old’ migrants were overwhelmingly Europeans, the assumption is that their integration was much easier and therefore fundamentally different from the non-European ‘new’ migrants who arrived in large numbers after 1945.

There are numerous indications, however, that in the period 1850-1940 immigrants from other European countries (especially Italians, Irish, and Poles) were perceived as culturally and ‘racially’ different. As Foner, Roediger, and others have underlined with respect to the United States, race is a highly elastic concept and subject to changes in social constructions of difference. The Poles in Germany, Irish in Britain, and Italians and Jewish-Russians in France have lost their (racial) stigma only gradually in the course of the integration process. There is therefore no fundamental reason to assume that the contemporary coloured migrants in Western Europe cannot be compared with intra-European migrants of the past.

Transnationalism

A third reason why many European migration scholars assume that the recent immigration is fundamentally different and therefore not suited to comparisons with previous settlement processes is the phenomenon of transnationalism. Whereas the newness of this factor is heavily debated in the US, in Europe, because of the assumed absence of a first ‘wave’, it is more or less taken for granted. As in the US, most sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists argue that due to changed circumstances in transport, communication and the more lib-
eral attitude of receiving societies, transnationalism will exert its influence over generations to come.\textsuperscript{31} Cheap phone rates, frequent vacations in the countries of origin (especially among former guest workers from Turkey and Morocco), satellite television\textsuperscript{32} and the active involvement of sending states (and their places of worship) with the immigrant communities in Western Europe, have given rise to the impression that integration is going to be much slower than in the past and that the character of integration has changed drastically. Moreover, the discourse of multiculturalism itself makes it easier for immigrant groups to maintain their own cultures, as receiving states, influenced by the discourse of multiculturalism, give greater legitimacy to these kinds of group expression.\textsuperscript{33}

Although a real debate on the newness of transnationalism is lacking, existing historical studies come up with roughly the same results as in the United States. We know, for example that a century ago migrants in Europe kept in contact with their home region through letters, the ethnic press, and frequent return migration, especially among Italians. Furthermore, it is stressed that sending states continued to reach out to their citizens abroad. In this manner, the Italian government subsidised organisations and offered social services to Italian emigrants.\textsuperscript{34} From the 1890s onwards Germans in the Netherlands and other countries were supported by a German state that was eager to promote German culture and ethnicity,\textsuperscript{35} whereas in the 1920s and 1930s, the Italian and Polish states (including the Polish Catholic Church) tried to get a similar grip on ‘their’ migrants in Western Europe by subsidising schools, churches, and associations.\textsuperscript{36}

Apart from continuities, the transnationalism among present-day immigrants also has new elements, most of which are linked to the transport and communication revolutions that have taken place in the last decades. It remains to be seen, however, whether in the long run most second generation migrants will keep functioning in a transnational field.\textsuperscript{37} Showing that it is much easier nowadays to remain in contact with the home culture does not necessarily imply that descendants of migrants will continue to use these possibilities in the long run. Data on the European situation suggests that transnationalism does not inevitably hinder integration.\textsuperscript{38} Moreover, it is conceivable that, due to the much greater importance of education and the penetration of European and American culture through movies, television, and pop music, young second-generation Turks and Moroccans will assimilate even faster than Italians and Poles a century earlier.
The state and migration policies

The last reason why the present in Europe is assumed to differ fundamentally from the past is the role of the state in controlling immigration and shaping integration. With regard to immigration controls, it is undisputed that both for the United States and Europe the First World War marked an important break with the past, although this by no means implied that immigration was restricted everywhere. For the first time Western European states started to control and monitor immigration on a wide scale, especially in view of the national labour market. The power of the state to distinguish between its own citizens and ‘aliens’ increased in step with the extension of its welfare functions at the national level. Thus, after World War II, states took a leading role in both the regulation of colonial immigration and guest worker schemes. Finally, in the last quarter of the 20th century, most countries developed integration policies. The state is therefore not only important in deciding who is admitted, but also who is treated as a full citizen.

However, this fundamental transformation of the state need not necessarily imply that comparisons between ‘now’ and ‘then’ are pointless. First of all, we should not let ourselves be obsessed by the national state. Long before its emergence migration was regulated and monitored by state institutions, but then at the local level. In England, but also in Germany and the Netherlands, from the early modern period onwards, migrants who moved from one municipality to another were considered aliens or strangers. The scale was different but the reasons behind this demarcation were similar. Both now and then it was concerns about the costs of poor migrants for the (local/national) welfare state. The Law of Settlement (1662) in England, for example, was explicitly developed to give municipalities the right to refuse migrants and send them back to the parish where they were entitled to poor relief.

The treatment of migrants in these ‘miniature welfare states’ bears many resemblances to that of foreigners in the last decades of the 20th century.

In the intermediary period, roughly from the mid-19th century to the 1980s, the state became a much more dominant player in the welfare domain, but this did not necessarily put aliens at a disadvantage. As David Feldman has shown, in the 1840s the British state changed the poor law system and stimulated free mobility by severely limiting the power of local parishes. Since 1911, the extension of state benefits such as national insurance, old age pensions, unemployment insurance and assistance, in many cases, did not make a distinction between citizens and immigrants until the end of the 20th century. Since the 1970s, these largely indiscriminate effects of national welfare provisions, com-
bined with progressive residence rights for aliens, led to the unintended long-term settlement of former guest workers and other temporary migrants throughout Western Europe, labelled by James Hollifield as the ‘liberal paradox’.48

This *longue durée* approach to the relation between the state and migrants shows that the First World War was, at least in this respect, a less-decisive turning point than is sometimes assumed. Nevertheless, the national state did make a huge difference in the 20th century. Never before were so many people forced to flee or confronted with abrupt changes in citizenship: people moved across borders, but borders also moved over people, to use Klaus Bade’s apt summary of these dramatic changes,49 leading to ‘enormous discontinuities and dislocations’.50 Moreover from the 19th century onwards, the emergence of ethno-national and racial categories in social and political thought enabled the reification of such differences between natives and immigrants in policy and practice.

Finally, exclusive attention to the state easily blinds us for important structural aspects of the integration process. Immigration policies – nationally defined, and culturally embedded – may be crucial to understanding the selectivity of migration and the possibilities for immigrants to integrate, but it remains to be seen whether and to what extent they influence the long-term integration processes over generations. Moreover, analyses of policies and discourses can also divert attention from the day-to-day interactions between migrants (and their descendants) and the rest of the population.51 An uncritical assumption that immigrants comprised homogeneous national or ethnic groups often stands in the way of a nuanced understanding of the integration process. In some cases, specific groups of immigrants are accused of opposing integration (the Turks), whereas in reality the second generation is integrating in a number of important domains. On the other hand, there are examples of groups, such as the Italians who went to Germany after World War II, who since the 1980s have been depicted as successful migrants, although their children do less well in schools and in the labour market.52 A long-term perspective combined with attention to developments in the key domains of integration (social mobility, intermarriage, housing, social networks, links to the home country) is therefore of great importance in evaluating both differences between countries and differences between time periods.

**Europe’s Specificities**

Although the comparison between old and new immigrants developed in the United States can be fruitfully applied to (Western) Europe, it is
necessary to underline a number of specific characteristics of the European situation. These are related to the timing of migration, the nature of colonialism, the ensuing different ethnic and racial categorisations, and the political and institutional context in which immigration and integration has taken place.

Periodisation

Whereas the US shows a clear divergence between the first and the second ‘wave’ of immigration, with relatively low immigration rates in the intervening period, this is much less clear-cut in the European case. To some extent, we can distinguish a roughly similar timing of the first and the second immigrant waves, with the Irish migration to England (1840-1900), the Prussian Polish-speaking minority to the Ruhr area (1870-1914) and the Italians to France (1870-1914), followed by the post-World War II immigrations from the colonies and labour-exporting countries outside and of Europe. However, this dichotomy covers only part of the complex migration picture. Some countries, like France (see the contributions in this volume by Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard and Laure Teulières), and to a lesser extent Belgium and the Netherlands, also experienced considerable immigration in the interwar period, whereas others were only marginally touched by immigration in the second half of the 19th century. Therefore, this intermediate period is for some countries an alternative comparator for immigration in recent decades. Furthermore, in some countries the second half of the 20th century is characterised by at least two distinct waves of immigration. In Germany, for example, the massive immigration of refugees from (South)Eastern Europe – almost 13 million in the period 1945-1950 – perfectly lends itself for a comparison with the almost four million Aussiedler who arrived in the latter decades of the 20th century (mostly) from the (former) Soviet Union. Another possibility is to compare various Aussiedler groups and explain their different paths of integration, as is illustrated in this volume by the insightful contribution of Barbara Dietz. It would be equally interesting to contrast the integration process of post-World War II refugees in Germany with that of the former ‘guest workers’, the Italians, Greeks, and Turks, who have settled there in large numbers since 1960.

Decolonisation

In contrast to the United States, most Western European countries (with the exception of Germany and Belgium) were confronted with immigration from the colonies on an unprecedented scale, starting immediately after the Second World War (New Commonwealth migrants...
in Great Britain, Eurasians from Indonesia and the Surinamese in the Netherlands, and Algerians in France). Given the specific relations with the ‘mother country’, most of these immigrants enjoyed a privileged legal position which enabled them to enter Western Europe without much problem. It is interesting, though, that this ‘imperial legacy’ produced a much less fixed racial categorisation than one might expect. Racism clearly already played a role in the era of decolonisation and the subsequent flow of (partly coloured) migrants from the colonies, like the Dutch Eurasians in the Netherlands, people from the West Indies in Great Britain and Algerians in France, but it never acquired the semi-primordial status that we witness in the United States. Even in the British situation, for example, which bears the most resemblance to North America when it comes to the definition of race, policymakers in the 1950s did not generally label black migrants as undesirable, as Randall Hansen shows in a recent analysis of the post-war immigration policy. The Colonial Office in particular stressed the importance of the Civis Britannicus sum, pointing out that all subjects of the British empire, wherever they lived in the Old Commonwealth, had the right to enter the home country. Even the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which restricted immigration from the Commonwealth by creating a skills-based quota system, would now seem quite generous. Even if Hansen’s provocative attack on a whole body of literature that highlighted the racist character of the post-war immigration policy is too one-sided, it is clear that the issue of race was more complicated than has thus far been assumed and less fixed in a black-white dichotomy than in the United States.

The experience of migrants from the other Dutch colony, Suriname, further illustrates the way in which perceived as well as real social and cultural differences offer a better explanation for the attitude of the native population towards newcomers than skin colour. The descendants of former African slaves in Suriname who have migrated to the Netherlands since the early 20th century were black in a phenotypical sense, but in the long run this has not produced a rigid race barrier in the Netherlands. Because of the absence of an internal Dutch slavery tradition, these migrants, as well as the descendants of indentured workers from India who have left Suriname for the Netherlands en masse since the late-1960s, did not automatically fall into a well-defined racial category and experienced modest, and sometimes fast, social mobility. Moreover, as most of them spoke the language of the coloniser (similar to the situation of francophone Africans in France and English-speaking West Indians in Great Britain) and were educated in a more or less Dutch system, acceptance of these newcomers by the indigenous population and inclusion in the nation-state was much easier.
than for the more ‘white’ labour migrants from Turkey and Morocco, who settled in Western Europe in roughly the same period.

The socio-economic position of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands was (and still is) considerably lower than of the native population as a whole and, further, due to their adherence to the Muslim faith, they are considered as much more alien. It is striking that these factors make them more ‘black’ in the eyes of the public than the Surinamese. Even the discourse of policymakers is dominated by this use of the term ‘black’. ‘Black schools’, for example, is generally used to designate schools where a large proportion of the pupils are first- and second-generation Moroccans and Turks. As the official target groups of policymakers (‘minorities’) are defined on the basis of socio-economic handicaps, migrants from Suriname are perceived as less ‘black’ than the Turks or Moroccans, because, on average, they do better in school and in the labour market. Thus, in this context, ‘black’ transcends its original ethnic meaning and has turned into a proxy term for class.61

A similar argument has been made for France, where the ‘beurs’ (second-generation Algerian migrants) are deemed more alien than much darker-skinned francophone migrants from central Africa. Michèle Lamont, who compared working-class attitudes towards blacks in the US and France, attributes the lower salience of racism in France partly to the republican ideal:

Indeed, if republicanism strengthens the boundary between a French ‘us’ and a foreign ‘them’, it also has had a powerful effect in downplaying the salience of skin color in the French public sphere: it presumes a voluntaristic or contractual approach to political participation that posits that anyone can join in the polity as long as he or she comes to share a political culture based on the universal (and superior) values of reason and progress.62

Both the Dutch and the French cases shed an interesting light on our comparison with the United States. Thus, it seems not that far-fetched that the phenotypical black Surinamese as well as black immigrants from (former) French colonies have profited from the immigration of other groups and in a sense have become more white (that is, less problematic). In this respect, their history has been similar to the experience of Jews and Italians in the US. These contrasting cases support the idea that race is a social construction in an even more fundamental way; for here colour is disconnected from the original phenotypical connotation. In principle, in certain contexts, even the ‘real’ blacks can escape from the determinations of colour.
The state and institutions

When we look at the role of the state, two major differences between Europe and the United States stand out. First of all, the fact that the US is one, be it federal, state, versus the many nation-states in Western Europe each with their own political and cultural heritage. Secondly, the differences in state ideology between the two continents stand out. Whereas in Western Europe, an interventionist welfare state, often of a corporatist nature, emerged in the 20th century, the US has followed a classic liberal path, characterised by a low level of interference both in the realm of welfare and benefits, regarding social policies, with the exception of the – heavily debated – affirmative action policies. Even the most well-known American assimilation policy, the Americanisation offensive in the inter-war years, was characterised by a noncommittal individual attitude by those involved in teaching immigrants (often by former migrants themselves) how to become an American, illustrated in the chapter by Dorothee Schneider in this book.63

Given the obvious differences in state formation between the United States and Western Europe, many migration scholars have focussed on nation-state comparisons with the explicit aim of accounting for developments in specific nation-states. The best known example is the Rogers Brubaker’s work on France and Germany,64 which inspired a number of other students to compare the integration processes of migrants in other countries.65 In this volume, the value of such analyses becomes apparent in the contribution of Thijl Sunier, who discusses the reactions of Islamic newcomers in France and the Netherlands.

However insightful such an approach may be, nation-state comparisons can also lead to the exaggeration of national characteristics and the neglect of the common features of the countries involved, especially with respect to the socio-political system and its effect on migration control and the integration process.66 The welfare state after the Second World War throughout Western Europe in particular has influenced the selection of immigrants as well as the settlement process. This could all be with well-defined intentions, through immigration and integration policies, but the unintended effects of state and non-state institutions are also of great importance. One can think of the unforeseen permanent settlement of former guest workers and their families, who established social, economic, and legal rights through their inclusion as legal workers. In structuring the settlement process, non-state actors, such as churches and unions, were also important. The role of trade unions in including and excluding migrants in the labour market and society in general is well known, as is demonstrated by Barbara Schmitter-Heisler in this volume.
Comparative studies of the policies and practices of particular states over time remain scarce. In this volume, Karen Schönwälder studied Germany from the moment of its unification in 1871 until the present day and offers a number of interesting suggestions and research questions. Using the central state as the measure of analysis over a long period of time has advantages. One is that it reveals that the welfare state has deep roots, which go well beyond the traditional Second World War caesura. Moreover, Schönwälder’s contribution reminds us of the oppressive nature of state policies in Germany over the long-term with regard to migration controls and integration, as the forced assimilation of the Polish minority has made clear.

New Contributions

Given the various timings of migration within and into Western Europe and the partly dissimilar economic, cultural, and political opportunity structures, the old and new comparisons are less clear-cut than in the American case. Contributors in the first section of this book have chosen what Nancy Green has defined as ‘convergent’ comparisons, which means observing different groups, often in different periods, in one country. Others, like Dorota Praszalowicz, Mark-Anthony Falzon, and Laurence Brown studied a single group in various locations, both within and between national states, following a divergent approach. Furthermore in this volume, we not only focus on large groups who were seen as problematic at the time, as is often the case in American studies, but we also look at ‘silent’ processes of integration, exemplified by the contribution of Laure Teulières on Italian immigrants in a French rural setting. Finally, the role of important actors in the receiving society is highlighted in the contributions by Barbara Schmitter-Heisler (unions), Thijl Sunier (state and religious organisations), Marlou Schrover (migrant organisations), and Dorothee Schneider who focuses on the similar interactions of the state and intermediate institutions, using the Americanisation movement as a case study.

This volume aims to demonstrate that structured comparisons of past and present integration processes in Western European nation-states are relevant and necessary for a better insight into the ways the paths of integration develop over the long run. By implication we argue that the ‘American’ debate on differences and similarities between the past and present immigrants could, with care, be applied to Europe as well. As we have seen, this is not to say that there are no differences between the two continents, or between countries.

To summarise, the situation of the European immigrant-receiving states diverges in at least four respects: 1) Most European nation-states
have yet to conceive of themselves as immigration countries; 2) there is no comparable disenfranchised and discriminated group as the former African slaves in the US, and by implication, less emphasis on colour; 3) the character of the (gradually expanding welfare) state is strikingly different from the US; and 4) immigration policies in Europe vary not only over time, as in the US, but also from country to country. It is obvious that these contextual differences have to be taken into account when we transplant the American debate to Europe. Doing so, the comparison of integration processes in Western Europe may then in the future stimulate a second kind of (meta)comparison: long term trends in the modes of incorporation in Europe and the US.

By stressing the similarities between past and recent migrations and paths of integration, we do not claim that historical patterns repeat themselves. It is clear that many of the variables (both where migrants and the structures of the societies of settlement are concerned) have changed over time. In order to assess the extent to which modes of incorporation in the past diverge from the present, structural comparisons of integration processes over generations are crucial. What the interdisciplinary migration field needs now more than ever is a thorough comparative approach which brings together and confronts research results from both historians and social scientists working on migration and integration in Europe. This book is meant to support this project.

Notes

1 See, for example, the thematic issue of the *International Migration Review* (vol. 31, 1997 no. 4); the *American Journal of Ethnic History* (vol. 21, 2002, no. 4); Foner 2000; Gerstle and Mollenkopf, 2001a; and Foner 2005.

2 One of the first historians who eloquently addressed this problem was Gérard Noiriel 1988.


5 Hoerder 2000, 121-140. A similar argument can be found in: Noiriel 1991.

6 Recent overviews are: Moch 2003a; Bade 2003; and Lucassen 2005. See also Hoerder 2002. For the period after the Second World War, see Ohliger, Schönwärder, and Triadafilopoulos 2003.


8 A recent initiative in this direction is the forthcoming *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (2007), edited by Klaus J. Bade, Pieter Emmer, Leo Lucassen and Jochen Oltmer. Paderborn and München: Schöningh / W.

9 Morawska 1990, 188. See also idem, 2001.
10 Especially interesting are structured comparisons in time and space. See for example: Green 1997b and 2002, 7-35. Another example of a historian who integrated insights from the social sciences is Gabaccia 1998.
12 For this argument see: Joppke 1999 (150-153), who argues that through decolonisation ‘race has become a legitimate category of group identification’, with long-lasting effects. A critical approach to this line of thinking can be found in: Lucassen 2002b, 85-101.
13 For a fundamental critique on this assumption, see: Waldinger 1996.
14 Massey 1995; and Joppke 1999, 149-151.
16 Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; and Alba and Nee 2003.
19 Portes and Rumbaut 1996.
21 Exceptions are: Lucassen and Penninx 1997; Bade 2003; Lucassen and Lucassen 1997, 21-22; Bade and Oltmer 2004; and Blanc-Chaléard 2000.
22 Moch 2003a and Hoerder 2002. An interesting attempt, but restricted to the mental landscapes of migrants, is Hoerder and Rössler 1993, in which the attraction of Paris and Vienna is compared to that of American cities.
23 Fabbro 1996; Wennemann 1997; Bade 2003; and Beier-de Haan 2005.
24 Bade and Oltmer 2004, 10.
26 Holmes 1988; Caestecker 2000; Lucassen and Penninx 1997; Lucassen 2002a; and Van Eijl 2005.
28 For a discussion see Green 2002, 86-88.
30 For recent critical assessments of both the alleged newness and the conceptualisation of transnationalism see: McKeown 2001; Ewa Morawska 2003; and Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004.
32 Although empirical research shows that the effect of satellite television on migrants can be quite different than expected: Milikowski 2000.
33 Although in certain countries like the Netherlands, this discourse has changed drastically since ’9/11’ and the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh.
34 Gabaccia 2000, chapter 4.
35 For the ideological background in the German context, see: Oltmer 2005; and Dann 1996.
36 This was even true for the Swedes in Germany, who in 1911 opened a school in Hamburg: Riegler 1985.

Vermeulen 2006.

For the US Important contributions on the role of the state can be found in the work of Zolberg (1990 and 1997). More focussed on (political) integration are Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001b.


McKeown 2004.

In France, the state, in combination with employers, had already gained the experience in recruiting foreign workers and making agreements with sending states: Ponty 1990. Similar, though less massive, initiatives were taken in Germany, where in 1927 and 1928 recruitment agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria led to the temporary immigration of 90,000 workers in the years 1928-1930 (Oltmer 2005, 447-478).


Feldman 2003, 79-104.


In Germany, the ‘Heimat principle’ had roughly similar effects as the English Old Poor Law: Fahrmeir 1997, 734-735.

Feldman 2003, 96.


Bade 1996b.

Moch 2003a, 196. See also Oltmer 2006.

This criticism applies to the otherwise very stimulating study by Rogers Brubaker who concentrated on debates and policies: Brubaker 1992.

Rieker 2000.

Although it tends to ignore the Mexican immigration since the 1920s and the massive internal south-north migration of African Americans.


Although most of these Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene had German roots, contemporaries considered their integration as virtually insurmountable.

Lunn 1997; Hansen 2000; and Willems 2003.

Guterl 2001, 190-191.

Hansen 2000, 250.

For criticism on his interpretation, see: Schönwälder 2001, 116-117 and 129-130.


Lucassen 2002b.

Lamont 2000, 190-191. See also Perlmann and Waldinger 1997, 902.

See also Zeidel 2004.


For the Netherlands see Van Eijl 2005, for Germany Oltmer 2002.


A limitation also applied in Lucassen 2005.
PART I

THEN AND NOW: CONVERGENT COMPARISONS
Poles and Turks in the German Ruhr Area: Similarities and Differences

Leo Lucassen

Introduction

One of the first migration scholars who stressed the value of comparing old and new migrants in Western Europe was the French historian Gérard Noiriel. Inspired by American scholarship he used the concept of the ‘melting pot’ to characterise the settlement process of migrants in France since the 19th century. In one of his earlier studies, on the city of Longwy, situated in the northeast of France, Noiriel used a comparison which may be typified as ‘diachronic-convergent’. Focusing on Longwy, which emerged as a centre of heavy industry in the period 1880-1980 he showed how in the course of time different immigrant groups settled in this region and to a certain extent had similar experiences, both with regard to migration and integration.

In this paper I use a related comparison, juxtaposing old (Poles) and new (Turks) migrants in the German Ruhr area. In itself such a comparison is not new. Several authors have hinted at the resemblances in the migration and integration process of these two groups, but only rarely has the comparison been systematically explored. One of the few attempts is the study by Aloys Berg. In his dissertation, however, he could only map the settlement process of the Turks until the end of the 1980s. Moreover, his study did not analyse in depth a number of important aspects of the settlement process in the long run. Following up on Berg’s pioneering work, in this chapter I will focus on the migration process and the reception by the German society by concentrating on the key domains of the integration process: the migration process, stereotyping, housing, work, education, intermarriage and transnationalism.

The central question of this chapter is, to what extent the integration process of these two groups was similar or different and to what extent the experiences of the Poles then help us to understand better the current settlement process of the Turks now. At a more general level, this case study and the application of the diachronic/convergent comparison is meant to contribute to the ongoing debate about the comparability of old and new migrants and the added value of historical migration studies.
The reason for choosing this specific comparison is that both groups have a number of important characteristics in common. First of all they were labour migrants with a largely agricultural background, and who were/are seen as a threat to the national unity of Germany, especially when it became clear that they would settle and not return. Furthermore, Poles and Turks were on average low skilled and ended up in the second segment of the labour market, even to some extent in the same mines and the same houses. Thirdly, partly because of the stigmatising discourse on the ‘ethnic other’, Poles and Turks organised themselves in ethnic associations, thus stressing their own ethnic identity and resisting integration or assimilation. Finally, they both were, at least in the first phase of the settlement process, highly spatially segregated and opposed to intermarriage.

The Migration Process

From the 1850s onwards the rural Ruhr area developed rapidly into one of the largest industrial hotspots of Western Europe, dominated by mining and heavy industry. This transformation attracted many migrants, not only from the nearby Southern part of the Netherlands, but also from Italy and other parts of Germany. Within these internal German migrants the ‘Poles’ were a distinct group. They were German citizens from the Polish-speaking parts of Prussia, born in the provinces of Upper Silesia, Posen, East and West Prussia. Like the Turks a century later, the migration initially consisted of young men who assumed that their stay was temporary and who hoped to return soon to the East with the money they saved. As not only wages but also prices were much higher in the West they tried to live as sober as possible and initially made few attempts to settle permanently. Women and children stayed in the agricultural East, working the land and waiting for the men to return. In this sense, both push and pull factors were largely similar for the Poles and the Turks.

After about a decade it became clear to the Poles that returning was not an enviable option. Not only was the East densely populated and lacked economic prospects, by their confrontation with capitalist labour relations in the West, they increasingly resented the feudal situation in the East where most people worked as (day) labourers at large agricultural estates, mostly owned by German (Junkers) or Polish speaking (Schlachta) nobility. Notwithstanding the similarities in the migration process of Poles and Turks, there was one important difference. Poles, who came from the largely Polish-speaking Eastern provinces of the German empire were German citizens, whereas the Turks were foreigners and until the 1990s had huge problems trying to naturalise.
Nevertheless, in practice this did not fundamentally alter the migration process. Thanks to the unforeseen effects of the liberal welfare state, characterised by James Hollifield as ‘embedded rights’, Turks could prolong their stay as ‘guest workers’ and thus gradually exercise the right to settle and bring over their families. Moreover, the decision by the government in 1973 to put an end to the recruitment and pursue a restrictive aliens policy discouraged many Turks into leaving, because they realised that this could jeopardise their residence rights. The Poles may have been German citizens and the Turks foreigners, but in the end, the migration and settlement process in the West of Germany did not fundamentally differ: Both migrations started as male dominated and were meant to be temporary, whereas in both cases, most of the migrants were followed by family members and stayed for good.10

Stereotyping and Stigmatisation

Most immigrants, in the past and in the present, have faced a certain level of stereotyping and discrimination. In the case of the Poles and the Turks, however, their presence – especially from the time that they decided to send for their families and started building their communities – was felt as a serious threat, both by the state and segments of the population.

In the case of the Poles, it was the powerful chancellor Bismarck who regarded them (along with the German Catholics) as a menace to the national unity. He was especially afraid that the Polish-speaking majority in the Eastern provinces – now part of Poland – would try to break away from the fresh and fragile German state, whose unification had been his life’s goal, and revive the Polish state which had been divided among Prussia, Russia and Austria at the end of the 18th century.

The repression of Polish organisations and the use of the Polish language by the Prussian authorities in the East only stimulated nationalistic feelings further and when a considerable number of Poles settled in the Western Ruhr area, the state decided to keep them under firm control and in 1906 even established a special ‘Poles-monitoring-centre’.11 Poles were not only feared for their nationalistic aspirations, but were also seen as inferior to the Germans, because of their Slavic roots and peasant backgrounds. To some they were even considered as racially inferior, whereas their adherence to Catholicism made them extra suspicious in the eyes of the largely Protestant Prussians. The anti-Polish policy coincided with the repression of Catholics, whom Bismarck also suspected of being disloyal to the German state, in the last decades of the 19th century during the so-called Kulturkampf.12
This development, which took place between 1880 and 1914, bears a number of striking similarities to the Turkish case. Although the latter did not have separatist aspirations, the fact that they were foreigners and from a different cultural background, made them in the eyes of many – though by no means by all – unfit for full citizenship. When in the mid-1970s it became clear that the Turkish guest workers would not return, the ethno-nationalist *ius sanguinis* legislation was not changed so that the second generation was also largely excluded from German citizenship. Only in the 1990s was the legislation on citizenship changed so that since 1993 the number of naturalised Turks is now slowly increasing. Those who opposed the structural inclusion of Turks in the German state, especially the political right, argued that Turks for cultural and religious (Islam) reasons were too different to assimilate. Especially since 1990s (stimulated by the Rushdie affair, the Iraq war and, of course, the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001) the Islam argument has become dominant and the discourse shifted from the nationalist to the cultural domain. Closely connected to this change in anti-Turkish sentiment is the fear that the Turks (and other Islamic newcomers) build *Parallelgesellschaften* (Parallel societies) or are causing a ‘Balkanisation’ of Germany.

In this sense the situation of the Turks is somewhat different from the Poles a century earlier, when the Catholic religion was not a central element in the negative stereotyping. Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf* withered in the 1880s and Catholicism was after all an indigenous Christian religion, culturally closer to Protestantism and Lutherism than Islam nowadays. To what extent the heightened problematisation of Islam and the defensive reaction of a part of the Turkish population in Germany will slow down the integration process is difficult to forecast. A massive shift towards radical forms of Islam, as is feared by many, however, is not very likely, as many religious associations increasingly embrace a more moderate European version of Islam which is compatible with the core norms and values in Western European societies.

To what extent, then, did this partly similar, partly different stigmatisation lead to different paths of integration in the key domains of housing, labour market, education, intermarriage, and transnationalism?

**Housing and Segregation**

The hundred thousands of Poles who settled in the Ruhr area (slightly over 100,000 in 1890, and by 1910 some 500,000) never exceeded 6% of the population, but especially in the north of the Ruhr area, this percentage was often much higher, ranging from 10% in Oberhausen to 23% in Herne and Recklinghausen. Moreover, Poles were concen-
trated in specific quarters. The residential intensity of the Poles directly resulted from the policy of the mines to provide special housing, so-called colonies, for their workers. In this way, employers hoped to encourage company loyalty. Furthermore, the mines deliberately segregated workers along ethnic lines in an attempt to prevent class solidarity.\textsuperscript{18} Many of the colonies were mainly occupied by Polish migrants, who often originated from the same area. It seems that, in general, the Poles were quite pleased with their relatively spacious houses and gardens, which was reminiscent of the rural environment they came from.

Increased mobility, especially after World War I, meant that those Poles who remained in the Ruhr area moved to other parts of town in the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. However, the stigma attached to colonies in general and Polish colonies in particular lingered on for a long time. In a socio-graphic study of a Ruhr town, published in 1958, the authors found that the remaining local Polish colony was still looked down upon by the rest of the population.\textsuperscript{19}

The spatial concentration in the Ruhr area on the city level was considerably higher than that of the Turks (in 2004), who reached a maximum of only 11\% in Duisburg. One of the reasons is that the Turks are much more evenly distributed across Germany than the Poles, who were predominantly found in the Ruhr area. Turks may be concentrated in cities, especially Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, and Duisburg, but at least a quarter of them live in smaller towns, whereas southern parts of Germany (like Hessen, Württemberg and Bavaria) also house considerable numbers of Turkish migrants.\textsuperscript{20} While Poles made up 20 to 30\% of the population of certain towns in the Ruhr area around 1910, the Turks are way below these percentages. This kind of comparison, however, can be problematic for at least three reasons: the level of analysis, the quality of housing, and the context of immigration.

First of all, the level of analysis is too general to ascertain what is going on at the neighbourhood level. We know, for example, that Turks are not spread evenly across the cities where they settled, Kreuzberg Berlin being the most well-known example. These concentrations in certain city quarters, often labelled ‘Little Turkey’ or ‘Little Istanbul’ have led the media, politicians, but also scholars, to label this development as a form of ghettoisation. Geographers and scholars from other disciplines, however, argue that this is misleading. Whereas the segregation index for African-Americans in the United States is around 81, the highest levels in Western Europe are around 68 (Bangladeshi in London), and for most groups below 50.\textsuperscript{21} For Turks in Germany circa 1995, this figure ranges from 20 to 40.\textsuperscript{22} When we look at the neighbourhood level, it is clear that within certain quarters, Turks tend to be
concentrated in certain parts. A good example is Marxloh, a quarter of about 22,000 inhabitants in the city of Duisburg. At the turn of the century, in this industrial town in the Ruhr area some 11% of the population was of Turkish descent. In Marxloh, the share was 25%, whereas within this neighbourhood they are concentrated in the eastern part where in certain parts almost 90% of the inhabitants are of Turkish descent.23

As these pockets are limited in scale, and given that the Turks overall have a relatively moderate segregation index, it would be exaggerated to label the settlement of Turks as a form of ghettoisation or to interpret it as a tight ethnic network.24 This interpretation ignores the fact that most of the migrants had virtually no choice and that these concentrations are a direct reflection of their weak labour market position and the availability of inexpensive (social) housing.25 Nevertheless, the ethnic preferences of Turks to live among their own people cannot be denied.26

A second factor which makes the settlement of Turks different from that of the Poles is the quality of the housing. During the phase of family reunification, most Turks rented cheap, poor-quality accommodations in the working-class quarters of German towns. Subsequently they moved to specific neighbourhoods where they were concentrated in large numbers. In the 1990s, more Turks started buying houses, although predominantly in those parts of town where they already lived. This coincided with a decrease in remittances sent to Turkey – although at the end of the 20th century, Turkey was still the third largest receiver in the world – and with a growing awareness that their future lay in Germany.27

Finally, the context of the immigration of Poles and Turks is different. As Blecking has argued recently, when the Poles arrived in the Ruhr they encountered a relatively ‘empty’ space. The area was sparsely populated and the small indigenous population were predominantly small farmers who were disinclined to work in the mines. Moreover, the mines deliberately built special ‘colonies’ for the miners, often segregated by ethnicity. Therefore, the housing was not only of good quality, but the frictions with the German population were also greatly reduced.

Labour Market Position, Schooling and Social Mobility

The disappearance of Turkish ‘ghettos’ will largely depend on the social mobility of German-born generations of Turks. In the case of the Poles, we know now that it took a long time before their descendants moved up the social ladder and left the Polish quarters. In the Ruhr area, the
composition of the Polish population was dictated by the mining industry and of the first generation, 80 to 90% worked as miners. This was much higher than among workers of German descent or foreigners from other countries. While the Polish men found employment in the coal mining industry, most of the women stayed home. Some of them found work in the textile industries of Bremen and Wilhelmsburg in the North and younger women often worked as domestics.

Polish men were vital to the mining industry. In the 1890s, a quarter of all miners were Poles and this increased to almost 40% in 1908. As a result of recruitment policies, these Polish men were concentrated in certain mines. In 1899, 41% of all the Polish men employed in the Dortmund mining district worked in only 19 of the 294 mines. These Polish mines, which were much larger than the average mine, were concentrated in Gelsenkirchen, Essen and Herne, towns that lie very close to one another. By the outbreak of the First World War, the number of Polish mines had grown to 33 (out of 291).

The data on the social mobility and school levels of the second generation are scarce, but suggest that they did only barely better than their parents. Even in 1948, research claimed that Polish children in Gelsenkirchen, by now the third generation, were still doing much worse in school than those with roots in Western Germany. Although the researcher was certainly biased and influenced by the racist discourse of his time, other studies point in the same direction. It seems not far-fetched to assume that even the third generation lagged behind, both at school and in the labour market and that a large portion of the offspring among Poles did not manage to rise above the working class.

The position of Turkish migrants in the German labour market are to some extent similar to those of the Poles. They were primarily recruited for unskilled or semiskilled work in the labour-intensive industries like metallurgy, mining, and textiles and although some of the Turks were skilled labourers, they had to accept the dangerous and tiring jobs at the bottom end of the labour market. For many this resulted in downward social mobility, not only because they had little choice, but also because their primary interest was in making money to save and send back to their home country and not in ‘making it’ in Germany. This does not imply that they were docile and always accepted their working conditions. Their contracts may have tied them to specific jobs and industries, but in practice, many of them moved as soon as they could find better-paid jobs. The position of female guest
workers was to a large extent similar to that of the men. They too worked as unskilled or semiskilled workers in the industrial sector, in textile and electronics factories, while only a minority found jobs in the service sector.

However, an important difference between the Poles and Turks is that the weak labour market position of the Turks was strengthened by the fact that many of them were concentrated in industries that were ripe for an overhaul and subsequently became centres of mass redundancies in the 1980s. The economy offered plenty of jobs until 1973, but with the recession of the 1980s, employment rapidly decreased and unemployment skyrocketed since 1981. That the unemployment rates among the former guest workers were soon twice as high as among Germans is not surprising. What is striking in the long term is that the Turks, who were on average better skilled than other guest workers, performed worse.

General unemployment figures, however, do not tell us much about intergenerational shifts in social mobility. During the 1980s, the picture was gloomy. Both the first generation as well as their children only managed to improve their position marginally and the segmentation on the labour market seemed permanent. A few decades, however, are too short a period to draw up an accurate balance sheet. Many young workers in the 1980s were either born in Turkey or were at the very beginning of their careers. If we compare the skill level of the first-generation Turks who were active in 1972 and 1980 with that of those working at the end of the 20th century, which includes many of their children, it is clear that the idea of a closed second segment for the Turkish immigrants cannot be upheld, certainly not for women. Both men and women, now predominantly of the second generation, are still overwhelmingly unskilled or semiskilled, but this group is decreasing. Meanwhile, the number of those in the more promising white-collar occupations in the service sector (Angestellten) is slowly rising. Gender differences are conspicuous in these shifts: women are doing considerably better than men and clearly adapt better.

At the same time this development does not provide a basis for too much optimism. Turks as a whole are not locked into an underclass, but for the time being, unemployment remains very high, while an important part of the second generation has inherited their parents’ status. This process may have been stimulated by the German apprenticeship system, a combination of vocational and job training. Although this has helped to reduce unemployment among second-generation Turks considerably, ethnically-specific access to job training and employment has developed, with many children following in the footsteps of their parents, the guest-worker generation. The only bright spots are: the period of unemployment for the second generation is
much shorter, and there are few signs of ethnic segregation or of wage discrimination in the labour market. Finally, Turks, and for that matter Italians, have profited more from the economic upturn at the end of the 20th century than the average German and other foreign worker. To gain more insight into the future perspectives of the second and third generation, we now turn to their school achievements.

It will come as no surprise that initially, Turkish children in German schools did badly when compared to their German peers. Many of them were born in Turkey and left for Germany in the middle of their schooling. In fact, they were more like a one-and-a-half generation than actual second-generation migrants. Moreover, as their parents still intended to return, many thought a German education would be of little value. This attitude changed in the course of the 1980s and 1990s when it became clear that their future lay in Germany and when the share of children born and bred in the host country began outnumbering those born back home. Nevertheless, the situation only improved very slowly. When we look at those who managed to finish their educations in 1997, it is clear that the children of ‘foreigners’ finished far behind their German peers, with – as usual – the girls doing better than boys. In 1997, for example two-thirds of the foreign pupils – as opposed to only one-third of the German students – left school without a diploma or with only a *Hauptschule* (elementary school) diploma, which is the lowest academic level.

On the other hand, the Turks are catching up, with girls doing slightly better than boys. Whereas in 1989, the large majority (62%) did not go beyond the *Hauptschule*, this share decreased considerably in the 1990s. Furthermore, the number of Turkish students who go to university is also rising. Nevertheless, again, there is no reason to be too optimistic for the near future. In a 2000 study, Turks were still clearly underrepresented at the higher levels of the German school system, also when compared to other immigrants, such as Italians, Greeks, and Spaniards. It is not inconceivable that we are witnessing the beginning of a split between those who have succeeded in attaining higher education qualifications and those who are stuck at the bottom of the educational ladder, i.e., those with mainly elementary vocational education (*Hauptschule*) who, moreover, have the least chance of obtaining an apprenticeship (*Lehre*), which functions as an important gateway to obtaining a regular job.

Furthermore, the dropout rates among second-generation migrants are almost three times as high as those among Germans. We have to realise, however, that the available data only refer to young people with a foreign passport under the age of 25. Turks with German citizenship, who are probably more integrated and are therefore likely to be doing better, have not been included in the German statistics which – just
like in France – use nationality and not ethnicity as a criterion. This ‘creaming-effect’ will only increase in the years to come and make the evaluation of social mobility among the second-generation migrants increasingly difficult. Moreover, Turks with no German primary education (35%) are more numerous than Italians (30%) and Greeks (23%) and their performance is therefore partly explained by their less fortunate starting position.

Apart from the (low) social-economic position of their parents, the relatively poor performance of the Turks seems to have been caused by the first generation’s failure to identify with Germany, along with their lack of proficiency in speaking the German language (only one third, as opposed to two thirds for other groups). Around 1990, for example, scholars found a clear relationship between the parents’ lack of fluency in the German language and the chance that their children would end up at the *Hauptschule*. Given the increasing orientation toward a permanent stay in Germany, one can expect that this effect will become less important and that the differences between Turks and similar guest-worker groups, such as the Greeks and Italians, will further decrease.

**Mixed Marriages**

Because of a lack of systematic research on intergenerational changes among Poles in Germany, the patterns of intermarriage among the different generations are difficult to reconstruct. However, there is enough anecdotal evidence to piece together part of this puzzle. During the early stages of immigration in Western Germany, when the number of migrants was still relatively low, mixed marriages between migrants and locals were not uncommon. In the Ruhr area, about one in five Poles married a local German woman. This relatively large proportion of mixed marriages can be explained by the fact that there were hardly any Polish female migrants at that time. After 1890, when immigration was at its height and ethnic Polish communities emerged, mixed marriages declined considerably to between 2 to 5%. First-generation male migrants decided en masse to marry Polish women and bring them along to the Ruhr area.

Second-generation Polish men, those born in the Ruhr area between roughly 1890 and 1914, still predominantly married Polish women (also from the second generation), but the proportion was significantly lower. In the 1920s, 30% found a spouse outside their ethnic circle signalling a clear decrease in endogamy and a further step towards assimilation. Nevertheless, the majority of the second generation still preferred a partner from their own ethnic group and until the Second
World War, more than half a century after the start of the immigration, the Poles displayed much more ethnic cohesiveness than is commonly assumed.

Again, the parallel with the Turks is striking. It is a well-known fact that Turkish migrants in Western Europe have a strong preference for marrying within their own group, either with second-generation peers or with partners from Turkey. This strong national preference is for a mix of nationalistic, cultural, and religious reasons, and related to the anti-Turkish feeling among part of the population in the countries where they have settled. Nevertheless, despite the violent attacks on Turks in the first half of the 1990s, the percentage of young Turks who choose a German partner is rising. To some extent this increase since 1995 may have been because of the growing numbers of naturalised Turks, but still, the trend is clearly upward. Equally telling is the shift in opinion among the unmarried Turks about mixed marriages. Whereas in 1980, about 28% could imagine marrying a German, within two decades this had doubled, with men slightly more positive than women. Negative opinions concurrently decreased from 45 to 28%. Turks may still display the greatest hesitation compared to other guest-worker groups, but the rise is much more pronounced. Given the relatively short period that Turks have lived in Germany and their strong ethnic and religious bonds, the growing openness in the domain of marriage is a remarkable indicator of progressive integration.

Transnationalism and Associational Life

When we follow Ewa Morawska’s definition of transnationalism as ‘a combination of civic-political memberships, economic involvements, social networks, and cultural identities that links people and institutions in two or more nation-states in diverse, multi-layered patterns’, and for the sake of the argument equate the Polish-speaking Eastern provinces of the German empire (Posen, Silesia, and East Prussia) with a nation-state, then it is clear that both the Poles and the Turks were engaged in elaborate transnational activities. Among the Poles, this phenomenon was to have a variety of manifestations. First of all, the first generation maintained their contacts with the East via personal networks, frequent travelling, and via the ethnic press. Economic involvement is expressed through investments in Polish savings banks and the buying of land and houses back home. These banks responded to the Poles’ desire to invest in property in the homeland, especially during the years of the colonisation attempts by the German state in the latter part of the 19th century.
Whereas personal contacts and investments decreased after the turn of the century, Polish associations mushroomed. In 1896 there were 75 clubs with a total of 8,000 members in the Ruhr area, whereas by 1910 this had risen to 660 and 60,000 respectively. These clubs had various goals and ranged from unions to singing clubs. What they all had in common was the use of the Polish language and strong nationalistic feelings, which were actively supported by comparable associations in the provinces of origin, especially Posen. The emergence of Polish associations is well illustrated by the development and aims of two of these associations: the Polish Union ZZP and the ultra-nationalistic Sokoł (pronounce: sokoh) movement. At first, the Polish miners joined the new German miners unions as they were being established in the Ruhr district in the 1860s and 1870s. These unions became powerful in the late 1880s, but at the same time it became clear that German unions were not particularly committed to their Polish members. Therefore, in 1902, the Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polkskie (a separate Polish union, ZZP), that followed a more or less social-democratic course, was established in Bochum. It soon attracted thousands of members and membership grew to 50,000 in 1910. Over the years, the ZZP became an integrated part of the German labour movement and even entered into alliances with other miners unions such as the local socio-democratic Alter Verband. After World War I, the ZZP chose for a more nationalistic stance. It took the position that, in principle, all migrants had to return to Poland and therefore, it regarded their presence in Germany as temporary. The result was that within a few years, the ZZP declined from being the third most powerful miners union in Germany to an insignificant club.

With the re-instatement of the Polish state after World War I, the nationalist struggle within the German Empire, was solved and the nationalist strongholds in the Ruhr district lost their salience. During the first half of the 1920s, the nationalist fire would, however, flare up one more time, which manifested itself in anti-Polish propaganda and in ethno-politics among Poles themselves. The defensive reaction of the Polish migrants could easily give the impression that they would always be an ‘alien body’ in Germany, as Bismarck and others had warned from the start. For example, the new Polish National Workers party (NSR) in the Ruhr district, which followed the ZZP union’s moderate Christian socialist line, warned parents not to let their children assimilate and told them to make sure that children retain their Polish-ness.

During the Weimar Republic, the German state opted for a more liberal policy towards national minorities, which was in part motivated by the realisation that this could guarantee similar rights for Germans in Poland. The state therefore supported initiatives to teach the Polish
language at (private) schools, and to set up language courses outside the public domain. Subsequently, several books and journals were published in Polish often aimed at children, for example the journal, *Maly Polka w Niemczech* (‘The Little Pole in Germany’). Finally, during the summer, special train trips were organised to send children to Poland where they could learn the language and experience Polish culture first hand. That in practice only a small minority of the second generation participated, was not so much the result of the lack of supply and obstruction by German authorities, but reflected the ongoing integration process and the realisation by most Poles that their future lay in Germany.

In the course of the 1920s, identification with the Polish cause and the desire to remain within a restricted Polish subculture decreased rapidly. This trend can be related to the decline in Polish associational life. In 1920, in the Ruhr area, nearly 1450 organisations flourished, but by 1926 this number had fallen to 700, with most of these organising social events without any political or nationalistic aims. This gradual shift in orientation is also illustrated by the gradual increase in intermarriage rates and the Germanification of Polish surnames.

The development of transnationalism among Turks in Germany (as well as in other Western European countries) is rather similar. Again we see the classic pattern of intensive contacts with the home country through personal networks and investments by the first generation, declining with the awareness, especially in the 1990s, that return was not a viable option. In their case it also took some time before associational life started to blossom, whereas the coming of age of the second generation is slowly changing the orientation of most organisations towards a permanent stay in Germany.

The Islamic faith has been used as a rallying point in the development of organisational networks aimed at recruiting Turks and thus ‘Islam... emerged as a common core of Turkish identity and gained a prominence which it had not possessed when migration into Germany first began’. There was a short period in which most Turkish organisations in Germany were more or less reproducing the Turkish political and religious landscape. Soon, however, Islamic organisations became dominant and in 1995, more than 2,000 Turkish-Islamic organisations were established with 100,000 (almost exclusively male) members, who, when we include their family members, represent roughly one quarter of the total Turkish population in Germany. Most of these organisations are affiliated with the DITIB mosques controlled by the Turkish state, in addition to this, the Islamist *Milli Görüs* movement (AMTG) continues to grow. Militant fundamentalists, joined together
in 50 organisations throughout Germany, represent only a tiny fraction of the Turkish Muslims.\textsuperscript{71}

As the second generation gradually assumes control of the governing bodies of the mosques, it is striking to witness how these Islamic organisations adopt the European rallying cries as they strive for human rights and religious freedom, which are threatened in their home country. Moreover, the Milli Görüs movement stimulates their members to opt for German citizenship and clearly sees a future for the Turks in Germany, where they will become German Muslims, as the president of the AMGT, Osman Yumakogullari declared at a congress of his organisation in June 1995.\textsuperscript{72} The expectation that Turkish Islam in Europe will increasingly focus on integration into Western European society,\textsuperscript{73} therefore, seems not at all far-fetched.

\textbf{Conclusion}

What has this comparison yielded? As mentioned in the introduction, the Poles and Turks share a number of noticeable similarities. Both were, on average, low-skilled migrant workers whose temporary migration project resulted in permanent settlement. Both were seen as unwanted and as a danger to the ethnic/national homogeneity of the German society, with a mixture of exclusion and self-exclusion as a result. Furthermore, in both cases, the slow integration process was/is characterised by low intermarriage rates among the first and second generation, limited upward social mobility and the perseverance of transnational ties, at least in the first 40 years. Finally, as Berg has noted, there are some striking parallels in the gendered perception of Polish and Turkish women, who were/are seen by the indigenous population as culturally more different than the men, both because of their clothing.\textsuperscript{74}

Does this observation imply that the course and the outcome of the settlement process of the Turks will strongly resemble that of the Poles? With this question we are immediately confronted with two limitations of the diachronic, old and new, comparison: 1) it is difficult and often impossible to find the same kind of data for both groups, and 2) even if we did have the same data and measurement techniques, the opportunity structure has changed through time, which makes it often unclear whether the relevance of the factors is similar, given the changes in the societal context.
Data problems

Although I have tried to find data on the same kinds of issues for both groups, it is easy to point out the incompleteness and inadequacies, both for the past and the present. The situation of the Turks in Germany is monitored much better and in more detail than was the case with the Poles, for whom many vital data are lacking. In the case of the Turks, however, it is also often difficult to measure certain developments, because they are ‘hidden’ in the overarching category of ‘foreigners’, a category used in many government statistics. This not only makes it impossible to break data down for certain national groups, but also neglects the increasing number of Turks who have become naturalised Germans and who are probably better integrated (the ‘creaming effect’). These data and measurement problems, which are inherent in all old and new comparisons, should not make us wary of these kinds of analyses, however, but should warn us about making facile conclusions.

Different opportunity structures

The second point is well illustrated by Diethelm Blecking’s warning against comparisons between the Poles and the Turks (or guest workers in general) that are too superficial.75 Thus, he justly criticised German politicians (probably from the SPD) who use the historical example of the Poles to reassure voters that the integration of the Turks will (also) turn out fine in the long run. Blecking could have added, that the opposite assumption (‘the old migrants were better’), is even more popular and tempting, but then in right-wing circles. Instead of ‘historical legend making’, scholars should also map out the differences. Blecking, and Berg before him, pointed out that when the Poles arrived in the Ruhr area this region was still relatively empty and fluid, a kind of ‘wild west’,76 which meant that they could shape it themselves to some extent, whereas the Turks had to readily adapt to an already established society.77 In other words, the worlds these two groups of migrants had to integrate into had the same geographical co-ordinates, but were socially and institutionally very different. In this chapter, three important changes in the overall opportunity structure have been identified in the domains of economy, education, and cultural orientation.

When the Poles settled in Germany, the mining industry was expanding and would remain a viable economic sector for almost a century to come. Their position as miners may not have been very enviable, but the pay was good and work abundant. The Turks, in contrast, entered a shrinking sector, which was ripe for restructuring, resulting
in massive layoffs and high unemployment rates among the first generation. Furthermore, the Turks may have in part lived, and continue to live, in the same kinds of houses inhabited by the Poles (in the mine colonies), the quality of these dwellings has dramatically worsened. All of these factors have influenced the social and economic positions of the second-generation Turks in a negative way. As a result, the socio-economic differences between them and the German population are, and have become, larger than those between the Poles and the Germans.

Comparing Poles and Turks with Germans in the field of education is not easy, not least of all because the relation between education and social mobility has changed over the last century. Formal education became much more important in the second half of the 20th century, whereas the lack of upward social mobility in various periods can have different effects and meanings. Most Polish children did not find better jobs than their parents. But this was true for most indigenous peers at the time, whereas the Turks, who now find themselves in a similar position as the Poles back then, see the gap between them and the Germans only decreasing very slowly.

Finally, there are indications that the cultural distance between Turks and Germans is larger than that between the Poles and Germans a century earlier. Their nationalist fervour may have been similar (both for themselves and in the eyes of the outside world), Catholicism – even the Polish style – was less alien and threatening to most Protestant Germans than Islam is today. Moreover, one could argue that the cultural problems between parents and their children connected with modernisation are more serious and traumatic in the Turkish case than they were in the Polish case.

*The added value of historical comparisons*

These caveats, however, do not imply that the diachronic-convergent comparison as used in this chapter is untenable or useless. The comparison makes clear that a number of developments are to a certain extent independent from the specific historical context. Thus, the diachronic comparison between Poles and Turks, allows us to identify striking parallels in the first phase (first and second generation) of the settlement process and shows that the slow integration pace of the Turks is not unprecedented and can to a large extent be explained by the way they have been categorised and by their unfavourable starting position. It is clear, for example, that both Poles and Turks in the first and second generations were stigmatised as culturally different, which led to their retreating in their own ethnic world, were wary to marry outside their own group and that the second generation is lagging be-
hind their German peers in the fields of education and the labour market.

At the same time, there are indications that the prospects of the Turks are bleaker, however. First of all, in contrast to the Poles, many second-generation Turks tend to choose marriage partners from the country of origin. Most of them do not have much knowledge of German society, which negatively influences the chances of their children. Secondly, the restructuring of the industrial sectors in which the first generation started out, resulted in high unemployment and a fragile socio-economic position, which was easily reproduced in the second and future generations. And finally, the overall gap between home and school cultures which, together with unemployment and the low incomes of the parents, is partly responsible for the low achievement levels (also compared with other guest-worker groups) and high dropout rates. It is conceivable that these factors will translate into a consolidation of an important part of the Turkish group at the lower rungs of society as a separate ethnic group, at least in the short run.

This danger of a socio-economic minority formation seems to be much more immanent than that of a ‘parallel' and permanent transnational society of which commentators like Bassam Tibi warn. The forecast of a permanent cultural clash ignores the dynamic of the settlement process and the adjustments that take place within the second and third generations. As with the Poles (and many other current and historical examples), the change among Turks in their orientation from the land of origin to the land of settlement will very likely lead to religious and cultural patterns which are largely compatible with that of the surrounding society. What is left in the long run will be a form of ‘symbolic ethnicity’. Although the speed of this development will depend on how a number of factors (such as the salience of global anti-Islamophobia, policies toward immigrants and minorities, economic developments, etc.) will develop in the future, the direction as such is less sensitive to outside factors.

Notwithstanding the methodological intricacies and the obvious differences in the integration process of Turks and Poles in the Ruhr area, the convergent-diachronic approach underlines that at least within one and the same institutional-political regime (liberal nation-states) the migration and settlement process over time displays its own dynamic, independent from the specific opportunity structure. In other words, structured historical comparisons provide us with the tools to distinguish between real and apparent differences between old and new migrants (both where the characteristics of migrants and the structure of the receiving society is concerned) and thus can correct the facile claims of scholars who work only in the present.
Notes

1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the conference ‘Integration of immigrants from Turkey in Austria, Germany and Holland’ (Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, February 27-28, 2004). I thank Jan Lucassen and Hans Vermeulen for their critical comments.


3 For the concepts convergent and divergent, see Green 1997a.


6 Berg 1990.

7 As applied in Lucassen 2005.

8 Peters-Schildgen 2003.


10 Although we have to add that after the First World War some Poles returned to the newly established Polish state, whereas others moved to the coal fields in Northern France, Belgium, and the Netherlands: Klessmann 1978.

11 Klessmann 1978, 19 and 86.

12 Brandt 1987, 3.

13 Especially churches, unions, scholars, and politicians have protested against this ethno-nationalist reflex: Bad (1994: 86). The initial image of the Turks was neutral and sometimes even positive: Von Oswald et al. (2003), 24.


17 Murzynowska 1979, 44-45.


19 Croon and Utermann 1958, 151.

20 Glebe 1997.

21 The segregation index expresses the percentage of people from a certain social or ethnic group that would have to move to different neighbourhoods to make it non-segregated.

22 Musterd and Deurloo 2002, 494.

23 Hanhörrster and Mölder 2000.


27 Glebe 1997, 140-150.

28 Klessmann 1987, 106.

29 Klessmann 1978, 256.

30 Klessmann 1978, 35.


32 Waterkamp 1941, 38-42.

33 Brepohl 1948, 178.

34 Murphy 1982, 61; Hauschult 1986, 238.


36 Oswald et al. 2003, 23.

37 Cepni 1980, 118.


39 Bender et al. 2000, 118; Bender et al. 2000, 69; Cepni 1980, 118.

40 Leggewie 2000, 86-95.

41 Faist 1993.
Herwartz-Emden 2003; Crul 2000.
Herbert 1986, 295; Herwartz-Emden, 700.
Alba 1990, 220.
Mehrländer et al. 1996.
Alba et al. 1994, 228-232.
For Polish women, the percentage of mixed marriages was even smaller than for the men.
Brepohl 1948, 126; Waterkamp 1941, 59; Franke 1936, 94-95; Murphy 1982, 113-115; Hauschildt 1986, 270-271.
Murphy 1982, 141.
Stefanski 1984, 158-162.
Kulczycki 1994, 222.
Kulczycki 1997, 149-150.
Oenning 1991, 52.
See also Oltmers contribution in this volume.
Oenning 1991, 129.
In 1926, 122 children from Wanne Eickel visited Poland for several weeks: Peters-
Schildgen 1997, 214; See also Oenning 1991, 129.
Murphy 1982, 144-146.
Franke 1939, 25.
Amiraux 1996, 49.
Rath et al. 2001.
Berg (1990), 282 claims that until the 1930s, Polish women were often recognised
by their long dark skirts.
A term also used by the French historian Gérard Noiriel (1984) to describe the
industrialisation of northeast France in the second half of the 19th century, where
many Italians (and later on also Poles) settled.
Blecking 2003, 184; Berg 1990, 278.
Old and New Migrants in France: Italians and Algerians

Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard

Contrary to most European countries, France has had a history of near-constant immigration since the 19th century. Historians only began studying immigration much later, however, within a context of the violent rise of xenophobia of the 1980s, a period when one of the leitmotifs of public opinion was to compare the recent non-European and Muslim immigrants (for the most part Algerians and their children, quickly lumped together in a ‘Maghrebi’ ensemble), considered inassimilable, to the European immigrants of the past who had ‘easily’ been assimilated into the French nation. The challenge then for historians (and other social science researchers) was to combat conventional wisdom by emphasising the similarities between past and present. In his pioneering work Le Creuset français (The French Melting Pot), Gérard Noiriel put forward a cyclic model that became authoritative and that we can summarise thusly: Throughout the migration process, a period of great mobility precedes a period of stabilisation/integration. The stabilisation, imposed by an authoritarian halt to immigration, takes place in a context of economic and xenophobic crisis; the conditions for integration were therefore essentially painful, but this pain is finally forgotten at the end of the long process of social assimilation.²

The analysis put forward by Nancy Foner³ has therefore long been popular in France. By contrast, she notes that, faced with the persistent difficulties encountered by certain groups coming from immigration, the historian nowadays investigates the differences between old and new migrations. This is what we shall try to do by looking at the two emblematic cases: the Italians and the Algerians.

I The Italians

The lengthiest ‘old migration’

Mass migrations to France began during the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1881, there were more than a million foreigners. They came from neighbouring countries; these migrations were the prolongation of movements sometimes stretching back from before the
French Revolution. The Italians (until then, settled predominantly in the Southeast) became the largest immigrant group in the country from 1901 onwards. They would remain so until the 1968 census, when the Spanish replaced them. This is the largest and longest lasting past migration, and the one that has left the most descendants in the French population, all origins taken into account.  

We can distinguish three large periods in this long history, separated by the two world wars. The first, between the mid-19th century and 1914, is composed of successive ebbs and flows, with a larger number of migrants at each turn in the cycle (100,000 Italians were counted during the Second Empire; more than 400,000 just before the war). At this time, the situation of these immigrants is highly contrasted: Early on, there were many merchants (Léon Gambetta’s father was a merchant in Cahors) and farmers (in the South); others were included long-term migrants (girovaghi: travelling musicians, peddlers, or sellers of statuettes); but at the time the Third Republic in 1870, most were contadini (farm workers) turned proletarians. They experienced the same fate as almost all immigrants in France. They were then the poorest migrants, doing the hardest work. Employers appreciated them for their endurance and their docile nature. Workers saw them as dangerous and hated competitors, ‘scabs’ and, for the French common people, they were considered dirty, dangerous, knife-wielding enemies of the Republic. The era was violent and they fell victim to several pogroms. Two infamous episodes were the massacre of Aigues-Mortes (1893), where 30 Italians were lynched by the population which had joined the workers after a dispute related to work in the salt marshes; and in 1894, when the Italian shops in Lyons were ransacked following the assassination of President Sadi Carnot by the anarchist Caserio. After 1900, the Belle Époque attenuates these conflicts and many Italians were able to find their place as craftsmen, shopkeepers, or building tradesmen in an industrialised France where both the economy and society were slowly evolving.

The inter-war period is the most important of the three. Italian immigration in France increased by outflows that had previously focussed on settling in the central powers or the United States. Those leaving the North and Northwest of Italy had been the most numerous; now, migrants from the centre and Northeast were added. Those seeking work and antifascist refugees (often one and the same) were mixed into this considerable wave of immigration. In 1931, when there were some 3 million foreigners in France, the Italians numbered nearly one million. There were already many women prior to 1914, but the children were often raised in villages. During the inter-war period, a large number of families were reunited in France for an indeterminate period of time. Several events forced them to settle permanently in France:
greatly increased obstacles to emigration by fascist rule from 1927, the 1932 French law fixing quotas on foreign workers, and the 1927 law facilitating naturalisation in France. This meant a large number of children born in France or who arrived young made up a ‘second generation’ who destined to remain. What was the situation’s context? The Italians were certainly no longer the most despised immigrants. Unlike the Armenians or Jews, they were not considered to be ‘impossible to assimilate’. The context of the 1930s is nevertheless one of the worst in history. Hatred of foreigners flared up in the country along with the first symptoms of economic crisis (late 1931). Political concerns were added to the economic depression. On the domestic front, attacks involving foreigners multiplied (including numerous assassinations: Barthou and Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934, the Rosselli brothers in 1937, among others). Abroad, war threatened, with Fascism and Nazism shoulder to shoulder. Regarded as Mussolini’s henchmen or subversive communists, the Italians were ‘undesirable’ (the 1930s’ term for ‘undesirable foreigners’). Il Duce’s decision to declare war on France in June 1940 created a divide that would only close slowly during the first decade after 1945. Even long after the war, schoolchildren were still called ‘fascists’, ‘macaronis’, or ‘dirty ritals’.

However, towards the end of the 50s, this was all forgotten: the hostility of the 30s, the Italian origins of many young adults (who otherwise often mingled with the native-born population through marriage). The Italians had become transparent inside French society. There were not even any community groupings linked to the last wave of Italian immigration. Between 1945 and 1960, the Italians were still the most numerous immigrants (along with the Algerians). A final wave of integration then occurred which, though still little studied, leads us to believe that it did not encounter any large obstacles. These immigrants, including those who came from southern Italy or the islands who were rare until then, symbolised the entire history of emigration, benefiting in France from an image which helped them to move up within the working class, against the backdrop of the economic growth of the Trente Glorieuses.

**A valid model for all past migrations**

The case of the Italians was in no way unique among past migrations; on the contrary, it seems to be emblematic. Almost nothing was known about the history of the very first immigrations, of those involving Belgians, the Swiss, or Germans. On the other hand, the foreigners of the inter-war period have been the subject of many studies.

These studies have emphasised the extreme diversity of the communities: refugees from all over Europe as a result of 20 years of violence
and dictatorship (Russians, Armenians, Eastern European Jews, then Germans, Spaniards, etc.), workers hired by the Société générale d’immigration (Czechs and especially Poles, who rank second behind the Italians). All met with their own destinies, but all of them were preoccupied with maintaining strong ties with their homelands or their own cultures. Thus, the Armenians constituted territories where the community feeling was strengthened by the memory of the original catastrophe, the 1915 genocide. The Poles, proud of their nation’s recently regained independence and under surveillance by their State, were intent on making their children truly Polish. The Italians themselves, not terribly patriotic before 1914, were transformed by the challenges of the fight against Fascism or by Mussolini’s active propaganda. This was the sign of the times, communities of foreigners were highly visible and public opinion decried the ‘Paris of Babel’ where one hardly heard French spoken.

At the same time, the Little Polands, Little Italies, Little Armenias, etc., were territories where isolated emigrants could find a stable way of life and the assistance that no one in the host country offered them. Moreover, the Republic encouraged the community spirit because it guaranteed order and good insertion. Teachers and priests appointed by the Polish government were accepted in the emigrant colonies, while Russian associations were used as an intermediary with a population that appeared to be quite foreign.

The evolution of these populations followed the same steps that we have described for the Italians, from xenophobic aggression to transparency. On the one hand, Spanish exiles were held in detention camps, with the men separated from the women and children in other camps, and above all, the violent antisemitism that accompanied the arrival of German refugees, foreshadowing the Vichy regime’s policy of exclusion and collaboration in the Holocaust. On the other hand, for those who had survived those dark years and especially for their children, the differences and hostilities were erased: There was a dispersal of the closed communities, followed by a professional insertion that gained them a standing equivalent to that of the French, and mixed marriages. Neither trips to the mother country (whenever possible) nor culinary customs and religious practices contradicted this feeling of assimilation.

How can this integration into transparency be understood?

It was quite common to cite a ‘French integration model’, associating equality with a certain uniformity in public behaviour. The descendants of Italian immigrants across the globe claimed they experienced this when cousins from different countries were reunited in Italy: Accord-
ing to the ‘Italo-French’, the ‘Italo-English’ kept more ‘to themselves’ and were less integrated into English society. Without resorting to the fixed idea of a model, it was obvious that cultures and political traditions differed from one country to another, and modes of acculturation could be felt. France has experienced the joint effects of a highly centralised state, resulting from a long history, and the principles of the Third Republic: the egalitarian ideal which considers the French people to be a unique ensemble of citizens ‘without distinction between origin, or religion’; an idea of the secular that led to churches being denied any official power. The relationship of the individual to the State was direct and (theoretically) excluded any intervention by a community organisation in society.\textsuperscript{12} The egalitarian treatment of citizens has had two effects: As reserved for the French, it has maintained the legal exclusion of foreigners.\textsuperscript{13} For those who became French through naturalisation, it has offered a true opportunity for assimilation. At the same time, population needs led to citizenship being opened up (through property rights in 1889 and facilitated naturalisation in 1927). The relative openness of French society went in the same direction. On average, 20\% of the marriages within communities of foreigners have been mixed, depending on nationality and location.\textsuperscript{14}

However, the effectiveness of this structural framework cannot be understood without the existence of long-term sociological and political factors. A certain social proximity existed between the working classes of the host country and the new proletarians who were migrants on French soil. The integration of immigrants and the integration of the working class both followed parallel paths, often crossing each other. In terms of politics, the position of foreigners in the workers’ movement (the first strikes in Lorraine were initiated by Italians in 1905) and shared combat (in the antifascist movement and the Resistance) have been the subject of several studies.\textsuperscript{15} Protest was a powerful catalyst for integration, even if it only concerned a minority. During a few great moments of communion, such as the strikes of the Front Populaire in 1936, the effects of militant culture and working-class culture were linked. The latter was the real melting pot for integration. Interacting in the day-to-day at work or in the working-class districts, the feeling of a certain shared destiny, the similar importance placed on schooling (even though the children of foreigners still mainly sought apprenticeships): all helped to encourage transparency. In our view, this general movement succeeded in making the European immigrants of this period seem culturally closer to the French.\textsuperscript{16}

Lastly, an account must be made of the historical and economic dimensions of the results of integration during this large inter-war wave of immigration\textsuperscript{17}. The sociological forces already in play at the end of the 30s were undone somewhat by the economic crisis which for im-
migrants reminded them of the precariousness of their condition, of living between unemployment and the threat of deportation, and xenophobia which sometimes led immigrants to return to their origins, for example, the French youths of Italian origin who were ready to follow Il Duce. Then the war dramatically changed their outlooks. The terrible events, including the years of German occupation, led to a shared desire for liberation. A new era began with the end of the war. Sustained economic growth and the birth of a consumer society meant the full integration of workers of all origins. It was even easier to erase the label of foreignness because everyone preferred to forget the Vichy regime and what had led up to it. Foreigners and French people of foreign origin, after enduring so much, encouraged this amnesia. The egalitarian and centralised traditions now encountered the economic and ideological contexts ideal for their effectiveness.

II The Algerians

An immigration between colonisation and decolonisation

In proportion to the overall population, the wave of immigration of the Trente Glorieuses was comparable to that of the 1920s. In 1975, France had nearly 3.5 million foreigners (7% of the population). During this time, Europeans were still predominant (60%, with the Portuguese topping the list at 750,000). The biggest change occurred in the number of immigrants from the former colonial empire, most of all from Algeria (711,000).

Contrary to what is often believed, this immigration began quite early; before 1914, when the industries in Marseilles and the mines in northern France hired workers from Kabylie. After the forced recruitment during the First World War, a steady stream of immigrants became farm workers or manual labourers in the industrial suburbs. Legally, these immigrants were neither foreigners nor French citizens. They were ‘French subjects’ with a Muslim status and they were seldom naturalised. Furthermore, they were dependent on the State, which controlled them, but also on the Algerian colonists, who were unhappy to see workers leave because life in Metropolitan France might subvert them. Socially, they were kept isolated in all-male groups and in hotels where the old village hierarchies were re-established. Nevertheless, some of them succeeded in staying in France, in buying a café and some even ended up living with French women. In fact, Messali Hadj’s nationalist movement, Etoile Nord-Africaine, which was created in 1926, grew out of emigration.
Algerian emigration changed in magnitude after 1945. The poverty of a fast-growing population drove the men to seek work in urban France. This movement was facilitated by the opening of access to French citizenship in 1947. To avoid worries from the Office National d’Immigration (ONI), which controls the entry of foreign workers, employers often resorted to these ‘French Muslims from Algeria’ (FMA). When the Algerian War began in 1954, living conditions in the slums and shantytowns occupied by these workers began to worry those in power, who feared the growth of militant ghettos. A specific policy for housing and social services was instituted to administer them (a lot) and to help them (a little): construction of boarding houses for workers by the SONACOTRA (Société nationale de construction pour les travailleurs algériens), created in 1956; and social assistance through the Fonds d’action sociale (1958). Even if this policy was later extended to all immigrants, the Algerians continued to be a separate group of immigrants from a colonial point of view.18

This was first evidenced by the fact that they remained in the lowest levels of employment for a long time, despite acquiring more skills and despite an economy that was rather favourable for promotions. They remained permanently classified as manual labourers, or ‘O.S.’ (specialised labourers) in the automobile industry for their entire careers, as recent studies by Renault have demonstrated.19 This was to exact a heavy price during the economic crisis of the 1980s, which began with the laying off of the O.S. workers.

Next comes the question of racism. The racism that Algerians faced was distinct from that of the old French xenophobia. First of all, it comprises the view of the native from the era of colonisation. Oscillating between condescending paternalism and mistrust in the face of uncontrolled ‘savageness’, this viewpoint can only conceive of subjects who were too estranged from civilisation to have any claim to equality. During the inter-war period, the sidi (North African) was condemned as a ‘procurer’ and ‘cutthroat’. The war for independence, which fuelled resentment among the Algerians (torture, violent repression in Metropolitan France), pushed certain categories of French people toward hatred (policemen, repatriates from Algeria). Anti-Arab racism led to a return of lynching (ratonnades).20 Faced with the dramatic increase in murders, the Algerian government decided to suspend emigration in September 1973, just a few weeks before the first 1970s oil crisis.

The refusal to imagine a settlement immigration of Algerian origin was also an effect of colonial racism. As the baby boom brought back demographic growth, the topic of immigration had no doubt become outdated. Without saying it as explicitly as the Germans, the immigrant was considered as nothing more than a Gastarbeiter who intended to eventually return to his home country. But the public records
concerning the Algerians reveal the reticence of public officials to allow North African families to settle permanently in France, because they ‘may create difficulties with their French neighbours, given that their customs were so foreign to our civilisation’. The arrival of Portuguese immigrants (even illegal immigrants) was favoured as a counterbalance.

But political contradictions led to the increased numbers of immigrants from Algeria and other former colonies. With the Evian Accords maintaining free circulation, the immigration of Algerian families increased immensely beginning in 1962. At the same time, numerous others seeking work arrived from Africa (Morocco and Mali notably) and could not be denied privileged status. When the period of economic crisis began in 1974, these immigrants were almost exclusively men; with their families joining them later on. Among the Algerian families, the children had already grown up. Along with other immigrants from shantytowns, notably the Portuguese, they were progressively moved into public housing projects (HLMs) constructed during the Trente Glorieuses, which the French natives themselves had already begun to abandon.

The time of the ‘Beurs’

In 1974, worker immigration was halted. A new phase of stabilisation began against a backdrop of social crisis. As in the 1930s, this stabilisation accompanied renewed xenophobia, marked by the emergence of the Front National, a political party whose success was founded on its rejection of foreigners. It was no surprise that the Algerians were their main target. However, not only were the immigrants ‘who take jobs from the French’ at the heart of the turmoil, but so were their children. Social problems as a whole were focused on these young people. First of all, their poor results in school were linked to the failure of a system which was unable to adapt to a large scale. Unemployment became endemic in the housing projects where they lived and where tensions only continued to worsen. In the 1980s, a climate of violence set in (which was highly publicised) and the public was outraged, which led to violence against Maghrebi youths, who were the victims of several murders; and violence by young people, riots, and rodeos dans les cités.21

These young people were very quickly labelled: ‘young immigrants’ (whereas, for the most part, they were born in France), ‘second generation’, ‘Beurs’ (a verlan slang term inverting the word ‘Arab’). Those of Algerian origin were predominant, while the presence of Tunisians and Moroccans justifies the term ‘Maghrebi’ which erases nationality, thus making it possible to resort to global colonial references: They
could not be ‘assimilated’ because they were ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims.’ In 1986, the right wing returned to power and adopted one of the Front National’s ideas: modification of the law on citizenship whereby the right of the soil automatically confers the right of citizenship.22

These young Arabs were more visible because of their willingness to make demands, which was something new in the history of immigration. These demands first took the form of peaceful citizen protests, known as ‘March of the Beurs’ (1983, 1984, 1985). Using a very Republican sense of logic, a demand for equality was made, but a form of equality that would recognise cultural diversity. Marginalised by the worsening social and political situations, this movement gave way to much more radical and hostile demands, encouraged by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism around the world. At the end of 1989, the first ‘crisis of the headscarf’ took place (girls in high school demanding the right to wear the hijab in school). This crisis deliberately targeted the secular tradition of the country.

These kinds of protests have not abated since then – much to the contrary. Nor has the social crisis been alleviated. Many of the younger children seem even more disoriented than their elders, and their violent actions have taken on a more serious character (i.e., gang rapes, juvenile delinquency among the very young). Difficulties have also expanded to affect neighbouring groups who have increased in size through family immigration (regroupement familial): This includes Moroccans and Malians, but also Turks in certain regions (including Alsace).23

In 1993-94 a large nation-wide survey was conducted that affected a large portion of the population with foreign origins.24 The portrait of the processes of social insertion and acculturation was somewhat contradictory. Acculturation was undeniable among all of the communities (with the exception of the Turks, at that time the most recent arrivals). Indicators showed that things were progressing a rapid rate: use of written and spoken French (over 90% of the children arriving in France before the age of 16), abandonment of religion (notably among young Algerians, even if certain practices such as Ramadan were maintained), the pursuit of schooling (especially among Algerians). Mixed marriages reached a level of 50% for young people born in France, with important exceptions: Algerian girls and the entire Turkish and Malian immigrant populations. Indicators of social insertion revealed important differences among the various groups. Young people of Algerian origin were situated among both the best integrated and among those who had the most difficulties succeeding (in school or at work).

Today, such studies no longer receive any financing, perhaps for fear of their results. However, recent partial surveys show that discrimination against young people of North African or Sub-Saharan African ori-
gin has worsened in the areas of job opportunities, housing, and even access to certain activities (notably night clubs). Young graduates of Maghrebi origin suffer from a level of unemployment that can only be explained by their names or physical appearance. A sign of the times is that after the ‘integration policy’ of the 1980s, an ‘anti-discrimination policy’ has now been implemented.

A ‘cycle of difference’

Indeed, the question now asked is whether a population is being constructed which will suffer permanent discrimination. This would constitute another fact hitherto unseen in the history of immigration in France. Contrary to former migrations in which the children, half-way between their parents and the host society, played the role of ‘mediators’ for integration, the children of new migrations appear to perpetuate their parents’ difficulties instead of attenuating them. This phenomenon can be seen geographically. In the past, as immigrant populations grew transparent, their members no longer lived in the same neighbourhoods; this dispersion made the communities invisible (or transparent). Today, in survey after survey, we can see that segregation is growing worse. In the Ile-de-France, where in 1999 nearly 40% of the foreigners in the country lived (versus 22% in 1936 and 31% in 1968), the towns where the number of foreign households had increased the most by 1999 were the ones which already counted the most in 1990 (and vice versa). Ghettos were being formed, with serious consequences for education. These neighbourhoods of relegation were not true communities, but rather brought people together who share numerous social handicaps. Among them, foreign households were predominant, especially those from Africa. That these neighbourhoods were characterised by ethnicisation was a sign that social problems have come to be characterised by ethnicisation. This was one of the aspects of the ‘cycle of difference’, a term chosen by some researchers to signify a new phase in the history of integration in France.

The ‘Algerian model’ was not valid for everyone, however, and we could speak of targeted discrimination. Young people of Portuguese origin, globally less affected by unemployment than the North Africans during the economic crisis (but relying less upon schooling), enjoy better economic integration today, even if they often came from modest backgrounds. Recent research has shown that European immigrants (the Portuguese and the Spanish) have generally left the troubled public housing projects, seeking to become homeowners in a process of dispersal similar to that of the Italians earlier. Asians, though quite often living in urban areas marked by strong ethnic visibility, cham-
pion citizenship through naturalisation; integration through the school system was combined with maintaining their cultural traditions.

This cycle of difference has more positive aspects. The demands of young people of Algerian origin have introduced the possibility of a new form of equality that consists of recognising cultural differences as a mark of identity, on a par with the French national identity. This evolution corresponds to a general tendency that the new immigrations were not responsible for, although they have served as a catalyst. Since the 60s, a taste for individuality has developed in France, along with criticism of the national tradition of excessive centralisation. In 1981, just before the law on decentralisation was passed, legislation re-established the freedom of association for foreigners. A policy of subsidies encouraged expression among ‘cultures of foreign origin’, notably the ‘Beur’ culture which, through music, literature, and a very active cinema, plays a contemporary part in regenerating national culture. The children of other immigration groups have followed in these footsteps (young people of Portuguese origin claim their ‘Luso-descendant’ identities). Those descended from old immigration groups got in touch with their roots; some with Italian grandparents, for instance, have applied for Italian citizenship. In the eyes of many, the European Union has helped to redefine the framework of integration and has encouraged cultural diversity.

However, it must not be forgotten that proclaiming one’s cultural heritage can be a political act, especially for young people of Algerian origin, who symbolically continue to fight against the former colonial power through this process. Their revolt against social exclusion was expressed in the growth of radical forms of Islam. As the sociologist Michel Wieviorka has suggested, claiming one’s cultural heritage can be read as a substitute for the class struggle as the mode for expressing one’s social demands. The image of Islam in the world today as a powerful means of protest makes it all the more successful among young people who suffer discrimination.

Although during the first mass integration, French society was finally able to absorb the diverse groups that had come to join it, it would appear that the opposite process has been set in motion by the offspring of Algerian immigration. By refusing to submit to the immigrant status that their parents had accepted, they were pushing for a redefinition of the national contract. Greatly shaken, French society has oscillated between passionate debates and attempts to adapt. The officially designated objective of finding a compromise between maintaining the egalitarian and unitary traditions and accepting diversity is not always visible.
III Two Different Immigrations, Two Different Eras

Of these two processes, many similarities can be noted. The Italians and the Algerians both experienced similar difficulties in their own ways: A situation of inferiority which leads to multiple handicaps in the host country, a process of integration which includes a struggle to find a place in a xenophobic society. Insofar as we were able to advance a conclusion, the results remain inconclusive because the future has as yet not been decided, the differences, however, merit a closer look. As we have seen, these differences result in part from the heritage of colonialism, but also in part because the context of integration has changed.

The weight of colonialism

The Algerian situation was a casebook study of the specific difficulties encountered with immigrants originating from the former colonies. It was also an exceptional case. Divided into départements, the only settlement colony, Algeria held a unique place in the French Empire: it was an extension of Metropolitan France. Its mode of administration was largely affected by the demands of the French colonists; these demands aggravated the processes of domination of the Muslim population. The local populations developed a lasting mistrust of France and transformed it into open hostility with the war for independence. Moreover, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) demanded that Algerian immigrants in France return to Islam to demonstrate their attachment to their homeland (and to refuse the non-religious influences of the coloniser). From within Metropolitan France we have seen how this immigration was different from all of the others and how the colonial heritage still affects French hostility towards Arabs and Muslims (unconsciously confused with Algerians). In the same way, the colonial heritage weighs on the hostility of young French people of Algerian origin who consider themselves robbed of the social status they believe they were entitled to in a society which bears a great debt towards their people.34

Colonisation opened the way to the massive post-war immigration period. Furthermore, the case of the former French Empire was similar to that of several other European countries, including the United Kingdom. French colonial history has resulted in discrimination problems that have less to do with colour (what Leo Lucassen calls the ‘colour path’ for those from the West Indies living in Great Britain) than with religion (might we speak of a ‘Muslim path’?).35 Thus, it can be understood that those coming from the former protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, where the effects of colonisation were of less consequence, or
that of the Turks, who were never colonised by France, all find themselves caught in an ‘Algerian model’. For the Malians, the problem of religion was less political and more family-oriented (polygamy, very large families), but patterns of segregation were nonetheless present.

This colonial link is currently shifting from a category of explanation to a new form of protest. Young French Muslims recently proclaimed themselves ‘Indigènes de la République’, thereby emphasising the past colonisation as the reason for today’s discrimination. At the same time, a colour movement is also on the rise: some residents of African origin have tried to form a black community around the memory of slavery.

Transformations in the host society

The weight of the colonial heritage accounts for the existence of precarious groups in present-day French society. Beyond that, the comparison between Italian and Algerian immigrants brings to light a more global historical evolution. For the Italians, the working world has been insisted upon as the setting for their integration. To the immigrants of that era, the dominant working class environment offered a culture and a goal of integration that was easily attained.\textsuperscript{36} No matter their origin, the industrial society offered all children from the working classes the same means for social mobility; factory work or the crafts industry were central for the boys, while girls became seamstresses or secretaries.

The French working world of the Trente Glorieuses is far removed from that of the Front Populaire. The spirit of struggle is no doubt the same, but the distance between it and recent immigrants is wider. Here again, housing has symbolic value, with a much more radical segregation than in the past. While the working classes move by and large into new public housing projects and adopt a ‘middle class’ lifestyle, immigrants (especially the Algerians and the Portuguese) find themselves at best in boarding homes, at worst in slums. They remain the instruments of production that needs them as cheap and temporary manpower. The question is whether economic growth, had it been sustained, would have allowed these differences to be progressively reduced, as it was then imagined, by enabling immigrant families to benefit from public housing.

The period of crisis which has followed has prevented us from knowing the answer, because, above all, this crisis has sounded the death knell of classic working class society which, deprived of any outlook, can no longer serve as the setting for integration. The racist Front National has progressively become the top workers’ party in France. Industrial jobs no longer constitute a means of economic integration for the children of migrants and, in the new service society, they were of-
ten rejected in favour of new immigrants in jobs requiring unskilled labourers. As a sign of this evolution, the towns of the former banlieue rouge (‘red suburbs’) surrounding Paris, formerly a privileged setting for the integration of French and foreign workers, have these days become the ones that face the worst difficulties (the Seine Saint-Denis district).

We have remarked that this evolution has not led to the same difficulties for everyone. A university education and high-level diplomas have become much more widely available for the children of immigrants than in the past. The success of girls is clearly visible, and this is a sign of hope for the future of groups suffering from discrimination. In an increasingly mobile world, being of foreign origin can be an opportunity (entrepreneurs without borders, like those from the Chinese Diaspora). In the context of the European Union, bilingualism and biculturalism were regarded as advantages by many descendants of European immigration. But the differences that have been carved out between groups demonstrate that the overall capacity for integration is diminished in a more competitive, more demanding society.

The role of the economy

If the economic and social context has been deeply altered, the difference in the economic situation at the end of these two immigrations also explains the different destiny of the second generation: thirty years of economic growth on one side, thirty years of economic crisis on the other. The War and the Vichy regime coming on the heels of the 30s constituted the first collective catastrophe in the history of integration in France, and this should not be forgotten if we are to put current problems into perspective. However, the period that has followed demonstrates to what degree economic prosperity and an overall improvement in living conditions had a beneficial effect on social integration, which is the basis for cohesion in a society. The Italians were hated after 1944 and were still quite impoverished. Some of their children entered the world of petty delinquency and small gangs. But all this was soon forgotten: a decade later, the ritals were only spoken of with sympathy and the young people, now married, had jobs allowing them a more stable lifestyle.37

The context of integration for young people of Algerian origin was one of massive unemployment, dilapidated living conditions, and growing segregation in the schools. Their fathers, already experiencing difficulties during the period of growth, lost their only recognised identity in France, that of the worker. And the sons thus experience a comparable level of unemployment, firstly because in France, young people were the first to fall victim to unemployment, secondly because they
suffer from discrimination due to their Maghrebi origins, even when economic growth makes a timid comeback. Consequently, their social and psychological structures were quite different from those of the young Italians living during the Trente Glorieuses.

It has been obvious that many aspects of this evolution were not unique to France. On several points, our analysis echoes the findings of Nancy Foner in her book on the role of the post-war boom which saw Jewish and Italian descendants permanent settling down in American society, and on the inequality of the contemporary integration processes, much more favourable than in the past for some, but leading to a greater level of marginalisation and exclusion for others. Western societies have been progressively converging and many of the problems concerning the position of recent immigrants have been common to all of the Western European countries, from the persistence of specific forms of discrimination to the management of the question of Islamic fundamentalism. We have attempted to demonstrate here how a different history has explained certain specific cases in France. On the one hand, a long tradition of immigration and social and cultural assimilation, the different crises of xenophobia notwithstanding, which did not challenge the myth of the unitary nation. On the other hand, the history of France as a colonial power, filled with successive contradictions – between a universalist discourse and differentialist practices, between a bloody period of decolonisation and the maintaining of specific relations with the formerly dependent populations. Managing the ‘diversity’ in integration, a key element of current immigration, is only much more problematic. Beyond that, the challenges have been the same for all of the countries that receive sizeable numbers of immigrants who are caught between socio-economic imperatives and North-South relations.38

Notes

1 Translated by Christopher Mobley, with the support of the CHS XXe siècle.
2 Noirel 1988, notably chapter 5.
3 Foner 2000.
4 According to calculations over three generations by demographer Michèle Tribalat, the Italians rank first (19%), far ahead of the Algerians, who rank second (11.7%), Tribalat 2004.
5 For an historiographic summary of Italian immigration, see Milza 1993.
6 Beginning in the 1920s, and following the American model, foreigners were often classified according to whether they were more or less able to be assimilated. Geographer Georges Mauco played an important role in this. Cf. Weil 1991, appendices.
7 Schor 1985.
In 1938, the Daladier Decrees greatly increased the political causes for discrimination and the creation of detention camps for foreigners. By the end of the Pétain regime, 76,000 Jews will have been sent to concentration camps from France; 50,000 of whom were foreigners, and 16,000 were naturalised or the children of foreigners.

The differences were remarkable between the Italians, who were champions of mixed marriages, and the Polish, and, among these groups, between the industrial communities of the North, which were very endogamous and the farm workers who were more inclined towards intermarriage. Cf. Girard and Stoetzel, 1953.

We must emphasise the considerable distance separating the illiterate Polish farm worker from the French industrial worker. Without speaking or writing the language, nothing in the customs of Armenian Christians or Russian Orthodox Christians helped them in French society, despite its Christian origins. And Italian or Polish religious beliefs were a factor that led to some exclusion or mockery among the secular or even anticlerical French.

After a broad debate, the law passed in 1993 did not revoke the right of the soil, but rather required a voluntary request from the age of 16. The right of the soil was made automatic again in 1998.

Among the numerous studies, see: Frickey and Primon 2002 and Rebzani 2002.

This freedom of association had been rescinded in 1939 (decree of 12 April) because associations of foreigners were then seen as a potential threat. For the following forty years, such associations needed the authorisation of the Ministère de l’Intérieur.

Italy now allows (or even encourages) this for those who have at least one Italian parent. Double nationality is authorised in France.

Thus the law on ‘l’interdiction ‘des signes religieux ostensibles’ à l’école: une commission préparatoire’ (‘Stasi Commission’) proposed the inclusion of new public holidays...
(Yom Kippur, the Eid), which would have implied redefining the country’s culture. The Government retained only the ban on the headscarf, which is seen as discriminatory by many Muslims (whereas many women see the law as a form of protection).

34 From this point of view, the extreme case is that of the Harkis (Algerians who fought on the French side). Those who were abandoned against their will in Algeria when the French retreated, and who suffered consequences which can be easily imagined, were sent to camps in France, with French citizenship being the only recognition they received. Their children live in an isolation that was even more severe than that of other Franco-Algerians. The first March of the Beurs was led by the son of a Harki. For the heritage of the Algerian War in the collective memory, see Stora 1999.

35 The French of West Indian origin experience less discrimination than the Muslims. As they come from older colonies (conquered before the French Revolution), they have long been citizens with parliamentary representatives. Upon immigrating to France after 1945, they were able to accept reserved jobs in the civil service or other assimilated public services (such as hospitals), without there being any racist backlash. Nevertheless, the West Indians today live in HLM housing projects and their children face difficulties similar to those of other young blacks.

36 For integration in the rural milieu, see Laure Teulière’s chapter in this volume.


38 With an additional distinction. Among the European nations, France has the largest number of both Jews and Muslims.
Rural Dimensions at Stake: 
The Case of Italian Immigrants in Southwestern France

Laure Teulières

Italian immigration to southwest France, which started in the early 1920s, presents a particular modality of migrants’ integration, as the settlement of Italian newcomers had a major impact on the countryside and on local communities. The aim of this paper is to underline the specific characteristics of this massive immigration, especially its rural dimension, and to think through the implications of this specific case for our general insights into the integration process.

The general image of this Italian migration has long been that of a successful and swift assimilation, that is the complete disappearance of the migrant group into French society. It is commonly assumed that the Italians became integrated without any tensions. Interpreting the settlement process of these Italians as a ‘miracle’ of integration, however, ignores the many difficulties and conflicts, especially during the first decades of their stay. These representations overshadow the harshness of the migrants’ working and living conditions, while, on the other hand, individual success stories have been glorified. In a way such a reading of the past can be seen as the price migrants have to pay for their integration; the price one has to pay in order to lose one’s status as a foreigner. Thus, it is a manner of imposing invisibility, of tolerating nothing but accepted differences.

To better understand the relations between the Italians and the indigenous French population in the South West, it is necessary to assess the reactions of public opinion at the time. Hence, the presentation will emphasise a plural approach combining an analysis of both the sociological dimension and the social discourse it generated. To do so, it is also essential to take into account the various systems of representation at work in southern French society.

Unlike other parts of France, like the East and the Paris region, until the beginning of the 1920s, there were very few Italians in southwestern France. They represented in general less than 5% of the foreigners established in the different districts (départements) in a region where Spanish migrants were traditionally very numerous. The 1921 population census notes only 2,557 Italians in the territory of the cur-
rent Midi-Pyrénées and Aquitaine regions, of which about 800 were located in the Gironde département. Some of those Italians were stall holders, some specialised in transalpine products, as for example little handmade statuettes. Many others were small craftsmen, such as chair makers, or employed as industrial workers, builders, or woodcutters. At the time most of them were seasonal migrants, who returned to their native country after a while. They used to move from place to place in order to find work, and were perceived as nomads. They were practically absent in agriculture, except in viticulture in the areas of Languedoc, the Mediterranean coast, or, to the west, in the Bordeaux region. In short, Italian migrants were scattered, represented a small population, were atypical, and practically invisible.

Things started to change in the early 1920s, when a significant migratory influx reached the Southwest region. Within a few years, between 1923 and 1926, approximately 40,000 Italians immigrated to the area. Men and women, adults and children, entire families. Generally speaking, men came first, found a place and then called for their wives, children, and eventually other relatives like brothers, sisters, or cousins. This massive and sudden movement was caused by the great shortage of manpower in the countryside, which for a long time had been dependent upon seasonal migrant labour. However, after the First World War and the dramatic demographic losses, the regional labour market reached an acute crisis. Farmers and property owners who were desperately looking for workers, called in the help of French recruitment agencies.

The legal procedures permitted the introduction of migrants into France as paid workers or as farmers leasing a piece of land. For the single year of 1924, the Italian State published an official statistic of 4,300 agricultural workers placed in the southwest of France, of whom 2,500 were métayers, that is to say farmers paying rent proportionally to the harvest and partially or even entirely in kind. A large minority of the newcomers established themselves as landowners from the very start of the settlement. Consequently, some of them contributed to encourage the migratory movement itself because they recruited fellow countrymen to immigrate as farm workers for their newly owned properties.

In that sense, the migratory movement produced its own internal dynamic, as Italians called for relatives, friends or even close relations from their village or region of origin. There are striking cases of numerous immigrants from the same transalpine village who settled in the same locality in France. In 1925, for instance, 184 Italians from the village of Medea (Friuli province) went to the French village of Castelculier (Lot-et-Garonne département). These chain-migration networks, which depended on local bonds, played an important role. They caused
an autonomous recruitment, actually a sort of ‘co-option’ between migrants, determined by personal ties. Nearly all of the immigrants came from the northern part of Italy, principally the provinces of Venice and Piedmont, but also Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria. Almost no one came from the south, or the rest of the country in general.

After that first boom, characterised by a contemporary as ‘the rush to Gascony’, the rate of immigration changed. The influx was reduced by Mussolini after 1926. With the aim of preventing emigration, the Fascist government’s policy reinforced its control over migrants and decreased the number of departures by enacting many legal obstacles such as new requirements concerning placement and housing, restrictions on family reunification, especially for adolescent sons, tightening of the rules for passports, etc. Moreover, it created a ‘General Department of Italians Abroad’ (1927), under the authority of the Foreign State Department, in charge of supervising all aspects of emigration and expatriates. According to the Fascist regime, this was the ‘motherland’s tutelage’, the project of holding sway over migrants and of establishing nationalist control.

However, the movement continued until the eve of Second World War in various ways. Of course, clandestine immigration played a certain role. Italians illegally crossed the border in the Alps or along the coast, others entered France with a tourist visa, in order to visit, or to undertake the Lourdes’ pilgrimage, and never returned. Another way consisted of taking legal migratory detours via other French regions to the Southwest. Some Italian iron workers, for instance, deserted their tough jobs in Lorraine and reached the southern countryside to enter the agricultural sector. At that time, in the neighbourhood of Toulouse, Auch, Albi, Montauban or Agen, it was quite easy for clandestine migrants to get their situation sorted out by the authorities because of the lack of workers in the region. As soon as they had found a place, they asked for an identity card as ‘farm worker’ and generally succeeded in obtaining it.

According to the census of 1936, more than 80,000 Italians had settled in the area. Nevertheless, that later influx remained underestimated by French people at the time. The first arrivals, during the mid-20s, had marked a milestone. The continuation of the phenomenon, somewhat fluid and diffuse, went more or less unnoticed. At the end of the 1930s, Mussolini tried to persuade the emigrants to return to Italy, using propaganda and promising various kinds of aid and help. Even if the statistics are not precise, that policy was largely a failure, especially in southwestern France, where many of them, involved in the agricultural world, were already firmly settled.
After the Second World War, Italian immigration again resumed in France as a whole. The influx became sizeable again in the southwest in particular during the years 1946-1948, then declined during the following decade and finally dried up in the early 1960s. Those newcomers remained largely confined to the agricultural sector. Moreover, it is necessary to point out that most of them were chain migrants, attracted for a significant part by previously settled Italians, who called for their family, relatives, or other workers from their native country. In 1954, the census mentioned 78,340 Italians in the Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées regions. At that time, naturalisations were already increasing, which has to be taken into account to arrive at an accurate picture of the demographic balance.

What then were the important factors involved in this rural-rural path of integration? It seems, first of all, that the original conditions of the movement are decisive. After the Great War, France’s southwest region had been depopulated. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, many areas had lost a considerable part of their inhabitants, about a third in only seventy years for départements such as Gers, Tarn-et-Garonne, and Lot-et-Garonne, and even more in some of the remotest rural sub-districts (cantons). Such a depopulation was therefore a long-lasting phenomenon. It was caused mainly by spontaneous birth control, notably on the part of peasant families, reluctant to divide their possessions by right of inheritance since the French Revolution had suppressed birthrights. The slaughter of the Great War had reinforced and accelerated this demographic trend. With about 1,467,000 people killed in France, the rural people were the majority of the victims. Finally, from 1911 up to 1921, the whole southwestern region lost some 235,000 inhabitants.

The Garonne’s basin was the epicentre in this process of deserting the countryside. The Italian rural settlement superposed on it closely, with the same heart formed by the districts of Haute-Garonne, Gers, Tarn-et-Garonne and Lot-et-Garonne, and similar fringes in direction of Lauragais (to the east), Quercy and Rouergue (to the north), Gironde and Périgord (to the west) and Pyrénées’ Piedmont (to the south).

Over the previous decades, French society as a whole, and its southwestern region in particular, had seemed to be haunted by the fear of depopulation and Malthusianism. The views of commentators, journalists, officials, notables, etc. were more or less similar on that point. They all made a tragedy out of the demographic problem, perceived as a dreadful danger, a warning sign of a sort of collective death. The prevailing attitude consisted in predicting a silent but nonetheless inevitable disaster, metaphorically dramatising its consequences: the southwest was becoming ‘the dying land’, ‘the old people’s country’, with ‘empty cradle homes’, etc. The falling birth rate was commonly called
'another Verdun', i.e., another huge demographic loss equivalent in scope to the most memorable battle in 1916. Moreover, it signalled another kind of defeat in relation to Germany which was, on the contrary, a high birth rate country. The demographic issue thus involved the feeling of decadence and thoughts about national decline. According to that representation, southern France was gradually decaying.

Within this context, the countryside was indeed passing through a crisis, because there was a shortage of workers to farm the Garonne valley’s land. The soil was under-utilised, neglected, with many fields lying fallow. In the Gers district alone, 2,500 farms were vacant in 1922. The drift from the land towards the cities was considered a disaster. The rural exodus represented an important theme for the press and various commentators. It did not only play an economic role but it also dealt with self-representation and symbolic foundations, which form the very keystones of French and regional identities. With the passage of time, one might today consider this evolution a long-term sociological alteration. But back then, it was perceived as the agony of civilisation itself. Regarding society as a whole, its rural nature was thought of as a guarantee against anomie and corruption, as if the virtuous countryside constituted a form of protection against the urban world, often depicted as a ‘new Babylon’, cosmopolitan, uprooted, and soulless.

Italian immigration was thus perceived according to these views. The prevailing representations were allowed to appreciate its qualities and to integrate its contribution in more ways than one. Meanwhile, the situation was quite different in southeastern France where Italians, traditionally very numerous, were commonly called babis, a disparaging term, or, in Occitan language, manja macaroni (macaroni-eater). The hostility was reinforced in the cities, particularly along the Mediterranean coast, where people feared a so-called ‘Italian peril’, i.e., unfair competition, criminality, indeed, even debauchery. In brief, in the southwest, Italian immigration was thought to be a remedy for depopulation and the crisis in agriculture. It was considered as a factor of revival, and hence frequently likened to a ‘demographical grafting’ or a ‘blood transfusion’ by the commentators of the time.

The attitude of the French elites and professional world is another key factor. Emigration was advocated by local agricultural unions, officials and even the regional political party leaders of a broad ideological spectrum from the conservatives to the republicans and radical socialists. The local elites themselves were mostly landlords and their own prosperity depended on farming. As a result, they promoted a repopulating policy in the countryside. According to the needs of the time, Spanish immigrants were not efficient enough and were to a certain extent resented. Often seasonal, and nomadic, they crossed the border.
with their own social strategy, such as giving up farming as soon as possible to move to the cities. Most of them preferred urban jobs and were consequently considered as unreliable. In the context of under-populated regions, with a predominance of mixed farming and sharecropping, passing migrants were no longer useful. Landlords and employers in agriculture were looking for people who wished to settle permanently, in other words for a new type of immigration.

It is important to underline the numerous failed attempts to settle rural migrants in that area. After the Great War, many local authorities, administrations and private offices tried to introduce farm workers from Spain or Portugal, Polish cowherds, Ukrainian shepherds, farmhands from Bohemia, and even French families from Brittany, Vendée or Savoy. The results, however, proved inadequate and sometimes pitiful. With the Italians, on the contrary, a migratory phenomenon of an increasing scale emerged. The local institutions welcomed their immigration and even intended to provide facilities, such as refunding the cost of the preliminary travel of the immigrants, promoting the transalpine labour force, encouraging the French to appeal to it and editing bilingual textbooks for everyday situation. Their views about the benefit of Italian immigration for the region’s development were widely circulated and rapidly prevailed.

Migratory projects on both sides were closely connected. On the one hand, the need for permanent migrants, on the other convergent personal emigration strategies. A considerable number of Italians came with the intention of remaining for good. Moreover, the migratory pressures were inter-linked. The emigrants left Italy as an effect of overpopulation and economic poverty and also as a consequence of political persecution by the Fascists. In the 1920’s, France represented an attractive choice for those who wanted to settle in rural areas. Central Europe – Germany as well as the former Austro-Hungarian Empire – had been turned upside down, Argentina was undergoing a crisis and entering the United States was becoming more and more difficult because of the quota policy. Thus, the French Midi became available at the right time as an alternative to previous destinations: an ideal area where it was possible to settle easily, where one could succeed in clearing a rural path, where it was still possible to rise up the social ladder via farming. For those Venetian or Piedmontese peasants, emigrating permitted them to continue the same work, without proletarianisation, without even being obliged to break with their rural ways of life.

Whereas most of the migrants came to rent agricultural property, a minority also managed to buy it after having sold their holdings in Italy. A survey of 1927 offers us more precise information. Of the Italians working in agriculture in the regions of Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées, 4,830 were landowners (22%), 12,152 were tenants (56%) and
4,756 were paid workers (22%). All of the Italian peasants had a strong desire to be the sole owners of a piece of land with a farm. That was nearly impossible for many of them back in Italy because of various factors such as overpopulation, no land available to purchase or prices were too high in certain territories, especially in the Po plain. Considering the peasant population of Piedmont, an Italian anthropologist has rightly mentioned its ‘hunger for land’.14 To hold on to a small holding appeared to be the main objective of most of the emigrants.

The acquisition of land by foreigners was sometimes resented in France at the national level. At the beginning of the movement, during the mid-1920s, this polemical theme was introduced in the Parisian press, with front pages headlines like the ‘Italian invasion in the French Midi’ or the ‘scandalous conquest of the soil by foreigners’.15 In the southwestern region, however, it was perceived as extremely positive. Moreover, it contributed to the positive image of Italian immigrants. Insofar as it was considered as a repopulating movement, it had to be durable, even permanent. According to the prevailing opinion on immigration, buying land was considered as an important sign of integration. To be in close contact with the soil (la terre) seemed to be a sort of pre-condition for the settling of foreigners, and rootedness formed a crucial element. Collective representations extolled the virtues of the land and an idealised rural society Becoming rooted in French soil, especially among those in the countryside, was perceived as the final proof of assimilation.

This background reveals that Italians were initially welcomed. At first, demographic preoccupation coupled with a general agreement on the benefits of an increased labour force eased the acceptance of this immigration. Indeed, the employment of the migrant population offered real advantages. The contracts they accepted at the beginning for the renting of land favoured the landlords. The working conditions were severe, with many obligations and additional fees. If one considers the neglected state the fields were in, the migrants’ efforts restored the soil fertility at very low costs. Within an archaic agricultural system, many men were needed to do the harvesting or to lead the yoke of oxen while ploughing. That is why French requests for immigration often specified tenant farmer families with ‘at least two [or more] men’. It is also the reason why the large Italian families were immediately appreciated by landowners: many people to work, many arms to maintain the farms and, in many cases, to clear them at the beginning.

The Italians’ social strategy were generally based – before and after emigration – on familial solidarity; the work of every member contributing to the prosperity of the group. Furthermore, family structures were often based on communitarian solidarity. While for the French peasants the estate was destined for the eldest boy, many Italian farms
were run by several brothers, as is revealed by the oral testimonies of migrants or descendants.\textsuperscript{16} The role of children working in domestic agriculture also has to be taken into account. Since 1936, foreign children were theoretically obliged to attend school until 14 years of age. Many of them, however, ended up working on the farms as well. In the case of share croppers, children contributed to help increase revenues from the property and consequently benefited the landlord.

Without any negative impact on the labour market, Italian immigration also had unexpected outcomes on the real estate market. Land had been depreciating in value for a long time. The sudden demand for land by the immigrants boosted prices, which peaked during the mid-1920s and some French landowners made good profits. The Italians were therefore easily integrated into the rural economic system. Without resolving the rural crisis, they at least contributed in many ways to improve the rural and agricultural decline and soften its socio-economic problems.

The case of other economic sectors makes it clear what was at stake in this rural path of integration. The economic crisis of the 1930s confirms that the peculiar representation of Italian immigration was not due to their (alleged) national characteristics, but was dependent more on the specific configuration of the local labour market. Between the crisis of 1929 until the Second World War, unemployment in the building industry had caused many tensions between French and immigrant workers. The increasing numbers of foreign workers and entrepreneurs in the building trade provoked a lot of protest movements in a xenophobic atmosphere, notably on the reconstruction sites after the great Tarn River flood in 1930, on major civil engineering sites, in the aeronautics industry in Toulouse, and the hydroelectric dam in the Pyrenees.\textsuperscript{17} In the framework of those times, Italians were targeted as were others foreigners.

The geographical framework is important as well. In this case, one could argue that the scattered pattern of settlement was another key factor. In the plains and the hills of the Garonne River area, farms were spread throughout the countryside. The majority of Italian migrants had settled outside the villages on isolated estates. They were not concentrated and thus were not very visible as a group, even if their numbers were large. As a result, there was never any ‘little Italy’, i.e., ethnic neighbourhood, neither in the small towns nor in the villages. Italian families did not live close to one another, which made the emergence of ethnic group formation unlikely. Such was the general situation, apart from very rare cases, as for example the concentration of Italian property in Blanquefort, in the Gers.\textsuperscript{18} In that very peculiar case, the Italian founders built a complete community life, with Catholic Church supervision.
Finally, the shared rural values above all stimulated the shaping of a favourable image among local French people. Even if the divergent perception of some cultural practices gave rise to feelings of otherness – for instance the question of food and domestic eating habits – it often revealed how much they had in common. In the words of the geographer Dominique Saint-Jean: ‘the similarities between two peasant cultures have probably contributed to reinforce the reassuring image of the “cousins from Italy”’. The shared background of peasant culture and know-how and the way professional relations were conducted, created a common ground between the Italian immigrants and the local French population.

One could also suggest the possibility that the regional dialect – Occitan – has played a role in the relatively smooth integration. Insofar as it is a Latin language, closer to ancient Latin than French, it sounded more familiar to the newcomers, making communication in the early stages easier. In the southern French countryside, it was the language of work, of trade talks at the local rural fairs and in many cases, more or less until the 1940s, the most useful way to communicate with one’s neighbours. How such a movement was perceived was connected, among other things, to the collective representations with regard to regionalism and Occitan identity. It is remarkable that the arrival of the migrants was framed in sympathetic and familiar terms, as if this was the only way for the indigenous population to come to terms with the immigration. The republican elite, in regional press articles, and those by key public figures, the original migratory influx was put into a historical context in which the past and present were linked by a chain of historical precedents.

The event was related to more ancient movements and it was emphasised that there had been periods in the past in which similar developments had taken place. Writers in the 1920s who were particularly keen on classical culture, accounted for the deep historical roots of Gascony’s and Italy’s bonds by recalling the Roman age and the common civilisation it had bred. However, they had also rediscovered all the Italian figures who had migrated to the area during the Renaissance including priests, artists, tradesmen, and bandits. These characters were used as an example of the geographic mobility of the ancestors of the contemporary Italian migrants. It was assumed that their ancestors had composed some kind of Latin-Occitan region pantheon, making the 20th-century immigrants the heirs of a fantasised tradition of exchanges, bound by a symbolic ancestry.

The national educational system played a crucial role in socialising and acculturating migrants by denying the expression of any specific ethnic culture. Even in the remote villages, the school integrated foreign children into a common French culture and language. But this
is only true in a very general sense. Despite the high attendance rate at primary schools, very few Italians went on to secondary schools before the 1960s. Moreover, following familial traditions, endogamy continued to prevail largely during the 1920s, especially as the Italian consulates frequently refused to deliver legal documents for those nationalists who wanted to marry a French person. Mixed marriages were rejected by most migrants so that many men went back to their native country to find a spouse. In the 1930s, however, intermarriages increased. This is well illustrated by the case of the La Rèole district, where the rate of endogamy dramatically fell from 56% during the period 1931-1940 to 19% in the years 1941-1949; while it declined in the countryside from 75% (1931-1940) to 47% (1941-1949). Consequently, the high Italian fertility rate quickly adapted to the French average. The change of nationality is another indicator of the integration process of migrants. For the Italians, the number of naturalisations increased slowly during the 1930s, while it rose quickly after the Second World War, favoured by a new context and the long-term settlement of migrants. In 1950, for instance, in the Lot-et-Garonne district, 31% of the Italians applied for French citizenship.

Finally, it should be stressed that integration is not a linear process, because of the repercussions of the Second World War. Whatever the level of social integration, according to standard indicators, the assessment can be radically modified when the political context changes. The Second World War gave rise to deep tensions and conflicting passions, even in the case of a relatively peaceful rural settlement. International developments, the consequences of the Italian declaration of war against France and the new tensions resulting from the German occupation transformed the image of Italians in the public opinion and strained relations between French and Italians.

One must notice that the climate became more tense during the late 1930s, when Mussolini reaffirmed his nationalist diplomacy, which was particularly aggressive towards France. When, in November 1938, the Fascist regime once again allowed free expression for its territories – Corsica, Tunisia, Djibouti, and even Nice and Savoy – it provoked a very contentious situation between the two States. Moreover, Italy entered into an alliance with National Socialist Germany, resulting in the German-Italian treaty of May 1939. Even if the French press had been very careful not to blame the migrants for the policy of their native country, public opinion towards Italians gradually deteriorated. In the emerging xenophobic atmosphere, foreigners in general were more and more perceived as ‘undesirable’, which affected the relationships between the indigenous population and the Italians. This is illustrated by several trivial events, which took place not only in cities. French people became more and more suspicious, and it did not take much for in-
cidents with Italians, who were perceived as being provocative anyway, to escalate.

Nazi Germany’s attack of Poland in September 1939, led to France’s official entry into the war. In that stage of the conflict, Italy was still neutral and as a result, its citizens had no particular obligations. Nevertheles, many Italians tried to spontaneously enlist in the French army, including anti-Fascist refugees as well as young immigrants. But such loyalist fervour was not encouraged by the French government, which did not want to provoke Italy. In the mean time, French men were being mobilised. In the countryside, this meant leaving their farms, whereas their Italian neighbours remained behind. This situation provoked immediate hostility towards migrants. Many were indignant that Italians maintained control of the soil and evaded the ‘blood tax’, an expression that illustrates what was at stake. Not simply a xenophobic outbreak, but a crisis in the integration process itself. In spite of being firmly rooted, Italian people appeared more ‘alien’ than they had fifteen years earlier, when they were still newcomers. Because of the deteriorating international political climate they were suddenly perceived as different, on their own, and isolated within a foreign community.

It became even worse after the 10th of June 1940 when Mussolini declared war on France at the very moment of its military debacle, defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany. Mussolini’s decision to attack France aroused an angry outburst and was seen as a major act of treachery, reviving the representation of Italians as deceitful and cowardly people. Some demonstrations, as in Toulouse or Marmande, illustrated this ‘explosion of hatred, from the main cities to the depth of the country’. Because of this ‘stab in the back’ – as the event became known by the French – Italians became the enemy, and continued to be for a long time, even after the rapidly signed armistice between the two countries. The resentment against Italian immigrants lasted, as well as the desire for revenge. For the immigrants, however, it was a painful experience. Most of them felt dismayed and torn between their motherland and their adopted land, where they had become rooted. During this period, they endured a very strained situation. To avoid any animosity, they generally adopted a wait-and-see attitude, were discrete, hard-working, and tried to make themselves invisible.

During the war, the restraints resulting from the German occupation only fuelled the acrimony. Because Italy viewed itself as a victorious state, it defended the emigrants’ status, which increased feelings of exasperation in French public opinion. Meanwhile, the French population worried about the prisoners of war still interned, and those who had to endure the everyday difficulties under the Vichy regime. It comes as no surprise that the Italian community had a bad reputation. Italians were considered indifferent, disrespectful, and arrogant. In the spring
of 1943, young Frenchmen were conscripted to work in Germany as part of the Obligatory Work Service (STO), while Italians were exempted. This marked yet another conflicting stage and caused many quarrels in the villages. Being very hostile towards the occupying Germans, most of the French held the Italians responsible for the hardships of the day, and for the actions of the Nazi occupier after November 1942. The migrants were called ‘macaroni’, as before, but henceforth also Bock’ (another word for ‘Kraut’) or ‘collabo’, or traitor.

The Second World War ultimately left behind a confusing legacy because things did not change suddenly in June 1944, the date of French Liberation. Feelings did not return to normal easily. Indeed, the experience of the war cast its shadow for a long period and the aftermath of the Second World War seemed unlikely to fade very fast. The French kept blaming the Italians for the June 1940 ‘stab in the back’. Immediately after the Liberation, public rumours accused the immigrants of having collaborated with the enemy during the German Occupation, as well as having taken advantage of their protected status to grow rich by buying and selling on the black market. Actually, a great number of trivial events marked the strong Italophobic feelings that lingered on in the public opinion. In this context, the discredited Italian community needed to recover its legitimacy in the minds of the French population.

Gradually the essential economic role of the Italian immigrants in southwest France in the post-war years, as well as its working skills and tact eased the negative image built up during the War and slowly favoured their acceptance. This process, however, was not easy. Quite a few Italian partnerships attempted to present a positive image of the immigrant community, while struggling against the very negative widespread stereotypes. One of the ways to fight prejudice was to propagate an anti-Fascist image as well as glorifying the blood shed by the Resistance fighters. Such a reaction could already be observed in some illegal pamphlets prior to liberation. When a young Italian was put to death for acts of terrorism in Toulouse in June 1944, pamphlets entitled ‘He died so France could live!’ were distributed for some time after by his fellow countrymen who had joined the French resistance. The text praised this immigrants’ son, descended from that hard-working agricultural population who had helped to bring the lands of France’s Midi back to life, who had been so heroic that he had ‘shed his blood in sacrifice to his host country’. Some people were portrayed as the embodiment of the sacrifice of second generation migrants. In this way, the anti-Fascist representation and discourse were used to symbolise ongoing integration.

The integration process from the 1940s onwards has not yet been fully studied. In the mid-1950s, the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) realised various surveys concerning immigrant adapta-
tion, more particularly the Italian farmers in southwestern France. They provide details concerning cultural changes within the families, showing the progressive adoption of French values and standards and ways of life. During the following decades, the immigrant population remained somewhat ‘invisible’, even as new migrants began arriving in the 1950s. In 1946, the law on the rural social system offered a more favourable status to sharecroppers (*métayers*), instituting a two-thirds share for the tenants, favouring their advancement to farmer status, and giving them a pre-emptive right to buy their land in cases where owners decided to sell their properties. France’s ‘Thirty Glorious Years’ – *les Trente Glorieuses* –, referring to the period of continuous economic growth in the three decades following the Second World War, marked an important phase of modernisation in French society, especially in the countryside. As a result, some of the Italian farmers using loans, became landowners during this period. ‘Those who arrived in the 1920s (due to the difficult circumstances experienced in the 1930s and during the war) finally acceded to land ownership and a certain wealth at the end of the 1950s, more or less at the same time as those who had arrived after the war’. The building industry also attracted many Italians who were seeking a better life, because it was possible to work in that sector without any particular qualifications. Many of them rose to a very good social status in that sector and a great number of successful building or civil engineering contractors were established. The emergence of local elites completed, to a certain extent, the collective path of integration. Since the 1950s, many people with Italian origins held functions in associations, trade unions or municipal councils, some of them even became mayors.

Nowadays, that community seems to be searching for its roots and some visibility again. Interest by the second and the third generations in their ancestors’ migratory history depends to a great extent on their parents’ social mobility. The quest for memories regarding the immigrants and their descendants’, however, goes beyond the simple private sphere. Nowadays, they claim a collective public memory, which transcends the family circle or group membership. This trend aims to represent the history of immigration in the guise of cultural events. The migratory experience has thus become integrated into a more collective memory supported by the wider rural society and the community’s commemorations of integration takes place in this context. Although the former ethnic community only constitutes a ‘residual identity’, what remains of their cultural specificity is very much valued, claimed, brandished, often reconstructed and reinvented as well. That is equally true for the third generation, made up of youngsters searching for their roots and trying to preserve the traces left by the immigrants.
Italian associations offer interesting dynamics. The immigrants’ or their lineage’s associations or clubs aimed to maintain and hand over the identity elements to the group of similar origin. They are also concerned with conveying their cultural heritage to the French population. Many associations are regionally based (Piedmont, Venice), which accounts for their strong affinities and success. Locally, Italian nationals, naturalised migrants and descendants in the southwestern region represent a considerable demographic weight, enough in any case to allow an identity and a curiosity for origins to be expressed and demonstrated. This explains the arrival of associations where immigrant memory developed its cultural turn. These associations are also clearly related to transalpine movements, revealing a transnational orientation crossing different spaces in France and Italy, defined as the immigration region and the home region.

Finally, the increasing number of French villages with Italian villages as “sister cities” is a revealing phenomenon. It has expanded from the late-1980s and the role played by the Italian associations was and still is crucial. Near Toulouse, in particular, it was an immigrant who realised the first matching up, which was followed by many others. At the moment the consular constituency in Toulouse (which covers the Midi-Pyrénées, Aquitaine and Poitou-Charentes regions) counts more than 70 municipalities twinned with Italian villages. In most cases, they stress the migratory links between them. These endeavours give rise to ceremonies that pay tribute to this migration. It is a symbolic way of combining the immigration and them two countries. The bonds that were thus established between two European regions were particularly favoured, maybe anticipating the integration movement of European societies in general.

Notes

1 Rural Provence provides another, if quite different, example: Claude 1995; and Faidutti-Rudolph 1964.
3 Bortolini 1997.
4 Mucci 2002; Loddo and Mucci 1999.
6 Micelli 1989.
7 Marcel-Rémond 1928, 34.
9 Bechelloni 2003a and Bechelloni 2003b.
10 Peyret 1928.
11 Ronsin 1980.
12 Domergue 2002.
14 Revelli 1977.
16 Rouch and Maltone 1989.
18 Maltone and Buttarelli 1993.
21 See also Weber 1976.
22 Veglia 1998b.
24 Guillaume 1988b.
28 Teulières 2002b.
29 Girard and Stoetzel 1954.
Assigning the State its Rightful Place?  
Migration, Integration and the State in Germany

Karen Schönwälder

In the American debate about integration and assimilation ‘then and now’, changing economic conditions and the social context of the ethnic communities feature prominently, but little consideration is given to the possible impact of changing political conditions on integration processes – although the problem is occasionally mentioned.1 To some extent this may reflect a general disregard for the state in migration research – as observed by James Hollifield as well as Aristide Zolberg. Thus Zolberg noted that “the role of states in shaping international migration has been largely ignored by immigration theorists”.2 And Hollifield sees theorists scrambling to “‘bring the state back in’ to social scientific analyses of migration.” While Hollifield mentions the ‘issue of incorporation’ as one major theme and poses the question of the role of the state ‘in incorporating immigrants into society and the economy’,3 his review of the literature, like Zolberg’s discussion, reflect the fact that recently revived discussions on the role of the state have focused on migration control, i.e., in Tomas Hammar’s terms, immigration policy rather than immigrant policy.

For the US it may to some extent be justified to assume continuity of at least major political structures and disregard change in this field as one component of the framework for integration. For Germany, however, this would be absurd. Here, in the last 100 to 120 years, enormous ruptures have occurred: Two world wars were fought by and inside the country, and six different regimes (seven if we include the occupation of 1945-1949) partly represent radically differing political structures. And yet, if we reconsider the literature on Germany’s migratory experience, the emphasis is often on continuity, and it is the assumed continuity of the key aims of government policy and the legal framework that is at its core.

So does it make sense to compare the integration processes of immigrants in Germany today and, say one hundred years ago? And what impact did state policies have on integration processes, to what extent did differing political frameworks determine integration outcomes?

As an analytical framework, it seems useful to refer to a model suggested by Alejandro Portes among others. It distinguishes between
three levels of immigrant reception that affect their modes of incorporation:\textsuperscript{4} 

1. The first reception level is the government’s policy toward different immigrant groups which can in principle take three different routes: exclusion, passive acceptance, and active encouragement.

2. The second level involves civic society, public opinion, and the labour market, and Portes assumes that it is not necessarily dependent on the first level.

3. The third level is the ethnic community. Here the importance is whether a sizeable community exists and whether it offers economic opportunities.

Portes and Rumbaut suggest that ‘The combination of positive and negative features encountered at each of these levels determines the distinct mode of newcomers’ incorporation.’\textsuperscript{5} As Portes emphasises, it is the intention of this model to direct attention away from the individual capacities of the immigrants (education, skills) to the social and political environment. Furthermore, while at least in German public debate the question of integration is often reduced to whether it has been achieved or not, a distinction between different modes of incorporation allows a more neutral and differentiated assessment of the situation.

The following text provides a sketch of migrant incorporation and major factors influencing it over the last 130 years of German history. In the last paragraphs the new integration policy of the current government will be outlined. Throughout, particular attention will be paid to the role of the state and it will be argued that – while we need to find out much more about the mechanisms of immigrant incorporation – overall the ability of the state to enable or control integration has decreased.

**Active Exclusion and Laissez-Faire: The Kaiserreich**

In the 1880s, Germany (i.e., the Kaiserreich was founded in 1871) became a country of immigration (as immigration now exceeded emigration)\textsuperscript{6} and of major internal migratory movements. It is estimated that of the about two million internal migrants from east to west, roughly 20% were ethnic Poles. But there was also significant other foreign immigration. Official statistics for 1910 recorded 1.26 million foreigners in the Reich, of whom the biggest groups came from Austria-Hungary (667,000), the Tsarist Empire (138,000) – both ethnically mostly Polish – the Netherlands (144,000), Italy (104,000), and Switzerland (68,000).\textsuperscript{7} Government intervention focussed on the Poles (and the Jews), and it is with reference to the Poles that many scholars have ar-
gued that harsh restrictive anti-immigration policies (mass expulsions in 1885, forced seasonal rotation, exclusion of families) made permanent settlement and integration virtually impossible. It seems that the Prussian state (and partly the Reich) was in control of migration and settlement.

However, some scholars claim that the ‘Polo-centrism’ (Polenzentrismus) prevailing among researchers has obstructed an appropriate assessment of state activities and that the treatment of the Poles represented a special case. Indeed, several restrictions applied specifically to ethnic Poles, while migrants from Italy, Ruthenians, or Czechs were not affected. Referring to the Italians, Del Fabbro argues that a ‘liberal foreigners law’ and a non-interventionist state stance constituted favourable conditions for an initial settlement process. At least the southern borders of the Reich could be crossed without papers, employment contracts could be concluded freely. The restrictive Prussian decrees hardly applied to Italians, partly because they were Prussian decrees that were not necessarily adopted by other German states, partly because they were not strictly enforced. Italians already enjoyed the benefits of social security schemes granting them sick pay and payments in case of accidents prior to 1914. The absence of an Italian infrastructure and of immigrant colonies may have favoured assimilation.

Considering the role of the state before 1918, it seems that we have to, first, take into account that Germany was a federal state. Secondly, we have to distinguish between a determined anti-Polish policy, that at the very least made it extremely difficult for Poles of non-German citizenship to become settled (i.e., a policy of active exclusion), and a laissez-faire attitude towards other migrant nationalities (passive acceptance). It seems that a passive state tolerated the settlement of non-Polish and non-Jewish immigrants. If nevertheless permanent immigration did not happen on a larger scale, factors other than repressive state activities must have been responsible, such as the structure of employment (in the seasonally unstable building trade, as mobile traders), seasonal migration traditions, and the absence of a strong, protective ethnic community. A factor we know very little about is civil society, i.e., the reception of migrants other than Jews or Poles.

The Caesura of the First World War

The most important factor affecting immigrant integration, indeed a major caesura, was the First World War. Most of the Italians left Germany, although even when both countries were at war with each other (from August 1916), a few thousand stayed on. The catastrophic eco-
nomic situation immediately after the end of the war and the fact that a new German republic now intervened to protect the domestic workforce contributed to a radically changed framework. Economic conditions and state intervention ensured that there was very little new immigration after 1918. For the US, Alba and Nee have suggested that the absence of ‘new supplies’ weakened the ethnic communities and encouraged assimilation. This may also have been the case in Germany, but thus far very little research has been done on the long-term development of migrant groups in Germany, and thus only tentative suggestions are possible.

Among the Italians another movement ‘home’ ensued in the immediate post-war years; in the Rhineland and Westphalia in 1926 only roughly 6,000 Italians stayed – compared to 26,000 in 1915. However, this smaller community now formed associations; they had their own newspapers and sometimes even schools. As the development of social and cultural structures was at least partly linked to a massive intervention of the Italian Fascist state, it is difficult to decide whether it indicates that bonds with the native country were still strong or that an Italo-German community was emerging, or both. There are indications that the group that survived the post-First World War crisis continued to stay but grew little: In Hamburg about 400 Italians were registered in 1916, while in 1925, 555 Italian citizens lived in the city. As about half of them indicated German as their mother tongue, this was in all probability a tiny set of mixed families. Italians numbering approximately 400 to 500 remained behind in Hamburg during the Nazi era.

For the Poles, the founding of a Polish state meant that they now had to opt for Polish or German citizenship, and if they chose the former, they had to leave Germany. If they stayed, they were confronted with a social climate severely affected by the hostilities of the war and the territorial conflict. Due to the transfer of territories to the new Polish state and the departure of about two-thirds of the Ruhr Poles, the Polish minority was now much smaller than before 1914. As Kleßmann has argued, the decision to remain in the Ruhr was equivalent to opting for German citizenship and to some extent accepting assimilation. Still, the population of Weimar Germany included one to two million ethnic Poles (mostly not in the Ruhr but the eastern regions). It seems that, while before 1914 pressure exercised by the authorities often had the opposite effects and strengthened a minority identity, in the long run and given the weakened ethnic communities, assimilation was the more common consequence. Ethnic communities were weak economically; they mostly consisted of workers, often at the bottom end of occupational hierarchies. Political organisations and a
A More Interventionist State

The state during the Weimar period was, in a way, far more interventionist than previously. Klaus J. Bade described the changes as a shift from a policy of rejection (Abwehrpolitik) to a policy dictated by labour market considerations. Jochen Oltmer now sees ‘the regulating, controlling, and administrating intervention of the protectionist welfare state’ at work. The development of a systematic labour market policy (in 1927 the Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung was founded) and the principle of preference for native workers secured by the trade unions fundamentally changed the character of state intervention into migration. Control became more comprehensive and the economic criteria of regulation were accorded greater weight. But other factors remained influential: When the Reich’s Minister of the Interior, Martin Schiele, in 1925 warned of the dangers posed by the ‘new immigration of elements of foreign descent’ (fremdstämmige Elemente) and appealed to the government to protect the ‘physical and moral health of our people’, this illustrates that attitudes toward immigration were strongly influenced by nationalist and racist beliefs. Apart from elements of the logic of a welfare state, we can see a nation-state at work, striving to secure the ‘German’ east by means of a population policy which perceived foreign migrants as a dangerous flood.

Developments in the late 1920s serve as a reminder that state control over foreign migration is not always effective. An estimated 60-70,000 foreign Poles had become settled. This was possibly an effect of the war (during which foreign workers had not been allowed to leave Germany) as well as of ineffective controls and concessions to economic needs in the post-war years. In the period 1927-1928, Germany and Poland agreed to a treaty on agrarian labourers which allowed Germany to force several tens of thousands of Poles to assume a migratory
seasonal labour scheme.\textsuperscript{27} It seems that an immigration process had been at least partly revised. Although one could also argue that, by exempting those who had arrived before 1919, it was already recognised that residence led to rights.

The development of a welfare state\textsuperscript{28} and the (initially) increased influence of the labour movement meant that foreign migrants were now officially granted equal wages as well as inclusion in the accident and health insurance schemes. It is doubtful whether these provisions were implemented.\textsuperscript{29} The ILO represented a new international agency that began to influence the conditions of migrant labourers – but again: probably with little effect. Officially, national minorities were now granted constitutionally guaranteed rights. Selective discrimination and the suppression of minority languages were no longer official state policy; the policy of Germanisation was largely discredited.\textsuperscript{30} The minorities policy of the German government was mainly determined by considerations with regard to German minorities outside the German state. As it was the aim to preserve them as separate German entities, Germany (i.e., in the League of Nations) opposed a policy of assimilation and supported cultural autonomy for minorities.\textsuperscript{31} But in reality, it seems that neither the constitutional provisions nor the commitment to cultural autonomy had any major effects on the living conditions of ethnic minorities in Germany. Representatives of the minorities complained about discrimination, and it seems that on the local level constitutional rights were obstructed.\textsuperscript{32}

Under the extreme conditions of the Nazi dictatorship, very little space remained for the development of a distinct ethnic identity, and widespread assimilation occurred. Little seems to be known about contacts between foreign and forced labourers and co-ethnics in Germany. And yet, on a small scale, immigrant minorities survived the racial state. In 1951, in the first statistical survey for the young Federal Republic of Germany, figures of 20,680 Italian, 73,483 Dutch and 44,268 Austrian citizens were recorded – many of them probably long-term residents and German family members of male foreigners.\textsuperscript{33} We know very little about their modes of incorporation into German society. As it seems, longer-term incorporation happened via mixed families and in border regions where economic and social relations transcended the nation-state borders (Dutch, Austrians).\textsuperscript{34}

In summary, Germany has a longer-term migratory experience but incorporation processes over several generations were not the rule and occurred mainly among ethnic Poles, in mixed families, and in border regions. Economic conditions, the impact of two wars and state intervention combined to prevent or disrupt trends towards immigrant settlement. Those who hung on were faced with the strong assimilationist pressures of an increasingly nationalist society in the Weimar Republic
and of the racist and violently oppressive Nazi regime. Given this background, it is astonishing that Polish life did reappear after 1945 – demonstrating the persistence of ethnic identities.35

**Eingliederung versus Einschmelzung: Policy Orientations after 1949**

In post-Nazi Germany, the West German authorities had to quickly adopt a position with regard to the incorporation of foreigners. Several hundred thousand of the former forced labourers and concentration camp inmates remained in the country. Like recognised refugees, the former Displaced Persons – now called *Heimatlose Ausländer* – due to the intervention of the Allies enjoyed a legal status close to that of German citizens. Political intervention, or in Hammar’s terms ‘immigrant policy’, focussed on the dissolution of the camps and support for housing as well as economic activities (partly subsidised by UN funds). Additionally, specific attention was paid to helping the refugees practice and retain their cultures, educational systems, and ‘their ethnicity’ (‘*Volkstum schlechthin*’). *Eingliederung*/*integration* was the aim, not assimilation/*Einschmelzung*. In 1968, for example, federal and regional states made about 3.9 million marks available for this purpose.36 This policy promoting the ethnicity of refugees and former DPs was eventually discontinued. It had been motivated by the assumption that some groups would return to their homelands, but also by concepts which linked the integrity of the individual to his or her *Volkstum*. This attitude was influenced by principles of inter-war minorities policy as well as by quasi-biological conceptions of the *Volk* (and by Cold War politics). As regards the effects of state intervention, we are so far pretty much in the dark as no detailed studies seem to exist of, for example, the Ukrainians, Croats, or Hungarians in West Germany.

Policy towards the so-called guest workers lacked a clear objective. While unquestionably foreign recruitment was initially seen as a short-term measure and immigration was not intended, it is not true that the German government pursued a consequent anti-integration policy. Rather, policies were shaped by conflicting aims and interests.

In the early decades of foreign recruitment the attitude of the authorities was marked by a fairly authoritarian stance. The state was seen as legitimately claiming control over the movement and residence of foreigners as well as many aspects of their social behaviour. Rarely do the files in the archives contain any hint of doubts as to the legitimacy of state intervention into the lives of foreign individuals. Officials confidently assumed that it was their duty not only to protect the health and security of the German people, but also to intervene in decisions of for-
eigners on the size and shape of their families. This meant no extended families and penalising for instance ‘deviant’ sexual behaviour, which could lead to expulsion because of a sexual relationship with a married woman or a person of the same sex.

Contrary to, for instance, the British state with its liberal attitude to individual freedom, the West German state perceived it as its task to supervise the Eingliederung (incorporation) of the foreign migrants. Eingliederungspolitik in the 1950s and 1960s had a paternalistic and a repressive side. One of its instruments was the suppression of nonconformist behaviour. Thus leaders of strikes were expelled. Counselling services provided help but also served the interests of political and social control. Remember that this was the Cold War period and that the fear of communist infiltration was omnipresent. Immigrant policy before 1970 remained very limited and under-funded. It consisted of minor subsidies for the employment of social workers by welfare organisations and for activities like ‘leisure centres’. Housing conditions were partly regulated (only employers’ hostels for officially recruited workers), but active measures for their improvement remained largely symbolic. After 1 June 1966, the children of foreign workers were obliged to attend regular schools, but it took some time until they actually did.

Nothing was done to promote the ethnic identities of migrants, and interventions into the often miserable housing conditions remained largely symbolic. But it is wrong to assume that, because of a rotation policy, ‘integration other than on the labour market was not a goal of governmental policies.’ Apart from the fact that rotation was never designed or implemented as a policy, due to a number of considerations the government was interested in a certain degree of integration and prevented from implementing a consequent anti-settlement policy. Several factors influenced this attitude and de facto policies: Compared to pre-war times, the sending countries now exercised a considerable influence on their citizens’ living conditions. Italy in particular, with the confidence of an essential partner in the process of European integration, demanded decent housing conditions and rights to family reunion for its citizens. Within the European Economic Community rights to equal treatment of workers and family reunion were implemented. Furthermore, West Germany was sensitive to criticism from abroad and anxious to prove that nothing linked its migration policy to the racist exploitations of the Nazi regime. The international context and foreign-policy considerations became a major influence on migration policy.

An example from the mid-1960s can serve to illustrate how complex aims influenced state policies towards the modes of incorporation of foreign migrants. In 1963-4, when labour migration was increasingly
perceived as a longer-term phenomenon, housing minister Lücke demanded that the Cabinet make decisions on the future place of foreign migrants in German society. Shortly before, in his role as president of the Katholikentag, Lücke had proposed concentrating the guest workers in centres for the different nationalities, and he now renewed his proposal of closed settlements with churches, schools etc., i.e., a systematic segregation of the migrant population which, as he claimed, would help protect the migrants’ cultural integrity. But, in spite of a labour recruitment policy which assumed the return of most labour migrants, the response to these proposals was uniformly negative: Representatives of both the churches and of other government ministries argued that a separate and concentrated settlement of the foreign workers was not desired; ghettos (sic) would hinder their integration and raise concerns with regard to internal security. As they insisted, the aim should be integration – which was explicitly distinguished from assimilation and involved the retention of migrants’ languages and Volkstum, but not by means segregation. Family reunion was partly welcomed as men without their families were seen as a particularly explosive potential and the Church feared extra-marital relations and a decline of mores. Thus a number of considerations worked against a consequent exclusionary policy.

Altogether, the ‘negative’ interventions of the state remained more important than the ‘positive’. By controlling access to the country and the labour market, the West German state influenced migration and settlement patterns. Until the surge of asylum migration, the state more or less effectively shaped the composition of the immigrant population by largely keeping out Africans and Asians. Naturalisation was not impossible but barriers remained high. Residence permits and further restrictions channelled economic activities into dependent employment, as access to self-employment and the professions was restricted. And yet, already in the 1960s, authorities were partly unable, and partly unwilling, to prevent the permanent settlement of immigrants. In autumn 1973, of 3,856,000 registered foreign citizens 877,000 (ca. 23%) had entered the Federal Republic eight or more years ago – already then, settlement processes were far advanced. The reasons why an effective anti-immigration policy was not implemented were manifold; they include economic interests, EEC provisions as well as – most importantly – foreign policy considerations. Rights accorded by the welfare state or the intervention of the courts were initially (before the mid-1970s) not decisive. The government repeatedly decided not to use instruments that were in principle at its disposal. Thus, if it did not passively accept permanent immigration and full integration, it did not effectively prevent it.
Integration Policy under Social Democratic Hegemony

With regard to the development of the welfare state, and more generally state intervention, the late 1960s and early 1970s mark an important stage. As is widely assumed, in this period the relationship between state and society changed fundamentally. Economy and society were now to be shaped from above, at least this was the idea. Labour market policy was redefined as an active, preventative intervention, and the governing Social Democrats (Willy Brandt had become Chancellor in 1969) wanted to create a fairer society. Additionally, the interaction of central and regional states as well as of state and civil society organisations changed and the network-state began to emerge.

Migration policy was not included in attempts to plan and consciously shape societal developments. But the changed framework affected immigrant policy in two ways: Firstly, the quantitative expansion of state activities and the welfare budget was reflected in growing funds. The budget for counselling services, and other activities related to labour migration, multiplied in the early 1970s. Secondly, the ideal of a more democratic and humane society proclaimed by the Social Democrats, as well as the new ‘spirit of the times’, made it difficult for politicians to appear indifferent towards the often miserable living conditions of migrant families and in favour of their forced return. Civil society was, in the early 1970s, ahead of the political elites, and for a couple of years conditions were favourable for integration. Racism and discrimination were now widely rejected – while the situation in the 1960s can be described as that of a ‘contained conflict’, i.e., a situation in which a significant conflict potential existed but was held in check due to the need to prove West Germany’s character as a democratic nation.

Nevertheless, the objectives of the government’s Eingliederungspolitik did not change substantially. Labour Minister Arendt’s political task was to provide help in order to enable the foreign workers ‘to settle in quickly and smoothly’. Integration measures were meant ‘to prevent isolation and ghettoisation and to reduce tensions and prejudices’. In 1971, Arendt declared that the integration of the foreign workers had overall been successfully achieved, although with regard to housing and schooling a few problems remained. Emphasis was placed on developing local co-ordination bodies, on language teaching, education more generally, and on publicity aiming to increase the acceptance of foreigners as co-citizens with – as was claimed – equal rights (gleichberechtigte Mitbürger). Eingliederungspolitik was explicitly not aimed at naturalisation – but it also refrained from propagating limited integration for temporary residents, rather it was claimed that, in all important aspects, equality was granted.
In 1972, the government decided that it wanted to limit, or possibly reduce, the migrant population in the Federal Republic, and obviously this decision – together with the subsequent economic crisis – fundamentally changed the framework for integration processes. Indeed, scholarly attention has since then largely focussed on the exclusionary strategies of the state, the emphasis placed on a solely temporary presence of migrant labourers, and the denial of incorporation into the community of citizens. The German state is mainly seen in its role as guardian and gatekeeper. And of course the demonstrated rejection of the immigrants’ presence, the high barriers to an acquisition of German citizenship, restricted access to the labour market for family members, programs promoting return, as well as hostility and racism in German society represent exclusionary policies and attitudes. Due to the ‘official interpretation of German foreigners policy as mainly a policy for the regulation of entry and stay, moves towards a policy aiming at integration have remained sporadic’, Esser and Korte concluded in 1985. And, as they further suggested: ‘Because the aims of immigrant policy in the FRG are contradictory and uncoordinated, one cannot expect success from the measures taken’.49

Prevented or Promoted Integration: Conflicting Views on Policy Outcomes

This had long been the accepted picture, and consequently, detailed investigations of immigrant policy have not enjoyed great popularity.50 Recently, however, established views have increasingly been considered unsatisfactory. Among social scientists, the common juxtaposition of different national models of either incorporation or exclusion is now frequently criticised as too harsh or at least as no longer valid.51 As has been pointed out, most European countries of settlement adopted measures to counter educational disadvantages, to improve labour market integration, to mediate in conflicts and to improve the social situation in urban concentrations of immigrant settlement. In spite of the recruitment stop of November 1973 and the attempt to reduce the immigrant population, the integration budget of the West German state rose continuously until the mid-1980s (an overview of the Labour Ministry’s budget for integration measures gives a figure of 15 million marks in 1973, 30.7 million in 1978, 63 million in 1982 and at its peak 89.7 million in 1985).52 In 1998, the Federal Labour Ministry’s budget (for counselling services, language courses, and other projects) was about 86 million marks. The direct integration measures are financed by several federal ministries, by the regional states (the Länder), the local authorities, as well as welfare organisations (and partly the EU),
and are only one part of the overall efforts.\textsuperscript{53} Behind the screen of an endlessly repeated ‘Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland’, Klaus J. Bade and Michael Bommes claim, a pragmatic policy of integration was implemented which contributed to a fairly advanced process of integration.\textsuperscript{54} But – as they further note – the achievements of integration were not recognised in the public debate. By focussing on criticism of the stubborn anti-immigration policy of successive West German governments, researchers and the wider public had been distracted from realising how advanced integration processes in fact were.

It is extremely difficult to assess the effects of specific political interventions and to decide whether the claims are true. The recently completed European Effnatis project claims that it, for the first time, ‘empirically compares the integration of [children of international migrants] in a European way and thus allows [it] to test the ‘efficacy’ of different national modes of integration of migrants’.\textsuperscript{55} It arrived at the conclusion that national patterns do matter but only in some respects: ‘In the area of structural integration (education, training, employment) there is no systematic pattern of national differences.’\textsuperscript{56} And further it states that ‘Germany with an ambiguous policy in the past has strengths in training and employment, but weaknesses in education, legal integration, and identificational integration’.\textsuperscript{57} It seems that the reference to ‘national modes’ of integration, and this means to the exclusionary stance of the German state, helps to explain only some aspects of immigrants’ modes of incorporation into West German society.

There is now one line of interpretation that emphasises the exclusionary stance of the German state and society as expressed in the (pre-1999) citizenship law, and tends to assume that the exclusionary logic was and is in many ways effective – and that where this was not the case, inclusion was achieved ‘against the state’. Jeroen Doomernik, in a recent study for the ILO, suggested that the ‘relatively poor integration into the labour market of the second generation [Turks] is related to at least the following two factors: the immigrants’ legal position and implicit and explicit discrimination. The legal ambivalence in which many immigrants and even their children find themselves, prevents them from making unequivocal choices.’ But he also admitted that ‘we have not been able to unequivocally establish precisely how effective efforts to integrate immigrants and their descendants on the labour market and into the educational system have until now been.’\textsuperscript{58}

A competing approach tends to point out that there is also a logic working towards integration, a logic which is mainly attributed to the welfare state, and sometimes to the character of the liberal state. Besides the exclusionist citizenship-model, another ‘national model’
seems to have been at work, namely ‘German Capitalism’ with its emphasis on an integrative course and a strong welfare state. Additionally, the federal state and plural welfare-state structure allowed different strategies to be pursued at the same time.

Baker and Lenhardt were already in 1988 arguing that the educational sector in West Germany was marked by ‘far-reaching tendencies towards integration’; they even described it as the ‘vanguard of the integration of foreigners’. In spite of the existence of integrationist as well as exclusionary aims, powerful practical constraints ensured that the respective structures and effects did not emerge.59 Similarly, the recent PISA study, although highlighting severe disadvantages youths with a migration backgrounds faced, did not show that more exclusionary and more integrationist stances in the regional states were systematically related to educational disadvantages. Nevertheless, the situation with regard to employment and education is extremely worrying. For several years experts consistently reported progress, i.e., a better formal education and improving positions in the labour market of second generation immigrants. More recently, however, developments are marked by stagnation and even a reversal of the positive trend.60 This can hardly be explained by the citizenship policy, but it also leaves us to wonder about the integrative effects of the education system. With regard to employment, the worsening situation is probably caused by a mixture of economic transformations with the effects of discrimination. As language and formal qualifications have become more important, in a situation when labour is scarce, discriminatory selection is more likely. Developments in education are more difficult to explain, in particular concerning the Italians who, in spite of a strong legal position and a relatively favourable societal reception, do not perform well.61

The New Integration Policy

A new integration policy is currently being designed and implemented. It can be seen as representing a third phase of German immigrant policy. It continues to be a basic assumption – which partly reflects German political culture – that it is the state’s task to intervene into processes of the incorporation of immigrants into German society.

In the first phase (1950s-1960s) intervention was marked by a strongly authoritarian attitude, and a policy promoting Eingliederung involved mainly conflict-avoidance and the suppression of nonconformist behaviour.

In a second phase (initiated in the late 1960s), an expanding welfare state and a more activist social policy became key influences – soon accompanied and contradicted by the attempt to, at least partly, revise the
immigration process. The co-existence of inclusive and exclusive poli-
cies was characteristic for this phase, and policy interventions had inte-
grative as well as exclusive effects.

Since the early 1990s and, in particular, during the governing coal-
tion of Social Democrats and the Green Party, government policy was
based on an acceptance of past immigration. As Germany’s citizenship
law was reformed, the objective of ‘integration’ became, at least for
large parts of the immigrant population, a policy that was no longer
contradicted by the denial of permanent immigration and the often in-
secure legal status of the migrants. If it is true that thus far the hostile
attitude expressed mainly by the restrictive provisions on naturalisation
constituted the major determinant of incorporation processes the situa-
tion has been transformed. Government policy now officially aims at a
permanent and full incorporation into German society of those mi-
grants ‘who permanently live with us and who accept our constitu-
tional values’. As this quotation illustrates, the acceptance of perma-
nent immigration and full incorporation has been accompanied by the
introduction of a clearer dividing line between those to be included
and those who shall be excluded.

Various migrant groups, such as ethnic Germans, refugees and la-
bour migrants, are now perceived as having major problems integrat-
ing. Previously separate integration programmes will be merged and
targeted at all migrants. Unfortunately, no research exists thus far that
would allow us to assess how this will work out for these very different
categories of migrants. The government is responding to a perceived
heterogeneity and lack of planning by proposing a more systematic
and co-ordinated intervention. A new federal agency has been assigned
the task to develop, in co-operation with the federal states and the local
authorities, a comprehensive integration concept. So far, no such com-
prehensive integration policy or administrative structures exist. Accord-
ing to a government-appointed Zuwanderungskommission, ‘pragmatic
improvisation’ was the everyday reality, and ‘short-term requirements
and considerations that covered only a few points determined deci-
sions’.

The meaning of ‘integration’ as the goal of government policy has
changed. The new integration policies represent a heightened concern
for developing and facilitating a shared cultural basis for participation
amongst recent as well as established migrants and refugees, i.e., a
new emphasis on the cultural and identificational aspects of integra-
tion. Intensified political efforts respond to social and educational dis-
advantages but they are also motivated by new (communitarian-style)
worries about the overall integration of modern societies, or, more spe-
cifically, fears of Islamic fundamentalism. In a way, expectations with
regard to the ability of the state to shape political attitudes and outlooks
have grown. But at the same time, the meaning of ‘integration’ remains controversial. When the Federal Government’s Commissioner for Foreigners Affairs defines integration as a ‘permanent process of consensus-building about the common fundamentals and rules of co-existence in a community’, a process that involves society as a whole, this is a Habermasian (or Kymlicka-style), communication-oriented concept. Equal chances and participation as well as the absence of discrimination are now strongly emphasised. But there is also the responsible Interior Minister’s voice who claims that ‘the best integration is assimilation’. It seems unclear what objectives government policy will try to fulfil. But this is no novelty.

As the government’s commissioner for foreigners’ affairs knows, integration depends on many factors, some of which cannot be controlled and planned by the state. Still, the new approach reflects a renewed confidence in the ability to steer social developments at a time when the call for a new, more reticent role for the state seems to be almost universal. Political science analyses of the development of the state in the last few decades assume that not only the external but the internal sovereignty of the state has eroded and a hierarchical top-down relationship between the state and the different spheres of society no longer exists. The state now operates in an increasingly dense network of transnational as well as internal dependencies and structures of negotiation. While the ability of the nation-state to control migration processes has recently been hotly debated, the consequences of a changing state structure and transnationalisation on immigrant policy remain largely unexplored. Additionally, the reshaping of welfare states and the reduced expenditures on social policy measures could diminish the integrative effects of policy interventions, at a time when the expectations with regard to state-encouraged integration are growing.

Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated that the extreme ruptures in German history largely deprived us of the opportunity to compare second-generation incorporation processes ‘then and now’ – at least if a comparison of developments in Germany is intended. Historians should however feel encouraged to fill some of the research gaps concerning the modes of incorporation of those small migrant groups who became settled and of mixed families.

In a longer-term historical perspective, change rather than continuity marks the framework for immigrant incorporation. While the character and role of the state underwent major transformations, the question of whether ‘the power of the state to control immigration and to enable
or block integration has increased\textsuperscript{70} cannot be answered with an unequivocal ‘yes’. State intervention today certainly encompasses more aspects of life than in the 1890s or the 1920s, and demands on the state have increased. But at the same time, restrictions arising from individual and social rights, the democratic and social character of the Federal Republic’s constitution, international connections and obligations, as well as the involvement of a set of actors in the field, have ensured that overall the ability of the state to enable or control integration has been reduced. Still, the various modes of incorporation of different groups of migrants, and the weight of the different factors shaping them, including the state, are thus far not very well understood.\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{Notes}

1 See Rumbaut 1997. Rumbaut demands that the ‘differences in the historical contexts of immigration and incorporation’ be taken more seriously; often sociological analyses operated in a ‘decontextualized historical vacuum’ (943).

2 Zolberg 1999, 71.

3 Hollifield 2000, 137-138.

4 Portes 1995, 23-26; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996.

5 Portes and Rumbaut, 1996, 84.

6 In German the term \textit{Einwanderung} (immigration) suggests permanent settlement, and this is one reason Klaus Bade prefers to not call Germany an immigration country at this time but a labour importing country instead. I use the term immigration in the wider Anglo-American sense.

7 For the figures (in general, if no other source is given), see Herbert 1986, 25. The \textit{Berufszählung} (occupational census) of 1907 partly recorded higher figures, i.e., 130,000 workers born in Italy (ibid., p. 26). Statistics are not entirely reliable, but they give an indication of the major nationalities involved.

8 See, e.g., Bade 1980b., 168.

9 Del Fabbro 1996.

10 Estimates put the number of Italians in the Reich at up to 200,000 in ca. 1910. Employment statistics for 1907 additionally give a figure of 36,000 Ruthanians and 29,000 Czechs in Prussia alone.


12 I.e., the language paragraph of the \textit{Reichsvereinsgesetz} of 1908 (the federal law on associations), see Wennemann 1997, 162-163. See also Oltmer 2002.

13 Elia Morandi (2003), in a study of Hamburg, paints a slightly different picture. He points to settlement concentrations and the existence of a couple of clubs, associations as well as an Italian green grocer and Italian bars.

14 Wennemann estimates that in 1915 about 25,000 Italians lived in the Rhineland and Westphalia (1997, 286, 183), they were not interned. Del Fabbro gives the much lower figure of about 20,000 willing to stay in Germany.

15 1928 statistics recorded 236,000 foreign employees in Germany. 100,000 had \textit{Befreiungsscheine} (exemption certificates) which indicates that they either had been living in Germany since 1913 (agrarian) or 1919 (industrial workers), or that they were ethnic Germans (or possibly originally German wives of foreign citizens). According to 1933 census figures which included the self-employed, 366,000 economically ac-
tive foreign nationals lived in Germany, among them 95,000 Czechs, 69,000 Poles, 42,000 Austrians and 37,000 Dutch citizens. Altogether (according to the 1933 census) 756,760 foreign nationals lived in Germany. The fact that 80% gave German as their mother tongue can indicate long-term integration, mixed families, German ethnicity, as well as concessions of the individuals to the political environment. For a detailed discussion see Oltmer 2005.

16 Alba and Nee 1997, 842.
17 Wennemann 1997, 190.
19 Morandi 2003, 121. Italian citizens were registered in Hamburg. The German wives of Italian citizens as well as the couple’s children automatically became Italian citizens. It seems that this factor has so far been underestimated in discussions of official statistics.
20 One-third opted for Polish citizenship and left, another third left for the French, Dutch and Belgian mines.
21 Kleßmann 1974, 154. Membership figures of the ZZP in the Reich declined from about 40,000 in 1922 to only roughly 5-8,000 in 1925.
22 See, e.g., Koch 1993.
24 This is true in comparison with the second half of the 19th century, while in the first half of the 19th century the situation was marked by the far-reaching intervention of the authorities. Controls were extensive and included, e.g., employment permits: Fahrmeir 2000.
26 This was the estimate given in the report of a Reichstagsausschuß (a parliamentary committee) to the Reichstag, vol. 395, 407th session, 22 March 1928, p. 13616. The report stated that those who had immigrated before 1 January 1919 should be granted the right to stay, everybody else (an estimated 27,000) should be expelled over the next six years. See Kahrs 1993.
28 Benz (2001, 28-29) describes the development of the democratic welfare state as characterised by a threefold process: an increasing inclusion of members of society in the state (voting rights as well as social policy), the extension of civil rights and the expansion of state tasks.
29 Baranowski (1995, 63) doubts that unemployment insurance and public health services as well as school education were extended to foreign agrarian labourers and their families.
30 For a detailed discussion of the background and impact of the minorities clause, see Schönwälder 1996. Article 113 of the constitution states: ‘Sections of the people of the Reich speaking a foreign language may not be restricted, whether by way of legislation or administration, in their free national development; this applies specially to the use of their mother tongue in education, as well as in questions of internal administration and the administration of justice’.
32 Kleßmann 1986, 502-503. With reference to the Sorbs, Gerald Stone (1972, 33) argues that Germanising policies ‘continued unchecked’. Representatives of the minorities frequently complained about discrimination against Polish Germans, e.g., the non-confirmation of elected local councillors or the prevention of land purchases, see Schönwälder 1996, 52.
Here it was estimated that about one-quarter of the overall 503,000 foreign citizens had arrived before the war. About half of the Austrians lived in Bavaria and 57,000 of the Dutch in North-Rhine Westphalia, i.e., in the states next to their countries of origin.

See the brief chapter by Veen 1995. He suggests that some resident Dutch were turned into forced labourers. Without specifying historical developments, he refers to a vivid organisational life (Nederland en Oranje, Hollandia) as well as a lack of information on occupations and the social situation of Dutch immigrants. The handbook has no entry on the Austrians. Of the Russian community during the Weimar period, ‘hardly a visible trace’ remained: Schlögel 1994, 234.

After 1945, Polish organisations were revived, and the new immigration of, first, former DPs and later refugees, labour migrants, as well as officially ethnic Germans, ensured that forms of ‘Polish life’ were kept alive. The West German government denied Polish organisations support. See Pallaske 2001. Angelika Eder’s contribution encompasses the period from 1918 to 1990. Like Stepień (1989) she points out continuities beyond 1945.


Doomernik 1998, 45.

For a detailed discussion of government policy and public debates up to 1973 see Schönwälder 2001. The Lücke-story is told on pp. 314-7. See also von Oswald, Schönwälder and Sonnenberger 2003.

Segregation was seen as a danger as large concentrations of foreigners could pose a potential threat. Experiences in 1945 had made a deep impression, when forced labourers were released and suddenly presented a (real or imagined) threat. Of course, the attitude of the federal government in the 1960s was contradictory as it tolerated residential segregation.


Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1974, p. 51.

On this issue, see Joppke 2003.


In 1970, the federal budget for counselling was raised from 2.75 to 4 million marks, additionally the Labour Ministry received 2 million for the co-ordination of different agencies. In 1971, the Labour Ministry received 7.5 million marks for counselling services.

A preliminary document on integration measures was passed, but it remained vague and repeated previously held views. For slightly different views, see Esser and Korte 1985 (subtle shift towards an integration policy), 180; and Meier-Braun 1988, 11 (first conception of an aliens policy).

Interview with the Nürnberger Nachrichten, 11 March 1971. It should be added that Willy Brandt gave a number of speeches in which he made far more critical statements and attacked discrimination against foreigners.

Ernst 1971.


Filsinger (2002) found that hardly anything was known about the policy of the local authorities.

An overall assessment is not easily achievable and was only recently attempted, see European Forum for Migration Studies, *Integrationsmaßnahmen der Wohlfahrtsverbände*, Gutachten für die Unabhängige Kommission “Zuwanderung”, Bamberg, March, 2001. *Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen über die Lage der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin and Bonn, 2002, pp. 39-46. The report argues that it is impossible to give an overall federal expenditures total for integration because foreigners participate in many general programs (46).

Bommes 2000b, 164-167.

**Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European Perspective – EFFNATIS**, final report, 2001, www.uni-bamberg.de, p. 83; ‘the assumption that different outcomes will result from national modes of integration... has never been empirically tested’ (9).

Ibidem, 13.


In 1983, of youths with a non-German passport, 34% left school without formal qualifications; in 1989 their share was down to 20%, but in 1991 it was still 21%, and in 1998, 19% (*Berufsbildungsbericht des BMBW*, 1991; Wolfgang Jeschek, ‘Die Integration junger Ausländer in das deutsche Bildungssystem kommt kaum noch voran’, *DIW Wochenbericht* 29/00, 2000, p. 5). Only about 65% of the 15 to 19-year-old foreign citizens are still in school – compared to 92% of the German citizens (1999 figures); participation in professional training (*Lehre*) is much lower than for German citizens. While among the 18 to 24-year-old German citizens 71% attend schools, universities or professional training, only 25% of the foreign citizens do the same (1999). Figures for 2000 are almost unchanged, see Jeschek’s report in *DIW Wochenbericht* 10/01.

See Granato 1995. Granato argues that a discrepancy exists between societal integration and integration into the labour market.

Coalition agreement between the SPD and Green Party as quoted in *Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen über die Lage der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin/Bonn, 2000, p. 203.

In 1979, the stated aim was the ‘improved integration, during their stay in the Federal Republic, of the foreigners living here’ (*Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Glombig u.a. und der Fraktionen der SPD und FDP*, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 8/2716 of 29 March 1979). In a statement of May 1982 (this was still the SPD-led Schmidt government), the federal government committed itself to an ‘integration policy regarding those foreigners who permanently live here’ (*zur Integrationspolitik hinsichtlich der dauerhaft bei uns lebenden Ausländer*). The same document stated that naturalisation could be an effective instrument of integration policy, and in 1981, the Cabinet had passed a bill intended to liberalise naturalisation. (*Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Fraktionen der SPD und FDP “Ausländerpolitik”, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 9/1629 of 5 May 1982*).


*Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen über die Lage der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin/Bonn, 2000, pp. 202, 205-6; see a similar conception in: *Integrationspolitisches Memorandum der Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Freier Wohlfahrtspflege*, ca. 2001. Compare the opinion of a previous commissioner,
Lieselotte Funcke, held in 1991, when she explained that integration was to be distinguished from assimilation. The latter demand was illegitimate as individuals should not be deprived of ‘their roots’. In particular in a German context, Wurzeln/roots still contains a ring of organicistic/biological conceptions. Integration for Funcke referred to ‘a step-by-step process of settling into our way of life and a peaceful co-existence of people of different origins’. The emphasis here is on adjustment, attitudes, and tolerance.

68 This mainstream approach is noticeable when minister Schily pointed out that it is expected of the ‘new co-citizens’ that they make efforts to integrate; the state should provide Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe (help to help yourself): Otto Schily, “Soziale Integration in der deutschen Gesellschaft als politische Aufgabe”, ZAR, vol. 22, 2002, pp. 371-375 (372).
70 Leo Lucassen, position paper for the workshop ‘Paths of integration’ held at the University of Osnabrück (19-21 June 2003), p. 5.
71 See Bernhard Nauck and Anja Steinbach, Intergeneratives Verhalten und Selbstethnisisierung von Zuwanderern. Expertise für die Unabhängige Kommission “Zuwanderung”, March 2001, in particular pp. 7-8. The authors argue that, instead of cultural differences between migrants of different origin, integration processes are determined by the specific opportunity structures at the time of immigration. Social science explanations of collective differences have thus far been unsatisfactory. While German researchers emphasised individual resources (education) and differing opportunities at differing times, American research stressed social relations within ethnic groups. In investigating generational differences, the different levels of social, inter-generational, and individual change had thus far not been interlinked in a satisfactory way.
To Live as Germans Among Germans.
Immigration and Integration of ‘Ethnic Germans’ in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic

Jochen Oltmer

In 1950, in the aftermath of the Second World War and after flight and expulsion had come to an end, there were about four million Germans still living in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe. Between 1950 and 1975, a total of about 800,000 Aussiedler (immigrants who are recognised by the German authorities as being of German descent) passed through the Western German border transit camps, and 616,000 more arrived between 1976 and 1987. Then, with the opening of the Iron Curtain, mass immigration of the Aussiedler began. Against the background of ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ in the USSR, their numbers increased rapidly from 1987 onwards. During the next nearly two decades, three million Aussiedler entered the Federal Republic of Germany. In all, more than four million migrants of officially recognised German descent emigrated to Germany during the second half of the 20th century.¹

In comparison, ‘ethnic German’ immigration during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic amounted to only several tens of thousands of people who, moreover, to a considerable extent returned to their countries of origin or continued to migrate overseas. The ‘remigration’ of ‘Germans of foreign citizenship’ since the late 19th century constitutes the background of today’s influx of Aussiedler, a phenomenon that, since the beginning of the 1990s, has been increasingly contentious.² The following comments will first discuss manifestations and structural patterns of ‘ethnic German’ immigration between the 1880s and 1930s. Then the focus will turn to the perception within Germany of ‘ethnic German’ immigration and to the integration – or, if applicable, non-integration – of the group under consideration, taking into account the fundamental changes occurring after the First World War in Germany’s political and economic situation.
‘Remigration’ of Russian-German Settlers in the Empire and Promotion of ‘Germanness’ in the Prussian East

From the late 19th century onwards, a large number of German settlers from East, East Central and Southeastern Europe had continued to migrate. Many of those German colonists, for example, who, during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, had settled in tsarist Russia since the 1870s, moved on to the United States, South America, Canada, and Australia. This was due to the Russian government’s gradual withdrawal, since the 1860s, of important privileges and increasing the pressure on the German settlers to assimilate by pursuing a policy of Russification. Moreover, economic development was impeded by a lack of arable land. The first Russian census of 1897 registered a total “German mother tongue” population of 1.8 million people. Between 1870 and 1914, Russian-German emigration to the US alone amounted to 116,000. The majority of emigrants left Russia after the turn of the century.

The exodus of ‘ethnic Germans’ from their settlements in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe to Germany began in the 1890s. The financially well endowed but politically contentious ‘settlement law’ (Ansiedlungsgesetz) of April 26, 1886, enabled the Prussian government to buy up Polish real estate in the Prussian provinces of Posen and West Prussia for the purpose of German peasant settlement. With the number of domestic applicants declining, the ‘Royal Commission for Settlement in the Provinces of Posen and West Prussia’ (Königliche Ansiedlungskommission für die Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen), began, especially since the turn of the century, to win over German colonists from abroad, mainly from tsarist Russia. The result fell far short of the high expectations. Between 1888 and 1914, 21,683 families came to settle in the provinces, of which about one-quarter, 5,480 families, came from abroad. Of these foreign Germans, most of them came from Russia (4,900), and, to a lesser extent, from Galicia (500) and Hungary (80). Most of the settlers of German descent from Russia came from Russian Poland (3,540 families), the rest mainly from Volynia. As the Commission’s efforts to attract ‘ethnic German’ colonists were most pronounced after 1900, the percentage of foreign settlers continued to be disproportionally high throughout the one and a half decades preceding the First World War. Their proportion peaked in 1905, with 41.9%.

Apart from the self-employed Russian-German peasant settlers, there was a larger group of colonists, namely, the farm workers called to work on the estates of the Prussian East. Again, the intention was to displace the Poles, but in this case the measure was not directed against Prussian citizens of Polish nationality, but against those Polish
migrant farm workers from Russian Central Poland and Austro-Hungarian Galicia who poured into Prussian agriculture in the hundreds of thousands each year.6 The Berlin ‘Society for the Welfare of German Remigrants’ (Fürsorgeverein für deutsche Rückwanderer), founded in 1909 with substantial support from Prussian authorities, brought a total of about 26,000 Russian Germans to Germany during the six years prior to the First World War. About two thirds of them came from Volynia.7 However, the number of Russian-German farm workers remained considerably lower than that of foreign Polish farm workers. In 1909, 216,000 of the latter entered Prussia, and until 1914 their annual number had risen to about 251,000.8

The purpose of persuading ‘ethnic Germans’ to return was clearly stated. They were expected to alleviate the effects of the rural exodus from the East Elbian agricultural region, to take the place of unwelcome Polish foreign seasonal workers,9 and “to lay new foundations for the patriarchal relations between estate owners and workforce that are so frequently lacking today”. Moreover, the recruitment of Russian-German farm workers was supposed to be instrumental in stabilising the Empire’s domestic political situation. “We must not forget that the social-democratic party is making every effort to turn the lack of farm workers into a permanent phenomenon. Lately the party’s agents have been particularly organised to stir up the foreign seasonal farm workers. Through an appropriate handling of the returning German migrants, these efforts can be effectively contained”.10

Advertising for the remigration of ‘ethnic Germans’, a measure supported especially by the extremely nationalist Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Verband), it was also pointed out that Russian-German immigrant families were very large. This was considered a clear advantage for the aim of displacing the Poles. It had the additional benefit of supplying the Prussian army with a considerable number of recruits who otherwise would have had to serve in foreign armies.11 Alfred Borchardt, founder and head of the Society for the Welfare of German Remigrants and former expert for agriculture at the German embassy in St Petersburg, concisely summarised the benefits of employing Russian-German farm workers: “The advantages are the unspoilt nature of German ethnicity, the firmness of faith, the patriarchal family life, the deep-rooted love for country life and the abundant offspring”.12

In a report to Emperor Wilhelm II, the Chief President of the province of Posen gave an account of the early recruitment measures in Russia. The state government, he wrote, had indeed increased its recruitment efforts in Russia since the 1890s, but, fearing foreign-policy complications because of the Russian ban on recruitment and emigration, only “on condition that the agitation was pursued with the utmost caution, appearing as a merely private matter and avoiding any impres-
sion whatsoever of being connected to the Commission for Settlement.” Since 1901, the report continued, thousands of leaflets had been distributed in German settlements with the help of emigration agents, and, at the same time, with the support of the Pan-German League, addresses had been collected: “The leaflets bore cover addresses mostly from Russian territory, to avoid attracting the attention of the Russian authorities”. The Chief President of Posen, Wilhelm von Waldow, stressed that the recruitment measures of the Commission for Settlement had indeed been successful, and that its leaflet had aroused the ‘ethnic German’ colonists’ “yearning for their ancient German home country” where they could “live as Germans among Germans”.13

The head of the Welfare Society emphasised that the society was also only able to work in Russia “in secret” and, moreover, had frequently had to take care of illegal border crossings of ‘ethnic German remigrants’: “In order to reach the mother country, they had to risk their lives … seeking to secretly cross the border. Usually this had the most inconvenient consequence of forfeiting any possibility whatsoever to return to their previous home country with impunity.”14

**Russian-German ‘Remigrants’ in the Strategy of German Warfare during the First World War**

The emigration and remigration of the late 19th and early 20th centuries did not endanger the existence of German settlements in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe. It was the European “new Thirty Years’ War” (Hans-Ulrich Wehler) – 1914-1945 – and its consequences led to the destruction of most of the main areas of German settlement in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe. In the course of the First World War and in its aftermath, millions of people all over Europe lost their homes temporarily or once and for all. In tsarist Russia, the advance of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies soon led to the flight, expulsion, evacuation, and displacement of millions of people from the border areas and war zones of the Russian West. Russian-Germans were among the victims, and ten thousands of them were transported East, especially from Volynia. In addition to being evacuated, Russian-Germans were also subject to displacement, because the tsarist government considered them as constituting a ‘fifth column’ that could not be tolerated behind one’s own frontlines.

The settlement of Germans in Volynia was most severely affected by the direct effects of war and the consequences of displacement. After it was annexed by German and Austro-Hungarian troops, the region became the centre of the emigration of colonists to Germany. The Society
for the Welfare of German Remigrants brought about 60,000 Russian-Germans into the Empire during the First World War. Among them, 30,000 came from Volynia, and about 25,000 of these were mostly sent to work in East Prussian agricultural sector. Most colonists came to the Empire after 1916. Of the 33,429 ‘remigrating’ Germans who were brought to Germany by the Welfare Society until April 30, 1917, 24,102 entered after May 1, 1916. 23,357 people, about two thirds of the approximately 33,000 ‘remigrating’ Germans who arrived in the Empire until the end of April 1917, were able, with the help of the Welfare Society, to find employment.\(^{15}\)

Contrary to the Welfare Society’s assertions, the immigration of Russian-German colonists to the Empire during the First World War was not primarily about humanitarian aid. The main objective was rather the targeted recruitment of workers in order to alleviate the manpower shortage in Germany effected by the war. As the German economist Karl C. Thalheim wrote in retrospect in 1926, the efforts were aimed at compensating “for the loss of lives during the war without resorting to workers of foreign origin” and at fortifying newly conquered areas with settlers who were considered reliable. “The return of German peasants settling in South Russia and at the Volga was seen to be an opportunity for this purpose”.\(^{16}\) Thalheim’s assessment points to two strands of discussion that were prominent during the First World War and also influenced the debate in the post-war era. The first consisted in considerations concerning the opportunities and benefits of ‘remigration’ to the Empire, focusing on potentials for development after the (winning of the) war. Second, the ‘remigration’ of ‘ethnic Germans’ mainly from Russia was of concern regarding war aims in general as well as the specific question of population policy in the areas to be annexed.

During the first year of the war, ‘remigration’ was already intensely being discussed in connection with plans for annexation and the intended establishment of a ‘border strip’ in the East. The area designated for annexation was the Russian territory along the Prussian border from Eastern Prussia in the North down to Silesia in the South. It seemed particularly suited for this purpose from the perspective of military, economic, but also ethno-national considerations. Continuing the policy of settlement in the Prussian East, the annexation was considered to serve its strategic purposes only if supplemented with a policy of settlement\(^{17}\) – by creating “a secure German bulwark through colonisation”.\(^{18}\)

The first measures of a settlement policy were discussed as early as mid-1915. They were aimed at ‘Germanising’ the ‘border strip’. In this context, the government authorities mentioned Russian-German colonists for the first time, intending them to play an important role in the
This issue was then discussed at the beginning of 1917 by the relevant departments in Prussia and the Empire, by the supreme command (Oberste Heeresleitung) and the command of the German forces in the East (Oberkommando Ost). It was planned to dispossess the “Russian-orthodox owners”, who after the annexation would be “excluded from acquiring German citizenship” anyway. The Russian state was supposed to compensate them. Thus, all of the involved departments agreed without reservation to the aim of annexing a strip of land along Prussia’s Eastern border as a ‘frontier fortification’ where the resident population was to be ‘resettled’ and ‘Germanisation’ was to be achieved by colonists ‘of German descent’ from Russia.

When German and Austro-Hungarian troops advanced more forcefully in 1917 and at the beginning of 1918, a far-reaching German policy of annexation in East Central and East Europe appeared increasingly realistic. On May 2, 1918, a conference was held to regulate ethno-nationally motivated privileges for Russian-German ‘remigration’. It was decided to “establish an organisation and enable it … to meet all demands”. An organisation working within the framework of ethno-nationally oriented migration control was seen to have a variety of tasks to fulfil. It should increase the ‘ethnic Germans’ willingness to ‘remigrate’, register those ready to ‘remigrate’ according to their number, qualifications and means, select suitable candidates in their countries of origin and take them to the Empire, considering the Empire’s capacity to admit immigrants with respect to economic, social, and security matters. Moreover, it was supposed to help with liquidating the possessions of those willing to leave. The organisation was expected to introduce measures in the Empire to accompany and support integration, namely, to organise the ‘remigration’, provide refugee camps and record employment and settlements.

In accordance with the results of the conference, the ‘Office for German Return Migration and Emigration’ (Reichsstelle für deutsche Rückwanderung und Auswanderung) was officially established on May 29, 1918. The director later described the motivation for its formation as lying in “the necessity to ensure that this large quantity of valuable Germanness does not pour over Germany haphazardly”. The issue was “to create a central authority in the Empire to systematically direct and control the flood of migrants.” Thus the primary aim was not to ‘rescue’ Russian-German colonists from their war-inflicted predicament, but the ethno-nationally motivated search for manpower and settlers. The establishment of the Migration Office therefore resulted from ethno-national and demographic considerations with the objective of compensating for the consequences of war by way of migration control. For this reason the department was vested with the responsibility for ‘remigration’ as well as for emigration from Germany. All areas of responsi-
bility in connection with the latter were, however, deferred because of the war. Thus the department initially served as an organisation purely for ‘remigrants’ with the purpose of preparing the ‘remigration’ after the general peace agreement.23 Despite all of the feelings of pity expressed by the authorities and the public for the Russian-Germans’ predicament, the main aim during the war was to persuade them to remain in their areas of settlement.24 At the same time, the authorities sought to retain the possibility of motivating them to ‘return’ to Germany when the country had enlarged its territory after winning the war.

The establishment of the Migration Office took place at the height of the German policy of annexation, at a time when the supreme command had taken full charge of that issue. This is also shown by the ‘Memorandum on the Polish Border Strip’ (Denkschrift über den polnischen Grenzstreifen) of July 5, 1918. It summarised all of the military, economic and ethno-national arguments for the far-reaching extension of the border towards the East that was necessary from the supreme command’s point of view. General Erich Ludendorff’s memorandum also set the standards for the question of ‘remigration’ and the responsibilities of the Migration Office. “For the years after the war, we have to reckon with a stream of returning German migrants, and it is ... completely up to the Empire’s authorities to control this stream according to the interests of the German Empire. ... The number of Germans determined to return to Germany from Russia alone is estimated at 1 ½ million = 300,000 families ... All of these returning migrants will have to be made room for. For this purpose neither the small areas in the Empire remaining for settlement nor the newly acquired parts of the Baltics and Lithuania will suffice. This is another reason for the necessity of obtaining the border strip.”25

‘Remigration’ as a Threat to German Post-War Society and the Minority Policy

With the defeat of the Reich in 1918, the implementation of the plans for Russian-German ‘remigration’ that had been developed during the last year of the war was rendered impossible. In May 1919, the Migration Office pointed out that “from the utilitarian point of view of German politics ... considering the present political circumstances” there was no alternative to the colonists than remaining in their areas, “as before, as Ukrainian or Russian citizens”. This was seen as promising the “preservation of Germanness there”. The Migration Office, moreover, saw no possibility for Germany to force ‘remigration’.26 The department reached an unambiguous conclusion concerning the future
policy towards those Russian-Germans who had come or been lured to Germany during the war. It stated “an urgent need ... to encourage as much as possible the return of refugees to their countries of origin”. This was not a new assessment, as such a policy of encouraging the Russian-Germans who had immigrated into the Reich during the war to return had already been pursued since the end of war in 1918. It aimed at alleviating the tense situation on the German labour and housing markets through the outflow of people who were “entirely destitute” and partly “long-term recipients of public welfare”.27

During the five years of turmoil during the Russian revolution, German occupation and Russian civil war 1917-1921/22, an estimated roughly 120,000 Russian-Germans were able to leave their areas of settlement for Germany. Almost all of them arrived in the course of the war or during the retreat of German troops from the territories of the former Russian Empire. For about half of them, Germany was merely a stopover on their way to the United States, South America, or Canada.28 In the Weimar Republic, the discussion on ‘returning’ Russian-Germans was largely superseded by the economic and social problems of a post-war society in which demographic considerations and measures raised during the world war became increasingly insignificant. Only occasionally was the question of the appropriate policy towards ‘remigrants’ raised in the press, the political debate, or in administrative provisions. Russian-German ‘remigrants’ and their role in the German migration policy of the early Weimar Republic were mainly discussed in 1921-22 and 1929-30.

According to estimates from the 1990s, Russia during the years of revolution and civil war, 1917-1922, suffered heavy losses in population, amounting to some 13 million people in all. As stated by the same source, 2.5 million of them died fighting for one of the armed units of the parties involved; 1.5 to 2 million emigrated; 2 million died of epidemic diseases; 1 million fell victim to terrorist attacks and banditry; about 300,000 lost their lives in pogroms against Jews. The majority, however, more than 5 million people, died in the famine of 1921-22.29 Among them were numerous Russian-Germans. According to estimates and the Soviet census of 1926, the number of Russian-Germans declined from 1.621 million at the end of 1918 to 1.238 million at the end of 1926. Taking into account the statistically probable growth in population, also including gaps in the birthrate, the Russian-German population decreased by 588,000 in a mere eight years. The reasons named for the decline of the total population 1917-1922 also apply to Russian-Germans. Their decrease can also be attributed mainly to the famine of 1921-22.

The ‘ethnic German’ colonists along the Volga and the Black Sea were amongst those who suffered the most. Destruction from the civil
war as well as life-threatening forced taxes in kind and bad harvests as in other parts of the country, had dramatically aggravated the food situation since 1920, and it is estimated that 25 million people starved in Russia in 1921. The famine was most severe in the province of Saratov, where 2.1 of a population of 2.9 million were starving. The province of Saratov comprised the settlement area of the Volga Germans where, in 1924, the ‘Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans’ was founded. In mid-1921, three quarters of all of the inhabitants in the Volga area were starving, and in the winter of 1921/22, almost all of them. In the settlement areas of Volga Germans, the population declined as a consequence of starvation and emigration from 452,000 to 359,000 between the end of 1920 and August 15, 1921, a rate of almost one quarter. According to data from the Soviet government which are bound to be underestimated, 48,000 people died in the Volga-German settlement areas alone, which constituted of 10% of all of the German colonists living there. Moreover, about 74,000 Volga Germans, about 20% of the total population, fled from the hunger in their villages to regions which seemed to offer better food supplies, such as Siberia, Central Asia, the Caucasus area, the Ukraine, and Central Russia. Several thousand Volga Germans found their way to Germany, and possibly 2,000 to 3,000 people fleeing from hunger were admitted to Germany.

When the first reports concerning large scale westward movements of ‘ethnic Germans’ fleeing from hunger reached Germany and predicted a “massive inflow to Germany”, the Ministry of the Interior reacted in the early summer of 1921 by proclaiming a clear policy of rejection. “We will have to strive to keep away from Germany that flux of refugees by all means.” All applications for immigration to Germany, the ministry went on to say, were to be rejected in the interest of “protecting the local population from a further deterioration in living standards”, given the housing shortages, unemployment situation and problems with food supplies. The Migration Office was given instructions by the Ministry of the Interior to employ all means at its disposal in order “to stop the ethnic Germans in Russia or divert them to other regions outside of Germany”.

The Migration Office objected to the strict blockade policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior. It regarded the rumours about masses of refugees flowing towards Germany as false. Therefore it strongly recommended “far-reaching concessions”, “for humanitarian reasons and in view of the German ethnicity” of those few refugees who could actually be expected to cross the border to Germany. The Office expected the strict closing of the borders to find no sympathy abroad, but especially within Germany itself, considering that the German immigration policy was already being met with considerable protest anyway.
The public, it predicted, will "never understand if those amongst our German nation who are worst off find closed doors in Germany and are let to starve at the German border, whereas swarms of foreign elements, especially Eastern Jews, considering supposedly impending Russian and Polish pogroms, are regularly granted hospitable admission in Germany, with the government referring to humanitarian obligations."34

Considerations of humanitarian aid and ethno-national preferences thus constituted the background of this plea by the Migration Office for a more open immigration policy towards the starving Volga Germans – as long as the number of immigrants was expected to be low. The wording of the statement points to scenarios that left, from the point of view of the Migration Office, no alternative but a blockade policy. The Office saw Germany "threatened" by a huge "stream" of refugees and expressed its "fear" thereof and of "demands on public welfare", and in general, of the "great difficulties" that a large number of refugees was likely to cause.

The Foreign Office also opposed a strict closing of the borders to the starving Volga-German refugees, so the Ministry of the Interior relaxed the rules and admitted some refugees. However, in the course of autumn 1921, it revealed how easily the tolerance threshold of the Ministry of the Interior could be overstepped. Until December 1921, the number of Volga Germans fleeing starvation who were able to reach Poland and cross the German border had increased to roughly 500 or 600. For the Ministry of the Interior, this exceeded the low limit of tolerable immigration by Russian-Germans, especially considering that many of them suffered from severe diseases, and because the German authorities had not been prepared for their admission.

The events in the admission camp in Frankfurt/Oder on December 6, 1921 finally prompted the Ministry of the Interior to once again close the borders to Russian-Germans. On this day, a transport of some 400 Volga Germans fleeing starvation had arrived in Frankfurt/Oder. Among them 85 "seriously ill men, women and children", "completely louse-ridden and seedy", were immediately admitted to the city hospital. Most of them suffered from highly contagious epidemic typhus. Within a few days the number of those who had to be put into quarantine in special buildings rose to 150, and by the end of December, 241. Addressing the Ministry of the Interior, the municipal authorities of Frankfurt/Oder thought it "entirely incomprehensible that a contaminated transport of this kind was, without any precautionary measures, led here and we were not informed until we had no choice but to admit the sick".35

After the events in Frankfurt/Oder and in view of the allegedly "difficult situation in Germany" created by the increase in registered refu-
gees to a total of 500 to 600, the Ministry of the Interior stated that “exaggerated consideration for the Volga Germans who left Germany a long time ago and now point to their German descent” was “misplaced”. The Prussian Ministry of the Interior also took a disapproving stance. It demanded that the economic and social situation of the population in Germany be the main priority when considering the issue, not the situation of Volga-German refugees.

Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau outlined this policy in a March 1, 1922 letter to the Reich chancellor. He wrote that relief campaigns for the starving Russian-Germans were to be supported by all means. The colonies in the USSR, he continued, had to be maintained, especially because it was not possible for the German population to accommodate larger quantities of refugees, considering the continuing considerable shortage in food and housing in Germany as well as the danger to public health. Therefore, aid for the starving was considered a “preventive measure in the fields of epidemic control and refugee welfare”. Rathenau expected the fight against the causes of migration to also offer economic advantages to Germany. He considered “South Russia as a market for our agricultural industry and as a future source of rich exportable crops can only be secured for us by immediately alleviating its desperate situation through enabling the population to remain there and cultivate the land.”

### Return Migration to the USSR and International Protectionism in Migration Policy

The subsidence of the famine in 1922 marked the end of large-scale emigration from Russia. The outflow had been decreasing considerably since the victory of the Red Army in the civil war and the consolidation of Soviet rule. The first measures to control emigration and labour migration from the territories under Soviet control had already been introduced immediately after the October revolution. Since 1919, anyone intending to cross the border needed a permit issued by the Soviet Ministries of the Interior and of War. Since 1922, it was effectively impossible to cross the border of the soviet territory for purposes of work or emigration, and exceptions were rare. Thus, the Soviet Union became the first state in the world to systematically and highly effectively control and regulate international migration (as well as internal migration). This very restrictive migration policy was closely connected with the Soviet large-scale industrialisation programme that was to be implemented with the help of far-reaching recruitment and the allocation of the entire workforce.
When the famine of 1921-1923 had ebbed, migration movements back to the USSR became significantly more important. The formal background was an amnesty declared by the government of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans on April 5, 1924, which was later extended to those emigrants who had left the Volga area prior to 1918. According to the ‘Central Committee of Germans from Russia’ and the ‘Society for Volga Germans’ who collected applications for the return to the Volga area and forwarded them to the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, a “remigration fever” began in 1926. The interest groups had no reservations, “because after all these years of wandering around, those unfortunate uprooted people do deserve to return to their homes and familiar work situations”. From the perspective of the pressure groups, the Russian-Germans’ high willingness to leave Germany and return to the USSR was mainly attributable to shortcomings in the integration policy of the Weimar Republic that had been criticised since the early 1920s. The conflict chiefly centred around the question of creating opportunities for settlement in Germany. In their publications, the pressure groups of ‘ethnic Germans’ from Russia mainly emphasised the Russian-Germans’ “disappointment” with the conditions of their admission into Germany. They were reported to have been treated merely “as a foreign nuisance, like Russians” and as “annoying rivals” in the labour market.

The soviet intention of preventing emigration worked very much in the interest of German politics. Fighting the crisis, the government of the Weimar Republic on the whole pursued a policy of restricting immigration which also applied to ‘remigrating ethnic Germans’. Their fate was regretted very much, but their immigration was decidedly unwanted. This was again evident when, at the end of 1929, Russian-German peasants affected by the Soviet compulsory collectivisation went to Moscow, hoping the German embassy would help them emigrate to Germany. Against the background of the emerging world-wide economic crisis, the German government consented to temporarily admit them only after extremely hesitant negotiations. In mid-November 1929, about 13,000 to 14,000 ‘ethnic Germans’ ready to emigrate were waiting in Moscow for their permits. At first the colonists’ efforts to obtain the permits from the relevant Soviet authorities failed. The police even took measures to put a stop to more ‘ethnic Germans’ coming to Moscow, and increased the pressure on those peasants already in the city to return to their settlements.

When the German embassy intervened on their behalf at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, this was mainly due to German domestic policy developments. A flood of press reports and publications had started a heated public discussion about German policy towards the Russian-German minority. Meanwhile, relief organisations registered high in-
flows of donations. Against this background, the German government no longer regarded as justifiable a policy that merely regretted the Russian-German peasants’ fate but did not come to their aid. Foreign Minister Julius Curtius, addressing the Reich chancellery, emphasised the particular importance of the public discussion on their fate. “German public opinion”, he wrote on November 6, 1929, was “already highly interested and would not be able to comprehend that ethnic German peasants who, forced by unbearable physical and mental hardship, have decided to emigrate from the Soviet Union, are let down and abandoned to perish.” Nevertheless, an unlimited admission of Russian-Germans into Germany was out of the question for the government.

In November 1929, the conflict over the emigration of the ‘ethnic German’ peasants escalated. On October 19, the Soviet authorities had permitted the colonists’ emigration on the condition that they depart immediately. Despite the Soviet threat to transport the peasants back to their colonies, a country willing to admit them had not yet been found. The peasants’ departure was thus delayed, so that the Soviet police authorities in mid-November began to initiate transports back to the colonies. According to German embassy research, 8,000 people, a majority of the colonists, were affected by the measures. The German embassy in Moscow asked the Soviet authorities for a deferment of the deportations. Although the foreign office supported the refugees’ temporary admission into Germany, the relevant departments in the Ministry for the Interior continued to reject it because of the costs and the fear of provoking similar endeavours.

In a race against the transports taking the ‘ethnic German’ peasants from Moscow back to their settlements, the cabinet, after consulting the leaders of the bigger parliamentary parties, on November 18, 1929 issued the permission for the temporary stay of up to 13,000 colonists in Germany. At the same time, it became known that the Soviet authorities had started large-scale deportations that quickly reduced the number of Russian-German peasants left in Moscow. The transports to Germany via Latvia and Lithuania began on November 30, 1929. Finally, approximately 5,700 Russian German colonists were brought to Germany.

There had been political pressure within Germany to immediately admit to Germany all of the Russian-German colonists from Moscow, pressure that came mostly from the Centre Party (Zentrum) and the right-wing parties. These efforts found further support in the ample discussions that took place in the press. The government sought to withstand the pressure and to find a solution to the economic and labour market crisis via a protectionist migration policy while at the same time having to admit initially thousands, but soon maybe tens of
thousands of impoverished peasants. The German Ministries of Finance and of the Interior as well as the Prussian government in particular had spoken out against their admittance.\textsuperscript{53}

The fact that the admission policy favoured from the very beginning by the German embassy in Moscow and by the foreign office that finally prevailed was not least of all due to Reich President Paul von Hindenburg’s intervention. The President stated that “to aid these pitiable peasants of German race is absolutely necessary for both humanitarian and political reasons”. He went on to say that “public opinion in Germany would not understand it if these people were left to starve to death, while since the end of the war tens of thousand of foreigners, mostly very undesirable, have already been admitted into Germany.”\textsuperscript{54}

Upon the suggestion of Foreign Minister Curtius, the government eventually formulated clear conditions towards the Russian-Germans’ interest groups for the temporary admission of the German colonists. The German government allocated six million Reichsmarks on November 19, 1929 for transportation and accommodations in Germany, but most of it was to be repaid by the interest groups involved. This applied to all costs for the transport outside of Germany as well as to costs of accommodations in Germany. Moreover, the interest groups were instructed to encourage the colonists to move overseas. When the Russian-German colonists arrived in Germany at the end of 1929, they were initially accommodated in three camps (Hammerstein/Posen-West Prussia, about 3,200 people; Prenzlau/Brandenburg, about 1,700; Mölln/Sleswig-Holstein, about 800). In 1930-31, they moved on from the camps to destinations in Canada, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina.

On February 20, 1930, the cabinet decided not to admit any more Russian-German colonists, partly for economic reasons, but also in order not to further strain German relations with the USSR.\textsuperscript{55} The government decided to stop the immigration in expectation of increased emigration from the USSR in the wake of further collectivisation in agriculture.\textsuperscript{56} Experts estimated the size of the exodus expected at 700,000 to 800,000 Russian-Germans, some of whom were believed to reach Germany.\textsuperscript{57} Given this assessment, the German ban on immigration since the beginning of 1930 was believed, in the words of the foreign office, to have “a strong effect on the colonists to remain on their native soil”.\textsuperscript{58} The German embassy in Moscow and the German consulates in the USSR were given instructions to warn the Russian-Germans against emigrating and to point out that immigrants were no longer being admitted into Germany.\textsuperscript{59}
Conclusion: The Limits of Ethno-nationally Motivated Preferential Treatment of One Group of Immigrants

One way of preventing foreigners of German descent from immigrating and settling in Germany during the Weimar Republic was the comparatively strict application of the 1913 Citizenship Law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz). This measure stands in stark contrast to the recognition and admission of Aussiedler (from 1993 onwards called Spätaussiedler) in the Federal Republic of Germany, a practice that is tied to the law that deals with the late consequences of the Second World War.60 In the Weimar Republic, ‘ethnic Germans of foreign citizenship in the Reich’ were denied swift naturalisation rights and legal equality with Reich citizens. Treating German citizens and ‘ethnic Germans of foreign citizenship’ equally would supposedly alienate ‘ethnic Germans’ from their home country, thereby weakening the position of minorities of German descent abroad. This policy was expected to increase Germany’s attraction for this group of immigrants and to further contribute to the dissolution of minority groups. Moreover, a liberal policy of naturalisation was seen as endangering the interests of the German economic and labour market policies. Thus the rationale of the Weimar policy towards ‘remigrants of German descent’ was to prevent immigration to Germany by maintaining the main areas of settlement in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe. It was motivated by considerations concerning domestic, foreign, and economic policies, if necessary contrary to humanitarian interests.61

National Socialist politics developed a completely opposing course that partly drew on the discussion about settlements during the First World War. But, in contrast to the Weimar Republic, National Socialist politics did not aim at maintaining the minorities of German descent in their areas of settlement. On the contrary – on the slogan “Back home to the Reich”, about one million ‘ethnic Germans’ (now called Volksdeutsche) were resettled during the period 1939-1944 predominantly from those areas in the East that were occupied and annexed by Germany. The resettlement of ‘ethnic Germans’ began in 1939 with the settlement of 100,000 South Tyrolese mainly in Tyrol and Carinthia. In 1940-41, 130,000 ‘ethnic Germans’ from Estonia and Latvia as well as from Bessarabia were brought to settle mainly in the areas of Poland annexed by the Reich (‘Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreußen’, ‘Reichsgau Posen’/‘Warthegau’). Finally, in 1944, 250,000 ‘ethnic Germans’ from Volynia, Galicia, and Transylvania arrived on German soil in what was more a flight from the Red Army than a resettlement.62

The settlement of ‘ethnic Germans’ was always based on the deportation of the indigenous population of Poles, Czechs and Jews. Large-scale deportations had been introduced in 1939-40, which ended in
genocide. In order to make room for the settlement of ‘ethnic Germans’, about 1.2 million Poles and Jews were expelled in 1940-41 from the formerly Polish areas along the river Warta and in Danzig-West Prussia, now incorporated into the Reich as ‘Reichsgaue’. And this was only the beginning, an overall plan for the area had already been drawn up. Of the more than 10 million people inhabiting the area, only 1.7 million were regarded as ‘capable of being germanised’, whereas 7.8 million Poles and 700,000 Jews were to be expelled. Final responsibility for resettlement and expulsion lay with the SS who ruthlessly carried out the policy of ‘Germanisation’ in Poland. The ‘general plan for the East’ (Generalplan Ost), drawn up by the SS in 1942, aimed at extending the policy of large-scale resettlement for the benefit of German settlers which had in part already been carried out in Poland to the whole of Eastern Europe as far as the Urals. For a resettlement of this magnitude, the plan would effect some 45 million people. Thus the German ‘nation without space’ was to make room for itself, expelling or killing the indigenous populations – with the exception of those who could still be of use as work slaves.

Fundamental changes in the European balance of power after the Second World War, the ‘Cold War’ and the destruction of a majority of German areas of settlement in East, East Central and Southeastern Europe effected a change in direction of policies towards minorities ‘of German origin’ in those areas. From the beginning, the Federal Republic of Germany pursued a liberal policy of admission towards Aussiedler from the Soviet sphere of influence, a policy that, compared to the treatment of other groups of immigrants, has been combined with wide-ranging privileges concerning matters of citizenship and social security. The Weimar Republic had neither been willing nor able to pursue a migration policy of that kind, given the aims of revisionist foreign policy for which German minorities and those ‘of German descent’ were treated as a means, but also regarding the economic crisis.

Notes

1 Bade and Olmer 2003.
2 For further details and considerations cf. Olmer 2005, 139-217.
3 Kabuzan 1990, 71-74, 79.
5 Until the end of 1899, the total number of settlers was a mere 120 families; see Chief President in Posen to Emperor Wilhelm II., July 12, 1903, Federal State Archive Berlin-Lichterfelde (BArch B), R 901, no. 30007.
6 Bade 1980a.
8 Bade 1984a.
9 Prussian Ministry of Agriculture, of the Interior and of Finances in Berlin to Chief Presidents in the Prussian provinces, May 28, 1909, BArch B, R 901, no. 30007.
10 Deutsche Rückwanderer 1908, 24-25.
11 Weber 1915.
12 Borchardt 1915, 12.
13 Chief President in Posen to Emperor Wilhelm II. in Berlin, July 12, 1903, BArch B, R 901, no. 30007.
14 Borchardt 1915, 8; see also German Consulate in Moscow to Reich Chancellor in Berlin, February 13, 1908, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18372.
16 Thalheim 1926, 114; Altrock 1920.
17 Geiss 1960, 230-239.
18 According to the head of the colonial school in Witzenhausen, who was among the first to bring “remigrants” to the Empire. Fabarius 1916, 16.
20 Negotiation protocol concerning the “Remigration of German comrades from Russia and other countries, and the regulations to be included in the peace treaties in this respect”, Foreign Office in Berlin, March 31, 1917, BArch B, R 3901, no. 18385.
21 Fischer 1967, 236-238.
22 Jung 1920, 5.
23 For the history of the Migration Office see Bade 1989. In May 1919, its name was changed to ‘Office for German Immigration, Remigration and Emigration’ (Reichsamt für deutsche Einwanderung, Rückwanderung und Auswanderung – Reichswagen-samt), and its responsibilities were extended, until, in April 1924, it was downgraded to the subordinate ‘Office for Emigration’ (Reichsstelle für das Auswanderungswesen).
24 Peschke 1918, 71-72.
25 Chief of the General Staff of the army in the Main Quarter to Reich Chancellor in Berlin, July 5, 1918, published in Geiss, 1960, 174-176; cf. the detailed “Memorandum concerning the German colonies in the former Russian Empire and their remigration to Germany”, Foreign Office, March 1918, BArch B, R 901, no. 30006.
26 Office for German Immigration, Remigration and Emigration in Berlin to Ministry of the Interior in Berlin, March 8, 1919, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18388.
27 Office for German Immigration, Remigration and Emigration in Berlin to Foreign Office in Berlin, January 18, 1921, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18389.
28 Schmidt 1993, 42-43.
29 Altrichter 1999, 351, 353.
32 Eichler 1939.
33 Ministry of the Interior in Berlin to Foreign Office in Berlin, August 9, 1921, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18389.
34 Office for German Immigration, Remigration and Emigration in Berlin to Ministry of the Interior in Berlin, August 19, 1921, BArch B, R 1501, no. 18389.
36 Quoted from Mick 1995, 350-351.
38 Dowty 1987, 63-76.
Amnestie und Rückkehrerlaubnis für wolgadeutsche Flüchtlinge, in: Nachrichtenblatt der Reichsstelle für das Auswanderungswesen, 8. 1926, no. 1, p. 4.


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The German ambassador in Moscow, Herbert von Dirksen, spoke of a “system of putting off the colonists by pointing to the platonic sympathies Germany had for them”; Ambassador von Dirksen in Moscow to Foreign Office in Berlin, August 1, 1929, published in: Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, series B: 1925-1933, vol. 12: June 1 until September 2, 1929, Göttingen 1978, no. 141, pp. 306-308, here p. 308.

Foreign Office in Berlin to State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, November 6, 1929, BArch B R 43 I, no. 141.

Telegram German Embassy in Moscow to Foreign Office in Berlin, October 29, 1929, BArch B, R 43 I, no. 141.

German Embassy in Moscow to Foreign Office in Berlin, November 19, 1929, BArch B, R 43 I, no. 141.

Proposition of the official in charge, concerning repatriation of colonists of German descent from Russia, to the State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery, November 7, 1929, BArch B, R 43 I, no. 141.

Protocol of the party leader meeting on November 14, 1929, Reich Chancellery in Berlin, BArch B, R 43 I, no. 141.

Extract from the protocol of the meeting of the German cabinet on November 18, 1929, Reich Chancellery in Berlin, BArch B, R 43 I, no. 141.

Telegram German embassy in Moscow to Foreign Office in Berlin, November 30, 1929, BArch B, R 43 I, no. 141.

Extract from the protocol of the meeting of the German cabinet on November 9, 1929, Reich Chancellery in Berlin, BArch B, R 43 I, no. 141.

State Secretary in the Reich President’s Office in Berlin to State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, November 12, 1929, BArch B, R 43 I, no. 141.

Dyck 1966, 162-184.

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Auhagen 1942, 57.

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Aussiedler in Germany:
From Smooth Adaptation to Tough Integration

Barbara Dietz

Introduction

The immigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union played a significant role in the post-Second World War immigration and integration experience of Germany. But in contrast to labour migrants, the inflow of ethnic Germans was not related to economic factors like recruitment programs or the business cycle. Because ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had experienced forced resettlement and ethnic discrimination during and after Second World War, they were allowed to enter Germany and were granted German citizenship upon arrival.

Until the end of the 1980s, the integration of ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler) into the German economy and society proceeded comparatively straightforwardly. However, since the political changes in Eastern Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the integration of Aussiedler has been characterised by frictions, which are similar to those of other immigrant populations in Germany. As a result, the integration path of the recent Aussiedler cohorts attracted the interest of migration and integration researchers who had thus far not paid much attention to this group. It became an increasingly discussed research topic to what extent and why the integration process of ethnic Germans had changed. Historians, economists, and social scientists contributed to that debate, referring to various theoretical considerations and comparisons with other immigrant groups.

Against this background, this chapter analyses the framework and the characteristics of the Aussiedler integration and their changes. The article focuses on the historical background of this migration movement, on the German admission policy, on the socio-demographic characteristics of ethnic German immigrants, and on the opportunity structure of the receiving German society. It will be argued that fundamental changes in all of these factors contributed to the frictions in the ethnic German integration experience since the political transformation in Eastern Europe and the break up of the Soviet Union.
1 Ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Historical Background

The history of ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is closely related to the history of European migration movements. In addition, shifting borders of the German empire played a role which sometimes included more people who considered themselves German and sometimes less. From the 15th to the 19th centuries, German-speaking migrants came to Eastern Europe as well as to the Russian Empire, to work and settle there. A considerable part of these migrants had been explicitly invited by the governments of the receiving states which wanted them to cultivate land, work in (agricultural) engineering, or secure border lands. Especially in the case of immigrants in the Russian Empire, significant privileges were granted to attract foreign settlers. As a consequence of these West-East migrations, German minority settlements developed in regions which nowadays belong to Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, changing borders contributed to the formation of German minorities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Upper Silesia, for example, which is now a part of Poland, belonged to the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation between 1335 and 1742 and later to Prussia. Thus a remarkable part of Upper Silesia’s population considered itself German. When Upper Silesia was divided between Poland and Germany in 1921 both parts included national minorities of the respective other nation.

Until the end of the 19th century, most ethnic Germans lived in peaceful coexistence with their neighbours in Eastern Europe and Russia. However, with the growing importance of nation-states and national ideologies at the end of the 19th century this situation changed. The political goal to even out national and territorial borders provoked the expulsion of national minorities or their (forced) assimilation. National governments and authorities in Eastern European states and Russia reacted more and more suspiciously towards its ethnic minorities as well as ethnic German migrants, withdrawing privileges that had formerly been granted. In addition, ethnic tensions and conflicts increasingly characterised the relations between Germans and their Eastern European neighbours.

In the 20th century political transformations and revolutions as well as two World Wars with Germany as the aggressor destroyed the economic and social living conditions of the German minorities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Immediately after the Second World War, the destructive policies of Nazi Germany resulted in the expulsion and flight of most ethnic Germans who had been living in Eastern Europe. In the USSR, many Germans had been deported to the eastern
parts of the country in 1941. Living in labour camps or under police surveillance until 1955, ethnic Germans were allowed to return to their former settlements no earlier than 1972. In the 1950s and 60s the Germans still living in Eastern Europe and the USSR had become a discriminated-against minority group. Whereas the Germans in Romania and to a lesser degree those in Poland had some opportunities to preserve their language and cultural traditions, the Germans in the Soviet Union were not allowed to speak their mother tongue in public until the end of the 1960s and suffered severe discrimination in daily life.

2 The Admission of Ethnic Germans into Germany: Politics Before and After 1989

After the Second World War, Germany emerged as the most important immigration country in the European context, admitting expellees and refugees, labour migrants, asylum seekers and to a considerable degree ethnic Germans as well. Between 1950 and the end of 2004, 4.45 million ethnic Germans came to Germany, 63% of them after 1989. This population movement took place after the expulsion and forced migration of German citizens and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during and immediately after the Second World War had ended. At that time – in the beginning of the 1950s – a remarkable number of Germans (approximately 4 million) were still living in Eastern Europe and the USSR, holding the citizenship of the respective states. Because many of them had experienced forced resettlement and ethnic discrimination, emigration to West Germany seemed like a viable option to escape the difficult situations in their home countries. However, the emigration of citizens from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European states was severely restricted. Until the end of the 1980s, ethnic Germans needed the invitation of immediate relatives in Germany to be allowed to leave the country of origin.

2.1 Immigration Politics

On the German side, the admission of ethnic Germans was regulated by the 1949 German Constitution which introduced their right to move to Germany and receive German citizenship. It has to be emphasised that it only affected those ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This political setting puts the Aussiedler migration to Germany in line with many past and contemporary migration flows which are connected to political and ethno-national determinants. These population movements often occur against the background of political repression and ethnic discrimination in the countries of origin.
and political security and ethnic affinity in the receiving states. In this context, the concept of diaspora migration represents a specific form: It is based on the perception of the sense of belonging and the return of migrants to a former homeland. Because the migration of ethnic Germans to Germany is linked to the political construction of co-ethnics returning to their nation-state it meets the basic criteria of diaspora migration. A similar constellation can be found in other ethno-national migration flows, for example, the Jewish migration from the (former) Soviet Union to Israel and the migration of Greeks and Finns from the successor states of the USSR to their respective homelands. Typically, these migration flows require some special political support on the part of the receiving state and society. Both an ethno-national migration motivation on the side of the Aussiedler and the assistance by the receiving German state have characterised the return migration of ethnic Germans.

Since the beginning of the 1950s, the German government has actively supported the immigration of ethnic Germans due to political and ethno-national considerations, urging the officials of the socialist sending countries to remove emigration barriers. With the opening up of Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, this policy changed remarkably. The new migration opportunities after the fall of the Iron Curtain which led to an immigration of 377,000 Aussiedler in 1989, created an ambivalence among Germans regarding the former open door policy of the German government towards ethnic Germans. Although the German authorities did not abolish the right of return altogether, they exerted a strong effort to channel and control the immigration of this group. A variety of measures – enforcement of admission barriers, reduction of integration support, economic assistance to the sending countries – have been introduced since 1990, which are usually instituted to prevent undesired immigration. After nearly 400,000 Aussiedler immigrated in 1990, these policies led first to a stabilisation and later – since 1994 – to a yearly decline in the total number of ethnic German immigrants.

Most importantly, the restriction of the Aussiedler immigration was related to the adoption of a new absorption law (Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz) in 1993. It only allowed Germans from the former Soviet Union to come to Germany without individually having to prove that they had been discriminated against because of their German descent. As serious ethnic discrimination against Germans in Poland and Romania is almost non-existent since the political transformation, their emigration has nearly ceased with the enforcement of the new law in 1993. In addition, the new absorption law established an immigration quota, fixing a maximum number of 220,000 ethnic German immigrants per year. In 1999, authorities further reduced this quota to
Moreover, since July 1996, ethnic German immigrants have to pass a German language test as a confirmation of their belonging to the German people (Volkszugehörigkeit). Because Germans in the former Soviet Union – which has been the dominant sending country since 1993 – were not allowed to speak German in the 1950s and 1960s, many of them lost their ties to their mother tongue. Consequently, 53% of 271,532 ethnic Germans who participated in the language test between July 1996 and December 2002 failed. It is remarkable that the percentage of ethnic Germans passing the test has continued to decline since its introduction: while 74% mastered the language test in 1996, in 2002 only 43% passed (see figure 2). This confirms that ethnic Germans could not reverse the process of losing their mother tongue.

2.2 Integration Politics

Notwithstanding its long-lasting self-image as a non-immigration country, Germany has absorbed a significant number of immigrants since the Second World War. However, the modes of immigrant incorporation were significantly different, concerning different immigrant groups. Whereas ethnic Germans receive German citizenship shortly after arrival, migrants of non-German descent have to fulfil demanding criteria to obtain German citizenship. According to the new law on citizenship which became law in January 2000, foreigners can apply for
German citizenship only after having been in Germany for eight years.13

The regulation on citizenship demonstrates that ethnic Germans are a privileged group compared to other immigrants. Furthermore, ethnic Germans are entitled to governmental integration support which most other immigrant groups in Germany are not. Referring to its political responsibility, the German government regarded it as an objective to actively support the integration of ethnic Germans into the German economy and society. Although there have been continuous cuts since 1989, the catalogue of assistance still comprises the following:

– financial assistance for unemployed ethnic Germans (for a maximum of six months). It can also be obtained while attending language classes
– language encouragement (for a maximum of six months)
– support for integration into the labour market, advanced training, and retraining
– support for the social integration and the professional advancement of juvenile ethnic German immigrants.

The aforementioned reductions in the integration support for ethnic German immigrants were the result of a fundamental policy change. Before the political transformation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the integration of ethnic Germans had been supported to compensate this group for hardships as a result of ethno-national discrimination in their former home countries. In addition, ideological arguments played a fundamental role: In the Cold War period the emigration of ethnic Germans from socialist countries had been used as evidence of the superiority of the West German system. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, system competition more or less ceased to exist,
while the increasing number of Aussiedler, the economic slowdown in Germany and the German reunification made it more and more difficult to finance the integration of this group. Furthermore, the native German population increasingly opposed government spending on Aussiedler who were often perceived as a burden to the welfare state. Following these arguments, the German government reduced the integration support for ethnic German immigrants step-by-step.¹⁴

3 The Changing Socio-Demographic Background of Ethnic German Immigrants

Since the end of the 1980s, there have been remarkable changes in the sending countries of ethnic Germans: between 1950 and 1988 nearly two-thirds of all Aussiedler (61%) immigrated from Poland, 12% came from the former Soviet Union and 13% from Romania.¹⁵ In the period 1989-2004, the former Soviet Union became the major sending country (75% of the ethnic Germans came from there), far ahead of Poland (17%) and Romania (8%). This change is a result of the opening up of the Soviet Union, the enforcement of the new German absorption law and, to a lesser degree, because the German minority populations in Poland and Romania had greatly diminished because of the ongoing emigration process.

Reflecting the deportation history of the German minority in the Soviet Union, the most important post-Soviet sending state is Kazakhstan, followed by Russia and Kirgistan.¹⁶

As can be expected, the social and cultural background of ethnic Ger-

![Figure 3](image_url)
man immigrants differs fundamentally, depending on their country of origin. This reflects the differences of the Romanian, Polish, and post-Soviet societies on the one hand, in addition it mirrors the strength and influence of the ethnic German communities there. Whereas Germans in Romania and Poland settled comparatively close to one another, the majority of ethnic Germans in the former USSR lived widely dispersed in a multiethnic setting. Most ethnic German immigrants from post-Soviet states, especially in the younger generation, did not preserve the German language and cultural traditions. Their ethnic identity is based on their German descent and the perception by (post) Soviet authorities. In that respect they differ strongly from ethnic Germans in Romania and to a lesser degree from those in Poland, who to a certain degree preserved their mother tongue and German cultural and religious traditions.

3.1 Emigration Motivations and Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of the Aussiedler Migration: New Features Since 1989

Originally, the emigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to Germany was related to ethnic factors and to family reunification. The wish to live free of oppression ‘as Germans among Germans’ prevailed for those emigrants. Therefore, most Aussiedler who came to Germany before the end of the Cold War had a comparatively good command of German and were familiar with German cultural traditions. In addition, the Aussiedler of the pre-1989 period had essentially a German family background, only in comparatively rare cases did mixed families immigrate. When the emigration barriers were eased at the end of the 1980s, the political and economic situation in the sending countries changed drastically, especially in the former Soviet Union. Since 1989, the economic, social and political crisis in the sending states led to the departure of ethnic Germans for the West. Whereas ethnic and family motivations prevailed before 1989, political and economic migration reasons became more important thereafter.

It is a striking feature of the Aussiedler migration since the end of the 1980s that German language competence of recent immigrants continues to decline and that the share of mixed families, mostly Russian-German families, in this migration movement has been increasing. This growing bicultural background of recent ethnic German immigrants has been documented by the German Federal Administration Office. Federal Administration Office statistics distinguish between ethnic Germans, non-German spouses and children, as well as non-German relatives of ethnic Germans. In 1993, a comparatively high percentage (74%) of the Aussiedler immigration were of ethnic German
A decade later, in 2004, this share had declined to 19% (see figure 4).

**Figure 4**  *The ethnic background of the Aussiedler immigration (1993-2004)*

What were the reasons for the deterioration of the German language competence and the increase in bicultural families in the *Aussiedler* migration after 1989? Apparently the most important factors were the release of emigration barriers on the side of the (post) socialist states and the shift of sending countries from Romania and Poland to the successor states of the USSR. This contributed to a broad emigration movement, especially from the former Soviet Union, and to the development of migrant networks. Accordingly, the unfolding of network dynamics over time considerably influenced the cultural and ethnic characteristics of the *Aussiedler* after 1989.

Migration is usually a selective process – especially in the beginning. In the case of most labour migrations, relatively skilled, productive and highly motivated people are drawn away from the sending countries. If one looks at the ethnic German migration this self-selection can also be observed, although the selection has expressed itself in criteria which were related to the ethnic minority background of this group. In the beginning of this movement, it was especially those ethnic Germans who were highly motivated to preserve the German language, cultural traditions, and religious practices who emigrated. This reflected the background of the German minority group in Romania to a certain degree, but had not been representative for the German minority in Poland and the former Soviet Union. In Poland and the former
USSR, the German language competence of the German minorities has diminished considerably since the end of Second World War.\(^{21}\) The rate of mixed marriages among the Germans in the USSR had been high compared to other ethnic groups there. At the end of the 1970s, nearly half of the German couples lived in mixed marriages; in 1989, Germans had the highest rates (65%) of mixed marriage in the USSR.\(^{22}\)

Network theory has argued that immigrants become less selective in socio-economic terms and more representative of the sending communities as the migration networks expand and the costs and risks of migration fall.\(^{23}\) It seems reasonable to say that such a development also manifested itself in the case of the Aussiedler migration, approximating the socio-demographic background of this immigrant population ever more to the ethnic minority communities in the sending countries.

### 3.2 Human Capital Characteristics: Continuities and Changes

Throughout its history, the Aussiedler resettlement included entire families.\(^{24}\) In most of these cases, ethnic Germans emigrated from their home countries without a return option. A noticeable feature of ethnic German immigrants is their younger age structure when compared to the native German population: 41.8% of ethnic Germans were under 25 upon their arrival in 2004, while in the German population it is only 26.2%. While the age structure of ethnic Germans and foreigners in Germany did not differ much in 1990, the age composition of foreigners in Germany had come noticeably closer to the native German population by 2004 (see figure 5). This did not happen in the case of ethnic Germans, however, who remain younger than natives and foreigners in Germany.

For decades the younger age structure of ethnic Germans has been regarded as a positive factor with respect to the integration of this group into Germany.\(^{25}\) However, since the end of the 1980s, this assumption has been severely challenged by increases in unemployment, especially among the younger Aussiedler.

It is comparatively difficult to evaluate the educational attainment and the qualification of ethnic Germans upon their arrival in Germany. Nevertheless, the existing data indicate that this immigrant group is better educated and trained than labour migrants from the recruitment states.\(^{26}\) At the end of the 1980s, about 12% of ethnic Germans who had worked prior to emigration had a university degree, 22% had a high school degree while two-thirds only a primary school education.\(^{27}\) Because their education and training had been completed in (former) socialist countries, the professional qualifications of ethnic Germans often did not correspond to German labour market requirements.
When looking at the occupational structure of ethnic Germans, several important characteristics can be identified. Whereas in Germany occupation in the agricultural sector decreased remarkably over the years, the share of ethnic Germans working in agriculture before emigration has even increased. This is due to the growing number of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, who still worked to a certain degree in the agricultural sector. Moreover, industrial professions are – compared to native Germans – overrepresented in the occupational structure of ethnic Germans. On the other hand, native Germans are more often employed in service jobs. These differences exist more or
less independently of the time period that the ethnic German immigrants entered Germany.

Figure 6  The occupational structure of ethnic and native Germans

Because the technological gap between Germany and the (post)socialist sending countries of ethnic Germans has not declined over the years, the qualifications of this immigrant group eventually often did not meet the requirements of the German labour market. In many cases, qualifications are related to professions in low demand and often do not meet German standards. Because of the ongoing globalisation process, a shift from the industrial to the service sector has occurred in Germany and the demand for low-qualified labour has decreased considerably. Whereas in 1985, unskilled industrial workers comprised 3.1% of German employment, in 2000, only 1.5% of the German workforce was performing unskilled industrial labour. By contrast, some 11.4% of ethnic German immigrants who came to Germany in 2000, was working in low-qualification jobs before emigration. This demonstrates a remarkable labour market risk for recent ethnic German immigrants.

4  The Integration of Ethnic Germans: New Patterns After 1989

The Aussiedler integration into Germany had been considered a reasonable success story until the end of the 1980s. Several studies confirmed
that the absorption of this group into the German labour market and society proceeded with comparatively little friction. In subsequent years, this situation changed, however, and ethnic Germans were confronted with substantial integration difficulties.

4.1 Integration into the Economy: Increasing Frictions?

Integration into the economy is usually defined in terms of equal opportunities for natives and immigrants concerning the labour market access and income positions. Consequently, the fundamental questions assessing labour market integration are whether immigrants gain incomes on a par with those of comparable natives and whether they face a similar unemployment risk.

Whereas a relatively successful integration of ethnic Germans into the labour market could be observed until the political transformation in Eastern Europe and the break up of the Soviet Union, the economic position of the Aussiedler increasingly worsened throughout the 1990s. A 1998 study found that ethnic Germans were in an unfavourable economic position when compared to natives: on average Aussiedler earned roughly 25% less and more often performed unskilled jobs, although their qualifications were comparable to those of the natives. An analysis of income determinants has revealed that the earnings of ethnic Germans depended on professional training and qualification, however more than half of this group did not end up working in the professions they were qualified for. Consequently, in many cases, the positive impact of skills did not materialise. In addition, only those ethnic Germans who bring along good German language skills can be expected to achieve incomes that are equivalent to those of natives. This is especially true for all skilled professions, particularly in the service sector. As the German language competence of recent Aussiedler has rapidly decreased, their economic position has become riskier.

In searching for employment, ethnic Germans are dependent on their German language proficiency, and on their job qualifications prior to migration. Thus the chances of finding a job are significantly lower for ethnic Germans with less German language skills and who have no qualification or training. Professions with different profiles in market systems and transition economies, for example jobs in administration, trade, banking, technology or education, denote a special employment risk. On the other hand, integration assistance by the German government supported the labour market integration of ethnic Germans to a considerable degree, although its impact decreased because of severe cuts after 1989.

According to labour office statistics and empirical studies, the unemployment of ethnic Germans is higher than that of natives, but lower
than that of foreigners in Germany.\textsuperscript{36} Again, the unemployment risk increased during the 1990s. In analysing the determinants of this development, empirical studies point to the impact of sending country characteristics. Ethnic Germans who come from the former Soviet Union and from Poland are more likely to be unemployed than those from Romania.\textsuperscript{37} This is explained by language competence, education, and training and by the integration into sending country networks. Network-related settlement behaviour has concentrated ethnic Germans from Romania in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, where a lower unemployment rate prevails compared to Lower-Saxonia and North-Rhine-Westphalia, where comparatively more ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union live (see table 2).

4.2 Integration into Society: Path Towards Segregation?

In contrast to foreigners in Germany, ethnic Germans were expected to bring along a cultural background similar to those of native Germans. In addition to the state-supported social integration programs this was supposed to guarantee a smooth absorption into German society. These considerations are in line with an integration model, putting assimilation at the centre of attention.\textsuperscript{38} In the medium and longer run, the assimilation model predicts an absorption of immigrants into the culture, social structure, and institutions of the dominant host country. In general, it is expected that immigrants will lose their specific cultural backgrounds and identities in the integration process.

The most important categories in defining social assimilation are acculturation – meaning the ability of migrants or minorities to adapt to the language and culture of the host society, and socio-structural integration – indicating the entrance of immigrants into the social neighbourhoods and institutions of the host country.\textsuperscript{39} Innumerable academic and journalists’ articles have described the expectation ‘that foreigners and their offspring will first acculturate and then seek entry and acceptance from the native-born population as a prerequisite for their social and economic advancement’.\textsuperscript{40} In the view of Gordon and many other scholars, the first step of acculturation does not necessarily lead to other forms of social integration into the host society. Immigrants or minority groups may acculturate but still not take part in the institutions or social neighbourhoods of the receiving society, or come into closer contact with the native population.

Whereas ethnic Germans mastered acculturation more or less successfully until the end of the 1980s, the socio-structural integration did not proceed without problems. Social contacts of ethnic Germans in the 1970s and 80s were often already constrained to family members or friends from the sending countries. Participation in German organi-
sations, institutions or neighbourhoods was rare. But unlike German expellees and refugees, who established effective (political) pressure groups in post-war Germany, ethnic German immigrants have not been greatly engaged in establishing organisations to pursue their interests. The most important organisations of ethnic German immigrants are countrymen affiliations, which have first of all been initiated to preserve the history and the cultural traditions of ethnic German minorities. Typically, countrymen affiliations are organised according to former (historical) homelands, such as the affiliation of Germans from Bessarabia, Silesia, or Russia. Only in recent years has the affiliation of Germans from Russia put more emphasis on supporting the integration of German immigrants. It is noteworthy, however, that countrymen affiliations could not attract a large membership. Although 1.6 million ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union moved to Germany between 1989 and the end of 1999, their most important pressure group – the affiliation of Germans from Russia – only increased by 17,660 members in this period. Other organisations, funded by ethnic German immigrants to provide legal, cultural, religious, or social support, are of much lower and of mostly only regional importance.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, a slower acculturation path than in previous decades and a lack of socio-structural adaptation has been observed for ethnic German immigrants. Parallel to this development, recent ethnic Germans tended to establish and participate in Aussiedler networks, which have often been identified as the decisive support for the development of segregated immigrant communities or sub-societies. This development refers to a new issue of debate in integration theory that focuses on the anticipated outcome of social integration. In most theories, social integration refers to the adaptation of immigrants to the middle-class cultural pattern of the host country. However, many societies vary considerably when it comes to social class and many include immigrant networks or minority cultures. Consequently, it is crucial to ask, into which specific social class or networks of the receiving society a respective immigrant group integrates.

In the following, acculturation and socio-structural integration patterns of recent ethnic Germans will be portrayed, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). If one looks at the most important indicator for acculturation, the proficiency and use of the host society’s language, the GSOEP data (1997) reveal that nearly all ethnic German immigrants from Romania had a good or very good command of the German language, compared to only 61.1% of those from Poland and 58.9% from the former Soviet Union. It is remarkable that ethnic German immigrants from Poland and the former USSR expressed a higher proficiency in the Polish and Russian lan-
guages respectively than in German (see table 1). This language profile has also had an impact on German language use in daily life, where 79.2% of Ethnic Germans from Romania but less than half of those from Poland and approximately half of the ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union spoke predominantly German. This clearly confirms that a fast acculturation of recent ethnic German immigrants – especially of the most important group from the former Soviet Union – can no longer be taken for granted.

The socio-structural integration, which is mostly defined in terms of friendship relations and institutional inclusions in the host country, will now be explored. The GSOEP data reveal close friendship ties of the ethnic Germans to former countrymen: nearly 40% of German immigrants name people from their former homelands as their three best friends and 72.4% had at least one friend from the sending country. Ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union are especially involved in home country friendship circles. This points to the important role of migrant relations and networks based on personal ties. The meeting frequency with relatives and friends and the time spent in helping relatives and friends can be used as a further indicator in the evaluation of social integration. The GSOEP survey found that ethnic Germans were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Indicators for the social integration of ethnic Germans (in %)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German language proficiency (speak German well or very well)</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficiency of the home country language (speak it well or very well)</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language used in daily life (mainly German)</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship relations (all three best friends from the home country)</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship relations (at least one of the three best friends from the home country)</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with relatives and friends (weekly or monthly)</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping relatives and friends (weekly or monthly)</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in social or neighborhood associations (weekly or monthly)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations (GSOEP 1997)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Socio-Economic Panel 1997, own calculation.
heavily engaged in meeting (92%) and helping (52%) their relatives and friends on a weekly or monthly base. In comparison to native-born Germans, of whom 80% meet and 42% help their relatives and friends weekly or monthly according to the GSOEP, the personal relationships of ethnic German immigrants are stronger. Besides friendships, the institutional inclusion of ethnic German immigrants is also important for the evaluation of their socio-structural integration. In the literature on this subject, no indication exists that recent ethnic German immigrants engage in political, social or neighbourhood associations in Germany to any remarkable degree. This has been confirmed by the GSOEP data. Only 6.5% of ethnic German immigrants participate in social, political, or neighbourhood associations on a weekly or monthly base. Because of the intense involvement of ethnic Germans in countrymen friendship networks, it may be assumed that these associations are often related to ethnic German immigrant issues.

Do recent ethnic German immigrants develop and participate in networks after they have entered Germany and what does this imply for the social integration of this group? In the process of social integration networks are usually seen as formal or informal ties through which information and other resources are distributed and channeled. Networks can take on various forms, which range from family and friendship relations to formal organisations. In this context, research literature identifies basically two ways in which migrant networks may function. Migration networks can provide adaptive support in finding employment, housing, or social information. This mostly short-term assistance may also have a positive impact on the long-term integration into the receiving society. On the other hand, migrant networks may work in the opposite direction, isolating immigrants in limiting their contacts to their own group and keeping them away from the native population and from the organisations and institutions of the receiving society. In the longer run, migrant enclaves may develop, which often indicate economic disintegration and social segregation.

A valuable indicator for the development of migrant networks is the spatial distribution of immigrant populations. In the case of ethnic Germans, settlement after arrival has been influenced to a considerable degree by the wish to live close to relatives and friends from the country of origin. Nevertheless, German authorities have distributed ethnic German immigrants according to a quota system throughout Germany to achieve some burden sharing on the local community level. If one looks at the settlement behaviour of ethnic Germans between 1989 and 1999, significant differences can be observed with respect to countries of origin (see table 2). Whereas ethnic Germans from Romania over fulfilled the quota for Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, those from Poland predominantly moved to North-Rhine-Westphalia.
In return, ethnic German immigrants from the former Soviet Union expressed a certain preference for Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia. It seems reasonable to argue that this settlement behaviour reveals a certain evidence for the formation of migrant networks.

The question of whether the settlement behaviour and the participation of recent ethnic Germans in migrant networks has led to enclaves and a certain degree of segregation since the end of the 1980s can not be discussed without looking at the German housing policy. In the beginning of the 1990s, French, Canadian, and US troops were withdrawn from German territory, leading to free housing space. In cases where the German authorities were in charge of these housing facilities, they used them to accommodate ethnic German immigrants. In cases where the housing space of withdrawing troops was put on the free market, ethnic German immigrant families frequently rented them to live close to their relatives and friends who had already moved to these housing developments. In some cities and communities this contributed to a considerable amount of segregation of these ethnic Germans.49

This growing spatial segregation of ethnic Germans has been accompanied by a tendency to withdraw from German institutions and neighbourhoods.50 In some cases, the increasing xenophobia of native Germans enforced this tendency. As a result, recent ethnic German immi-
grants – first of all those who came from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s – form predominantly Russian-speaking communities, where many newcomers integrate. These communities are strengthened by the bicultural background of ethnic Germans sustaining a framework, where the Russian language and major elements of previous cultural practices are actively retained.

**Conclusion**

This chapter shows that the integration path of ethnic Germans was characterised by a structural break at the end of the 1980s. In contrast to the comparatively smooth integration of this group before the political transformation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, serious problems in the absorption process could be identified thereafter. To some extent this came as a surprise: The German minority background of this immigrant group and the assistance by the German government had anticipated a fast integration into the German economy and society.

What are the most important determinants that can explain the changing integration path of ethnic German immigrants? First of all, the political transformation in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union turned the former highly restricted emigration of ethnic Germans into a mass phenomena. Although a comparatively privileged admission of ethnic Germans still prevailed after 1989, entrance barriers have been erected to constrain the immigration of this group. Nevertheless, the immigration of ethnic Germans increased considerably and stayed on a high level even after a new admission law came into force in 1993. This law introduced new procedures which led to a change in the sending countries and, through the development of migrant networks, also to changes in the cultural and social background of ethnic German immigrants. As a result, the German language competence of ethnic Germans, coming predominantly from the former USSR, decreased and the share of bicultural families in that migration grew. These features of the recent Aussiedler made their integration more similar to that of other immigrants in Germany.

Because the education, qualification and training of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union is less compatible with the German labour market than that of ethnic Germans from Poland and Romania, the economic integration became much more difficult in recent years. This process was enforced by cuts in governmental integration assistance which have been implemented as a result of policy changes. If one looks at the social integration of ethnic Germans after 1989, ethno-cultural distinctiveness and segregation can increasingly be ob-
served, indicating the growing importance of ethnic German minority communities. In that respect, the recent Aussiedler migration and integration mirrors a new trend in many contemporary migration populations: the tendency not toward fusion into the host society but to the retention of a distinctive ethno-cultural identity and to organise in self-sustaining minority communities. To respond to this new development in a productive way will be one of the challenges of future integration policies.

Notes

1 The most important privileges were free land allocations, exemptions from taxes and military service (Stricker 2000).
2 Cordell 2000.
3 For a historical overview see Bade 2000.
4 The constitutions of the Eastern European countries and the USSR did not include the freedom of movement until the end of the 1980s. Until then, only a limited number of people were allowed to leave, mainly related to family reunification.
5 Basic Law, article 116 (1). The 1953 expellee law regulated the admission and integration procedure of ethnic Germans in detail (Halfmann 1997).
6 Thus the admission of ethnic Germans into Germany is based on two assumptions: they belong to the German people (deutsche Volkszugehörigkeit) and that the German minority population in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had experienced ethnic discrimination as a consequence of the Second World War.
7 Brubaker 1998, 1049.
9 Shuval 1998, 10.
10 Seifert 1997.
13 Thränhardt 2000. Before this law came into force, foreigners had to reside in Germany for 15 years before being able to apply for a German passport.
15 A further 14% immigrated from other Eastern European states.
16 Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the Autonomous Territory of the Volga Germans was dissolved in 1941, followed by the deportation of the German population to the Eastern parts of the USSR, mainly to Siberia and Kazakhstan.
17 Bade 1994, 159.
18 The registration procedure distinguishes between ethnic Germans (according to § 4 of the federal refugee law), their non-German spouses and children (according to § 7 (2) of the federal refugee law) and their close relatives (according to § 8 (2) of the federal refugee law).
19 Massey et al. 1994, 705.
21 Dietz 1995, 43.
22 Dietz 1995, 46.
23 Massey et al. 1993, 450.
This study (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2002) refers to ethnic Germans who had come to Germany between 1984 and 1994 (German Socio-Economic Panel, see note 44). It may very well be that the income positions of ethnic Germans who immigrated later have grown even worse.

In non-qualification and low-qualification jobs, unemployment rates in Germany are higher than average.

German Socio-Economic Panel data indicate that 18% of the ethnic German workforce was unemployed in 1998. In the German workforce, the unemployment rate amounted to 10.1% in that year, and 19.6% in the foreign workforce.

This question has been an important research topic in the recent concepts of segmented assimilation (Portes 1995, Portes 1997, Portes and Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997).

The data set employed here stems from the immigrant sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The immigrant sample was added to the GSOEP to study the consequences of the new immigration to Germany since the end of the 1980s. In the immigrant sample, ethnic Germans who had moved to Germany between 1984 and 1994 were included (Burkhauser et al. 1996). The distribution of ethnic Germans according to former home countries reflects the distribution of sending areas in this period of time. An extensive comparison with official data reveals that the sample can be treated as representative for the recent ethnic German immigrant population (Bauer and Zimmermann 1997).

When respondents were asked this question in 1997, those from Romania and Poland had lived on the average for 8 years in Germany, whereas those from the former Soviet Union had immigrated 6 years earlier.

The Federal Administration Office usually allows ethnic Germans to denote the preferred Land where they want to live. In most cases, new ethnic German immigrants are sent there, as long as the quota is not filled. Otherwise, ethnic German immigrants have to move to the Land the Federal Administration Office designates, if they do not want to lose government integration assistance.
PART II

HERE AND THERE: DIVERGENT COMPARISONS
Polish Berlin: Differences and Similarities with Poles in the Ruhr Area, 1860-1920

Dorota Praszałowicz

Introduction

Massive Polish migrations to Berlin started in the 1860s and by the end of the century, significant centres of the Polish diaspora were firmly established. The process of immigrant community building and decline has thus far been studied mostly from the Polish perspective, and to a lesser extent, from the German side, focusing predominantly on cultural continuity and/or the policy toward immigrants. As both Polish and German discourses have been highly ethnocentric, much less attention has been paid to the integration and assimilation process. In this paper I will concentrate on the Polish presence in Berlin. The settlement of Poles in the Ruhr area will be used as a contrasting case, highlighting the specific characteristics of Berlin as a fast-growing metropolitan city.

The Polish Berlin of the past was exceptional for at least three reasons. First of all the city was located close to the eastern Prussian provinces where most of the Polish immigrants came from. Secondly, due to the partitions of the Polish state at the end of the 18th century, until 1918 there was no state border separating Brandenburg with Berlin from the eastern provinces. The lack of a state border meant that Polish influx to Berlin, although literally international, was not an interstate move. Thirdly, it should be emphasised that despite significant difference between the Polish and German culture, there was no large cultural distance between the immigrants and the city residents. Poles, most of whom were Prussian subjects at the time, usually spoke German and were familiar with German values and customs.

Geographical and cultural proximity shaped the Polish diaspora in Berlin in a special way. Its complex social structure, cultural orientations, and survival strategies differed not only compared to Polish-American communities, but also when compared to other centres of the Polish diaspora in Germany, especially the one in the Ruhr Basin. Polish communities in other European cities, such as Paris, were very different as well. The only place with a Polish immigrant population similar to Berlin’s was Vienna’s.
Polish Communities in Berlin

Polish migrations to Berlin started at the time of the partitions of Poland. In the first half of the 19th century numerous members of the Polish nobility had already served the Prussian authorities at the Hohenzollern royal court, in the Prussian state administration, in the juridical system, and in the Prussian army. Polish aristocracy visited Berlin frequently, many noble families had apartments there, and some aristocratic families owned residences in the city. Prince Antoni Radziwiłł married Louise von Hohenzollern (daughter of Prince August Friedrich, and niece of King Friedrich II), and after 1815, their palace in Berlin became an important cultural centre both for the Polish and Prussian elite. Count Atanazy Raczyński settled in Berlin in 1820 and between 1842 and 1844 built a palace with an impressive art collection.

In 1810, the Friedrich Wilhelm University was founded, which made Berlin a magnet for Polish youth. The number of Polish students in Berlin increased and represented various social strata. At the same time Poles found employment at Berlin University as teachers. In the mid-19th century, a new migration stream brought Polish politicians to Berlin. In 1848, Poles were granted their representation in the Prussian Landtag, and when the German Empire was established in 1871, Poles successfully won seats in the Reichstag.

There were several Polish leaders who openly contested Prussian rule. In the spring of 1848, a Polish military unit of 150 young men was formed in Berlin. They eventually left for Posen to join an anti-Prussian uprising there. On the other hand, the events of 1848 brought fighting Poles closer to the Germans, which is illustrated by 254 Polish rebels – well-known patriots Ludwik Mierosławski and Karol Liebelt among them – who were transported from Poznań to a prison in Berlin. Long investigations and the 1847 trial drew followers and relatives of the arrested Poles to Berlin. They were eventually released during the events of March 1848 at the request of the local (Berlin) population. An earlier example of occasional German-Polish solidarity was an enthusiastic reception (Polenbegeisterung) of Polish refugees by Germans in the 1830s. They had fled Russian Poland when the November Uprising there was crushed and found shelter in Germany, especially in Berlin.

One of the Polish communities in Berlin included the artistic elite: writers, musicians, and painters. They usually did not stay in the city for long, some (for example C.K. Norwid) were even forced to leave. Other Polish artists lived in Berlin without causing any controversy. The musician and composer Feliks Nowowiejski studied and taught in the Berlin Academy of Music, Julian Fałat and Wojciech Kossak worked
at the royal court as painters, and Stanisław Przybyszewski, writer and performer intermingled with Berlin’s international artistic elite.\textsuperscript{11}

The mass influx of Poles into Berlin beginning in the 1860s was due to economic reasons. Berlin’s urban growth accelerated in the 19th century, which contributed to the expansion of the city’s labour market, making it attractive for inhabitants of the agrarian eastern Prussian provinces – (table 1).\textsuperscript{12} This \textit{Ostflucht} became a well-known phenomenon and was analysed thoroughly by prominent scholars.\textsuperscript{13} Many migrants headed for North America where they joined other European emigrants. While Berlin continued to be an attractive destination, others settled in the Westphalian Ruhr area and mostly found employment in the coal mines. In 1910, about 60\% of Polish adult males, and 74\% of the Masurians in the Ruhr’s three main administrative districts were coal miners.\textsuperscript{14}

Economically motivated migration to Berlin was more diversified and consisted of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers.\textsuperscript{15} Both in Berlin and in the Ruhr area, men and women were evenly represented.\textsuperscript{16} Poles did not seek their own niche in the local economy. Most of them simply joined the emerging working class and contributed to its ethnic mix. Men found jobs in construction and the road works, or worked as carriers. Other male immigrants found employment in the mechanical, chemical, and manufacturing industries on which Berlin’s prosperity was based. Women were employed in the textile industry or worked as maids,\textsuperscript{17} whereas Polish women in the Ruhr had limited options for employment outside of the household.

Both in Berlin and in the Ruhr area the immigrant population was young, which is typical for economic migrations. Many migrants took their families with them; others married at destination. At the beginning of the 20th century in the Polish community of Moabit (in Berlin), the intermarriage rate reached some 50\%, with Polish men intermarrying more often than Polish women.\textsuperscript{18} Children constituted about

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Population of Berlin between 1820 and 1910} \label{tab:population}
\begin{tabular}{lrr}
\hline
year & population \\
\hline
1820 & 200 000 \\
1849 & 410 729 \\
1860 & 494 994 \\
1870 & 774 498 \\
1880 & 1 123 794 \\
1890 & 1 578 000 \\
1900 & 1 888 000 \\
1910 & 2 071 000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

one-third of the Polish community members in the Ruhr, and the situation in Berlin was probably similar. In both cases, the large number of families testifies to the stability of the immigrant population. Although it seems like a contradiction, the Polish communities in Berlin were characterised by both stability and fluidity. Compared to Berlin, the Ruhr Poles seemed to have moved less frequently.

Berlin Poles did not establish one or more ethnic neighbourhoods, but were scattered throughout the city with a few concentrations in working-class districts, such as Wedding, Moabit, Kreuzberg, and Friedrichshain, as well as in suburbs of Charlottenburg, Spandau, Schöneberg, Lichtenberg, Neuköln and Weissensee, which in 1920 became part of metropolitan Berlin. Throughout its history, Berlin's immigrant population shared public space with local German and non-German populations.

The economic migration brought also Polish artisans to Berlin, the most visible among them were tailors and shoemakers. Władysław Berkan, a tailor who established a successful workshop in the city centre, became a well-known leader of the local Polish diaspora. His memoirs offer an interesting insight into Polish life in Berlin.19

Generally speaking, the Polish diaspora in Berlin was diversified and represented all social strata. It had its aristocracy, intellectuals, tradesmen, entrepreneurs, clerks, artisans, and workers, and each social group was internally diversified. It should be noted that the working class was overrepresented in Berlin when compared to the social structure in the predominantly rural eastern Prussian provinces. Moreover, the Polish working class was dominated by unskilled workers. Migrants who were unemployed, and did not return home, found themselves on a margin and in the course of time produced an underclass.

Statistics and Estimates

The exact number of Poles in Berlin has been contested and the accuracy of the Prussian statistics has often been questioned by Polish ethnic leaders. The official data reflected the number of people who declared Polish as their mother tongue. However, many Polish labourers may have chosen German in order to secure their positions in the host nation. Table 2 demonstrates some discrepancies between Prussian statistics and Polish estimates, but these are not very significant, except for the 1890 figures.

Paradoxically, the Polish estimates quoted here could have been based on German estimates. At the very beginning of the 20th century, according to the Deutsche Zeitung, there were 75,000 Poles in Berlin in 1896 and between 80-90,000 in 1900.20 Let us compare these figures
with volume of migration to the Ruhr Basin (table 3). As migration statistics indicate, the provinces of Pomerania and Posen continued to send the majority of their internal migrants to Berlin and Brandenburg, while the migrations from East Prussia were equally divided between the Rhineland and Westphalia, on the one hand, and Berlin on the other. The ethnic mix of these migration streams was complex, for it included both Polish and non-Polish populations.

### Migration to Berlin

Not only Poles but also French, Jewish, Bohemian and Dutch immigrants have, since the 18th century, contributed to the plurality of the Berlin metropolitan population.\(^{21}\) On the other hand, migration from the eastern Prussian provinces was ethnically mixed. The territory was populated by Germans and Poles, with Jews, a smaller minority, as a third ethnic group. The provinces Silesia, Posen (Poznania), and West Prussia were typical German/Polish borderland, whereas Jews were concentrated in the cities of Posen, and to a smaller extend in Silesia.\(^{22}\) All three groups became involved in the migration process, probably with Jews and Germans as pioneers, followed by Poles.\(^{23}\) Jews were most prone to migration which resulted in significant decline of their

### Table 2  Poles in Berlin at the turn of the 19th century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>District Potsdam</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Polish estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>15,857</td>
<td>11,482</td>
<td>27,339</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>27,326</td>
<td>19,255</td>
<td>46,581</td>
<td>50,000 to 90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>33,333</td>
<td>35,300</td>
<td>68,633</td>
<td>80,000 to 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>37,655</td>
<td>43,714</td>
<td>81,369</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3  Population born in the eastern Prussian provinces, and living in Brandenburg, the Rhineland and Westphalia in 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>population born in the provinces</th>
<th>living in Berlin and Brandenburg</th>
<th>living in the Rhineland</th>
<th>living in Westphalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Prussia</td>
<td>181 616</td>
<td>73 428</td>
<td>114 871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Prussia</td>
<td>156 657</td>
<td>35 736</td>
<td>43 551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomerania</td>
<td>258 426</td>
<td>12 589</td>
<td>8 075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posen</td>
<td>222 830</td>
<td>46 915</td>
<td>83 873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silesia</td>
<td>297 350</td>
<td>42 931</td>
<td>50 710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

population in the province of Posen. In proportion to the size of the Jewish group, its migration was much more intensive than either the Polish or the German outflow. In Posen the number of Jews exceeded 55,000 in 1845, which had dropped to less than 40,000 by 1873.24

There is not enough room in this chapter to investigate the ethnic composition of the migration streams.25 The issue is interesting, however, as a single example reveals. Władysław Berkan (the aforementioned tailor) left West Prussia for Berlin in 1880 in the company of a young German blacksmith’s son from his home village. His companion had an aunt in Berlin.26 It was a typical example of chain migration in which the migration network spread over ethnic boundaries. As soon as the two migrants reached Berlin, however, they separated. The German went to his aunt, the Pole who did not know anybody in Berlin, looked for his fellow countrymen to find provisional accommodations. So far, we know little about the way the migration process functioned in the borderlands. It is difficult, therefore, to estimate the ethnic composition of migrations to Berlin. Although Berkan’s case could have been an exception, it is not inconceivable that people of various ethnic backgrounds left home together heading for destinations unknown. We know, for example, that the first Polish migrants travelled with Germans overseas.27 For Jews this may have been different, however. Cornelia Östreich for example asserts that Jewish migration was a separate phenomenon, and that it had little to do with the migrations of Germans or Poles.28 This assertion is corroborated by Jewish migration records (memoirs, letters, ethnic press) which show this process as a mono-ethnic venture, based on Jewish social capital.

Another important issue concerns the time and direction of migration streams. The case of the Poles who organised a military unit in Berlin to return to Posen (to join the uprising in 1848) demonstrates that there were many migration streams and counter-streams. The main destination was Berlin, but many returned home (return migration), whereas some migrants moved repeatedly between their birthplace and the Prussian capital (circular migration). Finally, Berlin was also a transit city for many Polish migrants who were mostly heading overseas or to the Ruhr Basin. The size of this transit migration is difficult to estimate, however.

The geographical proximity of Berlin to Poland meant that many Poles in Berlin remained closely attached to their homes. According to patterns of late-19th century mass migrations, the majority of Poles left home for economic reasons and planned to return with their savings.29 Many of them did return, in fact. Others, despite their intention to return, stayed in Berlin, and some planned from the very beginning to settle there for good. All of them went home frequently, and sent their children there for holidays.
Some Poles like tradesmen, businessmen, and politicians commuted between Berlin and Poland on a regular basis. Others travelled there periodically, such as the aristocracy and students. Workers who did not have a permanent job were involved in circular and/or seasonal migration. Geographical proximity and the lack of a state border resulted both in high return migration rates, circular, and/or short-term migrations. The trip was relatively short and cheap. Berlin simply proved to be a ‘close magnet’, easily accessible, and easy to depart from.30 These different types of migration were not linked to a specific migrant community, however. Permanent residents and short-term visitors (to take two opposite cases) were found in all of the Polish communities, including the aristocratic, artistic, and working-class circles.

First World War

The First World War greatly stimulated return migration, which had already commenced at the beginning of the war and only accelerated in 1918. The status of Polish immigrants changed significantly after 1918, due to the reestablishment of the Polish state. Moreover, the Treaty of Versailles introduced the option for citizenship. All who opted for Polish citizenship had to leave Germany before January 1922. Those who chose Germany were granted German citizenship, and could stay in Berlin. The main difference between Polish immigrants in Berlin and the Ruhr district was that the Poles from the Ruhr decided to migrate in large numbers (between 80,000 and 100,000) to the mines of France and Belgium, in order to avoid going to Germany. Another 50,000 Poles migrated from the Ruhr to destinations other than France or Poland. By the late 1920s, the Polish population in the Ruhr had oscillated between 96,000 and 120,000.31

For those who decided to return to Poland, Berlin became the transit city once again. The return migration flow was rather chaotic, especially since both German and Polish authorities tried to limit its volume. Polish authorities were worried about the rapid influx of people who needed housing and work.32 German authorities on the other hand, tried to prevent the emigration of the labour force, and announced on May 1919 that men between 17 and 45 years of age were prohibited from leaving. In 1925, 13,491 Poles with German citizenship and 5,897 city residents with Polish citizenship were counted in Berlin. The size of the Polish immigrant community had thus shrunk to one-third of its pre-war size.

Polish leaders in post-First World War Berlin oriented themselves towards the new Polish state and some of them became Polish diplomats in Germany. A well-known example was Karol Rose, editor of the Pol-
ish language daily who was appointed to the Polish consul in Berlin. Other leaders tried to get the support of the Polish government for local ethnic activities, but this was complicated by internal leadership conflicts. Moreover, Polish Berlin suffered from the departure of its intelligentsia, whereas many Poles had integrated into German society, especially those who had opted for German citizenship.33

**Cultural Continuity and Integration**

Polish immigrants founded their own societies in Germany, especially in Berlin and the Ruhr area. The Ruhr Poles produced mostly working-class organisations and in 1902 established their own trade union Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie (ZZP), not in the least because Poles were not permitted to join German trade unions. The ZZP extended its influence far beyond the Ruhr area, and in Berlin it opened 24 branches with roughly 6,000 members, with another 24,000 in the Ruhr area.34 Twelve years earlier in Berlin, the Polish Socialist Society was founded, after the repeal of the anti-socialist laws. The local branch of the Polish Socialist Party belonged to the Polish Socialist Party of Prussian Poland with its headquarters in Posen. Interestingly, during the International Socialist Congress in Brussels in 1893, Germany was represented by a 40-member delegation that included one Pole, Bolesław Przytulski. However, Polish historians rushed to point out that during the Congress Przytulski kept in touch with Poles from Russian and Austrian Poland, and not with members of his own German delegation.

The most numerous, and probably most powerful organisations, both in Berlin and the Ruhr area, were Polish Catholic workers societies attached to local German parishes and organised on a territorial basis. They had their own libraries, organised meetings, lectures and discussions, and contributed to Polish language education (organised by educational societies). The members were all required to go to confession and take communion at least once a year at Easter. In Berlin, the local affiliates in 1903 formed an umbrella organisation which in 1913 became known as Vereinigung der Pfarrkommittees.35

It should be stressed, however, that the Poles in Berlin produced a variety of societies which served the diversified local ethnic population, and which were organised along class lines,36 although the Polish upper classes contributed financially to charities and the educational movement, which was led by artisans. This buttressed the ethnic cohesion which was instrumental in sustaining and negotiating Polish national identity,37 which was further fuelled by the national tensions after the Polish partitions at the end of the 18th century. German
authorities hoped to assimilate (Germanise) the Polish population in the East, while local patriotic elites (part nobility and intelligentsia) actively and successfully defended Polishness.38

The most influential immigrant organisation was probably the Polish Industrial Society (Towarzystwo Przemysłowców Polskich – Verein der Gewerbetreibenden), an elitist organisation founded in 1867 and oriented toward educational, cultural, and charity tasks.39 It provided many Polish local societies (established mostly by artisans and skilled workers) in Berlin with moral and financial support and also promoted the Polish bank (Skarbona/Sparbuchse) that was established to make Polish immigrants financially independent from German financial institutions.

Both Berlin and the Ruhr area had their own Polish singing societies, drama circles, political groups, educational organisations, charity organisations, youth societies, units of Polish Falcons, and women’s clubs.40 All of these were confronted with the pressures of Germanisation.41 This hostile policy meant that Poles were unable to establish their own cultural centre in Berlin prior to 1920. Instead, Polish societies met regularly in Polish and German restaurants.42 On the eve of the First World War, there were 60 restaurants owned by Polish immigrants, which were popular with both Polish and German customers. There were at least 20 German restaurants and beer gardens that were frequented by Polish immigrants.43 This intermingling of Poles and Germans shows that ethnic mobilisation was unable to prevent integration.

In 1892, various Polish societies in Berlin formed the Alliance – an umbrella organisation, which in 1897 brought together 37 of the 40 local organisations. In contrast to local societies that limited their activities to neighbourhoods, the new Alliance organised mass meetings, attended by hundreds (800 to 1,000) of Poles.

Efforts to establish a Polish press in Berlin can be traced back to 1874 and between 1890 and 1897 the Gazeta Polska w Berlinie (Polish Newspaper in Berlin), a semi-weekly was published, after which it was transformed into a successful conservative daily Dziennik Berliński (Berlin Daily). This paper was supposed to oppose the socialist weekly Gazeta Robotnicza (Workers’ Post), founded in Berlin in 1891. About the same time (1890) the popular Polish daily Wiarus was launched in Bochum, aimed at Polish miners.

Notwithstanding the stress on national unity, the Polish diaspora was split between the political left and the conservative (Catholic) right. These conflicts may have had a alienating effect, on the other hand, they taught immigrants how to negotiate and reach compromises.44 For a long time, Polish leaders tried to keep ethnic arguments out of German politics in order to maintain internal cohesion. They avoided
involvement in political debates at election times, trying not to support any political party. In the course of time, however, ethnic activity became politicised. Nationalistic movements, a new form of ethnic activity, became salient at the turn of the 19th century. The First World War did not stop Polish ethnic activity, and by the end of the war almost 60 Polish societies were operating in Berlin. In 1921, a new federation, the Polish Alliance in Germany (Związek Polaków w Niemczech) was established to consolidate the Polish immigrant population in Germany.

Most Polish studies on migrations to Berlin focus on the ethnic cultural activities of immigrant societies and ignore the integration process. In the eyes of most Polish historians, integration simply meant Germanisation, which from a patriotic point of view had to be condemned. Germanisation could be translated into German as Entnazifizierung; a very loaded term that implies treason. There are a few exceptions, however to the Germanisation fixation. Kazimierz Rakowski who spent few years in Berlin at the turn of the 19th century, published an essay in 1901 that presented interesting examples of Polish involvement in the life of the host community. Another exception is the memoir of Władysław Berkan who mentioned his frequent interactions with Germans. Memoirs are one of very few sources that shed light on (good) ethnic relations in the workplace.

The main tasks of Polish ethnic activity, were to promote cultural continuity and to counteract the pressures of Germanisation. Migration studies demonstrate, however, that ethnic associations, regardless of their orientation, always stimulate assimilation. They often serve as a bridge between ‘old’ and ‘new world’, and help ease a cultural shock. They make it possible for an immigrant to adjust to a foreign world. With regard to Polish ethnic activity in Berlin two factors are important. First of all immigrant societies had to struggle against unfavourable state politics, and secondly (partially as a result of the first) the ethnic institutional wholeness was never reached. The anti-Polish policy prevented the establishment of Polish parishes and limited the influence of the ethnic leadership. As a result, Berlin never became a centre of Polish intellectual life. In contrast to Paris, which in the 19th century hosted the elite of Polish society including the leaders of Polish uprisings, the patriotic aristocracy, famous composers, and the popular romantic poets.

One of the reasons why Berlin failed to become a Polish cultural centre was its proximity to Poland, where Posen continued to be a point of reference for the Berlin Poles. The immigrants developed their own publishing activity, although it was not as important as in other Polish diaspora centres because they regularly received Polish newspapers, books, and textbooks for their children from Posen. They were frequently visited by prominent Polish politicians, and if necessary,
they would go to Posen to consult patriotic leaders about their activities. A number of Polish societies in Berlin were branches of larger organisations headquartered in Posen. That was the case of both the Polish Falcons and the Polish Socialist Party. As a result, the Berlin Polish elite escaped from the shadow cast by the Poznań elite.48

Another factor which hampered immigrant activity was the lack of an ethnic parish. Most Polish immigrant communities in the world were organised around their Roman Catholic churches. Because of the considerable size of the Polish Catholic population in Berlin, one would have expected that there would be many Polish parishes operating in the city. Despite Polish dispersion in Berlin, immigrants tried very hard to create a Polish Catholic ‘Fürsorge’. This failed, however, because of the Prussian assimilation policy which culminated in Bismarck’s Kulturkampf. At that time, immigrants suffered both as Catholics and as Poles. Moreover, they were not supported by the Roman Catholic Church in Germany. The Breslau diocese to which Berlin belonged exerted assimilation pressure on immigrants instead. In fact, the Polish situation both in Berlin and in the Ruhr area was typical of any immigrant group confronted with politicised assimilation pressures.

The Poles nevertheless remained loyal to the Roman Catholic Church, and put a lot of effort into organising their own Catholic societies,49 which brought them closer to the host population. Ethnic Catholic societies followed German patterns, and thus helped acquaint Poles with German associational life. It should be noted that Catholic societies were unknown in Polish territories at the time. Moreover, the Polish Catholic societies usually kept in touch with similar German societies, thus bringing immigrants and natives together. The first Polish Catholic Society was established in 1865 in Berlin, and this was announced in the Berliner Volkszeitung in a short note published in Polish.50 The society met regularly in the Catholic House (German) at Niederwallstrasse 11.

Polish-German clashes could not be avoided, however. In 1906, some 4,000 Polish parishioners of St. Marien Liebfrauen Parish announced a boycott of the parish in the hope that it would attract the attention of the Church hierarchy. Their main aim was to petition for Polish language services. During the one-year boycott, Poles attended services in another parish, and did not pay their dues to the St. Marien Liebfrauen. In general, immigrants were refused the right to have Polish priests and they had to fight for Polish language services. The only Polish priest, Rev. Władysław Enn worked in the St. Pius Church in Friedrichshain between 1885 and 1887. After which, he was sent to Posen. He was replaced by Rev. Wilhelm Frank from Silesia who spoke Polish but did not contribute to Polish ethnic activity.
The St. Paulus Church (Moabit) initially hosted a good relationship between Rev. Marian Wallenrod and his Polish parishioners. But this deteriorated when a new parson, Rev. Jakob Hockeckfeld, was appointed in 1910. In March 1914, a conflict over the language of the first holy communion ceremony arose. The Poles pressed for Polish language service, but the priest refused. Local Polish leaders thus decided to postpone the ceremony. In the summer time children were brought to Posen, where they enjoyed the first holy communion ceremony in Polish in the local St. Martin’s Church. This case demonstrates the importance of geographical proximity. There was no other Polish diaspora centre that could have found this type of solution.

The pressure of Germanisation was not only exerted in Berlin but also in the Ruhr. The Roman Catholic Church there usually refused to assign Polish priests, sending instead German priests who had been trained to speak Polish. In 1913, 75 priests were involved in religious services for the Poles, with only three Poles among them. In 24 parishes, Polish services (with sermons and hymns in Polish) took place every Sunday, and in 101 other parishes they were organised on an irregular basis. It should be stressed that not all German priests in Berlin were hostile toward their Polish parishioners, as the example of Rev. Marian Wallenrod has already made clear. Another case in point was Rev. Strombeck who supported decorating a chapel in his church in Tempelhof with an image of the Madonna of Częstochowa, the icon of Polish Catholicism.

Notwithstanding the large number of Polish associations and nationalist activities it should be stressed that the majority of Poles did not participate in Polish community building. At the beginning of the 20th century, Kazimierz Rakowski estimated that the size of the Polish population in Berlin was roughly 60,000, but according to him, only about 5,000 joined ethnic societies or read Polish newspapers. That was much less than in most Polish diaspora centres, especially in the Ruhr. One of the reasons could have been geographical proximity to Polish territory which resulted in regular contacts with people at home. Maybe there was simply no need to find substitution for traditional primary social relations. Another explanation is the often temporary character of migration which made migrants indifferent to the ethnic cause. On the other hand, short-term migrants depended on ethnic networks and it would seem that they would at least be somewhat involved in the ethnic community.

More adequate explanations point to the problems connected with national identity. Discussing the size of the Polish population in Berlin, Rakowski wrote: ‘It is highly doubtful that these people can be called Poles without any hesitation. They quickly lose their national identity. Actually, their identities were never fully expressed, instead they were
based the on social milieu at the place of origin, on the language and denomination. National identity which was not well constructed at the time of the peasant emigrations from Polish territories, transformed, and sometimes radically so in their new surroundings. Identity is always highly contextual and selective and here became renegotiated and reconstructed. Those immigrants who declared German as their mother tongue were not cynical liars. Instead they were probably confused about their identities, about the differences between locality, nationality and citizenship, between their every day language and the official state language.

Rakowski noted that many Poles joined local German societies in Berlin, and offered a few examples which illustrate the complexity of the identity question. The first case relates to the Poles who joined German Catholic societies and were thus losing contact with their Polish tongue. According to Rakowski there were many Polish members in these societies, and in one of them, Poles even formed a majority, but ‘still agreed to have meetings in German’. Clearly German was perceived as the natural way to communicate in working class circles, although not among their ethnic leaders.

A highly interesting example of integration is the Kriegerverein, the Polish unit of the German Kriegerbund. Its members were Poles who had served in the Prussian army. At their meetings they spoke Polish and sang Prussian marching songs which they had learned as soldiers. They proudly identified with Prussia and the Prussian army, and they regularly celebrated the emperor’s birthday. Members of the Kriegerverein identified both with their ethnic tradition and with the German Empire. Ethnic identity expressed itself in two ways: First, the society was a Polish unit of the German association where Polish veterans could celebrate their past together with their compatriots. They could have entered local (German) units of the Kriegerbund, but chose to establish their own ethnic branch instead. Moreover, according to Rakowski, they distanced themselves from Polish ethnic clubs and societies. Instead, they kept in touch with both the army, and the Kriegerbund headquarters, and while celebrating the Emperor’s birthday they usually were provided with live music played by an army band. The second dimension of ethnic identity is language. Members of the Kriegerverein clearly knew German, but preferred to speak Polish. Language for them was not an element of patriotic discourse, but a matter of everyday convenience.

Rakowski also discussed a process of ethnic amalgamation. He blamed intermarriages for the decline of ethnic distinctiveness by a number of immigrant societies, whose members married German women. The Polish Singers Society, for example, printed posters advertising concerts in German. Thus, Polish (male) singers, of whom many
were married to German women, hoped to reach both Poles and Germans. Rakowski accepted German language posters, but criticised the society for singing German songs, and reciting German poetry. Eth- 
nic amalgamation was also noticed by Abramowicz, the author of another Polish Berlin memoir. Abramowicz wrote explicitly that mixed marriages stimulated assimilation and that children of these families did not speak any Polish. He complained that over time family names would be the only remaining evidence of Polish roots.

Rakowski’s laments regarding immigrant integration indicate that the process was well advanced. This process, however, was eased by the dynamic of the metropolitan population in which radical and rapid transformation was underway. The receiving society was a mixture of local people and large numbers of newcomers, both Germans and non-Germans. The structural differentiation was advancing and opened up room for immigrants in old and new social strata. Poles contributed to the social dynamic and integrated into various segments of the newly emerging social structure. Most of them joined the working class, a new strata comprised largely of newcomers. Migration was an inherent experience of the working class in a time of rapid changes where individuals faced many options. And so while negotiating their identity they were free to choose between upward mobility which usually was consistent with assimilation or cultural continuity (maintaining Polish identity and traditions) which significantly diminished one’s chances for social advancement.

The new metropolitan population was pluralistic and dynamic, but the German Empire was not. The militant nation-state sought to assimilate immigrants, and exerted pressure on them. Immigrants reacted by adopting various strategies. Most Polish immigrants in Berlin assimilated into the mainstream German culture. They did not leave many records behind which might offer us some insight into the mechanisms of the process, however.

State – Community – Individual

The Prussian state (beginning in 1871) and the German Empire promoted immigration to Berlin. It was expected that the relocation of the Polish population would break social ties, ultimately leading to the disintegration of the Polish community, and that it would push Poles into revising their identity. The state authorities made it clear that any ethnic (non-German) activity was unwelcome. Until the end of the World War I, there were no ethnic parishes and no regular Polish schools in Germany. Polish immigrants, in Berlin as well as in the Ruhr area, did develop an entire range of societies, however. These associations varied
in terms of class, attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church, political ideas, cultural interests, etc. Still it is important to realise that only a minority of the immigrant population was ever involved in ethnic community building activities.

Immigrants adopted various strategies to counter the assimilation pressures. Most of them conformed, especially since their upward mobility led them into higher strata of German host society. This process has thus far not attracted much attention from scholars. The reason may be that it is difficult to find sources which give insight into the mechanisms of assimilation. Most studies on class and social mobility in Germany overlooked the ethnic dimension of the process. The Polish studies, on the other hand, made people believe that the “ethnicity forever” attitude prevailed.

The analysis of personal documents gives us some sense of how individuals struggled with assimilation and with the social pressures they faced in their everyday lives. Those who resisted full assimilation left some evidence. They gave us insight into their integration process, and into their efforts to secure cultural continuity. Those who assimilated did not write much about the process. We know that this process was not linear, that it was bumpy and complicated. Immigrants had no vocabulary which would enable them to frame the process. However, it is certainly worth the effort to seek out new sources and continue to question traditional sources, such as the ethnic press and immigrants’ letters.

Notes
1 Polish mass migration started in the mid-19th century. The most popular destination was North America, but Germany was the second choice. Within Germany, the Ruhr Basin and Berlin became centres of Polish diaspora. Pilch 1984, Kubiak 1988, Walaszek 2001. See also the chapter of Lucassen in this volume.
4 Kleßmann 1978, Kulczycki 1994, Kulczycki 1997; and Lucassen’s contribution in this volume.
5 Taborski 2001.
7 Warschauer 1904, Molik 1999.
8 Molik 1989.
10 Poniatowska 1986.
14 Kulczycki 1994, 33. 
15 Rakowski 1901. 
16 Murzynowska 1981. 
17 Rakowski 1901. 
18 Hartmann 1990. 
19 Berkan 1923. 
20 Rakowski 1901. 
22 Preussische Statistik 1908. 
24 Von Bergmann 1883, 242-243. 
26 Berkan 1923, 20. 
28 Ostreich 1997. 
30 Tylor 1971. 
31 Poniatowska 1986. 
32 Gołąbek et al. 1937. 
33 Gołąbek et al. 1937. 
34 Kulczycki 1994. 
35 Kulczycki 1994. 
36 Rakowski 1901. 
40 For a list of Polish societies in Berlin, see Appendix III. 
41 Rakowski 1901. 
42 Gołąbek et al. 1937. 
43 Abramowicz 1979. 
45 For a discussion on intended and unintended, declared and actual functions of associations, see Merton 1968. 
46 See Schrover’s contribution in this volume. 
47 Breton 1964. 
48 Rose 1932. 
49 See Appendix I for a list of Roman Catholic parishes to which Poles belonged in Berlin. 
50 Kozłowski 1987. 
51 Kleßmann 1978. 
52 Rakowski 1901, 240. 
53 Compare Murzynowska 1981, 85. 
54 Rakowski 1901, 239. 
55 Rakowski 1901, 251. 
56 Rakowski 1901, 249. 
57 Abramowicz 1979. 
58 For a discussion on assimilation, see Morawska 1994, and Alba and Nee 2003.
Appendix I

Roman Catholic Parishes in Berlin which gathered many Polish members at the beginning of the twentieth century

1. St. Hedwig / Św. Jadwigi
2. St. Michael / Św. Michała
3. St. Sebastian / Św. Sebastiana
4. St. Paulus / Św. Pawła
5. St. Mathias / Św. Macieja
6. St. Pius / Św. Piusa
7. St. Bonifatius / Św. Bonifacego
8. Herz Jesu (Charlettenburg) / Serca Jezusowego
9. St. Marien Liebfrauen / Najświętszej Marii Panny
10. St. Antonius / Św. Antoniego

Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, Berlin 1907, Jahrgang 30; Amtlicher Führer durch die Fürstbischofliche Delegatur, Berlin 1912; quoted after Murzynowska 1981, 91.

Appendix II

Polish students at German universities at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>Breslau</th>
<th>Leipzig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1880</td>
<td>43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>79</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>139</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>128</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Breslau, Berlin and Leipzig received the largest portion of Polish youth which studied in Germany. The table gives data for the universities only.
Appendix III

List of Polish societies and institutions in Berlin (1919)

1. Verein der Gewerbetreibenden in Berlin
2. Verein der Bäcker
3. Verein der Schlachter
4. Verein der Friseure
5. Industrieverein ‘Piast’
6. Verein polnischer Geerbetreibenden in Moabit
7. Verein ‘Bildung’ in Berlin
8. Konferenz des Heiligen Jan Kanty
9. Verein ‘Zuflucht’
10. Vereinigung der Pfarrkomitees
11. Polnische Gewerkschaft
12. Kreis ‘Befreiung’
13. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein in Niederwalde
14. Verein polnischer Bürger in Berlin
15. Verein ‘Stella’
16. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein ‘Lech’
17. Nationalverein der gegenseitigen Hilfe
18. Verein der Bürger und Bürgerinnen in Moabit
19. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein in Norden Berlins
20. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein unter der Obhut des Heiligen Joseph
21. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein unter der Obhut des Heiligen Antonius
22. Freundeskreis der Polnischen Bühne in Berlin
23. Polnisch-Katholischer Verein in Berlin
24. Verein Polnischer Schützen in Berlin
25. Verein Polnischer Schmacher in Berlin
26. Verein Polnischer Tischler in Berlin
27. Verein der Kaufmannsjugend in Berlin
28. Verein der Polnischen Jugend in Berlin
29. Musikverein ‘Laute’
30. Gesangverein ‘Halka’ in Schöneberg
31. Gesangverein ‘Harmonia’
32. Gesangverein ‘Cecylia’ in Berlin
33. Gesangverein ‘Echo’ in Neuköln
34. Gesangverein ‘Moniuszko’ in Berlin
35. Gesangverein ‘Chopin’ in Berlin
36. Gesangverein ‘Laute’
37. Gesangverein ‘Lyra’
38. Gesangverein ‘Ton’
40. Männerturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin II (Moabit)
41. Männerturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin III (Wedding)
42. Frauenturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin I
43. Frauenturnverein ‘Der Falke’ Berlin II (Moabit)
44. Turnverein ‘Der Falke’ in Schöneberg
45. Turnverein ‘Der Falke’ in Neuköln
46. Turnverein ‘Der Falke’ in Oberschöneweide
47. Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Schöneberg
48. Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Neuköln
49. Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Wilmersdorf
50. Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Oberschöneweide
51. Verein Polnisch-Katholischer Arbeiter in Lichtenberg
52. Verein der Polinnen aus Niederwalk in Berlin
53. Verein der Polinnen ‘Sterr’
54. Verein Polnischer Bürgerinnen in Berlin
55. Verein der Polinnen unter der Obhut des Heiligen Josef in Berlin
56. M. Konopnicka – Verein der Polinnen in Berlin
In this paper I shall be looking at Hindu Sindhis, a well-defined community of traders from northwest India. More specifically, I will compare the pathways of economic integration of Hindu Sindhis in two very different places – London and the Mediterranean island of Malta. Data for the paper derive from two sources. Intermittently between 1995 and 2000, I conducted anthropological fieldwork in Malta, London, and Bombay (Mumbai). I draw extensively on oral history as narrated to me by several senior traders. Research in the Malta National Archives in 1999 yielded 88 records pertaining to 10 Sindhi firms that date from 1887 to 1928.2

Any study of migration and integration must include a look at processes of economic integration at the national and, increasingly, global levels. It is evident that, from the *vu cumpra* (‘want to buy?’) peddlers selling everything from beach towels to souvenirs in Italy, to Gujarati corner-shopkeepers in Britain, entrepreneurship of some sort is the occupational choice of many thousands of immigrants to Europe. This phenomenon has been studied for various situations (notably the Netherlands and the US) and there is a sizeable body of work on ‘ethnic/immigrant entrepreneurs’.3 As the word ‘ethnic’ indicates, most of the studies trace the integration of immigrant groups into host economies by focusing on the group itself – in so doing “they reduce immigrant entrepreneurship to an ethno-cultural phenomenon existing within an economic and institutional vacuum”.4 There is a dearth of studies that locate particular groups within different spatio-temporal contexts, thus highlighting the importance of the interaction between ethno-cultural dynamics and local socio-economic situations, as part of the integrative process.

In this paper I will try to show that Hindu Sindhi diaspora and migration are:

– themselves embedded, to paraphrase Clifford, in ‘particular maps and histories’, these being quite often specific to nation-states;5

– uneven processes that leave ostensibly homogenous (on the basis of ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc.) groups with marked internal dif-
ferentiation as regards access to resources and structural positions within nation-states and the global economic system. 6

Although ‘Sindhi business’ may, on the basis of ethnic affiliation, be seen as a vertebrate category, in fact it takes on different local hues as different facets of the diaspora that themselves have developed within particular historical milieus, encounter specific local situations.

Introducing Hindu Sindhis

Hindu Sindhis (henceforth ‘Sindhis’) originate in the province of Sind which from 1843 to 1947 was the most northwestern province of British India; Sind became part of the newly-formed nation-state of Pakistan with the Independence of India and the Partition of the country in 1947. When the British conquered Sind and annexed it to their Indian possessions in 1843, the province had for several hundred years been ruled by a series of Muslim dynasties. Prior to the Muslim conquest, the population of Sind was predominantly Hindu with a strong Buddhist presence; 7 by the time of the British annexation however, it was mainly Muslim with roughly one-fifth of the population being Hindu. The Hindus of Sind were mostly employed in trade and small business, although a very small number of them served as administrators to the Muslim Talpur Mirs and aristocracy and, later, to the British.

In a nutshell, there were two major waves of population movement out of Sind. The first, which originated with the British annexation of the province in 1843, was confined to a group of merchants from the small town of Hyderabad (to be distinguished from the city of Hyderabad in central India) who, leaving their families behind, struck out in search of business opportunities to places as far apart as Panama and the Straits Settlements (today’s Singapore). Because the wares they sold and traded in originally were the handicrafts of Sind (‘Sind works’), these migrants were known as ‘Sindworkis’ and the type of long-distance translocal commerce they practised as ‘Sindwork’. This first significant population movement was therefore centred solely around trade and may be described as a ‘trade diaspora’. 8

The second migration, on the other hand, was a direct result of the political and social strife that came with the Partition of India in 1947. Sindhis left their homes in the fledgling Pakistan en masse and moved to India or to locations such as Malta where they already had considerable business interests. Since then the Sindhis that had settled in India after Partition have participated in a third migration: the so-called ‘In-
dian diaspora’ which has seen millions of people move out of the subcontinent in search of opportunity.

Sindhi migration therefore is typical of modern mass migrations from India (and South Asia generally), which have taken place within two broad contexts: the first, that of Imperialism within which Indians left the subcontinent as indentured labourers or (as in the case of the Sindhis) independent traders; the second, that of free migration to western countries and the Middle East in search of better job opportunities in all sectors. As a result of this series of migrations, Sindhis today are dispersed in well over one hundred countries. They retain a degree of cohesion that manifests itself in marriage and kinship practices, in the politics of group identity and, most notably, in the types of business relations they engage in. Most importantly, they have managed to integrate and embed themselves into the economies of their various destinations, often taking into their stride sea changes in economic structure and opportunity. It is at this point that comparison becomes possible.

The Sindwork Diaspora and the Mediterranean Link

As witnessed by the tragic events unfolding daily on Sicilian beaches, to immigrants today, Mediterranean Europe is little more than a stepping stone towards the economically more promising northern European countries. This, however, was not always so and has to do with the Mediterranean’s present status as a political and economic backwater. In order to understand Sindhi migration to Malta one has to think back to a rather different situation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the Mediterranean was one of the important theatres of northern European interest; this was particularly true for the British, for whom the middle sea was an essential part of the route to India, the ‘jewel in the crown’ of empire.

It is mainly the first wave of diaspora that concerns us here. Sindwork and its long-distance networks of trade emanating from Hyderabad were also, but not exclusively, the product of historical contingency: a number of causal factors were at play. First, the deposition of the Talpur Mirs by the British caused a sudden breakdown in the patterns of consumption of high-quality handicrafts by local ruling elites with the result that established Hindu Sindhi traders had to locate new markets for their goods. Second, the world in the second half of the 19th century was one of rapidly growing opportunities and a British-dominated, expanding world economy. This happened on two levels: first, the growing ease of communication and transport in north-west India and
Sind itself, and second, the global reality of a growing exchange of goods and people often across vast distances.

British rule expanded the limits of communications and transport in Sind. In 1889 for example, the Indus Valley Railways that linked up with major lines in India to connect Karachi to Delhi was completed. In 1864, the Indo-European Telegraph Department laid a submarine cable between Karachi and Fao (in what was then Turkish Arabia), joining the Turkish telegraph line and therefore linking up Sind (Karachi) with Europe.  

More importantly the Suez canal, opened in 1871, proved a major impetus behind the increasing level of transport and communication. In 1891, for instance, Sind participated in some sort of foreign trade with 37 countries as compared to 18 in 1871. The argument here is not merely that Sind was linked up with the world in terms of enterprise and trade, but that this world was itself expanding rapidly due partly to the British ‘policy of adventure’ and cultivation of free trade. Besides, the case of Sind is typical in that the second half of the 19th century witnessed the beginning of large-scale communication technologies with the diffusion of the telegraph and the invention of the telephone. The period, that has been described as the ‘second Industrial Revolution’, was one of confluence of different technological developments that created new ways of producing, travelling, and communicating. This point is essential in order to understand the link between a small landlocked town in Sind and a Mediterranean island. Although the move out of Sind by Hyderabadi traders was a reaction to local circumstances, it was feasible only because of the global realities of the latter half of the 19th century. This then was the infrastructure which made possible the bridging of geographical boundaries through trade and brought the first Sindworkis to Maltese shores.

The first Sindwork firms were established in Hyderabad around 1860. After this date one comes across Hyderabadi traders setting up business in several places around the world. They arrived in Japan a few years after the 1868 Meiji Restoration; in 1890 Bulchand, a bhai-band from Hyderabad, landed on the shores of the Gold Coast in what today is Ghana; around 1880, Sindhi traders went to Ceylon; in 1870, Sindhi firms established themselves in Gibraltar, and in Sierra Leone via Mediterranean routes in 1893; and in Hong Kong, a small Sindhi community was active by the late 19th century.

The first thrust of the diaspora seems to have been in the direction of the Mediterranean – Markovits holds that their first destination was Egypt – and later through India to the Far East. The Mediterranean then, as now, was a favourite destination with travellers and tourists from Britain and the industrial countries of northern Europe and as such constituted a profitable market for the handicrafts of Sind –
which were of high repute among connoisseurs of ‘Oriental’ (in Edward Said’s sense) artefacts. Around the same time the ‘overland route’ to India through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea (rather than round the Cape of Good Hope) became popular with the coming of steamers – P. & O. vessels, for example, began plying this route in 1840. Passengers would embark at the ports of the north and sail round through Gibraltar, disembarking at Alexandria and proceeding by Nile steamer to Cairo; from Cairo they went by carriage to Suez where they embarked on another boat down the Red Sea and frequently changed into a third one at Aden according to whether their final destination was Bombay, Calcutta, or Madras. The names of these places come up again and again in the papers of Sindworki firms from the mid-19th century. The Mediterranean, then, with its shiploads of travellers eager to buy into the idea of ‘authentic’ souvenirs, provided an attractive market for the Sindworkis.

Later, as Sindworkis diversified into curios and silk and started to draw upon sources other than local Sind production, they found excellent centres of production and sourcing in India and the Far East, particularly Bombay (where many Sindwork firms set up depots and, in some cases, offices functioning in conjunction with Hyderabad) and Japan. The main line of trade of Sindwork seems to have been the export of silk and curios from the East to the West. Here the points of the compass pertain to the provenance of producers/consumers rather than their location – in the geographical sense, an Indian-made curio sold to a British traveller in Singapore, for instance, was moving from West to East. Firms were quick to open new branches and expand their network to places as far away as Panama and Australia, generally following the lines of international travel – not surprisingly, their expansion often converged with the advance of the British Empire, itself the major actor in the large-scale international human interactions of the time.

**Sindworkis in Malta: Tourism and the Trade in ‘Curios’**

The earliest record of Sindworki activities in Malta dates from 1887; when the firm Pohoomull Brothers applied to the colonial authorities for the release from customs of one case containing ‘Oriental goods and some fancy weapons as knives, daggers, etc.’ Since the application states the firm’s intention to sell these wares in its shop, it is evident that it had been operating in Malta for some time – enough time to establish a shop that is. By the first decade of the 20th century, at least ten Sindwork firms had established businesses in Malta. For many of these firms, Malta was one node in a trade network spanning the Far East, the Mediterranean, East and West Africa, and South America.
Although the main trade was that of the export of silk and curio items from the Far East and India respectively to the tourist and visitor entrepôts of the Mediterranean and South America, there were significant subsidiary currents of a more localised aspect. Thus, for example, there were circum-Mediterranean networks which were engaged in the re-export of goods that did not sell well in a particular place, or in the export of locally-manufactured products.

The typical Sindhi establishment in Malta was an import business and a retail outlet on the main shopping thoroughfare of the island, Strada Reale (later Kingsway and today Republic Street) in the capital Valletta. As photographs from the period show, the shops were generally well laid-out and the wares arranged in an attractive way – this was a luxury tourist market that required central locations and a quality image.

It is worth keeping in mind that the factor behind the presence of Sindhis in Malta was the geographical location of the island within the context of the British Empire. Most Mediterranean shipping routes included Malta on their itinerary and this meant a large presence of travellers, troops, and administrators stopping over briefly and exploring Valletta, including the main shopping area that was situated a couple of streets away from the harbour. The dependence of Sindhi firms on tourists and stop-overs was evident in the spatial location of their businesses, which ensured that from the time a ship dropped anchor to the time it left Malta, the visitor was tempted constantly by the Sindworkis’ wares.

Their dependence on the tourist sector was also evident in the types of goods they sold. Up to around 1930, Sindhi shops in Malta were mostly engaged in the curio and luxury textiles trade; a typical Sindwork shopfront sign from 1907, for instance, read ‘Grand Indo-Egyptian Persian Bazaar – Suppliers to the German Imperial Family.’ They catered to the Orientalist tastes of tourists and visitors and made little effort to explore the local market. This is not to say that they had no Maltese customers; turn-of-the-century Japanese ceramics, one of the lines that Sindhis dealt in, survive in many a Maltese home today. Shops were stocked with Japanese ceramics and antimony wares, brassware, silk items of clothing such as kimonos imported mainly from Japan, silver filigree, embroideries, and curiosities.

The Sindworki firms seem to have been well-organised: they had letterheads printed professionally for their correspondence for instance, and they also enrolled the services of the town’s more established lawyers when relating to the colonial government. In all cases the head-offices, where the important decisions regarding the firm network were taken and personnel enrolled, were in Hyderabad; the telegraph was widely used for rapid communication between Malta and Sind. Most
Sindworkis present in Malta at the time were salaried employees. Each firm had a manager and a number of shop assistants (who apparently often doubled as cooks and servants to the managers) depending on the size of the firm. The owners of the firms are recorded as visiting Malta from time to time, presumably to check on the progress of the branch and scout for new ideas and markets.

Employees were recruited on a two-and-a-half- or three-year contract basis. Potential recruits were generally located by word of mouth, inevitable in a small town like Hyderabad; one case specifically mentions that an employee was enrolled through an uncle of his who was on good terms with the owner of the firm. The passage to and from Hyderabad was paid for by the firm; in the few cases in which salary is mentioned, it appears that half the employees’ monthly salary was sent back home to Hyderabad, and the other half given to the employees in a lump sum when their contracts ended (this was probably only the case with junior employees). During their period of employment, they lived together in housing provided by the firm, usually in Valletta itself or its suburb, Floriana. Neither managers nor junior employees were allowed to bring their wives and dependants over from Hyderabad and it was only after Partition in 1947 that Sindhi men in Malta were joined by their families. There were several instances of relatives working together in the same firm.

As regards employment itself, there were two systems in operation. The first was based on the old gumashta (agent) system whereby the owner of the firm employed agents to run his various branches. These agents were a type of working partners – they worked on a commission basis, and had some degree of autonomy. The second, and by far the most common, type was that of the salaried employee. Employees were recruited generally on a three-year written contract that bound both employer and employee for the duration of that period. Bhaiband boys were enrolled at a young age (15 or so was a typical age for a son, slightly older for a relative or acquaintance, to leave school and join a business) and assigned to a particular branch.

Originally, wherever the Sindworkis went, they tended to keep to themselves and form little enclaves. They did not necessarily mix with other groups of Indians present in their destinations as traders or indentured workers. By the mid-20th century, trading associations were being formed by Sindhis around the world, usually aimed at protecting their interests as a group. Yet even within these enclaves, competition was rife. Individual firms expected complete loyalty from their employees and did not encourage them to socialise widely, especially not with the employees of other firms. (Again, as the joint petition for better conditions from Malta shows, the employees did not necessarily subscribe to this idea.) Members of particular firms ate and worked to-
gether, slept under the same roof, and sometimes did *puja* (worship) together – this was partly because the risk of trade information leaking to another Sindwork firm was a constant worry to the employers and considered to be too great to encourage a wider socialisation.

**Post-1930s Diversification**

In the early 1930s, a change took place in the Sindwork business based in Malta as the main companies withdrew their interests. According to the memory of Sindhis living in Malta today, this was due to falling profits. This explanation is probably correct given that the worldwide economic recession and the resulting flop in tourism dealt a heavy blow to the silk and curio industry – the firm Udhavadas & Co, for instance, was one of the casualties. However, the shops that had belonged to these firms did not close down; rather, they were sold to the former employees (generally to the managers) of the firms, who were ready to operate at smaller profits. Further proof of this change of ownership lies in the fact that today most of the premises from where the firms operated still belong to the descendants of the erstwhile employees.

Therefore, since the late 1930s, Sindhi business in Malta has been in the hands of the erstwhile managers of the Sindwork firms who had become the owners of the retail outlets, and their descendants. Apart from the close relatives of the traders who moved from Hyderabad to Malta (often via a number of intermediate stops in India or elsewhere) to join their menfolk permanently, Partition produced no significant influx of Sindhis along the established model of ‘splintering off’ the major firms and recruiting new people from India. There were two reasons behind this. First, Malta being a very small island with limited market possibilities, it was not seen as a land of opportunity as were places such as Hong Kong and Africa. Second, and more importantly, from 1952 to 1985, tight immigration laws meant that the only Sindhi men who could move to Malta from elsewhere were those who got married to local Sindhi girls. As one informant complained to me, ‘we wanted to do favours to our cousins, but we couldn’t. In 1952, the doors were closed and we couldn’t bring anyone to Malta. For 33 years not a single person came from India’. Sindhi business in Malta has therefore tended to be passed down and/or to change hands within or between the same 8 to 10 families. The local development of Sindhi business is therefore a very interesting case study in that it shows a closed system in terms of number of personnel – even if these people remained well-connected in terms of both family (through marriage, that is) and business to Sindhis across the world.
This shift in the personnel structure coincided with a general change of line. Although a few shops continued to deal in the old line of curios and luxury textiles, many of them started to diversify and explore the local market, concentrating on a wider variety of textiles. By the beginning of World War Two the strength of Sindhi businesses in Malta had become the import, wholesale, and retail traders of textiles mainly for the local market. Many of the shops specialising in curios and luxury textiles had shifted towards, and diversified into, the general textile sector. This proved to be a wise choice. The post-war period in Malta was characterised by the growing affluence and changing expectations of Maltese society – indeed, old people in Malta today tend to differentiate strongly between the lifestyles they led before and after the War. The textiles sector gained steadily in importance as Maltese women generally (as opposed to a small urban elite, that is) became aware of fashions and started making clothes that went beyond utilitarian principles and experimented with styles and type of textiles. In the period between the late-1950s and the mid-1970s, Sindhi retailers enjoyed a veritable bonanza of business. Through their family and trading connections in the Far East and notably Japan, they had access to affordable and good quality sources of textiles. During that period, they had little competition from Maltese businessmen and monopolised the textiles market almost completely – the saying among Maltese seamstresses was: ‘Jekk trid bicca drapp tajba mur ghand l-Indjani’ (‘If you are looking for quality textiles, ask the Indians’).

Things were to change yet again, however. During the last quarter of the century Malta’s female workforce increased and diversified even as sex discrimination was officially erased regarding wage rates in 1971. This meant that there were more women with less time and more cash to spare who needed smart clothes for everyday use, and who were therefore prone to buy ready-mades. Sindhi businesses were quick to respond: by the mid-1980s, almost all of the textile shops in Valletta had changed their line to ready-mades, with an emphasis on the lower-middle end of the market. This time competition with Maltese-owned businesses was intense but the Sindhis were able to combine competitive prices with relatively good quality and managed to hold their ground in this new sector very well indeed. The proliferation of Maltese-owned boutiques in fact offered new opportunities for Sindhis, since almost all of them became large-scale wholesalers as well as retailers; previously they had tended to concentrate on import and retail. Most boutiques owned and run by the Maltese were and still are small local ventures that rely on wholesalers with established import links for their stocks. Sindhis relied on their knowledge and established networks of translocal trade (one should keep in mind that they could draw upon a long history of Sindwork) to supply these small retailers.
Today around 19 Sindhi-owned businesses deal in ready-mades while four deal in textiles. The latter specialise in high quality textiles – there is still a demand for this upper-end market since Maltese women prefer to have clothes made to measure for special occasions such as weddings.

Not all Sindhi businesses made the shift from curios to textiles to ready-mades, however. Two or three continued to operate in the bazaar-type line and to cater to tourists as well as an increasing number of Maltese people looking for off-beat gifts or cheap home decorations. These bazaar-type shops were very creative and innovative in their choice of lines. In the early 1980s, for instance, cheap electronics such as watches, calculators, and games sold very well; again, Sindhi connections in Hong Kong and other mass-production centres in the Far East placed them in an excellent position to import, retail, and wholesale to Maltese shopkeepers. Their shops, situated as they were on Malta’s prime shopping street, were almost assured brisk business provided the product was attractive.

The central location of their shops also meant that the Sindhis were excellently positioned to tap major economic booms as they came. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, tourism grew dramatically from an insignificant trickle and by 1989, the annual figure of one million visitors was reached. A number of Sindhi businessmen (generally those in the bazaar line) ventured into souvenirs and at present a significant number of souvenir shops in Valletta belong to Sindhis – at one point, one enterprising individual ran a chain of four shops, all situated on the main street and all of which had belonged at one time to the Sindwork firms.

Since the 1970s, Sindhis in Malta have ventured increasingly into new lines. One business set up in 1972 specialises in supplying to industry – his company employs 19 Maltese people and imports and distributes a range of products used by the local manufacturing industry. A few have opened Indian restaurants as a subsidiary business to their import and wholesale trade; these are staffed by chefs and waiters brought over specially from India (not Sindhis, though) and two are co-owned with Maltese partners. One young entrepreneur whose father is in the business of importing, wholesaling, and retailing of souvenirs and bazaar-type goods has set up a separate real estate agency, again in partnership with a Maltese businessman.

Worthy of mention is the fact that Sindhi traders in Malta came together in 1955 to form the Indian Merchants’ Association (Malta). In my mind this indicates a change in the spatial perception of business. Before Partition, when Sindworki firms were for the most part based in Hyderabad, local operations in Malta and elsewhere were seen as ‘branches’, as extensions of the company that is. The morphological
metaphor of the branch linked geographical extensions across space to the main trunk based in Hyderabad: the tree was the firm. After Partition, when it became clear that an eventual return to Sind was unlikely, local operations were visualised as pockets of business, located quanta of firms; there was no longer a ‘branch’ connecting them to Hyderabad. The Association was never very active in actual terms and in 1989 it was renamed the Maltese-Indian Community, which supports my argument for a shift in perception towards a located ethnic group. Today it concerns itself with community activities such as Diwali parties and running the temple and community centre.

The general trend is that while in the early days of its establishment Sindhi business in Malta was a specialised operation, it has moved in the direction of diversification, higher local investment, and embeddedness in the Maltese business world. The various lines Sindhis have explored are in part a result of local market conditions, but they are also products of connections with Sindhi businessmen living around the world, which have enabled them to integrate into local economic structures.

Doing Business in a World City: Sindhis in London

Sindhi business practices in London ought to be understood within the context of the economy of a city the influence of which has for centuries extended well beyond English or British shores. In general terms, the importance of London as a node of translocal processes makes sense within the recent framework of thought advanced.24 The observation that, as Braudel puts it, ‘cities always have a measure of control over physical space through the networks of communication emanating from them’25 is certainly nothing new. Recent theorists, however, have suggested that in an increasingly interconnected (‘globalised’) world, advanced service systems tend to agglomerate in a few large metropolitan centres which go beyond the classical connective role of urban settlements and attain the status of ‘world or global cities’. Sassen argues that the transformation of the world economy (a process which gained momentum in the 1960s) to one based on services and finance brought about a renewed importance of major (‘global’) cities as sites for certain types of activities and functions.26 ‘World cities’ are the nerve centres of the globalised economy; they are the sites of most of the leading global markets for commodities, commodity futures, investment capital, foreign exchange, and equities and bonds; and they attract clusters of specialised business services, especially those that are international in scope.27 Moreover, as Castells holds, ‘the global city is not a place, but a process. A process by which centres of production
and consumption of advanced services, and their ancillary local societies, are connected in a global network ..."\(^{28}\) Of course, the importance of world cities extends beyond the economic sphere and, as Hannerz for instance shows, they serve as hubs of ‘transnational connections’ on levels of cultural production other than the economy.\(^{29}\)

London is no run-of-the-mill world city. It belongs with Tokyo and New York in a league of special importance, and this is partly the result of its unique history. King describes a process whereby London changed from an Imperial capital to a world city – a specialised finance and business centre and base for cultural production in an increasingly integrated new international division of labour. Especially interesting is what he calls the period of the ‘internationalisation of London’ from the 1950s to the 1980s, as a result of which ‘London has become the arena of international capital, the site for the creation of global profit’.\(^{30}\)

Its primacy as a global city and the growing post-war importance of London as a hub of international commerce and finance crossed paths with the Sindhi diaspora in three ways. First, the migration of Sindhis to London in the post-war years is to be seen within the context of the replacement, by international labour from the former colonies, of a population which was employed in manufacturing, and which left the city as the sector gave way to financial services.\(^{31}\) A few Sindworki firms had branches in London before Partition, but the bulk of Sindhi migration to the city (and to Britain in general) gained momentum in the 1960s. Many of the Sindhis who are now self-employed in business originally moved to London from India as young graduates of technical colleges (in some cases as students) and eventually caught up with the Sindworki firms operating there and went into business after a period of employment with these firms. We note, therefore, a shift in the sense that many of the Sindhis who moved to London as aspirants to the technical and professional salaried employment sector ended up moving on to self-employment using the Sindwork firms as stepping stones.

One of the reasons behind this shift was the degree of racial discrimination which these Sindhis encountered in London. Gul, for instance, moved to Britain from Kenya – where he had held a good clerical job with the Army – in the late-1960s: ‘When I came here racism was unbelievable. People made fun of my accent, even though I spoke excellent English. After years of service with the Army in Kenya, I came here to be offered a job as a doorkeeper’.

Santosh is now the proud owner of a thriving electronics business based in fashionable offices in north London: ‘When I first arrived here, I worked for six weeks in a nightshift job with a dry-cleaning firm, smelling all the nice smells of piles of clothes being washed. I
then joined K. Chellaram, with whom I worked for three years before setting up with my brother-in-law. Racial discrimination was not limited to people seeking employment: Dharam, a qualified engineer who did get a job with a British company run by a ‘particularly enlightened Britisher’, remembers how ‘clients would often look disappointed that the company had sent them an Indian engineer’. The factor of discrimination, then, prompted many people to seek employment with Sindworki firms that had offices in London – as one trader told me, ‘at least they were Indians like us’. Of course, Sindworki bosses were only too keen to employ Sindhis, partly because, as one of them put it to me, ‘English employees look at the time and ask for their rights’. The Sindworki network in London at the time was rather tight-knit and this facilitated the entry of new arrivals into the sector. Sindworki offices were concentrated in the Moorgate area where one building in particular, Salisbury House, housed several Sindhi offices (about 50 by one informant’s estimate); the owners of the firms socialised regularly at a pub there, and the exchange (deliberate or not) of business information was especially easy. One trader told me how he had taken a week off from one firm in order to try another, but his boss got to know about this through the Moorgate circle and was ‘very upset’ about his employee’s disloyalty.

Today that racial discrimination is – at least on the institutional level – much less salient than it was in the 1960s, many young Sindhis are going for well-paid middle-managerial and consultancy jobs in London. Sindhi parents tend to attach importance to their children’s qualifications (even if this is not necessarily seen as the antecedent of professional employment – many of them would still wish their sons to take over their businesses, for instance) and are generally willing to finance post-graduate degrees, generally in business studies and management, at the LSE and other reputed Universities. These young people, therefore, find themselves in good positions to take up well-paid jobs, and an increasing number are doing just that.

The second population movement of Sindhis into London was due to the ‘Africanisation’ programs which took off in East Africa in the mid-1960s. East Africa had for a long time been a major site of settlement and business operations for Sindhis, who were generally but not exclusively involved in the import and wholesale sector; these operations were of course the product of Sindwork, which had continued to attract Sindhis from India to Africa after Partition. In 1967 in Kenya, the rights of non-citizens to stay in that country for any length of time were withdrawn. Deprived of their right to do business and/or reside in the country, non-citizen Indians suddenly found themselves in an uncertain position and in the period between September 1967 and March 1968, approximately 12,000 Indians rushed to settle in Britain.
In Tanzania, official restrictions on the private mercantile sector practically killed off private firms by 1970. In Uganda, Idi Amin expelled all Indians from the country in August 1972 as the culmination of a series of ‘Africanisation’ measures orchestrated by himself and his predecessors; a total of 28,600 refugees moved to Britain between September and November of that year. In a nutshell, by the late-1960s and early-1970s it was evident throughout East Africa that the era of free commerce (and in Uganda, the right of residence) was over, and that Indians generally and Sindhis particularly had no future there. As a result, a substantial number of the Sindhis moved from East Africa to London.

By my estimate, the Sindhis in London today number a few thousand. They have settled mainly in north and central London, and today distinguish themselves as ‘central London Sindhis’ or ‘suburban Sindhis’. The former are very wealthy and generally own Sindworki firms spread over several countries, though some have made their money in London. The latter are generally people who migrated, as described above, from East Africa or India and are in small self-employed businesses or other forms of employment. This is no doubt a broad generalisation – homes in neighbourhoods such as Hampstead or Swiss Cottage often cost a lot of money – but by and large it seems to hold. Sindhis themselves certainly believed this; they often pointed out to me the differences in lifestyle between the two groups, and the alleged snobishness of the ‘central London Sindhis’. Lila, whose multimillionaire Sindworki family belongs squarely in this category, explained to me how she socialised with women from millionaire Gujarati, Marwari, Punjabi, and Sindhi families living in central London, and that ‘wealth has a lot to play in the selection of this circle – six out of my eight best friends, including three Sindhis, live on “millionaire row” – Avenue Road near Regent’s Park’.

The second way – after the process of post-war immigration – in which London’s status as a world city and Sindhi life in it are related, pertains more directly to business. Sassen has argued that to look at the global economy in terms of international finance or global telecommunications is only part of the story; it leaves out a plethora of activities and types of workers that are intimately connected to and indirectly produce global flows. Thus, a world city consists indeed of city bankers and jet-setting financiers, but it also consists of substantial populations of people who are connected to them – whether by cleaning their offices, fitting fillings to their teeth, or selling them CD-Walkmans for their morning jogs. In turn, everyone needs the food store, the newsagent, and of course the curry house. Sindhis in London have tended to go into the provision of consumer items, although a substan-
tial number run restaurants or hotels, or provide some other service such as dry cleaning.

The huge (presently around 8 million), upwardly-mobile population of a metropolis such as London creates an insatiable appetite for consumer items; moreover, its cutting-edge commercial practices demand the latest technologies and innovations, and reward the people who are in a position to provide them. Sindhis, because of their family and community connections with Japan and other manufacturing centres of the Far East, are in such a position. A substantial number of Sindhis in London are in the electronics line, as evidenced by their presence on Tottenham Court Road, a hub of wholesale and retail electronics shops. In this context it is interesting to note how profoundly the routes of Sindhi business are related to changing global conceptions of quality.

In the early days of Sindhi operations in London (mainly from the 1930s to the 1960s), Sindworki firms often sourced products from Britain for their wholesale and retail businesses in Africa and elsewhere; then, British manufacturing was synonymous with high quality in the minds of many, while Japanese-made goods were seen as second-rate – as one trader who imported from Japan to East Africa told me, ‘we used to joke that they lasted a week and then died on you’. But as the image of Japanese manufacturing changed from that of tackiness to that of dependable technology and affordability, established Sindhi business routes were simply reversed to tap into the new global market trend. Interconnectedness shows up in other, similar instants. According to informants, the ‘hot line’ in the 1970s was the import of watches and cheap electronics from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea (note the similarity to the situation in Malta) – then of course, these countries specialised in such manufacture, and again Sindhis were well-equipped in terms of business connections to exploit the change. A significant number of Sindhi businesses in London tap into their connections with India and elsewhere to cater to the ‘ethnic niche’ market – that is, the large numbers of people of South Asian origin settled in the city. One trader I met, for instance, made his money importing sari material through his brother based in Japan, for which he found ready sale among Bangladeshis in London. Again, this sector is to be seen within the context of the population dynamics of a metropolis, in the sense that only an urban locality attracts enough migrants from a particular place to form ‘ethnic markets’ – in Malta for instance, it would be inconceivable for Sindhi importers to specialise in such a sector, because the country in no way attracts the thousands of migrants that London and other big cities do.

The third way in which the dynamics of London impinge upon and interact with Sindhi business practices has more directly to do with the city’s status as a world city. Many of the major translocal Sindhi firms,
with branches in several places and generally involved in import and export but also sometimes in manufacture, have offices in London which, because of its infrastructure as a world city (communications, banks, etc.) is seen as an excellent place to co-ordinate business, especially finance. Possibly the best example of how London serves as a hub of translocal Sindhi business is that of confirming houses, which among Sindhis were in their heyday during the 1970s and 1980s. The principle of the confirming house was summed up to me by a Sindhi who made millions in the business and now lives in a penthouse overlooking Regent’s Park in Central London: ‘A wants to import from B, but he has no money; B doesn’t know A, so credit is out of the question; the confirming house steps in as intermediary’. ‘A’ in this case are Sindhis operating in West Africa (notably Nigeria and Ghana), who imported goods from Chinese and other suppliers (‘B’) in Far Eastern countries. Direct credit between these suppliers and Sindhis in Africa proved very hard to negotiate, and many small traders based in Africa did not have the type of credit worthiness to go directly to the international banks. (With particular reference to Nigeria, there was the additional problem that Nigerian banks would not open letters of credit on behalf of exporters in the Far East.) Sindhis in London therefore set up confirming houses specialising in financing this trade. The confirming house in London would open a letter of credit in favour of the exporter. As soon as the goods were shipped, the exporter would get paid by the confirming house; the confirming house then allowed the importer in Africa a credit period which allowed him to sell the goods. Again in the case of Nigeria, the system was for the trader to pay his local bank, which in turn paid the confirming house in London through the Central Bank of Nigeria.

London was particularly well-suited to act as a hub of the financing of Sindhi trade. It is a ‘supranational’ key city situated at the core of a general post-war tendency towards the globalisation of capital; and in any case, the city has played an historic role as the hub of the world’s financial system resulting from the accessibility of support services such as foreign-exchange brokerage, expertise in financing international trade, and good communications.

The Sindhi confirming houses themselves were mostly financed by British and other banks based or having branches in London, although some of them also made use of their own finances. They charged confirmation commissions of 4 to 5% (occasionally 3 or 6%); this depended on the liability and the stability of the country in question – as one confirming agent told me, ‘(t)o Liberia I may not accept 10% while to the US, 3 to 4% will do’. Apparently some countries imposed charges on money remittance, which practice increased the commission charges. The credit period was equally variable but was generally
in the region of 90 to 120 days from the day of shipment. In addition
to these charges, the importer would have to pay the commission
house the interest charged by the bank, plus any other expenses.

There were two types of confirming businesses. The first were
known as ‘house to house’ and were owned by the importing company
itself, typically a large and established Sindworki firm. Apart from fi-
nancing trade, ‘house to house’ confirming houses acted as foils to si-
phon money out of Africa into Britain – the ‘profit’ made by the Lon-
don company would ultimately be coming from the African company
owned by the same people – and therefore distribute the assets of that
company. This distribution of assets was extremely important for com-
panies operating in West Africa, which was seen as a very unstable re-
region. The second type was ‘third party’ or ‘customer finance’ confirm-
ing houses, which were separately-owned financing companies. Some
Sindhi confirming houses in London had a few Gujarati clients based
in West Africa, but the bulk of the trade took place between Sindhis;
note, however, that this did not necessarily include the exporters, with
whom relations of trust did not matter very much given that they were
getting paid by the banks. Because they were ready to extend credit to
Sindhis based on trust, confirming houses served as excellent step-
ning-stones for businessmen trying to establish themselves, who would
otherwise never have managed to obtain credit from banks, let alone
Far Eastern suppliers – as one confirming agent told me, ‘in a way it is
easier to start a business without initial capital, because of confirming
houses’.

Confirming houses therefore made profits of 4 to 5% on thousands
of business deals often worth vast amounts of money, and many Sind-
his in London became millionaires in a matter of a few years. The sys-
tem constituted a very important node of translocal Sindhi trade for
about 15 to 20 years; all my informants told me that there has been a
decline in its importance since the 1990s. There were several reasons
for this decline. First, apparently the confirming house – importer net-
works were rife with problems of betrayed trust and defaulted pay-
ments, and this prompted many businessmen to be more wary and
limit deals based on trust to relatives and Sindhis they knew well. One
Sindhi who worked with a confirming house in London for four years
told me that he observed several instances of malpractice by the firm,
such as changing the date of receipt of payment from Africa and thus
‘nicking a few days’ more interest’, claiming higher interest than the
bank in London actually charged, and taking deposits from the Sindhi
importers based in Africa before the letter of credit was opened, thus
earning bonus interest on this money (which was deposited in banks).
In addition to these problems, there were those brought about by eco-
nomic and political shifts – the main reason behind the decline of the
London-Nigeria link, for instance, was the major slump in Nigerian trade in 1984 – due to falling oil prices.

**Discussion**

Sindhis around the world are interconnected in terms of kinship, religion, and ethnicity through practices such as transnational marriage matching and visiting, an equally diffuse belief in the cult-deity Jhulelal, and common myths of origin and historical formation. In this sense, one may comfortably speak in terms of ‘the Sindhi diaspora’ – and of course this level of corporacy affects business practice, as I explore elsewhere.36

On the other hand, the Sindhi diaspora is a highly diverse collection of strategies which have developed differently on two levels. First, because the term ‘the diaspora’ in fact subsumes at least three waves of migration from the sub-continent; and each of these waves is located within a particular social and historical milieu. First, we have seen that in Malta Sindhis established themselves as part of the Sindwork diaspora of the 19th century; while in London, they mostly derive from the post-Partition movements and in particular from the expulsion of Indians from East Africa. Second, it is because of the economic aspect of ‘the diaspora’ that has developed in response to local situations, which of course are embedded in local structures of market and commercial organisation. Thus, in Malta, the development of Sindhi business has to be understood in terms of a small and somewhat-isolated (because of immigration laws) community operating within the context of a small nation-state with limited and shifting local markets; in London, Sindhi business practices have for their nourishment drawn on the dynamics of a world city and its needs and translocal connections. The personal histories recounted to me in Malta and London can be differentiated into a number of types. In Malta, they indicate a closed system of businesses being passed down through families and growing or shrinking according to the number of men in those families. When younger businessmen point out changes, these usually refer to lines and methods of doing business. In London, most Sindhi traders produce life histories of mobility and the exploration of opportunities and markets, generally involving transnational shifts. The point is that ‘Sindhi business’ is very much an umbrella term for practices which vary considerably according to locality. Moreover, it is essential to realise that trajectories of economic integration, even when underpinned by the centripetal dynamics of specific ethnic groups, are the results of historical interactions between mobility and local economic circumstance.
Notes

1 Sections of this paper have appeared in Falzon 2004 and 2005. I am deeply indebted to Dr. James Laidlaw of King’s College, Cambridge, for his long-term support and scholarly guidance. Dr. Susan Bayly of Christ’s College, Cambridge, also deserves my gratitude. My field research was funded by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and the Emslie Horniman Scholarship Fund of the Royal Anthropological Institute.

2 Petitions to the Chief Secretary of Government (CSG), 1885 to 1930.
3 For an overview of published research see Rath and Kloosterman 2000.
4 Rath and Kloosterman 2000, 657
5 Clifford 1994, 302.
7 Maclean 1989, 12-14.
9 Jayawardena 1973; Clarke et al. 1990.
10 Baillie 1899; Choksey 1983; Hughes 1874.
11 Annual Statement of the Trade and Navigation of the Province of Sind, 1870 – 1, 1890 – 1 (Royal Commonwealth Society Collection, Cambridge).
12 See, for instance, Singer et al. 1958.
13 Chugani 1995: 23
14 Mahtani 1997, 14-16.
15 Chattopadhyaya 1979.
16 Merani & Van der Laan 1979, 240.
17 White 1994, 5
18 Markovits 2000, 117.
19 Tindall 1982, 93, 175.
20 CSG No 4949 / 1887.
21 CSG No 4922 / 1906.
23 Markovits 2000, 143.
25 Braudel 1973, 312, see also Braudel 1982.
26 Sassen 1994.
27 Knox 1995.
28 Castells 1996, 386.
29 Hannerz 1996.
30 King 1990, 93.
31 King 1990, 71.
32 Gregory 1993.
33 Sassen 1994.
34 See Barth 1969.
35 King 1990, 90-91.
The shortage of comparative studies on Caribbean migration is perhaps not surprising given that the region’s general historiography remains fragmented by the borders of language, nation, and empire. However, in the past decade there has been an upsurge in comparative scholarship on Caribbean migration, particularly by those seeking to make connections between contemporary immigration in North America and Western Europe. Led by anthropologists and sociologists, recent studies have adopted differing comparative frameworks to analyse the cultural changes and social structures which have shaped the experiences of Afro-Caribbean migrants on both sides of the Atlantic. In advocating that histories of migration more consciously develop comparative approaches, Nancy Green has identified three distinct analytical frameworks to interpret population movements; linear, convergent and divergent comparisons. For Afro-Caribbean migration, the linear approach has been most often used by anthropologists seeking to highlight the cultural differences faced by the migrants between their societies of origin and those that they enter as immigrants. Sociologists have tended to construct divergent comparisons contrasting the experiences of Caribbean migrants between different societies to emphasise the impact of differing state policies or the similar labour markets faced by immigrants.

While linear comparisons focus on the relationship between a single Caribbean territory and the metropole, divergent studies have been far more geographically ambitious. Covering Caribbean immigrants to the US, Canada, England, France, and the Netherlands, they often compare migrant groups drawn from different territories, ethnic groups, and social classes. This assumption of regional commonality however is highly problematic due to the historical distinctiveness of migration dynamics, trajectories, and systems for each Caribbean society. As Nancy Foner notes of her own comparative work on contemporary Jamaican migration, even within population movement from a single country there can be significant differences due to the social composition of migrant flows and historical change in both sending and receiving societies. Recognising the individuality of island environments and their migration systems does not necessarily preclude posing questions of
“big structures, large processes, huge comparisons” (to borrow the Charles Tilly’s phrase), however it does stress the importance of linking together sending and receiving societies in the same comparative framework.

Such a multifaceted comparative approach has been developed in Foner’s studies of Jamaican migrants as well as in Margaret Byron and Stephanie Condon’s examination of return migration from Europe to the Caribbean. Like their work, this chapter also combines both a linear and a divergent approach; contrasting the integration of two groups of immigrants into two European societies, but also remaining focused on their changing connections to the Caribbean. A generational and transnational comparison of contemporary Afro-Caribbean migration to Britain and France reveals that processes of integration have not only differed between the two countries, but they have also changed over time. These divergent paths of integration were shaped by shifting state policies and labour markets, as well as by changes in the migrants’ own connections to the Caribbean. The emergence of a distinctive second generation within Afro-Caribbean migrant families in Britain and France has raised common issues of identity and exclusion, while also highlighting the contrasting transnational networks which these communities have constructed.

Dynamics of Post-1945 Migration to Britain: The Windrush Generation

Seeking to preserve the formal unity of empire after the Second World War, British authorities passed the British Nationality Act 1948 which merged the mother country and its colonies in a single citizenship as subjects to the British crown. The 1948 legislation was intended to solidify the nexus between Britain and the white Commonwealth, and its implications for colonial immigration from the Caribbean, Africa, or Asia were largely unanticipated. Arriving in the midst of the debates over the Act, the SS Empire Windrush docked in Britain in June 1948 carrying 492 West Indian passengers. Surprised by the arrival of these ‘coloured colonial immigrants’, the Labour government saw their movement as the product of exceptional wartime circumstances in which a troop transport ship had offered relatively cheap passage to the UK, and in which Jamaican ex-servicemen with their demobilisation gratuities had money available to afford the voyage. For British authorities, the arrival of the Empire Windrush did not symbolise the beginnings of a new mass migration, but rather a unique exception to the continuing limitations on passenger transportation from the Caribbean to the UK. Between 1946 and 1950, it is estimated a total of 1,826 West

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Indians landed in Britain, of which a third were stowaways, and the remaining two thirds of the arrivals were carried by only six ships. Of these latter passengers from the Caribbean, almost half arrived on the “exceptional” voyage of the *Empire Windrush*.

Faced with the difficulties of direct passage by sea to the United Kingdom, Jamaican travel agent Freddie Martin improvised another route across the Atlantic in the spring of 1950. Martin arranged for Jamaican migrants to fly to New York, and then travel on to Britain by sea at a cost of 90 pounds. During the following year, 2,000 immigrants travelled to England via North America, which was more than the total immigration in the first five years following the war. Annual movement remained at this level for the following year, and when Michael Banton surveyed West Indian migration to the UK in 1953, he argued that it was possibly even decreasing. However, in the next two years there was a radical increase in the intensity of movement as in 1954 an estimated 10,250 West Indian immigrants arrived in Britain, and this more than doubled the following year to 24,500. At the heart of this transformation were not the ‘push’ factors of unemployment or population density in the Caribbean, nor the ‘pull’ factors of labour demand in the UK. Rather, the growing flow of migrants was fuelled by the increasing availability of transportation, due largely to a parallel stream of emigration from Southern Europe. Mass Caribbean migration to Britain was directly enabled by its connection to a second migration system – by the low-cost fares offered by passenger steamers returning to Italy, Spain, and France after having carried European immigrants to Latin America.

In January 1955, British authorities were surprised by the arrival of 500 migrants from Barbados, Montserrat, Grenada, and St Kitts at Victoria Station in London. They had travelled by sea to Italy, and then by train across Europe at a fare of 67 pounds per head. As a result, the British Colonial Office requested its officials in the Caribbean to regularly report on departures from the islands. For 1955, these reports give details on almost 22,000 migrants, which represented 90% of the estimated arrivals for that year. The colonial reports therefore provide a revealing vision of not only the differing points of departure in the Caribbean, but also of the distinctive streams within this intensifying movement.

West Indian immigrants arriving in the UK via European ports (largely Genoa, Vigo, and Marseilles) represented half the total movement of 1955. However some of these emigrant ships from Southern Europe also sailed directly to British ports, and when we include such vessels like the *Auriga* (which on separate voyages landed passengers at Plymouth, Genoa, and Southampton) then the total carried by these ships rises to almost two-thirds. It was this connection between the two mi-
The importance of the changing availability of transportation in shaping the flow of migration across the Atlantic leads to a reinterpretation of the impact of US immigration policy on emigration flows from the British West Indies during the early 1950s. The 1952 McCarrren-Walter Act, which dramatically reduced the quota for Caribbean immigration to the US, is often described as responsible for the dramatic increase in migration to the UK. However, the decisive change in US immigration policy came in 1950, with the reduction of its wartime program of agricultural migrant labour. During the war, 62,439 Jamaicans had been seasonally employed on the US mainland.14 While the changes of 1950 made migration to Britain a more appealing avenue of economic advancement, it was not until 1954-55 that Atlantic shipping made such mass movement possible.

A second important aspect of the 1955 figures for migration is that they highlight the importance of gender relations in shaping the dynamics West Indian migration to Britain. The proportion of women and children travelling together was greatest on the BOAC flights from Jamaica to London, and on the smaller, regular shipping lines that sailed directly to Britain. In contrast, the large passenger liners from Southern Europe often carried predominantly male passengers. Given the higher costs of the BOAC flights, these were probably paid for by remittances from Britain, and so often represented dependants joining their male partners. Yet, as Margaret Byron rightly argues Caribbean women were not simply “passive movers”.15 The strikingly low level of children who traveled to Britain before 1962, show that most Afro-Caribbean women migrated as wage earners rather than as homemakers. As Stuart Hall records,

Of Jamaica’s new emigrants to the United Kingdom during 1953-62, 52 per cent were male, 40 percent female, and only 8 percent children... Adults who left Jamaica between 1955 and
1960 were accompanied by 6,500 children but left behind a further 90,000.\textsuperscript{16}

Many of these children in Jamaica were fostered in rural districts such as St Elizabeth and St Ann where the proportion of children to adults increased to over 800 per 1000 adults, whereas in Kingston the proportion was 450 per 1000 adults.\textsuperscript{17} The low levels of child migration throughout the 1950s were only partially compensated for by the arrival of dependants during the 1960s.

The significance of transportation networks in shaping Caribbean migration is also revealed by the extent to which the early movements to Britain were dominated by Jamaica. According to departure records, almost 80\% of the Caribbean migrants to the United Kingdom in 1955 were from Jamaica. The development of trans-Atlantic migration from the Eastern Caribbean was especially shaped by the extension of air transport to the region. The construction of airstrips on islands such as Montserrat in 1956, and the growth of regular air services became the conduit that was responsible for the second upsurge in immigration in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{18} The arrivals in Britain during the peak years of Caribbean immigration in 1960 and 1961 were largely carried by air. Three quarters of the Jamaicans who rushed to Britain during these years, in anticipation of UK legislation blocking this type of migration, travelled by aeroplane.\textsuperscript{19}

Access to transport therefore not only explains the total emigration figures given above, but also the differences in timing between movements from specific territories. In comparison to its population, Jamaica was significantly over-represented in the early movements to the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Population in 1960</th>
<th>Emigration to UK 1955-1961</th>
<th>Emigration as percentage of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1,609,814</td>
<td>148,369\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>825,700</td>
<td>9,610</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Guana</td>
<td>558,769</td>
<td>7,141</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>232,085</td>
<td>18,741</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>88,617</td>
<td>7,663</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>86,194</td>
<td>7,291</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vincent</td>
<td>80,705</td>
<td>4,285</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>59,479</td>
<td>7,915</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla</td>
<td>56,693</td>
<td>7,503</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>54,060</td>
<td>4,687</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>12,167</td>
<td>3,835</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,664,283</td>
<td>227,040</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} From 1953-1961.
UK. Barbados and the northern islands of Dominica, St Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, and Montserrat, also experienced significant emigration to the UK. (table 2) Local conditions, traditions of migration, and availability of transport all seem to have fuelled movement from these territories. In contrast, there was relatively less migration from the southern Windward Islands and Trinidad, due to the latter’s economic expansion in the 1950s and to fewer transport opportunities.

While streams of movement from each island responded to distinctive dynamics, there does seem to have been a shared vision of migration across the British West Indies. For many in the early 1950s, their aims were to “better themselves’ by going overseas for a few years” and to then return with the economic and social capital gained in the outside world. While official and public debates in Britain on coloured immigration cast the new arrivals as permanent settlers, for the migrants themselves, most remained focused on returning to the islands they had left behind. The metropolitan vision of Caribbean migration as unidirectional was reflected in the construction of British immigration statistics, which regularly published the difference between immigration and return movements rather than totals for the two flows. In reality, streams of migrants were moving in both directions across the Atlantic, although the peak of return migration for those migrants from the early 1950s paralleled the new influx of the late 1950s.

The intention of migrating for several years and then returning, powerfully shaped both the formation of migrant communities in Britain and the transnational connections they maintained to the Caribbean. Temporary migration made remittances of central importance to West Indians both abroad and at home. In raising the passage money for the journey across the Atlantic, family and friends often provided crucial financial support. Migrants therefore arrived in Britain with a web of economic and social obligations to those at home – to repay loans, to provide passage money for others, to give material support to the families they had left behind. Remittances were therefore of immediate importance for both the migrants and those at home; in 1960 a quarter of Montserrat’s national income was from overseas remittances ($800,000 British West Indian Dollar, BWI) while in 1963, Jamaica received £8.1 million from the same source. The need for remittance funds shaped both the employment that newly-arrived migrants sought (as factory work offered immediate wages for regular remittances) and the communities they constructed in Britain.

Remittances and chain migration were the core of the transnational connections established by West Indians in Britain. Initial Labour government policy had sought to actively disperse black migrants across the country, to avoid the race riots which had erupted in British port ci-
ties after the First World War. However, in the 1950s, Caribbean migrants increasingly congregated together in London, Birmingham, Leeds, and Leicester as they relied on each other to find housing and employment. As Ceri Peach writes of London:

> Chain migration from islands produced distinctive clusters so that, north of the river, there is a kind of archipelago of Windward and Leeward island colonies from Dominicans around Paddington to Montserratians around Finsbury Park.

With general housing shortages, and private rental signs frequently announcing “No Blacks”, migrants most often depended on each other through sharing rooms, sub-letting, or quickly seeking to become homeowners themselves. Racism in the private housing market, therefore forced many West Indians to invest in home ownership, depleting their resources for remittances or a return passage.

Racial discrimination also fundamentally shaped West Indians’ entry into the British labour market. Although contemporaries saw the late 1940s and early 1950s as a period of dramatic labour shortage, the experiences of blacks immigrants were highly ambivalent. In the wake of the arrival of Empire Windrush in 1948, the Colonial Office identified nearly a quarter of a million vacancies across Britain in hospitals, metal foundries, and textile miles, however the Ministry of Labour remained strongly opposed to the use of black immigrant labour. Employers were also reluctant to hire black males where they would be working with white women, and were opposed to having more than small numbers of West Indians in the same workplace. West Indian migrants therefore tended to be concentrated in certain areas of the economy – for example, in the transport sector they were initially recruited only as bus conductors or as station staff on the railways. By late 1958, London Transport employed 4,000 black workers, a quarter of whom had been directly recruited from the Caribbean.

Reinforcing the barriers of racial discrimination was the contrast for the migrants between the work cultures of the Caribbean islands and those of their new environment. West Indian economies followed the seasonal rhythms of export agriculture, which meant that occupational multiplicity and flexibility were crucial for both men and women to avoid temporary unemployment. The limited monetary rewards available within the islands meant that skilled labour and status (the latter derived from clerical or government employment) were highly valued. In travelling to Britain, most migrants saw themselves as skilled or semi-skilled workers, leading Basil Davidson, an economist at the University of the West Indies, to comment, “A man would claim to be a ‘painter’ or a ‘mechanic’ simply because, in some remote past, he
held a brush or a spanner in his hand or even watched someone else handling these implements”. 35 Davidson’s criticism explains the contrast between the perceptions of coloured immigrant labour as unskilled by British officials and employers, and the expectations of the migrants themselves that their vocational skills would provide economic advancement. The following table comparing 400 Barbadian migrants with the island’s general workforce in 1955 shows that migration was occupationally selective but was also seen as an avenue to skilled employment overseas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Occupations of Emigrants and Resident Population of Barbados, 1955 (in per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male Emigrants</td>
<td>Male Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Labourers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional / Clerical Workers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled and Factory Workers</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Traders</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamstresses</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestics</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cumper 1957, 74.

Significantly, West Indians faced pervasive discrimination not only in the private sector of the labour market but also in the public sector. The hostility to hiring coloured immigrants by government agencies has been detailed by Clive Harris, and was particularly important given that this was a period of both economic and state expansion. Harris stresses that the exclusion of Afro-Caribbean migrants was explicitly justified on the grounds of culture rather than race. 36 However, given the colonial education system in the British West Indies, such cultural-based distinctions were exceedingly difficult to apply. These tensions were reflected in the following description of one Afro-Caribbean candidate, who applied for an engineering position at the Ministry of War in 1949:

His qualifications were all right; his English was quite good; he answered pretty well; and although he wasn’t a strong candidate, he would have been passed as he was. But both departments represented that it was out of the question to appoint him, and Major Sumner [chairperson of the selection panel] felt bound to acquiesce. They gave him a border-line mark, but he won’t get in. 37
Discrimination was widespread in both the higher and lower levels of public sector employment, reflected in Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s outrage at the several hundred Afro-Caribbean workers employed in the British postal service.38

The issue of discrimination in the public sector raises the debate over the State’s involvement in the ‘racialisation’ of West Indian immigrants. Randall Hansen has argued that sections within the British State mounted a principled opposition against a racialised policy, and that as a whole, politicians and civil servants were far more liberal regarding immigration than British public opinion.39 Yet, both of these arguments focus on policy-making as an internal process, and therefore fail to show how the State interacted with other sections of society (such as the public exchanges that produced Churchill’s objections to black postal workers). As Kenneth Lunn rightly argues:

Attitudes and cultures were often formulated in the local context, whether it was through the influence of the local state or community/workplace networks. This is not to argue for the absence of national input, politically, culturally or economically, but to suggest that this had to compete with a number of often oppositional forces, whose origins were from a more localised setting.40

In examining the reaction of the British State to Caribbean migration, it is therefore important to focus on the tensions and differences within the State – between national and local bodies, between different Ministries, and between politicians of the same political party.

Significantly, within British government debates, the Colonial Office was consistently one of the strongest advocates for West Indian migrants.41 Such a role was certainly shaped by the importance of migration to Britain’s colonies and its potential impact on the imperial relationship. In July 1948, reacting to Caribbean disillusionment at the failure to create a migrant labour scheme to parallel the European Volunteer Worker program, the Governor of Barbados wrote to his superiors:

Quite honestly, I think that the refusal to organise emigration from the West Indies into the United Kingdom or to give really adequate or convincing reasons why it cannot be organised is doing more harm to pro-British feeling and sentiment in this part of the world than anything which has happened for a very long time... At the risk of repeating myself, I must once again emphasise of what extreme importance is a sensible and amicable settlement of this question of emigration to the United
Kingdom. I know that the Colonial Office realises the position, I
don’t think that His Majesty’s Government as a whole does, and it
really is a vital matter in the relationship of certain of the Car-
ibbean Islands, Barbados in particular, with the Mother Coun-
try.42

Yet, as the imperial relationship changed during the 1950s so the Colo-
nial Office’s involvement in immigration policy became increasingly
weaker.43 During the summer of 1961, the legislation limiting Com-
monwealth immigration was deliberately kept secret from colonial gov-
ernments in the Caribbean and delayed until after Jamaica’s referen-
dum on independence.44 Rumours of impending immigration restric-
tions meant that during the same time there was a huge influx of
arrivals seeking to beat the ban. The end of British colonialism and the
closing of coloured immigration were therefore inter-linked processes
which culminated in 1962 with the redefinition of British citizenship
to exclude Afro-Caribbean migrants from the rights of entry to the for-
mer mother country.

Migration and the Tensions of Assimilation in the French Antilles:
The BUMIDOM Era

Nineteen-sixty-two was a decisive year for movement from the Carib-
bean to Europe as it marked both “the end of free movement from the

Graph 1  New Commonwealth Immigration to UK, 1955–July 1962

Source: Katznelson 1973, 34.
Caribbean to Britain and the institutionalisation of an organised labour migration from the French Caribbean.\textsuperscript{45} While the Commonwealth Immigration Act was being debated in Britain, the French government created a new state agency, the \textit{Bureau pour les Migrations Intéressant les Départements d’Outre Mer} (BUMIDOM) to encourage and shape emigration from the French Antilles to the métropole. Such contrasting imperial policies were both a product of contrasting conceptions of citizenship and colonialism, as well as the differing position of the Caribbean in the respective European empires. Symbolically, Martinique and Guadeloupe were described as part of France’s \textit{vieilles colonies}, whereas the British West Indies which had also been colonised in early 1600s were labelled as part of the New Commonwealth during the 1950s immigration debates in Britain. The close connections between France and her Caribbean colonies had been reinforced after 1945; directly to forestall American influence in the region and indirectly by the traumatic conflicts of decolonisation elsewhere (particularly the prolonged war in Algeria).

In the wake of the Second World War, France had redefined its Caribbean colonies as \textit{Départements d’Outre-Mer}.\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Départementalisation} was seen as fully integrating the islands into France’s political, economic, and social welfare system, as well as representing the fulfilment of full assimilation into Republican political culture.\textsuperscript{46} Such measures had been welcomed in Martinique and Guadeloupe in 1946 as important measures to mark the end of colonialism. However, in the mid-1950s there was increasing disillusionment at the lack of social and economic development in the islands, with early supporters such as Martiniquais poet and politician Aimé Césaire becoming outspoken critics of French policy. Fuelled by local and international currents, the growing independence movements of Martinique and Guadeloupe seemed to culminate in mid-December 1959 with three days of serious rioting in Fort-de-France. Fred Constant has emphasised the significance of these events as the development of state-organised emigration was partly intended to guarantee political stability in the DOMs.\textsuperscript{47} Criticism of the limitations of the administrative assimilation of 1946 therefore led to the effort in 1962 to redefine assimilation into a physical exchange of peoples between the islands and the métropole.

Fuelling the political tensions of the late 1950s was the economic transformation of island society in the French Antilles. Administrative integration in 1946 had led to a dramatic increase in the state bureaucracy on the islands. As Edmond-Smith writes of Martinique:

\begin{quote}
Between 1954 and 1967 the public sector increased the number of its employees by 239 per cent. The tertiary sector is the main source of permanent stable jobs and high incomes, it employs
\end{quote}
37 per cent of the total wage earners but has 70 per cent of the permanent jobs and distributes 73 per cent of the total (Martini- quais) wage bill. Of a total wage bill of 500 million francs, the 19,000 civil servants receive half, or as much as the 62,000 wage earners of the private sector among whom 56,000 temporary workers receive one-fifth. 48

The economic dominance of the public sector made state employment a highly attractive career for Antilleans, and explains the strength of resentment against the immigration of French officials from the métro- pole. For the islanders, ‘the position of civil servant is thus highly prized: the incumbent has a stable job, a regular salary, pension and status, as well as a salary much higher than that of other sectors of the population doing similar work’. 49 While emigration from the British West Indies often drew disproportionately from government functionaries and clerical workers as they had the resources to travel, for French Antilleans such employment offered a secure career within the islands. 50

In contrast to the expansion of the public sector, export agriculture was marked by concentration and mechanisation with the islands’ connection to the European Economic Community. 51 The contraction in the sugar industry was particularly dramatic as production in Martinique fell from 86,100 tons to 21,800 tons between 1961 and 1972, and the island’s agricultural labour force fell from 36,098 workers to 17,000. 52 Drawing on Operation Bootstrap in Puerto Rico, emigration was conceived by French officials as a safety valve to reduce social tensions and unemployment during the period of economic transition.

If political and economic tensions formed the context for the formation of BUMIDOM in 1962, its explicit justification was the ‘demographic problem’ in Martinique and Guadeloupe caused by their rapidly increasing populations. Alain Anselin strongly argues that the rates of natural growth for both islands were decreasing significantly throughout the 1960s, and that the demographic problem was partly constructed by French authorities to justify their own policies. 53 While state officials made demographic growth their main rationale for organised migration, such perceptions did have a powerful impact on government policy, particularly the priority given to family unification and to young and female migrants. The spectre of population increase while not the only motive for official action did directly shape the character of state-organised migration to France.

The emergence of BUMIDOM in 1962 drew on earlier currents of migration to France which had been fuelled by state action and private initiatives. In contrast to the British West Indies, it seems that sea passage was more regularly available from the French islands to Europe,
so that in 1955, several hundred British West Indians travelled first to Guadeloupe and then onward to Marseilles and Genoa. In 1954, there were an estimated 9,240 Martiniquais and 6,380 Guadeloupeans residing in France, and by early 1962, this had increased to nearly 40,000 Antillais and Guyanais. Some of these migrants had been directly recruited as workers for state employment in the post-telecommunications (PTT) and health services. This early emigration to the public sector in the métropole in the 1950s was fuelled by the status of state employment in the islands and by the belief that training overseas would allow emigrants to transfer to a similar occupation in the public sector at home. By 1959, young men in Martinique and Guadeloupe became subject to conscription for national military service, which, intensified by the conflict in Algeria, also became a major conduit for migration to the mainland. Conscripts were frequently demobilised in France, with an open option to return to the Caribbean. A far less successful scheme was the Service Militaire Adapté which sent conscripts to public works projects in French Guiana to deliberately encourage their later settlement in the territory.

The creation of the BUMIDOM in 1962 therefore directly drew on these pre-existing flows of migrants to France, however the Bureau had an important impact in re-shaping the dimensions and dynamics of movement. The Bureau aimed to provide information to potential migrants, to subsidise their transportation and to place them in appropriate employment or training programs. In its twenty years of existence, BUMIDOM assisted 84,600 migrants which represented just under half of the Caribbean immigration into France during the period. Importantly, this migration was developing as other currents of immigration into France were becoming increasingly constrained. Aldrich and Connell argue that:

Migration from the overseas départements seemed more appropriate than migration from either Africa or the Iberian peninsula, traditional sources of imported labour, because it solved employment problems both inside the métropole and in the outre-mer; furthermore it was easier to regulate and was wholly Francophone.

As French citizens, migrants from Martinique and Guadeloupe were eligible for public sector employment that was not available to foreign nationals, and were largely seen as not raising the cultural or racial tensions caused by the arrival of other immigrant groups. Family reunification was central to BUMIDOM policy, both for its impact of demographic growth in the islands and to make the Caribbean community in France a more permanent population. By 1966,
31% of the migrants assisted by BUMIDOM were classified as family reunions.\textsuperscript{60} The Bureau adopted a deliberate policy of seeking to encourage the migration of children through differential subsidies by age.\textsuperscript{61} Such a policy was especially significant given the economic constraints which shaped migrant decision-making.\textsuperscript{62} As a result, the proportion of immigrants under the age of 14 for French Caribbean migrants in 1968 was almost double that of British Caribbean migrants in 1961 (See Graphs 2 and 3). While large numbers of children were fostered in the British and French islands during both migrations, it is probable that the numbers were much lower in the French Antilles due to the state facilities provided for family migration.

A second core responsibility for BUMIDOM was in providing vocational training to assist in adapting to French society and employment. Training programs were especially important given the rural background and low educational qualifications of many of the early migrants.\textsuperscript{63} The Bureau organised training programs in construction, metal work, domestic service and health care but few of these schemes seemed to offer occupational mobility. The limited nature of the training offered confirms in some ways the criticisms that BUMIDOM was focused on recruiting unskilled labour for particular sectors of the French economy.\textsuperscript{64} Significantly, BUMIDOM’s programs deliberately attempted to disperse the migrants across France, with the intention that they would move into local employment.\textsuperscript{65} However, most migrants opted to move to Paris instead where they had social connections or better economic prospects. Such attempts to spread migrants geographically, echoed efforts by British authorities in the early 1950s. Both policies were motivated by fears of migrant concentrations creating racial tension, and both failed due to the social networks and ambitions of the migrants themselves.

Family connections as well as BUMIDOM recruitment were two factors which encouraged Afro-Caribbean migrants into the public sector.\textsuperscript{66} With the decline during the 1970s of France’s manufacturing industries, and the increasing growth of the service sector, both metropolitan and island economies reinforced migrant preferences for state employment. By 1982, while 60% of French labour force were engaged in the tertiary sector, such employment represented 80% of France’s Afro-Caribbean workers.\textsuperscript{67} Male migrants were concentrated in the PTT and police, while almost 40% of female workers were involved in the health services. State employment however gave such migrants lateral rather than vertical mobility, as most were concentrated in the lower levels of the public services.\textsuperscript{68}

With attempts to close off foreign immigration to France in 1974, the growing problems of domestic unemployment in the metropolitan economy, and the intensifying criticism within the Caribbean of state-
sponsored emigration as fuelling dependency rather than development, BUMIDOM policy became increasingly controversial. As a result, the agency gave priority to encouraging family migration during the 1970s, and was closed in 1982 by the new Socialist government. Replaced by the Agence Nationale pour l’Insertion et la Promotion des Travailleurs d’Outre-mer (ANT) the focus of government action shifted away from encouraging emigration to facilitating the integration of the existing migrant community and to assisting return migration to the Caribbean.\(^6\) This reversal in immigration policy was paralleled by a policy of political decentralisation which was also intended to stimulate economic development in the islands and therefore lessen the internal forces that fuelled migration to France.

**Diverging Transnational Communities, Converging Second-Generations**

While the changing contours of state policy had a powerful impact on the initial arrival and integration of Afro-Caribbean migrants in Western Europe, the communities they have established in Britain and France have also been shaped by their changing connections to the Caribbean. Demographically, there is a significant contrast between the Caribbean-born populations in Britain and in France. The British Caribbean-born community has ‘aged’ with little Caribbean immigration after the late 1960s, and with a steady return migration back to the Caribbean by retiring workers.\(^7\) In contrast, the Caribbean-born community in France maintained a relatively constant demographic profile between the 1968 and 1990, largely due to the continual movement between the islands and the métropole. One important difference for the Antilleans in France is the decrease in Caribbean-born children under 14 in 1990, which reflects the significance of BUMIDOM’s family reunification policy for the earlier movements.

**Graph 2**  
*Ages of Caribbean-born Population in Britain, 1961 & 1991*

Source: Byron 1996, p. 95
More problematic is the comparison between Caribbean-born migrants and the second (or third) generation in the two countries. Recent British censuses have shifted to a subjective approach to ethnic identification, whilst French censuses identify the second generation based on parentage, but limit this category to those under the age of twenty-five and unmarried. As a result, there are considerable difficulties in both countries in estimating the total population of Caribbean-origin.
Dominating the contrast between the two communities is the continuing and concentrated character of movement between the French Antilles and France. While the Afro-Caribbean community of France is described as the *troisième île*, there is no similar reference for British West Indians who often have family divided between the UK, the US, Canada, and various Caribbean territories. Concentration has reinforced the intense physical interaction between France and the DOMs. From 1967, BUMIDOM organised subsidised return vacations to the Caribbean which by 1970 had grown to almost 6,500 per year.\(^72\) Workers in the French public sector were able to lobby for a *conge bonifié*, in which they were able to claim two months vacation in their home island subsidised by the State.\(^73\) Return flows of migrants to the Caribbean were also encouraged by the economic problems which struck France between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s.\(^74\) As a result, Byron and Condon argue that “French migration became relatively dynamic by the 1980s, with people confident of moving in either direction, if and when it was convenient and affordable for them to do so”.\(^75\) These constant movements between the *troisième île* in France and the Caribbean (as well as the growth of tourism) fuelled a tripling of air traffic to the region between 1971 and 1991.\(^76\)

The concentration of migration movements was also reflected in the high level of island endogamy amongst the relationships of Caribbean residents in France. Endogamy was not only facilitated by continual arrivals, but also by the intention to return to the Caribbean. French census statistics are unclear as to whether partners from the métropole are of Caribbean or European origin, so that the high level of island endogamy recorded in the following table would still be an underestimate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female’s Place of Birth</th>
<th>Male’s Place of Birth</th>
<th>Guadeloupe</th>
<th>Martinique</th>
<th>Métropole</th>
<th>Non-French</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guadeloupe</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,220</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>4,880</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>23,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinique</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>15,532</td>
<td>5,548</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>25,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Métropole</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,396</td>
<td>10,932</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-French</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>1,828</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>27,552</td>
<td>31,920</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Marie 1993, 106.

Such a pattern of family relationships echoed the island endogamy of Caribbean migrants to Britain in the 1950s which was fueled by networks of chain migration and by their ambition to return. One early Montserratian migrant to Britain stated:
My wife comes from Montserrat too. That way there is no headaches. We can go back to Montserrat – or move anywhere – at any time and we won’t be quarrelling. I am not looking to go back to Montserrat just yet. The English are a tolerant people for now. But it might go the other way. You never know when you are a trespasser in another man’s country. 

However, as Caribbean migrants became a more permanent community in Britain during the 1960s, patterns of relationships changed and island endogamy declined. The decline of island chauvinism and the construction of a black British identity was both a cultural phenomenon and expressed in social relationships. 

A second key divergence between the Caribbean communities of Britain and France was the differing perceptions of integration held by European policymakers. Strikingly, issues of integration and assimilation were largely downplayed by BUMIDOM in contrast to the fears of British civil servants that coloured immigrants would create racial conflicts like those occurring in the US during 1960s. Yet, despite this fundamental contrast in government policies between the two countries, the experiences of Caribbean immigrants in the labour market, education, and housing have been remarkably similar. Therefore, for the second generation of both communities there has been a tendency towards convergence, especially during the economic crisis of the early 1980s.

The experiences of the descendants of Afro-Caribbean migrants to Europe during the 1980s, in many ways anticipate the recent US debates over ‘second generation decline’. Given that much of the American scholarship on the second generation is still at a speculative stage, especially for Caribbean migrants whose children have yet to enter the labour market, the European experiences of an earlier migration seems to offer an important comparative perspective. In both Britain and France, the economic upheavals of the 1980s resulted in dramatically high unemployment levels for Afro-Caribbean men. Employment in the service sector to some degree shielded Afro-Caribbean women from the collapse in the labour market. In France, the most recent migrants (largely those in their twenties) suffered double the national unemployment rate. Such experiences highlight the importance of the national economy in setting the parameters for integration, although the contrasting approaches of Mitterand and Thatcher to their respective Afro-Caribbean communities shows that state policy also has a significant influence in politicising social issues.

In 1997, the British-raised writer Caryl Phillips crossed the Atlantic on a banana boat to retrace his parents’ journey from St Kitts to Britain. At the end of his voyage, Phillips described how:
On this bleak late winter’s morning, I am happy to be home. As I look at the white cliffs of Dover I realise that I do not feel the sense of nervous anticipation that almost forty years ago characterised my parents arrival, and that of their generation. I have not travelled towards Britain with a sense of hope or expectation, I have travelled towards Britain with a sense of knowledge and propriety, irrespective of what others, including my fellow passengers, might think.85

This image of the different journeys faced by two generations of Caribbean migrants highlights the profound historical changes which have shaped both their own identities and the European societies in which they have settled. Island cultures and transnational social networks have been refashioned in environments which have been dramatically transformed in the second half of the 20th century. The first and second generations of Caribbean migrants to Western Europe have therefore followed differing paths of integration, as they have responded to the challenges of changing state policies, labour markets and public debates.

Notes

1 Higman 1999.
5 Foner 1998.
6 Foner 1979; Foner 1985; Byron 1996, 91-104.
7 The problems of obtaining comparable data for the two countries are reinforced by the disciplinary differences in the national scholarship on these migrations, as studies of Caribbean migrants in Britain have been dominated by sociology and political science, whereas in France, the subject of Antillean migrants has been most explored by demographers and psychologists.
9 Lindsey 1992, 74-75. Half of the passengers on the Empire Windrush had seen war duty in Britain, and the same proportion claimed to have definite work plans when interviewed upon their arrival by British authorities (Lunn 1989, 166-167).
10 Lindsey 1992, 87.
12 Banton 1953, 11.
14 Banton 1953, 9.
16 Hall 1988, 273.
17 Davison 1962, 69-70.
18 Philpott 1973, 32.
19 Tidrick 1966, 30
21 Between 1957 and 1962, an estimated 11,900 migrants returned to Jamaica from Britain, which was more than the total emigration of 9,992 from the island to Britain in 1958 (Tidrick 1966, 26).
22 Cumper 1957, 81.
23 Philpott 1973. In 1954, an estimated quarter of those Jamaicans who had travelled by sea had their passage paid directly in Britain (Tidrick 1966, 30).
24 Lowenthal 1972, 221.
26 Lunn 1989, 167.
28 In the long term, home ownership could provide the economic capital to enables retirees to return to the Caribbean (Byron 1996, 98).
30 Harris 1993, 28.
31 Harris 1993, 43.
32 Though some – such as policemen, teachers, clerks and skilled workers – had used this scheme simply as a means of getting to Britain, when they attempted to seek skilled or clerical work after the crossing the Atlantic were rejected and told to return to the railways or buses (Brooks 1975, 40-45).
33 Byron 1994, 97
34 For an example, see the autobiography of a Jamaican carpenter (Collins 1965, 62, 70-75).
35 Davison 1962, 21.
36 Harris 1993, 31-33.
37 Harris 1993, 32.
38 Hansen 2000, 64-65.
40 Lunn 1997, 337.
41 Hansen 2000, 18.
45 Byron 1996, 93.
46 There were, however, important exceptions to the transfer of mainland legislation as political power remained more centralised in the islands, and various social welfare programs were only partially implemented (Aldrich 1992, 73-76).
47 Constant 1987, 11-12.
48 Edmond-Smith 1972, 446.
49 Edmond-Smith 1972, 446.
50 Lowenthal 1962, 207-208.
51 Anselin 1979, 61-62.
52 Blérald 1986, 191-194; Anselin 1979, 64-65
53 Anselin 1979, 77-78. For a contrasting interpretation see Domenach 1992, 48-52.
54 Aldrich 1992, 112; Anselin 1979, 100.
55 Condon and Ogden 1991b, 509
56 Condon and Ogden 1991b, 510; Byron 1996, 97.
58 Edmond-Smith 1972, 449; Condon and Ogden 1991b, 511.
60 Anselin 1979, 104.
61 Condon and Ogden 1991b, 513.
62 Condon and Ogden 1998, 244.
64 Condon and Ogden 1991a, 450-453.
65 Condon and Ogden 1991a, 451-452; Condon and Ogden 1993, 271.
66 Condon and Ogden 1993, 243
70 Byron 1996, 94.
72 Briere 1973, 39.
73 Galap 1985, 127.
74 Byron 1996, 97.
75 Byron 1996, 98.
76 Domenach 1992, 140 & 152.
77 Philpott 1973, 171.
78 James 1993, 255-258.
79 Byron 1996.
80 Foner 2000, 235-236.
82 Byron 1988, 224; Foner 2000, 237.
83 Anselin 1995, 114.
85 Phillips 2000, 16.
PART III

INSTITUTIONS AND INTEGRATION
The process of immigrant incorporation (or exclusion) is complex and shaped by many factors. Among the most important, are the characteristics of immigrants (their ethnic/racial characteristics, their human and social capital), the economic, social and political characteristics of sending and receiving societies, and the relationships between them. Recent theories and research has focused increasingly on the latter characteristic, in particular the creation and maintenance of transnational ties and transnational communities. While the transnational perspective has provided new insights into the changing contemporary reality, this perspective has tended to marginalise or simply exclude many of the variables deemed important in previous society-focused perspectives.

The question of whether transnationalism is a new phenomenon or just a newly discovered one, has been the subject of some debate. The purpose of this paper is not to contribute to this debate. I tend to agree that the transnational dimensions of immigration while not new, have become increasingly more salient for understanding immigration and its consequences in the 21st century. Yet, this need not imply that other variables have become marginal or irrelevant for our understanding of immigrant incorporation.

Indeed, it is not unusual that variables deemed important in previous perspectives are discarded or marginalised when a new perspective becomes more and more accepted, only to reappear at a later point. A good example for this process is the paradigm shift in the 1970s from the assimilationist model to the differentialist model of immigrant incorporation. In this case, we can observe a more recent return to an, albeit, revised assimilationist model.

This chapter is loosely based on an assimilationist/integrationist perspective, where integration is seen as a process, not a final state, and where integration is a matter of degree. Borrowing from Theda Skocpol’s ‘bringing the state back in’, the broader purpose of this paper is to bring the host society back into the equation. I propose to do this modestly by focusing on one host society institution, namely trade unions.
Trade Unions and Immigrants

Among host country economic, social, political and cultural institutions, trade unions merit particular interest. They have been the chief champions and representatives of working class interests in industrial societies and the majority of immigrants to such societies have been, broadly speaking, members of the working class. This was the case at the turn of the last century and it is the case today.

Although trade unions are primarily social organisations that represent the interest of the working class vis-à-vis employers and the larger society, they also play important economic and political roles. In championing economic, social, and political rights for workers and advancing and representing working class interests, trade unions have played an important historical role in integrating the working class into the economic and socio-political fabric of advanced industrial democracies. As the majority of immigrants to industrial societies then and now have occupied unskilled and semiskilled positions at the bottom of the labour market (i.e., they are members of the working class), and as trade unions represent the interest of this class, immigrants appear to be the natural constituents of unions.

The potential integrative thrust of trade unions is threefold. First, at the societal level, trade unions may defend the interests of immigrants, by attempting to influence immigration policy and anti-discrimination/anti-racist legislation. Second, at the level of the workplace, immigrant union membership does not only establish institutional ties between newcomers and unions, it may also serve as a basis for participation in other political and social organisations, including political parties, and voluntary and community-based organisations. Third, at the level of union organisation, trade unions may provide immigrants with positions of leadership. These activities develop and strengthen ties between newcomers and existing institutions, increasing the formers' stakes in the host society's institutional and organisational structure.

Yet, the relationship between trade unions and immigrants has often been a difficult one as unions confront two major dilemmas: whether to support immigration or to support restricting it, and whether to recruit immigrants as members or to exclude them. How they respond to these dilemmas is crucial to their role in the process of incorporation. While part of the institutional structure of all advanced industrial societies, trade unions differ in a variety of characteristics (e.g., structure, ideology and goals, density, and role in the political system). They also change over time, as they must adapt to changing economic, social, and political circumstances. As such their roles in the process of immigrant incorporation are expected to vary across societies and over time.
My central question concerns the conditions and circumstances under which trade unions are more or less likely to contribute to this process. This question is best addressed within a historical (then and now) and comparative (here and there) framework. While the main purpose of the paper is explorative and analytical, I will frame the questions and discussions using illustrations from the United States, France, and Germany.

I begin with the United States for two reasons. First for better or for worse, much of the literature on immigration and immigrant incorporation explicitly or implicitly has drawn on the ‘American experience’. Second, the scholarly literature on immigration and trade unions is considerably more developed in the American case. By taking the differences between the United States and Europe into consideration, a more detailed exploration of the American case will then allow me to ask some questions about the two European cases.

Trade Unions and Immigrants in the United States, Then and Now

A key characteristic of the American experience is the fact that mass industrialisation coincided with and was fuelled by mass immigration in a society where the prevailing ideology promised the newly arriving ‘huddled masses’ success through hard work and a piece of the American dream. At the same time, American capitalism at the turn of the century was probably the most ruthless and employers wielded often uncompromising power in their attempts to thwart union organisation. Until the 1930s, the American state invariably and staunchly supported the interests of employers over those of workers. In this context, the trade union movement confronted significant economic, social, and political difficulties in organising an ever-growing, ethnically and racially diverse labour force. In a situation where unions were squeezed from above by the employers and the state, and from below by immigration, ‘immigration has played a decisive role in the American version of labour politics’.6

As a result of this and other factors, particular to the United States, such as the extension of voting rights to white males before the advent of mass industrialisation, the American trade union movement has been less ideological and more pragmatic than its European counterparts.7 Their overall pragmatic posture and relative independence from political parties (often identified as the source of American union weakness), however, has given American unions considerable flexibility, allowing them to adapt more rapidly to new and changing situations.
In terms of the first dilemma, until the 1980s, American unions have fairly consistently opted for restriction, supporting all legislative initiatives to restrict immigration. Vernon Briggs’ historical examination of the relationship between union density and immigration rates, showing an inverse relationship between the two appears to support the rationality of this choice: unions gained strength when immigration was low and lost strength when immigration was high. In a context that assumes that restrictionist legislation is an effective tool for controlling immigration, the unions’ quest for restrictions seemed rational and promised results.

While the legislative efforts of American unions are well known, their organising efforts and successes with foreign-born populations are frequently overlooked. Although the evidence suggests that unskilled immigrants had been eager to unionise at the turn of the century, the structural and ideological limitations of the member unions of the AFL (American Federation of Labor) which had become the dominant labour federation by 1900, made them uninterested or even hostile. As craft unions they sacrificed the broad interest of the working class to win increased wages and benefits for their exclusive membership, primarily skilled workers, most of whom were native born and they were strictly opposed to recruiting among the unskilled, most of whom were foreign-born.

The changing industrial structure associated with mass production in the 1930s gave rise to the new industrial unions of the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organization). It is important to note, however, that the rise of the CIO came at a time when immigration had been severely restricted (the decade 1930-1940 had the lowest number of immigrants since the 1890s) and immigration issues had receded from the national agenda. The new CIO unions welcomed the unskilled, including the long-marginalised African-Americans who had migrated to the industrial North in the period after the First World War and the unskilled first- and second-generation immigrants.

In addition to welcoming the immigrant populations, the unions of the CIO and many AFL unions that adopted the structure of industrial unions in the 1930s served as a vehicle for economic integration and cultural assimilation. As George Sanchez observed in the case of Mexicans in Los Angeles in the 1930s and 1940s, union activity played a crucial role in changing the perspective of Mexican-Americans toward political activity in the United States, making labour and political activity the ‘greatest “Americanization agent”’.

Union membership offered first- and second-generation immigrants opportunities to develop leadership skills as union officials and second-generation immigrants predominated among CIO activists. The suc-
cess of unions in turn brought foreign-born workers into the economic mainstream, providing them with stability and dignity.\textsuperscript{18}

Union membership rose steadily in the period after the Second World War, at a time when legal immigration was relatively low, although undocumented immigration was clearly on the rise in the 1950s. In the period between 1950 and the 1980s, unions focused on routine activities such as enforcing existing contracts. Organising activities had become less important and were ‘conducted according to long-standing routines’.\textsuperscript{19}

The historic 1965 Immigration Act, which was supported by the unions, was not intended to open the country up to a new and massive wave of legal and increasing undocumented immigration, especially from Mexico which had been outside the previous restrictive quota system, but was now included in the new system. Beginning in the 1960s, undocumented immigration increasingly occupied legislators and unions.\textsuperscript{20} The unions saw the undocumented as a significant threat and supported all legislative efforts aimed at eliminating or at least reducing the flow of undocumented workers. Consequently, they welcomed and strongly supported the provision for employer sanctions in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. With the exception of the United Farm Workers Union, which joined the AFL-CIO in 1965, the unions did little to organise legal or undocumented immigrants who continued to arrive in increasing numbers throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

The rapid increase in mass immigration that began in the 1970s also coincided with deindustrialisation and a decisive shift to a service economy. The decline of the manufacturing sector (and associated job losses) which had been the backbone of the union movement in the 1950s, and the rise of the service economy contributed to a rapidly declining union membership (from a high of slightly above 30% of the labour force in 1955 to 15% in 1990).\textsuperscript{21} The new unskilled service sector jobs were increasingly filled by women and new immigrants, and the latter no longer originated predominantly in Europe, but hailed from Asia and Latin America, particularly Mexico.

As was the case with the AFL at the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the AFL-CIO unions initially saw these new workers as difficult to organise and as a threat to wages and working conditions and they took a defensive stand. In the service sector they concentrated on organising the skilled, such as teachers, and municipal and county workers most of whom were citizens or long-term legal residents, not recent immigrants or undocumented workers.\textsuperscript{22}

Beginning in the early 1990s, facing an all-time low membership, the two major union federations, AFL-CIO and the Teamsters, radically changed their positions as champions of restrictionism to champions
of immigration. At their 1993 annual convention in Washington, DC, the AFL-CIO issued a historic policy resolution that praised immigrants ‘in building the nation and its democratic ideals,’ and ‘playing a fundamental role in building our movement and continue to make indispensable contributions to the strength of our unions to this day’. The resolution concluded by stating that ‘immigrants are not the cause of the nation’s problems’ and that the AFL-CIO was committed to providing fair opportunities to legal immigrants and due process to those entering the country illegally.23

In line with the new thinking, in the mid 1990s the AFL-CIO opposed some of the recommendations of the Commission on Immigration Reform aimed at curtailing illegal immigration and at reducing legal immigration, contributing to the defeat of the proposed measures and allying itself with a formidable coalition of interests that included the National Association of Manufacturers and the National Christian Coalition, among other strange bedfellows.24 At the 2000 New Orleans meeting of the Executive Committee, the AFL-CIO announced that it was seeking the repeal of employer sanctions and that it favoured a new amnesty bill for six million illegal immigrants. John Wilhelm, President of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers International Union, made it clear that ‘the labour movement is on the side of immigration’.25

The unions’ new direction was not just restricted to pious sentiments and announcements. The 1993 resolution included a new commitment to organising and strategies for all member unions to develop programs for immigrant members and potential members and to work with immigrant advocacy groups.

Harking back to the organising heydays of the CIO and the need to organise the unorganised, the unions have made a renewed commitment to organising workers that had previously been excluded, in particular women, minorities, and immigrants.26 To underline their new commitment, the AFL-CIO created a new organising office and set aside $20 million for organising campaigns.27 With the help of bilingual organisers, they began aggressive organising and recruitment campaigns among immigrants in the service sector where they have been concentrated, including the hotel and restaurant industry, the construction industry, the garment industry, the food industry, and among janitors.28

The new leaders that came into office in 1995, including John Sweeney (AFL-CIO) and Richard Trumka (Teamsters), were at the forefront of these changes and they have brought into high positions Hispanic leaders such as Linda Chavez-Thompson, AFL-CIO vice-president in charge of immigration issues and Eliseo Medina, vice-president of the SEIU (Service Employees International Union).29 Indeed, within the AFL-CIO, the SEIU has become the fastest growing union with around
1.4 million members. Referring to immigrant membership in SEIU, Eliseo Medina, West Coast Vice-President of the union, noted that ‘thirty percent are immigrants, twenty percent are children of immigrants’ and among the immigrants ‘many are here illegally’.

This historic turnaround has met with some success in union organising among Hispanic immigrants in particular, and in areas of heavy Hispanic concentration, such as California. While much of the organising efforts have concentrated on Latinos, the largest immigrant group in the United States – Latinos have proved to be relatively easy to organise (some have argued because unions are common in Latin America) – union organising efforts and successes have not been restricted to the Latino population. They have included Asian women at the Los Angeles airport, Armenian workers in home health care, and even parking attendants from East Africa, and Taiwanese immigrant workers in Los Angeles.

Unions have not stopped at bringing immigrants into the union fold. They have also pursued broader social justice ends, often hand in hand with other progressive groups and organisations.

In August 2003, the AFL-CIO joined with other organisations to demand changes in immigration law and policy, including calls for the legalisation of undocumented workers, and better work place protection for temporary foreign workers. To mobilise the new coalition, and to ‘spotlight immigrant rights and the injustices of current immigration policies’, the AFL-CIO has played a key role in organising and sponsoring, ‘the Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride’ consciously modelled after the 1961 civil rights movement freedom rides. Making direct reference to the struggle of black Americans during the civil rights era, John Sweeney rallied supporters stating that ‘we believe as Martin Luther King Jr. believed, that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere’.

Unions have also mounted campaigns to encourage immigrants to seek American citizenship and vote. An exit poll of Latino voters in the recent Los Angeles mayoral election found that 22% of these voters were union members and that the vast majority had voted Democratic.

This historic turnaround was a clear response to rapidly declining membership rates in a changed environment that threatened union survival and was championed by a new progressive leadership elected in the 1990s. The new leaders did not only recognise that the new immigration was here to stay, but that continued and unquestioning support of restrictive legislation would only alienate potential new members. Most important perhaps, they recognised that in the age of globalisation, such legislation was doomed to be ineffective. In these circumstances, it made more sense to abandon previous support for re-
strictionist policies, to welcome immigration and immigrants, including the undocumented, and to step up efforts to organise them. As Roger Waldinger has noted, ‘the AFL-CIO is now one of the few mainstream organisations that has come out as decidedly pro-immigrant’.41

As was the case during the heydays of the CIO, unions have provided immigrants with leadership positions at the local level and the national level and they have championed their cause in the larger society.42 While the longer-term effects of this turn-around cannot be assessed at this point, American unions have recognised the need to organise immigrants and have committed themselves to this task. Most recently, the relative importance of organisational efforts has been foremost among the issues leading to a pull out of seven member unions from the AFL-CIO to create the Change to Win Coalition. The renegade unions’ leadership had grown dissatisfied with the continued decline of unions and the slow pace of organising.43 John Wilhelm, co-president of UNITE HERE (hotel, restaurant and garment workers), declared that the union was committed to spending half of its revenue on organising campaigns. Immigrants will be the main target of these campaigns.44

Europe, Then and Now

While immigration and immigrants have played a role in the creation of the working class in many Western European societies (France, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium), in none did in-migration reach the numbers or proportions found in the United States. Although France, like the United States, and unlike Germany, was considered a country of immigration during the early period of unionisation (between 1895 and the First World War), migrants constituted a relatively small proportion of the population (rising from 2.5% in 1906, to 3.9% in 1921 and to 6.1% in 1926).45 Until recently, Germany imported ‘foreign workers,’ who were not expected to settle there but eventually return to their countries of origin. In the period between 1890 and the First World War, foreign workers in Germany made up approximately 4% of the labour force.46

Compared to the United States, the historical and contemporary scholarship on trade unions and immigration in Europe is more limited.47 Most existing scholarship focuses on the positions of trade unions regarding immigration policy and there is little scholarly work on strategies to bring immigrants into union organisations. The dearth of literature is particularly pronounced for the pre-Second World War period.
The comparative literature on trade unions is rich with discussions on the divergent development of unions in the United States and Europe and frequently points to the absence of a strong socialist movement in the United States as an example of American exceptionalism. While American unions have tended to be pragmatic and not directly linked to political parties, European unions have been more ideological, and more closely linked to political parties, communist, socialist and Catholic. Before the Second World War, the trade union movements in Germany and France were characterised by multiple federations, each with its distinct ideology and party affiliation.

While French union organisation has undergone some changes since the early 20th century, in line with the overall political discontinuities in recent German history, changes in German trade unions have been more dramatic. In 1933, shortly after coming to power, Hitler abolished all independent trade unions, replacing them with the Nazi Party affiliated German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront). After the Second World War, German trade unions reorganised into a unitary structure in one federation, the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund - German Trade Union Confederation).

Students of French trade unions agree that French union structures have been fragmented and divided along ideological lines often leading to rivalries between federations. The two most important federations in terms of membership today, are the CGT, and the CFDT (Confédération General du Travail, Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail), followed by the FO (Force Ouvrière). Compared to German unions, which have been well integrated into the post-Second World War corporatist system of decision-making, French unions have had some difficulties forging coherent political strategies vis-à-vis the state.

Although German unions have experienced some decline in membership (from 40% in 1950 to 33% in 1997), union membership in France has fallen precipitously from 30% in 1950, to a low of 9 to 10% of the labour force, the lowest union density among industrialised nations, a ‘trade unionism without members’ which finds itself in a ‘deepening crisis’.

French Unions, Then and Now

Although the French State encouraged immigration and the assimilation of immigrants before the Second World War, unlike the United States, France failed to develop a comprehensive immigration policy and immigration remained a kind of laissez-faire system for the first seventy years of the 20th century. Before the Second World War French unions generally favoured the overall restriction of immigration hoping
that it would reduce the supply of labour. Support or opposition to re-
strictions, however, varied somewhat with the rise and fall of unem-
ployment. During periods of low unemployment unions were more in-
clined to support immigration and they were strongly opposed when
unemployment increased.\textsuperscript{54}

In their 1918 program, and in keeping with their universalist ideolo-
gical position, the pro-Communist CGT (France’s largest federation
founded in 1895) officially defended ‘the right of all workers whatever
their nationality to have the right to work where they can’\textsuperscript{55} and wel-
comed immigrants as members. In the 1930s, when economic and po-
litical crises gave rise to high unemployment and increased xenopho-
bia, both the CGT and the CGTU (which had split off the former in
1920) pressed for immigration restrictions now arguing that immigra-
tion served the interest of capital at the expense of labour. Thus, it is
hardly surprising that the CGT co-operated with the government’s ef-
forts to send home thousands of workers in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{56}

Although unlike the AFL the French labour movement subscribed to
a more inclusive, internationalist ideology, the organisational efforts of
French unions have been relatively weak.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, by 1914 the French
labour movement had organised only one million French workers,
making it barely capable of unionising foreign workers, who are notor-
iously more difficult to organise,\textsuperscript{58} and French law preventing foreign
workers from occupying leadership positions in unions further reduced
foreign workers’ interest in union membership. In turn, the unions’ in-
ability to use immigrant union leaders further limited their abilities to
recruit more immigrants into its fold and foreign labour organisers
were often subject to expulsion.\textsuperscript{59}

In the 1920s, the CGT and in particular the CGTU did make some
attempts at organising foreign workers and defending their interests.
The CGT advocated equal pay for foreigners holding the same jobs as
French persons, opposed the expulsion of foreigners for union activity
and advocated the right of foreigners to become elected unions offi-
cials.\textsuperscript{60} Although the CGT established a national office for organising
migrants in 1924, the union’s organising drive met with little success.
By 1929, only about 7,500 of the 90,000 Polish miners had joined the
CGT’s miners union and of the 425,221 Italians in France only 15,000
had joined CGT unions.\textsuperscript{61}

The CGTU’s organising efforts included the creation of a special de-
partment for foreign workers with a central co-ordinating office in
Paris and regional offices in the provinces and the establishment of
ethnic sections. Unlike the CGT, which supported the principle of
prioritising French workers at the onset of the Depression in 1930, the
CGTU continued to favour a policy of equal treatment. In its 1931 and
1933 Congresses, the CGTU supported the ‘complete freedom of fron-
tiers, an abolition of all police measures and control of immigration and an end to all expulsions’. 62

Noting that language represented a significant barrier to organising immigrants, the CGTU organised French classes for immigrants, urged union leaders to learn foreign languages and printed pamphlets and propaganda in Spanish, Polish, and Italian. In the face of lacking enthusiasm among French members and new waves of expulsions of foreign militants, these efforts met with little success. In 1925, the CGTU miner’s union could only claim to have organised some 2,200 Polish workers, representing only 8% of Polish miners. In the 1920s, at a time when some 438,000 Italians were working in France, the CGTU declared an Italian worker membership of 10,000 to 25,000. Despite its pro-immigrant internationalist stance, ‘the CGTU failed to integrate the foreign worker into the French working class’. 63

Given their past inability to shape immigration policy, in 1945, French unions strongly supported the creation of an Immigration Office (Office National d’Immigration) and they were given representation on the agency’s Administrative Council. Yet, the unions’ quest for control over immigration proved illusory as the ONI turned out to be ineffective. As long as the French economy was growing, employers directly recruited labour abroad by-passing the office, or immigrants simply arrived to seek work. As a consequence, the work of the ONI was reduced to regularising workers already in France, issuing work and residence permits, rather than controlling their entry.

While the French government ignored these practices throughout the 1950s and 1960s, in 1968, it tried to gain some measure of control by moving to end them for unskilled workers. 64 After several decades of neglect, and following the economic downturn of the early 1970s, immigration policy became a salient issue in France. 65 In 1974, following the oil crisis, the French government suspended further work-related immigration and began to tighten residence permits and citizenship rules.

Given the ‘uncontrolled’ flow of immigration until the late 1960s, it is hardly surprising that the CGT officially opposed immigration beginning in 1947 and continued to do so throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. 66 In the late 1960s, recognising that immigration was unavoidable, both the CGT and CFTD (the CGTU had reunited with the CGT in 1936 and the CFTD had emerged from the Catholic union movement in 1964) no longer opposed it in principle, demanding instead greater government control and the legalisation of undocumented immigrants.

They also recognised the need to organise immigrants and to defend their rights, 67 at the work place and in the larger society, including their right to housing and the absence of discrimination. During the
volatile 1970s, unions supported several radical strikes and actions initiated by immigrants.

Although there were some minor differences between the two major federations, both established commissions for immigrant workers at the national and departmental levels and organised language and education groups. Unfortunately little is known about the successes or failures of these policies, especially their effect on membership recruitment and immigrant leadership positions within the union.

Beginning in the late 1980s, economic and political developments forced the unions to rethink their approach, and they began to consider a more open policy. As the more regulated labour markets of the 1960s and 1970s gave way to highly competitive, less regulated labour markets, and as the state’s ability to control immigration weakened, unions pursued a more nuanced approach. While they continue to seek to reduce the numbers of immigrants, they recognise that immigration is inevitable and that overly restrictive policies only forces immigrants into a precarious underground.

Thus unions have increasingly favoured policies that bring immigrants into the mainstream. These include the legalisation of undocumented workers, the extension of work and residency permits, the facilitation of permanent residency and the liberalisation of family reunification. They have taken these positions in opposition to anti-immigrant measures taken by the French government in the past twenty years.

At the same time, unions continue to focus on education and training, providing literacy and language courses and teaching French workers to be more tolerant, sympathetic, and understanding of newcomers. In keeping with their ideological position French unions have continued to engage broader societal issues, including the need for adequate housing, the teaching of the mother tongue and calls for equal wages for equal work. All three federations (CGT, CGTF, FO) have focused particular attention on the problems of racism, which they see as a problem for all workers, French and immigrant alike.

Despite their political/ideological and tactical support for immigrants and immigrant issues, French unions have not been successful in attracting immigrants as members. While they have championed immigrants and their rights, immigrant union membership has remained below that of natives.

**German Unions, Then and Now**

While migrants came to work in Germany before the First World War, unlike France, Germany did not experience much in-migration in the
inter-war period, and during the war the Nazi government made ample use of forced labour.\textsuperscript{70} Mass immigration to Germany is primarily a post-Second World War phenomenon and Germany emerged as the most significant immigration country in Europe in the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

While much of the work on pre-First World War migration to Germany has focused on Polish workers,\textsuperscript{71} foreign workers in Germany included several nationalities, including citizens of Austria-Hungary, the Netherlands, and Italy.\textsuperscript{72} Although most were not considered immigrants and were expected to return to their home countries, some managed to remain and settle in Germany.

Until the Nazi government abolished free trade unions in Germany in 1933, the German trade union movement was divided along ideological/religious lines. The two most important union federations were ‘free’ social-democratic unions and the Christian unions, with the former being by far the largest and most influential.\textsuperscript{73} After significant organisational struggles during the latter part of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the German union movement grew considerably between 1896 and 1913. Membership in the free unions increased from one million in 1904, to two million in 1910, and reaching 2.54 million in 1913.\textsuperscript{74} In the same year, the Christian unions counted only 350,000 members.

As was the case for French unions, German unions’ attitudes toward foreign workers tended to vacillate between internationalism and protectionism, moving closer to protectionism during periods of economic crises (e.g., 1900-1902 and 1907-1908).\textsuperscript{75} Of the two federations, the Christian unions tended to be closer to the protectionist pole. Unlike the free unions which variously supported immigration and stressed solidarity with foreign workers, they opposed unrestricted immigration and supported the preferential treatment of German workers.\textsuperscript{76}

While the free unions recognised the need to organise foreign workers and began publishing pamphlets and periodicals in Polish, Czech, and Italian as early as 1898, their successes in recruiting foreign workers, were rather meagre. By 1912, only 7,000 Italians working in Germany had joined unions,\textsuperscript{77} and officials in the construction workers’ union (most Italians worked in the construction industry) reported that only 6 to 7 thousand of the 130,000 Italians working in that industry had joined the unions.

While the Polish workers in the agrarian East had little chance to organise, as most German agricultural workers were not organised, the Polish miners in the industrial areas of the Ruhr presented a geographically concentrated industrial work force and a potential membership for the German trade union movement. While both the Christian and free trade unions officially opened their doors to Polish miners they ignored their cultural differences, and language needs.\textsuperscript{78} Although sev-
eral thousand Polish miners were said to have been members of the two German unions, Polish workers did not feel that German unions represented their interests. In 1902, Polish miners organised their own union, the ZZP (Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie) in Bochum and membership in the ZZP grew rapidly, soon counting 20,000 members. While the ZZP often collaborated with German unions (especially the Catholic unions) in strike actions, it also stood in opposition to them concerning religious and in particular nationality issues.

Although French and German unions took a more inclusive, universalist stand than American unions, often taking pro-immigrant positions, the evidence reviewed above suggests that in the period before the second World War, they were barely more effective as agents of integration than their American counterparts.

In their four country comparison (Germany, France, Switzerland and Great Britain) of immigration in Europe, Castles and Kosack note that ‘German unions have probably done more than those of any other country to integrate the foreign workers into the labour force and have taken on welfare functions going beyond the normal trade unions tasks’. The DGB’s welcoming stance can be partially attributed to the fact that in the German case, unlike the French case, the government sought the unions’ agreement before recruiting foreign workers beginning in 1955 when German unions occupied a position of power and influence that eluded French unions. While not enthusiastic about the prospect of bringing foreign workers to Germany, especially at a time when unemployment was still a factor, the unions agreed provided that the workers recruited would be treated equally to German workers in terms of wages and working conditions.

Until the mid-1970s, German unions supported the prevailing notion that immigration to Germany was a temporary phenomenon and that the ‘guest workers’ would eventually return to their countries of origin. As such they did not object to the passage of the restrictive 1965 ‘Aliens Act’. A few years later, when many progressive social groups, including churches, recognised that the temporary had become permanent, unions were at the forefront of supporting changes in the law leading to its eventual liberalisation.

In his review of German trade union attitudes and actions, Kühne describes four phases. In the first phase (1955-73), unions saw migration as temporary and concentrated their activities on insuring equal rights for migrants at the work place. In the second phase (1973-82), following the recruitment stop of 1973, unions supported the right of family reunion, but also a more restrictive regulation for the reunion of children and spouses. In the third phase (1982-1990) trade unions were among the first groups to recognise the fact that Germany had become a country of immigration and needed to adjust its laws and po-
licies accordingly. In keeping with this recognition, unions sought to improve immigrants’ residence and socio-political rights. They also objected to the possible expulsion of foreigners drawing unemployment and welfare benefits proposed by the government and a law aimed at enticing immigrants to return by providing them with monetary incentives.

Among the DGB member unions, the IG Metall (Industriegewerkschaft Metall, metal workers’ union, until recently Germany’s largest union within the federation) was particularly active in supporting immigrant workers’ rights and was the first to call for voting rights for immigrants in local elections. It also opposed the 1990 Aliens Law as not sufficiently liberalising and demanded the liberalisation of the restrictive citizenship laws. While continuing to favour immigration restriction, but in recognition that Germany had become a country of immigration, IG Metall and the DGB supported a new immigration law that would allow immigration based on a quota system that would take employment conditions into account. In the fourth phase, 1989 to present, trade union concerns focused on the asylum and refugee crisis. In view of political pressure to undermine the liberal asylum law derived from article 16 of the German Constitution, trade unions embarked on a vigorous campaign to maintain the existing right to asylum.

The DGB supports the strengthening of the legal position of immigrants already in the country, but opposes economic migration which is deemed to have adverse effects on labour market policy. In this context, the unions are especially opposed to short-term migration. Voicing their support for more systematic integration policies, the unions favour the granting of automatic permanent residency permits for foreigners who have been in Germany for a long time, arguing that the current system of diverse legal statuses reduces immigrants’ readiness toward integration. Along similar lines they have urged increased recognition of foreign diplomas. Recognising that discrimination is a reality, they also support an anti-discrimination law.

At the organisational level, in the first and second phase, German unions have been quite successful (especially when compared to their French counterparts) in bringing immigrants into the union fold. This was less due to their organisational skills and tactics, then to the fact that the majority of immigrants until the late 1970s were working in manufacturing industries, which had been the source of traditional union strength. Like the French unions, German unions did make some accommodations to their new comrades. They established special offices for immigrants, they provided language courses, and they placed immigrants in special administrative union positions dealing with foreigners. Yet, beginning in the late 1980s, immigrant union
membership and the number of immigrants elected to union officers which had increased steadily in the 1980s, stagnated.89

Spoilt by past successes, German unions have confronted some difficulties in adjusting to the changing conditions of a post-industrial and globalised economy.90 Having grown accustomed to their privileged position in Germany’s post-war social and political system, they are now ‘groping to regain the initiative’.91 Having been able to rely on their institutional resources (labour laws, industry level bargaining), organising has become ‘the stepchild of German unions’92 and German unions have come to view organising in terms of communication and publicity, often using advertising companies to sell the ‘union product.’

While such methods are hardly effective in retaining existing members and organising non-members, they are likely to be even less effective in recruiting new immigrant workers. As Wolfgang Streeck has recently pointed out in the case of IG Metall, more than 50% of that union’s members are above the age of fifty. Furthermore he remarked that the unions are out of touch with the contemporary political understanding of young German people in general and young people of immigrant descent in particular.93

Conclusion

Given the lack of systematic data, the conclusions that can be drawn from the previous discussion are tentative. While trade unions are in a position to contribute to the integration of immigrants, the literature on trade unions and immigration, especially in the two European cases, has focused on union policies toward immigration and immigrants in general and the data on union actions and activities toward immigrant workers, on immigrant membership in unions and their leadership positions within unions are sketchy.

Despite differences in ideology and structure, trade unions in all three countries had little success in organising immigrants before the First World War. In the American case, the unions of the AFL opposed immigration and rejected immigrants as members. German and French unions vacillated between restrictionism and internationalism. While they generally supported the rights of migrants, and made some feeble attempts to organise them, they also had to confront the legal restrictions imposed on foreign labour and the workers’ own return orientation and fears of deportation. Overall, unions probably played at best a minor role in the process of immigrant integration in all three countries. In the case of the United States, the organising drives of the CIO unions provided increasing opportunities for first and second immigrants and the evidence suggests that they played an important role...
in the process of integration throughout the 1930s and 1940s, at a time when new immigration was low.

The picture in the period after the Second World War is more mixed. In the German case, unions were initially able to recruit immigrants into the union fold, but they have had some difficulties in adjusting to new socio-economic conditions and new constituents, including more recent immigrants. Like French unions they have concentrated primarily on defending the rights of immigrants in the larger society. While their immediate post-war position and activities, helped immigrants adjust to German society, their relatively unchanged stance in the face of a rapidly growing service economy and new types of immigrants, including asylum seekers and refugees may have lessened their potential as an integrative force in the 1990s.

French unions have tended to concentrate their resources on lobbying for political issues, and mobilising strikes and demonstrations. While many of these issues have included issues directly relevant for immigrants (e.g., anti-racism campaigns, campaigns for the religious rights of Muslims), there is no evidence that they have actively promoted their union membership.

Compared to German unions, French and American unions have been relatively weak and both have confronted significant membership losses in the past thirty years. In contrast to French unions, however, American unions have begun to respond to these losses. Harking back to their pragmatic lineage, they have recognised that their very survival depends on organising the new labour force in the service sector, and much of this labour force is immigrant labour. As has been the case with the changes from the AFL to the CIO during the 1930s, beginning in the 1990s the AFL-CIO has attempted to inject new vitality into the American labour movement by championing immigrant equality and rights and like the CIO in the 1930s, the ‘new’ AFL-CIO has returned to its organising roots. Most recently, the relative emphasis and urgency placed on the need to organise immigrants, women and minorities and to aggressively promote them to leadership positions, has been at the heart of a new split within the American labour movement. Whether the new Change to Win Coalition will be successful in its quest to revitalise the American labour movement and to act as an integrative force for millions of low skilled and poorly paid immigrant workers labouring in the service sector, remains to be seen.94

Notes

Brubaker, 2001, 534.

Skocpol 1985.

Of course there are also middle-class immigrants, especially in the US and more recently in Europe, but they are the minority.

Mink 1986, 10.

There are exceptions, most notably the IWW which was doomed to failure. For a detailed analysis, see Voss 1993.

The AFL supported the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 which excluded Japanese immigrants. At the beginning of the 20th century, they lobbied for restrictions on immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe and strongly supported the 1917 immigration act, imposing literacy test and as well as the 1921 and 1924 immigration acts which put a virtual halt to immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.


Haus 1995.


Within the American labour movement in the late 19th century there was considerable identification with all workers, but between 1880 and 1900, a period of significant immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe, the labour movement became increasingly exclusionary and nativist, and solidarities of all kinds narrowed. Only the IWW (International Workers of the World) carried on the internationalist agenda until 1920. (Nissen and Grenier 2002).

An additional factor was state-supported employer resistance to unions which was much stronger in the United States than in most Western European countries.

These successes came ten years after restrictive legislation passed in the 1920s had cut off the flow of immigrants and the foreign-born population had stabilised.

Milkman 2000, 5.

Sanchez 1993, 249.


Milkman 2000, 5.

Voss and Sherman 2000, 304.

Two events led to the virtual explosion of undocumented immigration: the termination of the Bracero program in 1964 and the imposition of quotas on migration from the Western Hemisphere in the 1965 immigration act. The AFL-CIO had long been fighting for termination of the Bracero program, but termination of the Bracero program only increased illegal immigration. The organising of farm workers began in 1962 under Cesar Chavez while in 1965, the United Farm Workers became a chartered AFL-CIO affiliate.

This was also a period of increasing opposition by employers. The Reagan administration’s breaking of the 1981 airline controllers’ strike reminded unions that a new wind was blowing in Washington, and it was not favourable to unions.

AFSCME – the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees is the largest American union today.


Briggs 2001, 161. The US Commission on Immigration Reform had been created by the 1990 immigration law and was originally chartered to study illegal immigration, but was later amended to study “comprehensive” immigration.


Voss and Sherman 2000, 311.
For articles on recent organising tactics and campaigns, see Brofenbrenner et al, 1998; Milkman 2000. For organising among Latino workers in particular see, Figuero 1996.

Organising among janitors has been particularly successful and the organising drives have spread from their initial location in California to the East Coast. For more information on the Justice for Janitors campaign see, Waldinger et al, 1998.

He had previously organised 1,000 garbage workers, cafeteria workers and bus drivers in Texas for AFSME.


In the early 1990s, Latinos made up ten percent of the labour force and eight percent of unionised workers (Vargas 1996).

The Oregonian, January 28, 2002.


In addition to the AFL-CIO executive council, the coalition includes many AFL-CIO membership unions, the Legal Aid Society, Oxfam America, Mexican-American Defense and Educational Fund, and many others. For a more detailed listing see, Tuason, 2003.

Parks 2003.

The new freedom rides took place in September and October of 2003. Freedom riders who included documented and undocumented immigrants, union and community supporters rode buses from coast to coast, stopping in over one hundred communities on the way, going to Washington to lobby Congress and to New York for a massive day long celebration of America’s immigrants.


Los Angeles Times, June 14, 2001. What is motivating them is that they are moving into the working class and joining labour unions, the historical incubator of Democratic activism. Like the Irish and Italians before them, they are finding a home in the Democratic Party. The Los Angeles Times exit poll found that 22 percent of voters were union members and of those 77 percent were Democrats. Miguel Contreras, head of the LA County Federation of Labor, which leads the nation in union organising, stated that 80 percent cent of new union members were immigrants. They are looking to be part of mainstream society and they don’t want to live in the underground economy.

Waldinger 2000, 51.

For portraits and short biographies of some of the Latino organisers, see Figueroa. 1996.

Members of the Change to Win Coalition are: SEIU (Service Employees International), Brotherhood of Teamsters, UNITE-HERE, UFCW (United Food and Commercial Workers), Laborers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, United Farmworkers.

The Washington Post, September 15, 2005. On July 8, 2004, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Union combined with the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees, to form UNITE HERE.

Mauco 1932. In the 1920s, France was second only to the United States as an industrialised immigrant society (Horne 1985).


Note that DAG, Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft, the federation for white collar workers, and Beamtenbund (civil service association).


At any given time, the same labour confederation may exhibit a diverse relationship with the state, may sit on state councils while at the same time mobilising members and sympathisers to strike. See Chapman, Kesselman and Schain 1998:7. See also Daley 1998.


Boulin 2000, 218.


Quoted in Lloyd 2000, 115.

Freeman 1979, 228.

Haus 2002, 10.


Cross 1983, 144-145.

Gani 1972, 21.


Watts 2000; Lloyd 2000, Gani 1972. As immigration gained increased momentum in the mid-1960s, the CGT reiterated its restrictive position, reflecting conventional wisdom in 20th century that foreign workers undercut wages and working conditions of natives.


Lloyd 2000, 111.


During both wars, Germany used prisoners of war. Some eight million “foreign workers”, prisoners of war and concentration camp prisoners were used during World War II.


Between 1870-1914, 1.2 million migrated to Germany, mostly from Poland and Austria-Hungary, Kühne 2000. The 1907 Census of occupations found an average of 4.1% foreigners in industry and agriculture (Hoerder, 1987, 22).

The free unions, also Allgemeiner Freien Angestelltenbund for white collar workers, and Hirsch-Dunkerschen Gewerkvereine, yellow unions.

Hoerder 1987, 23.

Forberg:120 and Herbert 1990.


In 1910, there were 104,000 Italians in Germany (Herbert 1990, 70).+.

Forberg 1990.


Herbert 1990, 80.

Castles and Kosack 1973, 130.

Schmitter 1981.

Vorschlag der Bund-Länder-Kommission zur Fortentwicklung einer umfassenden Konzeption der Ausländerbeschäftigungspolitik” Bonn, 1977. The unions had participated in the commission.

Kühne 2000.
85 Voting for non-EU foreigners in local elections was declared unconstitutional by Bundesgerichtshof.
86 Pitted against the SPD government at the time. Unions take stands on political issues. At the local level unions encourage members to get involved with refugee councils.
87 www.dgb.de/themen/zuwanderung.
88 Union participation among foreigners in Germany is also facilitated by the system of codetermination.
89 Kühne 2000.
90 Hoffmann 2000.
91 Behrens, Fichter and Frege 2002.
92 Ibidem.
93 Frankfurter Hefte, no. 6 (2001).
94 For information about the Change to Win Coalition’s program, see www.changetowin.org.
One evening in January 1878, a special train ran between the Dutch cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht. The journey lasted an hour and the train stopped at every station in between. The local Utrecht newspaper had predicted that many people would take this train to attend a play at the German theatre in Amsterdam, and indeed 272 people did. It is not certain whether all of them went to the German theatre. There was also a circus in Amsterdam that same night. A fortnight later, another special train was announced in the Utrecht newspaper. This time the German theatre in Amsterdam premiered the play Freund Fritz, a comedy in three acts.

The German theatre in Amsterdam was a very active organisation. On March 29, 1839, the opera Othello was performed. It was the 51st performance at the theatre that season. There had been two productions every week, each time of a difference play or piece of music. Despite this enormous activity, the German theatre in Amsterdam had not been doing well financially. There was too little interest in the performances, and there were quarrels amongst the organisers. In 1839, the director feared that his theatre, the only one in its kind in the Netherlands, would be forced to close. The Theatre Français did much better, despite the fact that the French immigrant community was only a fraction of the size of the German one. The French theatre, however, also attracted the Dutch elite, who admired French culture and enjoyed an evening of French entertainment. This elite did not appreciate German culture in a similar fashion. The German theatre however, managed to survive throughout the 19th century. The construction of a railway network contributed to its survival, because it enabled people from further away to travel to Amsterdam for an evening performance.

Utrecht did not have its own German theatre. The percentage of German immigrants in Amsterdam was not much larger than Utrecht’s (2% in Amsterdam versus 1.4 in Utrecht), but the actual population of immigrants in Amsterdam was larger. In 1859, 5,286 Germans were living in Amsterdam. Apparently this number was not enough to maintain a theatre, but luckily it was supplemented by Germans from elsewhere as transportation improved. But the relatively modest size of the German immigrant community was not the only reason that the
theatre was struggling. In 1880, the American city of St. Louis had a German population that was ten times that of Amsterdam. St. Louis had over 300 active German clubs and societies, not counting the numerous church-related organisations. Yet, its theatre did not do well there either. The German language press of St. Louis praised the plays at the theatre endlessly, but like the theatre, the newspapers were struggling as well. The press and the theatre both had a vested interest in the preservation of the German language and its culture. The German language schools and German churches of St. Louis had similar interests, but did not do much better either. Language was clearly not what was keeping German communities together.

In 1964, the Canadian researcher Raymond Breton believed that immigrant organisations increased the coherence within a group of immigrants because the creation of an immigrant organisation made the group’s boundaries clearer. Critics of Breton’s work pointed out that counting the number of organisations was not enough to measure the extent of a community’s cohesion. Some organisations made strong demands on the loyalty of its members. Therefore, it was not only the number of organisations but also the character of the organisations that was important.

Immigrant organisations are an interesting source of information about a group’s identity or ethnicity. The character, size, and number of organisations indicate the extent to which immigrants want to profile themselves as being different, or are seen by others as being different. Immigrants set up organisations to create, express, and maintain a collective identity. By forming an organisation, immigrants fence off their ethnic identity from others.

It is generally accepted that ‘groups’ and ‘ethnicity’ are social constructs. The consensus about the social construction of ethnicity does not mean that ethnicity is defined in the same way by all authors. A typical example of a definition is the one used by Bonacich and Modell. They define ethnicity as a communalistic form of social affiliation, arising from a special bond among people of like origins, and disdain for people of dissimilar origin. The definition leaves it open as to what people share. Although it is not clear what is needed to create a separate ethnicity, language and religion feature in all of the definitions. As this article will show, language and religion were not enough for the cohesion of German immigrants.

This article describes the organisations of German immigrants who came to the Netherlands in the 19th century. The focus is on German immigrants in the Dutch town Utrecht. Comparisons are made with German immigrant communities elsewhere, especially in the U.S. What was it that held German immigrants together and set them apart from others? German immigrants in various countries set up similar
organisations: churches, Liedertafeln (Singing Societies), and Turnvereine (Gymnastic clubs). We take a closer look at these organisations to see how these organisations expressed their Germanness or Deutsch­tum. Before that, I briefly outline the characteristics of the German immigrant community in Utrecht.

A German Community?

Since I have described the German immigrant community of Utrecht at some length elsewhere, a short summary will suffice. In the 19th century, German immigrants formed by far the largest minority in Utrecht (as in the rest of the Netherlands); 60% of the immigrants was born in German regions. In the middle of the 19th century, there were more than 40,000 Germans in the Netherlands. In Utrecht, as in the Netherlands as a whole, German migrants constituted 1 to 1.5% of the population. In 1849, Utrecht had a total population of 50,000. There were three times that number of inhabitants by 1920.

The German immigrant communities in the Netherlands were much smaller than those in the United States. At the end of the 19th century, more Germans lived in New York than in Berlin. In 1880, St. Louis had 54,901 German born inhabitants of a total population of 350,518 (16%). Cincinnati had a German population of 46,157 of a total of 255,139 inhabitants (18%) and Milwaukee had 31,483 Germans of a total population of 115,587 (27%).

Between 1850 and 1859, there was a total of 957 German immigrants in Utrecht of whom 535 were men and 422 women (sex ratio 1.3). Between 1860 and 1879, 1231 additional immigrants arrived: 747 men and 484 women (sex ratio 1.5). On average, German men stayed in Utrecht for a shorter period of time than their female counterparts. Migration to Utrecht mostly consisted of young adults, rather than of families with children.

The German immigrants were not all from the same regions, but some concentrations can be pointed out. The majority of the German immigrants came from regions that border with the Netherlands. Shopkeepers and shop assistants came from the region around the river Ems, in Oldenburg’s Münsterland. These shopkeepers sold textiles and cloth, and were almost all men. The assistants were both men and women, but the former outnumbered the latter. The shopkeepers lived and worked in the city centre, where they had large shops and boarding houses for their assistants. We find these communities of shopkeepers in all of the major Dutch cities. The shopkeepers and their employees formed 20% of the German immigrant community in Utrecht. Smaller groups (each 5%) were formed by the filemakers from the
Ruhr area and stucco-workers from a specific part of Oldenburg; these were all men. Domestic servants mainly came from the region near the German-Dutch border, where the Rhine enters the Netherlands.

Migrants from the Westerwald, in Nassau, formed the largest group within the German immigrant population (30%). They were traders in stoneware jugs and pitchers. The Westerwalders formed a strong cohesive community. The community had a high intermarriage rate (85%). The Westerwalders lived in a few streets where they formed 80% of the population. The Westerwalder community in Utrecht was essentially a transplanted village, as defined by the American historian Kamphoefner. Most of the Westerwalders in Utrecht came from two villages: Ransbach and Baumbach. Other Dutch towns had Westerwalder communities that were similar to the one in Utrecht, but the community in Utrecht was particularly large. The Westerwalders in Utrecht also show similarities to Westerwalder communities in the United States. These communities were alike in their cohesion. They were, however, older than the Utrecht community. In Utrecht, the community dated from the beginning of the 19th century. The Westerwalders that migrated to America sailed on four ships that left the Dutch port of Rotterdam in 1740, 1744, 1749 and 1753. The American communities were also transplanted villages, but the Westerwalders that went to America showed a greater diversity including pastors and schoolmasters. In Utrecht, there were only traders. In the American cases not only large parts of a village population were transplanted, as in Utrecht, but also the complete village social network.

Formal Versus Informal Organisations

Informal organisations may predate formal ones. In her classic 1949 article on immigrant organisations, the American sociologist Mary Bosworth Treudley made the assumption that formal organisations not only arose after the community had existed for long enough to reach some stability, but also that formal institutions became more important as informal ties became weaker. When individuals no longer shared enough common experience and understanding to be bound by informal ties, the immigrant community sought to forge more formal ties so as to retain some form of bonding.

By their nature, informal organisations leave few traces in the archives. As a result, they are difficult to track down. Some individuals did, however, play an important role in the German immigrant society, and can therefore be seen as the key figures in an informal network.

Theodor Engelmann, for instance, played such a role. He came to Utrecht in 1869 and married the daughter of the by that time very fa-
mous and popular Utrecht professor, F.C. Donders. Engelmann's wife died within one year of the marriage at the birth of their twins. Engelmann remarried a German pianist, Emma Vick Brandes. For the next 20 years the couple regularly organised concerts in their home, which were attended by some 200 people per event. German composers – including Johannes Brahms – musicians and scientists attended these informal gatherings. The events were a meeting point for all those who shared an admiration for German culture, language, and science. Religious and political discussions were taboo.

Similar roles were played by Henry Rahr, Heinrich Geuer, and Johann Kufferath. Rahr was a shopkeeper who sold pianos and sheet music. He also tuned and repaired pianos and as such knew many people. He was an active member of many clubs and societies, and regularly organised concerts. Geuer was a glass painter who set up an organisation which he called the Shelfish [sic] Club, because he missed the evenings full of fun and nonsense he used to enjoy in his native Cologne, and which had been concluded with a traditional meal of haddock (Schelfisch). Johann Kufferath was the city music director, appointed as such by the city government. He was responsible for the city orchestra and music education. In the 40 years that he held his job, he invited countless soloists to perform with the orchestra, and sent orchestra members to Germany to fulfil their professional training.

The American historian Dobbert shows how German pub owners played an important role in the informal German immigrant network. In the 19th century it was joked that if three Germans migrated to America, the first one opens a pub, so that the other two will have a place to argue. The pub owner would introduce the newly arrived immigrant to the more settled countrymen. The pub owner would also provide a place for groups of immigrants to meet, combined with the lavish consumption of German beer.

In Utrecht, 35 German immigrants – men and women – owned either a pub or a hotel. The pubs served German beer and had German waiters and staff. Three of the most important hotels were German.

A German Language?

German immigrants spoke a variety of German dialects. The Plattdeutsch that was spoken near the German-Dutch border was very different from the dialects that were spoken elsewhere. The Plattdeutsch of the lower Rhine and Weser was a bit like Dutch, and very different from the melodious Bavarian of the South, or the nasal Saxon of the East. The written German, Schiftdutsch, was the language of the upper classes: university graduates, higher government officials, teachers,
noblemen, and commissioned officers. It was the language of Goethe and Schiller. As the historian Dobbert remarks, it was not a living language, since the majority of the immigrants did not speak it. Migrants were taught written German before their migration, but their children grew up in the new country with spoken German only. The language could therefore never be the essence of Deutschtum. This severely limited the range of all organisations that were based on language, such as theatres, schools, and newspapers.

In the beginning of the 19th century Utrecht had a small private German school with 30 pupils. By 1850, the school had disappeared. Some of the wealthier German immigrants could employ private instructors or could send their children to boarding schools. There are indications that some German immigrants pursued this tactic. However, neither option was chosen on any large scale. It was not only the language problem that made it difficult to run a school. The rich and the poor, as a rule, did not send their children to the same school. The same was true for Catholics and Protestants. Differences in language, class, and religion made it difficult to set up school. Even in the Dutch city of Rotterdam, which had a much larger and more homogeneous community, attempts to set up a school did not succeed until the end of the 19th century.

A German Church?

A little under half of the German immigrants in Utrecht were Catholic, about the same percentage were Protestant and 2% were Jewish. About half of the Protestants were Lutheran, and the other half Calvinist. Religious differences were important within the Utrecht population as a whole, as they were in the rest of the Netherlands. Dutch Catholics and Protestants were usually organised in separate associations. The German society was also deeply divided along religious lines. Thus it is reasonable to expect that the German immigrants in Utrecht were also organised along religious lines.

The number of German Jews in Utrecht was small. They joined Dutch Jewish organisations in Utrecht. They also joined German non-Jewish (and non-religious) organisations, such as the singing societies described below. This is remarkable since in the second half of the 19th century, Jews in the Netherlands were usually denied access to gentile social clubs.

In the United States, Catholics in German immigrant communities had their own parishes. In 1851, in New York, there were approximately 35,000 German-speaking Catholics. They congregated in two German-language churches. German Catholics in New York were poor and
were concentrated in a few neighbourhoods. Although German-speaking Catholics and Irish Catholics lived in the same neighbourhoods, they did not attend the same churches. The Germans here felt that a loss of language was tantamount to a loss of faith. Of course, Latin was the language of the liturgy, but for sermons, confessions and hymns it was a possible to choose between Dutch and German.

In Utrecht, there was no Catholic parish that can be labelled German. This can be deduced from Confession records. Confession before Easter was obligatory for Catholics and the registers of those who confessed have been preserved. From these it is clear that the Westerwalders and Münsterlanders attended different churches. They went to the church nearest to where they lived. The Westerwalders and Münsterlanders came from different German regions, they spoke different dialects, and belonged to differed social classes. The Münsterland shopkeepers were amongst the richer inhabitants of Utrecht; the Westerwalders amongst the poorer.

There may also have been another important difference. In St. Louis, Catholics from the Rhineland and Southern Germany were ill-informed concerning church matters and prone to leaving their church. Catholics from the north of Germany were well-informed concerning their religion and were thus more loyal to their church. Thus a different attitude towards their own religion could also explain why Catholics from the various regions did not congregate together.

The Lutheran community was very different from the Catholic one. The Lutheran immigrants in Utrecht included both men and women, but men far outnumbered women. The result was that all of the women could, if they wanted, marry within their own church, while the men could not. The Lutheran community was characterised by a high intermarriage rate. This made the church very much an organisation for immigrants and not for their offspring.

The Lutheran church in the Netherlands has a long history. German immigrants had been coming to the Netherlands for centuries prior to the nineteenth century. The number of immigrants was high in the 17th and 18th centuries. Their numbers started to decline at the end of the 18th century. The Lutheran church in the Netherlands during this period was well-organised. Its members were almost all immigrants and most were German born. Many children and grandchildren of Lutheran immigrants left the Lutheran church and joined the Dutch Calvinist church. This meant that the survival of the Lutheran church depended on new arrivals from German regions.

As time passed, repeated conflicts arose within the Lutheran church about whether the sermon should be in Dutch or in German. The discussions revolved not only around the language to be used during services, but also concerning adaptation to Dutch society. In German
states, the Lutheran church was much more orthodox than its counterpart in the Netherlands. In German states the church could afford to take this position because the German states were largely religiously homogenous. The civil government supported the dominant religion and vice versa. In the Netherlands, the Lutheran church was a small minority church and could not claim the same support. The more orthodox perspective in the Netherlands was advocated by preachers trained in German regions. To counterbalance this orthodoxy, the training of preachers in the Netherlands was favoured.37

After the turbulent period of 1780 to 1787, when the Prussian army invaded the Netherlands, the Lutheran church wanted to distance itself from the German invaders and its German heritage.38 It symbolically broke with its status as an immigrant church and became a Dutch minority church. The breach was stimulated by a sharp decline in new immigrants by 1800. In the 19th century, only a very small portion of the Lutheran church members was born in German regions, although they often descended from German parents or grandparents. Most of the new German Lutheran immigrants who came to the Netherlands in the middle of the 19th century decided not to join the Lutheran church. This decision was reinforced by the fact that the sermons and psalms were no longer in German. Considering the long tradition of Lutheran migration to the Netherlands, one would have expected new arrivals to expand their organisational infrastructure. Instead, the newer migrants who arrived in the mid-19th century found the infrastructure was no longer very German and was therefore of little attraction to them.

The conflict within the Lutheran church in the Netherlands shows remarkable parallels to conflicts elsewhere. One constant was that language always played a role. The mid-19th century Lutheran church in Cincinnati decided to keep German as the church language as long as five church members preferred services in German.39 In the Netherlands, the 18th-century conflict is usually described as a conflict between established Lutherans and their offspring on the one hand, and new arrivals on the other. In the US, the conflict was seen more as the outcome of differences between the Plattdeutsch-speaking German immigrants from Oldenburg, and the Hochdeutsch-speaking Lutherans from the south. The Lutheran community of Cincinnati circa 1830 consisted of Lutherans from Württemberg and Switzerland, later joined by German migrants from Oldenburg. The Plattdeutsch-speaking German immigrants were more orthodox, the Hochdeutsch-speaking Germans more liberal. In the end, the Plattdeutsch-speaking immigrants established their own church where only speakers of their own dialect were welcome.
In the 19th century in the US, the Lutheran church was seen as ‘one of the strongest bulwarks of […] Deutschtum’.\textsuperscript{40} The Lutheran church played a crucial role in some German immigrant communities. Through its schools and its sermons, both in German, the Lutheran church maintained its culture or its coherence within (the Lutheran part of) the German community. However, religious differences meant that it was never one united German community. According to Luebke, 19th-century German immigrants in the US identified themselves primarily as Catholics, Lutherans, Evangelicals, Mennonites, or Methodists, and only secondarily (sometimes only incidentally) as German.\textsuperscript{41} In 1890, in Cincinnati there were 12 German Evangelical, 3 Lutheran, 6 Methodist, 4 Presbyterian, 2 United Brethren, and 1 German Baptist church, and 34 Catholic Parishes. If the Lutheran church was a bulwark of Deutschtum we should ask whose or what Deutschtum that was precisely.

**Innere Mission and the Gustav Adolf Stiftung**

The Lutheran church in Utrecht had grown increasingly unattractive for newcomers since the mid-19th century. New organisations arose that catered to the needs of the most recent German Protestant immigrants. Contrary to the older organisations, these newer organisations had ties to the emerging German State.

In the second half of the 19th century, two new organisations emerged: the *Innere Mission* [The Inner Mission] and the *Gustav Adolf Vereeniging* (GAV).\textsuperscript{42} Both organisations, although in a somewhat different manner, did what was called missionary work amongst the German immigrants in the Netherlands. The *Innere Mission* and the GAV both stepped into the gap that had opened up when the Lutheran church became less German.

The *Innere Mission* was based in Germany, but it was also active amongst German Protestants outside Germany. The *Innere Mission* directed its attention mainly at those Germans who perceived their stay in the Netherlands as temporary such as stucco workers and agricultural labourers. The organisation created a link between Protestantism and the new German nationalism. Retaining people for the faith was equated with retaining them for the nation. German migrants were handed brochures by wandering *Innere Mission* priests (Reiseprediger) with the symbolic title ‘Wegweiser zur Heimat’ (guide to the homeland). By keeping to their religious beliefs, the immigrants would be able to find their way home and would thus be saved for the nation. Not all of the German immigrants were addressed in this manner, only the Protestants. The wandering *Innere Mission* priests came regularly to
Utrecht upon the invitation of the stucco master Herman Abeling, who organised the church services at his own expense and advertised them in the local newspaper. Some 80 people usually attended the services, 40 of whom were stucco workers. The rest were other Germans living in Utrecht, who for many years had not heard a German service.

The GAV was an affiliate of the German Gustav Adolf Stiftung (GAS). The GAV, however, remained independent of the GAS for several reasons. One was the emerging German nationalism, which the GAS wanted to support along with Protestantism. The GAV believed that these were separate issues, noting that ‘Christ was not a German’.43 The GAV wanted to fortify Protestantism, not a German Volksgeist. In Utrecht, the GAV had between 300 to 400 members. Membership lists have not been preserved, but it is fairly certain that not all of its members were German, although Dutch Calvinists were advised by their own newspapers not to join this organisation. One-fourth of the GAV’s funds went to the German parent organisation (GAS). But the GAV found its own course and disassociated itself from the German nationalism that became increasingly stronger in the GAS as the 19th century progressed. Some German immigrants in the Netherlands disagreed with this stance and joined the GAS instead.

Liedertafeln

All of the German immigrant communities had their singing societies or Liedertafeln. In other countries, Liedertafeln managed to unite German immigrants from very different regional and religious backgrounds. According to the American historian Bohlman, singing played a crucial role in the shaping of a German-American identity.44 The first Liedertafel in Germany was set up in Berlin in 1809.45 The Liedertafeln played a role in the movement for a united Germany. In the 1840s, they were an alternative to forbidden political organisations. The idea of the Liedertafel was exported to other countries, together with ideas concerning German unity. Exporting the idea, however, implied transforming it. In the Flemish part of Belgium, Liedertafeln were set up to increase Flemish unity, just as the German Liedertafeln were meant to encourage German unity. A stronger Flanders, it was argued, could be created by singing in German, since this implied creating a distance from both France and the Walloon provinces. The Liedertafeln in the German regions, however, perceived their Flemish counterparts as advocates of a greater German empire, which might include Flanders.

In Denmark, Liedertafeln had favoured the union of Schleswig-Holstein with Germany. After Sleswig-Holstein became part of the German Empire, anti-German sympathies in Denmark grew stronger. For
the *Liedertafeln*, this meant that they became much more German in nature. In 1867, it was decided that only German-born men and their sons could become members of the *Liedertafeln* and that the official language at meetings would be German. As a reaction to anti-German sympathies, the German immigrants withdrew into their own organisations and made these more exclusively German in nature.46

The dilemma of the *Liedertafeln* concerned what kind of unity they supported: the unity between German immigrants, as was the case in the US and England, or support for a united Germany and a Great German Empire, which might include parts of Denmark, Flanders, or the Netherlands.

The first *Liedertafeln* in the Netherlands were established in 1827. They were led by Germans, used German study materials and sang only German songs. The *Liedertafeln* differed from the older singing societies in the way its members sang seated at long tables. In the period from 1827 to 1915, some 500 of these singing societies were founded. Between 1845 and 1915, annual Dutch-German singing contests, were held alternately in Cleves and Arnhem. German contestants usually came from the Lower Rhine region, although interest began to wane after 1852. A sharp rise in the number of Dutch organisations followed, and the Netherlands organised its own singing contests. The Dutch singing societies were, however, already less German by the mid-19th century. Contestants were required to perform at least part of their repertoire in Dutch and composers were invited to write new *Liedertafeln*-style songs in Dutch. The reason for this was the fear of annexation, which was expressed throughout the second half of the 19th century and especially after the wars of 1866 and 1870. The fear of annexation was, however, perhaps less important than the fear of being suspected of supporting annexation.

The Dutch *Liedertafeln* were not exclusively immigrant organisations; there were also numerous non-German singers, including Dutch contestants and immigrants from other countries. In Utrecht, the *Liedertafel* Aurora was established in 1845 by the Dutchmen, F.C. Kist. The *Liedertafel* had approximately 500 members. One in five was German. An analysis of the membership lists shows that the singing societies were all-male but open to German immigrants from various religious and regional backgrounds. Members included rich Catholic shopkeepers and their assistants. There were Lutheran, Calvinist, and Jewish members from almost all runs aspects of society. Geuer, founder of the Shellsfish Club was a member, as was piano dealer Rahr, city music director Kufferath, two of the most important pub and hotel owners, and the president of the GAV. Lower-class Catholics, however, were totally absent. None of the poorer Westerwalders were members.
In 1849, the second *Liedertafel* was established in Utrecht. The UMZV (Koninklijke Utrechtse Mannenzangvereeniging) was a singing society with a membership of some 770. Some of the members from *Liedertafel* Aurora switched to UMZV. Some of the German shop-keepers, who were not yet members of the older organisation, joined the UMZV instead. For the rest, we find a similar mixture as that of the Aurora. Again we find no Westerwalders amongst its members. A third organisation was founded in 1873, but this one seems to have been short-lived.

If the *Liedertafeln* shaped a German-Dutch identity, like it had shaped a German-American identity, this was an identity that, in the first place, did not clearly distinguish the Germans from other groups, and secondly, it was not an all-inclusive identity. Singing societies managed to include some parts of the German immigrant community, but by no means all.

**Turnvereinen**

*Turnvereinen* or gymnastic clubs were as characteristic of German immigrant communities as the singing societies were. The *Turnvereinen* were founded in the beginning of the 19th century. They were regarded as subversive organisations by the German government. After the failed revolution of 1848, many Forty-Eighters or Turners, as these revolutionaries called themselves, left for the United States where they founded the German-American Turner Movement and prepared for new revolutions in Germany. In American towns they built exercise halls, the so-called *Turnhalle*. These were often impressively large buildings, that not only housed the gymnastic club itself, but also theatre clubs, rifle clubs, chess clubs or German language schools.

Utrecht also had its gymnastic clubs, but they did not play the same role as those in England and the US. The reason for this is that the revolutionaries who emigrated from Germany did not go to the Netherlands. With no revolutionaries, the gymnastic clubs were just gymnastic clubs. One German revolutionary did come to the Netherlands, Carl Euler, did indeed set up a *Turnverein* in Utrecht. This, however, was a general organisation rather than a German club and it had none of the aspirations that the German Vereine had elsewhere. Its members, 153 in total, were mostly students. Euler seems to have run a second, rather informal Turners association. After Euler left Utrecht in 1851, the gymnastic club Kallisteneia was founded to continue the informal group established by Euler. The club had 150 members, but only one was German. Carl Euler did return to Utrecht once, in 1854, this time as an advocate for the GAV.
Mid-19th century Utrecht had seven gymnastic clubs with a combined membership of several hundred. The clubs all attracted different sectors of society: students, army officers, civilians, and boys. None of the clubs called itself German; no club used the German word Verein in its name. Seven gymnastic clubs was a lot for this relatively small city. With so many gymnastic clubs, there was little need for German immigrants to set up a German organisation of its own.

In Cincinnati, the Turners set up an impressive Turnverein, which non-German children started to join, and since the children of German immigrants no longer spoke or understood German, English became the accepted language.49

In St. Louis, the German immigrants were successful in their efforts to get gymnastics on the curriculum of the public schools. The Turnvereine Teachers also became gym teachers in the public schools.50 After this period Turnvereine diminished in popularity. The gymnastic clubs were clearly German in inspiration, but after half a century they had lost much of their Deutschtum. The majority of the German immigrant community had from the beginning not supported the political ideas of the original Turners. Catholic German immigrants were advised to stay away from the gymnastic clubs. If the Turnvereine were indeed expressions of Deutschtum it was again, like the Lutheran church, a Deutschtum, which included only a part of the community.

German Unity

The German immigrant communities in the US had numerous organisations, but were far from united. ‘Wherever there are four Germans gathered, they will find five different ideas.’51 Most organisations did not survive the first generation, despite the effort of German language schools, pub keepers, newspapers, and theatres to keep the Deutschtum alive. The children of German immigrants no longer spoke German. In an attempt to save the lively German culture that once was, albeit distributed over many different organisations, some key figures in the major German-American immigrant communities attempted to arrive at a more united position by finding a common denominator they were sure existed. German communities in America first celebrated German Day in 1883 to commemorate the arrival of the first German immigrants in 1683: Pastorius and his Palantines aboard the Concord, the German equivalent of the Mayflower.52 Later, this celebration was combined with the anniversary of the battle of Sedan. Neither the original notion, nor the anniversary of the battle of Sedan appealed to all German immigrants. The Forty-Eighters and the Catholics disassociated themselves from the nationalistic and anti-Catholic sentiments that this
movement was based on. In the end, the common denominator became the struggle against Prohibition, which was seen as a real threat to German identity. German organisations profited from the sale of beer during large gatherings, and Prohibition would eliminate this source of income. In the end, the Deutschtum represented nothing more than a keg of beer.

In Utrecht, the first organisation that presented itself as German, the Deutsche Verein zu Utrecht, was founded in 1897 by recent German immigrants, all Protestant middle-class men. Contrary to the situation in other countries, where the word Verein was used much earlier, this was the first organisation that used this word. The choice of name was not irrelevant. A name can represent a collective identity and through the name a collective identity is shaped.\(^53\) This new organisation used both Deutsche and Verein in its name. Its aim was to stimulate Germanness, sociability (Geselligkeit) and a love for Germany. Despite its universal claims and its appeal to Deutschtum, this organisation, like the previous ones, only represented one portion of the German immigrant population.

The First World War was a watershed in German-American history. Many German-Americans began to dissociate themselves from their German ancestry. The situation in the Netherlands was different, due to Dutch neutrality during the war. The Germans in the Netherlands set up organisations that supported German-Dutch families who had lost their breadwinners during the war. This was followed by the creation of a memorial for the German prisoners of war who had died in the Netherlands. In the 1920s, the first real attempts were made to create more unity. In the 1930s, German organisations came under Nazi influence. At that time, unity was achieved by denying the Germanness of some.\(^54\)

**Conclusion**

Most of the 19th century witnessed the migrations of Germans, while there was no actual German State. This meant that there were no state initiatives that could shape or hinder immigrant initiatives by, for instance, enforcing homogeneity and coherence. Before the founding of nation-states, sending societies did little to keep in touch with their former residents. On the contrary, prior to 1871, the various German states as a rule did not take back people that had emigrated, even if it was the emigrant’s intention to migrate only temporarily. Once people left, they were often refused re-entry. This changed after German unification.
In contemporary society, migrants are seen, both by the sending and the receiving societies, as still belonging to their country of origin, despite their migration and long-term stays outside their country of birth. This feeling is expressed by the use of the term ‘migrant’ even for the second or third generation.55 This hereditary immigrant status affects the way immigrants and their descendants organise themselves. In the past, immigrant organisations were mostly a first generation phenomenon, which may offer immigrant organisations greater continuity. Government initiatives and the emergence of the nation-state seemed to make the real difference between the situation then and now.

Deutschum existed in the 19th century, despite the absence of a German State. Germanness was just a multitude of German organisations making various claims on Germanness. There was a sense of identity, but it was not expressed collectively. Germanness, then, existed without a common denominator. When the German national state finally took shape, this had a profound influence on the notion of identity. Boundaries were defined more sharply, but also excluded more people.

The German immigrant community in Utrecht was not a coherent community although claims on coherence were made by some organisations. It could be asked how coherence, or claims on coherence, relates to integration. The German migrants from the Westerwald formed the community with the most coherence and the least integration. It was also the community with the least formal organisations, and Westerwalders also did not participate in more general German organisations. The coherence of the community seems to have curbed the need for formal organisations and at the same time forestalled the integration of this group. Among the other Germans, coherence was less important and formal organisations were relatively open and integration was easier than among the Westerwalders.

The governments of contemporary sending societies set the boundaries within which the immigrant organisations could function. The governments of the sending societies, contrary to past practices, have tried to maintain an influence over their former subjects for a much longer period of time. Meanwhile, the governments of the receiving societies continue to label the children and grandchildren of immigrants as immigrants. These factors when taken together, seem to give immigrant organisations more a sense of continuity. The examples given in this article reveal that claims of a common identity can be made without a consensus on what this identity actually is. The results are the establishment of ephemeral societies that do not survive the first generation.
Notes

1 Schrover 2002, 135-182.
2 Olzak and West 1991, 470.
3 Olson 1980, 133.
5 Breton, 1964, 193-205.
6 Roberts and Boldt 1979, 103-108.
7 For an extensive discussion see the special issue on immigrant organisation of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2005; Schrover and Vermeulen 2005, 823-832.
8 Cohen 1985, 685, 693.
9 Ibidem, 685, 693.
12 Hutchinson and Smith 1996.
13 Bonacich and Modell 1980.
14 Schrover 2003; Lesger et al. 2002; Schrover 2001b; Schrover 2002.
15 Nadel 1990.
16 Olson 1980, 11.
17 Schrover 2002, 82-90.
18 Kamphoefner, 1987, 70.
19 Kuselman Burgert and Jones 1989.
20 Tilley 1990.
21 Bosworth Treudley 1949.
22 Meijler 1984, ix-xv.
24 McCaffery 1996, 53.
27 Dobbert 1980, 60.
32 Ibidem, 359.
33 Ibidem, 360.
34 Olson 1980, 118.
36 Ibidem.
37 Ibidem.
38 Ibidem, 196.
41 Luebke 1974, 34-35.
42 Schrover 2002, 150-156.
43 Translated from the Dutch original, quoted in Schrover 2002, 154.
49 Dobbert 1980, 47.
50 Olson 1980, 145.
51 Dobbert 1980, 79.
52 Ibidem, 48.
53 Koopmans and Statham 1999, 678.
54 Henkes 1998.
Religious Newcomers and the Nation-State: Flows and Closures

Thijl Sunier

The presence of Muslims in Western Europe is at once a new and an old phenomenon. At the present moment, several million people with an Islamic background work and live in Europe, but the relation between Europe and what has been coined the ‘Islamic world’ did not start with the arrival of migrants after the Second World War, the ‘third wave’ of Islam as Cardini has called it. This relation dates back to the earliest Islamic history and it is mainly a relation between Islam and Christianity. In more recent times, many Western European states have developed a history of colonial relations with the Islamic world. Said has demonstrated how these shaped the image of ‘the Islamic world’ and how this image in turn legitimated colonial rule. Moreover, it has set the scientific paradigm for the study of Islam in the 20th century.

More relevant for the issue at stake is the fact that the image of Islamic society as one devoid of any rational basis, contributed to the self-image of the post-revolutionary secular nation-states, both in Europe and in the Middle East. The French historian and philosopher Ernest Renan (1823-1892), famous ideologue of the (secular) nation-state, wrote extensively about Islam and even went into debate with the equally famous Islamic modernist Jamal ad Din al-Afghani. Renan’s critique had much to do with the idea of Islam as a pre-modern religion and the idea of the secular nation-state as the highest stage of societal development thus far. As Djait put it: ‘His [Renan’s] harsh treatment of Islam is tied in with a grand egalitarian vision of cultural progress’. Thus what concerns us here is not the accuracy of the images themselves, but the role they played in the development of the self-image of Western European nation-states in the 19th and 20th century. Not so much the age-old controversy between Islam and Christianity is relevant, although it does play a role as a canon for rhetoric, but rather the image of Islam as a pre-modern religion that by definition does not separate between state and religion. It was assumed that whereas modern nation-states, on their path to modernity, had effectively relegated religion to the private sphere, Islamic societies were theoretically incapable of separating the public from the private and the political from the personal. It is particularly this image that was reactivated during the most recent close encounter between Islam and Europe: the post
Second World War era.

Two developments are of crucial significance here: the large scale immigration of workers and their families from the 1950s on, and the emergence of Islam as a political factor in many countries of the Middle East and Asia since the early 1960s. Both developments posed a new, and in certain respects, unprecedented challenge to the religious status quo in Western Europe. Islam was at once a religious newcomer in these nations, but certainly not an unfamiliar one as I have argued above.\(^8\) The formation of Muslim communities and their organisational, social and political activity, triggered a series of, sometimes fundamental, debates about the character of the nation-state, secularisation processes, the role of education, fundamentalism, the position of women, and related issues. The Iranian Revolution and its European offshoot, the Rushdie affair, the uprising in many parts of the Islamic world and more recently the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, in Madrid, London and Amsterdam, and most recently the Danish cartoon affair in February 2006 have heightened the sensitivity of policymakers, opinion leaders, and citizens to the presence of Islam in Western Europe. At the beginning of the 21st century, religion has largely supplanted national origins and ethnicity as the key boundary marker and has become a key principle for social organisation and community building. Many politicians and journalists in the West, following the lead of American political scientist Samuel Huntington discuss the new Muslim presence in Europe against the backdrop of an age-old ‘clash of civilisations’ between the West and the Islamic East.\(^9\) Such an approach is a half-truth at best, and seriously misleading when pushed too far. While no one can deny that Eurasian history has been marked by a series of confrontations between the Islamic South-East and the Christian North-West, it is also incontrovertible that the two civilisations have often interacted in more positive, mutually beneficial ways. A sober view of the historical relationship between Europe and Islam should take both into account.\(^{10}\)

Immigration of Muslims: The Integration Debate

Since countries in Western Europe have at least on paper accepted the fact that most migrants are here to stay, a debate has broken loose about the ways in which these newcomers would be integrated into the countries of settlement. The term ‘integration’, however, amounts to conceptual confusion not least because there is no generally accepted definition of the term. What is meant by integration very much depends on how one defines the principal actors in the process and how one accesses ‘the issue at stake’. Engbersen and Gabriels, for example, have
argued that in the public debate and politics of the Netherlands, integration is narrowed down to the socio-economic position of ethnic or religious migrants. This runs the risk of ‘ethnisising’ the issue. The integration of migrants renders a unique character in such a way that it tends to overlook more general processes or factors that account for the position of newcomers, such as class structure. Migration to Europe started, after all, for economic reasons both on the sending and on the receiving end.

Another problem is the sometimes complete neglect of the normative dimension of integration. Nation-states are active cultural agents. Integration has a clearly normative connotation. It is related to questions of social order and it deals with the relation between individuals and the state. Nation-states have historically grown normative views on this relation. When we look at the ways in which Dutch society dealt with the so-called ‘maladjusted’ working-class families in the first half of the 20th century, and we analyze the educational programs designed to ‘integrate’ these people into the mainstream society, there is a striking parallel with the so-called ‘civilisation’ programs (inburgeringsprogramma) designed for newcomers today. Normative rules have changed of course but the process is almost identical. In that respect integration is a specific form of socialisation. This is what Peters calls the ‘moral dimension of integration’ and it is closely linked to what has been coined as ‘moral citizenship’. Related to that is the neglect of the role of power in many studies. Integration into a new society is often perceived as a neutral process of cultural adaptation in which individual migrants become a member of a new society. The recent plans of the Dutch ‘minority’ minister Verdonk to introduce quantifiable, measurable criteria for integration developed by the Amsterdam economy professor Van Praag, is a typical example of this way of thinking. Thus Van Praag argued that integration ‘should be liberated from the grasp of the soft sociologists’. This is the dominant liberal view on integration and it is largely based on the perspective that the state is a neutral arena. But at the same time it is, very paradoxically, the liberals who opt for a more thorough control by the state on the integration. Integration is, however, in principle a phenomenon of unequal power relations. It is a process whereby people try to get access to vital resources, both material and immaterial. Irrespective of how we define these resources, it is important here to state that this implies action from the side of the newcomers.

Contemporary migration and integration is often treated as a unique, unprecedented phenomenon. As a consequence, historical comparisons with previous immigration are regarded as irrelevant. According to this view, it makes no sense to compare the ways in which Catholics in the second half of the 19th century negotiated their place...
in Dutch society with Muslims today, or to look at the similarities in the position of Jews in the beginning of the 20th century. It is like comparing apples with pears. The present discussion about the place of Islam in Dutch society gained momentum when a well-known ideologue of the Dutch Labour Party launched a new round with the publication of an article called The Multicultural Drama. Important for the issue at stake is the part where he stated that the struggle between religious groups at the end of the 19th century was a struggle between groups which were a part of Dutch history for centuries. Despite their religious differences they were held together by a common history and a common commitment to the Dutch nation. Muslims, on the other hand, have just recently arrived. Their (lack of) commitment to society is the essence of the problem. A slightly different version of this argumentation can be heard from those who point out the negative images about Islam. The difficulties that Muslims face in getting access to the central institutions of society are related to negative stereotyping and (religious) marginalisation that prevent them from taking part in society. They argue that the crucial difference between the anti-papism of 19th century Netherlands and Muslims today has to do with the age-old controversy between Islam and Christianity. Comparisons makes no sense, because the cultural distance between Islam and Christianity is insurmountable and the circumstances are fundamentally different.

There are of course important differences with respect to the emancipation process of Catholics in the 19th century, of Jews in the early 20th century, and the integration of Muslims today, and images about Muslims do have a specific content especially since the recent turmoil, but the similarities are at least as important. In earlier research, I argued that a crucial aspect of the integration of Muslims in Dutch society is the emancipation process, sustained by organisations and institutions established by Muslims. In all three cases, religion constitutes the core of a emancipation movement. As to negative stereotyping and marginalisation, one has only to look at what Protestants thought of Catholics to understand that cultural and religious distance is relative and situational. Religious boundaries are more important than the religious stuff they enclose, to paraphrase Barth. Instead of treating the precarious position of Muslims in Western Europe primarily in terms of the internal dynamics of migration, or to relate it to age-old stereotypes about Islam, I will analyse it primarily within the framework of the historical process of state formation and nation-building and the emancipation of religious minorities. The present enculturation of Muslims will be better understood, we believe, by comparing it with the way the European nations have coped with religious difference and the emergence of new religious actors in earlier periods of their history, that is roughly from the early 19th century onwards. We then
get an idea of the similarities and dissimilarities in the ways in which particular nation-states deal with these issues. This is the first argument I want to put forward.

**Muslims and the Nation-State**

Integration is thus a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. It is my contention that there are similarities and parallels between the position of Muslims and other religious minorities in earlier stages of history. The integration of Muslims is of course linked to their (former) migrant status. They are for the most part indeed newcomers, but is it also an issue that puts the significance of religion in the process of nation-building back on the political agenda. It has to do with the ways in which nation-states deal with religious diversity and how they perceive themselves. Whatever we think of the presence of Muslims, it is clear that the developments with respect to Islam, both within Europe and in the world at large, have challenged the character of Western European nation-states. It is a widespread misunderstanding that Western European nation-states are ‘accomplished’. The fundamental formative episodes go back more than a century and a half and their status quo need not, so to speak, to be reconfirmed. So this is very dubious and an ideological statement at best. Billig has shown that even established nation-states must constantly ‘reconfirm’ and ‘re-enact’ their status quo.²² Hegemonial discourses and meta-narratives about the nation must be retold over and over again. The very image of Muslims as arriving in an accomplished nation-state is part of that hegemonial discourse, by which Muslims are a priori excluded from becoming part of the nation as Muslims. The fuzz that is made about imams saying nasty things about western society, or the fear that ‘our’ democracies will be ‘islamised’ by ‘waves’ of migrants with an Islamic background,²³ proves, so to speak, the thesis that nation-states are contested and defended.

An essential aspect of that nation-building process is the construction of terms by which groups are included and excluded. Thus Brubaker has referred to citizenship as a form of social closure.²⁴ It is an exclusive status that some people acquire and others will not. The present turmoil about the ‘faces’ of Islam is mainly a (power loaded) debate about the question whether Muslims could be part of the nation or not. It is a debate about the very character of the nation and it will influence this character. The modern state provides a neutral legal and administrative framework, but as I stated above, as a socio-cultural network the nation is not neutral at all. The question what is ‘French’ about France or ‘Dutch’ about the Netherlands can only be answered in
terms of a particular, historical narrative. This calls into question the often drawn sharp distinction between ‘civic’ nations such as France and ‘ethnic’ nations such as Germany. Even ‘hardcore’ civic nation-states in which citizenship is primarily articulated in political terms, such as France, need a certain degree of common culture, mostly in the form of formative narratives. In this narrative, some groups will occupy centre stage while others will find themselves at the periphery. Likewise, some will be represented in an early stage of the narrative while others will only make their appearance towards its end. In the course of the story of the nation, certain groups will move from the periphery towards the centre, and the way that particular story is told is a defining characteristic of the nation.

In some European states, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany, as well as in some parts of the Balkans, religious pluralism has persisted since the late 16th century. But in the first three cases, Protestantism enjoyed a cultural and political centrality none of its competitors could claim. For all their pluralism, these nations were not religiously neutral spaces. The same is true of the post-Ottoman Balkan nations. Consequentially, nations were often formally committed to religious neutrality while their cultures, including their political cultures were suffused with the values and habitus of the dominant religion. This observation also applies, of course, to those nations in which formal religious pluralism only arrived in the early 19th century. Formally, all religions are equal, but in practice the traditional, established religion occupies a privileged cultural space (a good example is the comparison of the French headscarf affairs with the Bavarian crucifix-affair).

Political Culture

The second argument I want to put forward has to do with nation-states as products of historical development. Regarding the integration process, Adrian Favell has convincingly demonstrated that integration discourses reflect the dominant political culture of each nation-state. Integration touches on general issues about the ‘politics of diversity’ apparent in all nation-states. This is especially true for the arrival of immigrants with an ‘alien’ religious background such as Islam. The way in which France deals with religious diversity differs in important respects with the way in which Germany does and this can be explained by referring to historically grown differences in the way nationhood, citizenship and emancipation are conceptualised. The prolonged and acrimonious conflict between republicanism and clericalism in the French Third Republic is paralleled by the German Kulturkampf, the
School Conflicts in Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as the contest between secularism and Islamism in recent Turkish history. In all such cases two questions are at stake: 1. The opposition between a secular and a religious definition of the nation and the state; 2. The status of various groups who do not belong to the old dominant church. The outcome of the conflicts over these matters largely determined the nature of the political culture of a given nation as well as the place of the religious within it in the 20th century.30

The key concept here is ‘political culture’ and it deserves some clarification. As a concept ‘political culture’ was coined by the American political scientist Gabriel Almond;31 it refers to ‘a particular pattern of orientations to political action’. A few years later, the concept was elaborated by Almond and Verba in a comparative study on political stability, in which they introduced the term ‘civic culture’ roughly denoting the same.32 The book became the standard work of the so-called ‘political culture approach’ in political science. Since then, the term has continued to be a focus for research on political models and political praxis.33 Political culture refers to ‘political style’, political values and norms, patterns of political decision-making, legal issues, but also to the historical imagination, myths, and hegemonic discourses. The variety of aspects clearly shows how difficult it is to pinpoint the concept to one definition. When we concentrate on issues of religious minorities, multiculturalism, citizenship, and nation-building, there are numerous comparative studies, mainly in the field of sociology, political science, and political philosophy that refer to political culture in one way or another.34 Instead of discussing the conceptual history of the term and its use in social science, I will explain why I think that the concept is relevant.

In the first place, it is one of the key concepts for comparative analysis. I start from the hypothesis that nation-states indeed show difference in political culture. Although all European nation-states, including Turkey, grant religious freedom to all its inhabitants, at least on paper, there are not only significant differences in legal and institutional arrangements between nation-states, the discourses that accompany these arrangements also differ considerably. The actual net effect of this freedom differs accordingly. Against the background of the post-war influx of migrants from non-western backgrounds, the increase of transnational networks and processes of globalisation, some scholars have, however, argued that these developments seriously challenge the nation-state as the key political entity and that we have entered an era of post nationalism.35 Even multiculturalism as a political program, it is alleged, seriously challenges the traditional nation-state concept.

I strongly doubt this. Despite important developments, the nation-state still does play a crucial role as a powerful unifying agent and re-
pository of legitimisation. Despite the undeniable globalising tendencies, the European nation-states still maintain their historically evolved distinct political cultures, which implies, among other things, that modes of civic incorporation, concepts of citizenship, and models of integration differ considerably from one nation to another. European integration, it is often argued, will lead to a gradual erosion of the differences between nations. That may be true of economic policy, but the politics of language, religion, education, and even immigration are national, or even regional rather than European issues. On the contrary, the acceleration of the process of European integration since the late 1980s (from the Maastricht Treaty to the Euro) has led to a growing awareness of national identity, and in some cases to a revival of nationalism and regionalism. The recent debate about so-called ‘national historical canons’ in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark points in the same direction.

Political culture is not just a static category, but the outcome of a struggle, a negotiation process that at the same time structures and shapes further political processes. What a political culture ‘is’ at a given moment in history is thus highly path-dependent. Instead of assuming that every nation-state can be boiled down to one single politico-cultural essence independent from time and space, I surmise that there is in every nation-state a historically grown set of peculiarities that can be identified as political culture and that takes different shapes within different contexts. Proper comparison can show us the workings of political culture, but also its relativity and the contingent character of the concept rather than its presumed unchangeable essence. Thus when we take the French notion of laïcité, the explicit separation of religion and state as an aspect of French political culture, it does not mean that this principle appears in the same shape and meaning under all the various circumstances, despite the ‘legal reification’ of the concept in the Constitution. Under ‘normal’ circumstances laïcité indeed means that state and religion are separated and thus that religion is free of etatist constraints. But there are periods in the history of France in which there was a heightened concern about laïcité, for example at the time when Jules Ferry, Minister of Education at the beginning of the 20th century, issued the famous secularisation laws. In that period laïcité denoted the weakening of the Catholic Church vis-à-vis the state by putting it at the same level as religious minorities in the Republic. The concept of laïcité was in fact designed by the revolutionaries to counteract the dominant position of the Catholic Church. During the turmoil about the so-called headscarf affairs in the first half of the 1990s, laïcité was invoked as a means of legitimising the ban on the headscarf. Thus in 1994, Minister of Education François Bayrou, proposed a tougher policy against all forms of religious proselytism and a
ban on ostentatious signs at school, thereby referring to the secular character of the Republic. This has a completely different meaning, not least because Islam never had something close to a dominant position. Bayrou’s position was restated by president Chirac in December 2003 in his speech following the publication of the report by the Stasi Commission on secularism. The legislation that was implemented thereafter, was in fact a firm reconfirmation of the secular principles of the secular republic, but under completely different circumstances. Those who defend a more liberal attitude and challenge the strict secularist politics, do not normally question the separation of church and state. They prefer to question the interpretation of this principle.

Aspects of political culture are contested and contextualised and they shape the discourse. It follows that in the above case laïcité has been a relevant discursive field in French political culture for quite some time. As such, political culture (or laïcité for that matter) is an object of research, something that can be identified empirically and comparatively. Two aspects are particular relevant: The first is the national narrative that structures political culture as a discursive field. The second is political culture as an actual political repertoire.

**Political culture as national narrative**

A crucial element in political cultures is the narrative about the nation, the national myth. As such, it is a story of the nation about itself: the grand narrative about the nation’s past, present and future. Concerning the French case, Wieviorka argues that nationalist arguments that reject Islam on traditional religious grounds should be separated from republican arguments that refer to universal principles of equality of all human beings. This may be true in theory, in practice, however, nationalist and universalist arguments are mixed up. It was Bellah who pointed to the quasi-religious character with which modern (secular) nation-states refer to themselves, using the term ‘civil religion’. To paraphrase Geertz, one could consider these narratives as *model of* and *model for* the nation. An important aspect of national myths is that they are hegemonic. According to Haas, a national myth is: ‘the core of ideas and claims that most citizens accept about a nation-state beyond their political divisions’. Universalism is part of that myth. Anderson, Billig and others have argued that nation-states tell this story through the creation of a national history. These national histories are of course contested and re-written over and over again, yet they co-shape dominant discourses and as such have a certain durability and effect. Moral communities are constructed by presenting the history of the collective to the next generation. History textbooks are an excellent source for the analysis of national imaginaries. In it, a selective look is
thrown at the nation’s past, taking up what is considered necessary in understanding the present and omitting what is considered irrelevant. It is through history textbooks that the notion of ‘what a nation stands for’ is transmitted from one generation to the next. The concepts presented in history textbooks are, of course, not to be confused with reality: they reflect what the nation wants itself to be (or what it wants to be seen as), rather than what it actually is. As in every socialisation process, children are not confronted with social life as it is but as it should be, sometimes in an almost self-stereotypical way. However, this does not mean that it is meaningless. On the contrary, principles of legitimacy are defined by transmitting how civil society should be dealt with, who should participate, and how solutions should be found.51

Political repertoires and contentious politics

Political culture not only refers to dominant discourses, but also to the political process itself. When we look at the previously presented example of laïcité in France and the ways in which it has been applied in concrete situations, it becomes clear that we do not deal with abstract political principles but with concrete contested issues (headscarves, schools, houses of worship, etc.) and real political actors. As I stated earlier, religious newcomers are involved in an emancipation process, a struggle to get access to resources. It is my contention that nation-building is first and foremost a process sustained by political collective action. The nation-state is the very outcome of political struggle. Political culture provides the constituent elements of the contestation and structures the subsequent political struggles so that the outcome will set the stage for the next phase. Political culture can thus be considered as the argumentative repertoire, the available political language that political actors have at their disposal. There are of course other discourses, but the dominant one has proven to be the most effective to meet the demands in situations where there is inequality of power. To put it differently, it is of vital importance to master the societal skills of the dominant society and to understand the appropriate language. An example may elucidate this. During a debate between members of the Dutch Christian Democratic Party and spokespersons of some Islamic organisations about integration and the position of Islam, the members of the CDA were very critical about certain Islamic values that ‘do not fit into our society’. The spokesman of the Arab European League (AEL), presently one of the most active Muslim organisations in Belgium and the Netherlands, referred to ‘sovereignty in one’s own set’ (sovereiniteit in eigen kring), in order to demand the right to live according to Islamic prescriptions. He knew precisely that this principle, developed by Dutch Protestant actors during the school struggle at the
end of the 19th century, would appeal to CDA members. They remained, of course, critical towards Islam, but the AEL representative at least did not have to ‘explain’ what he meant. Thus repertoires that have been produced in previous periods and previous political arenas, can prove to be useful and effective in present ones. As such, political culture is in itself a process and it follows that the most successful political actors are those that master the dominant discourse. McAdam et al. have argued that the vast majority of studies of nationalism are mostly concerned with the first aspect, the (dominant) discourse, rather than with the question of how this came about. Actors seem to have been ruled out and emphasis is laid on institutionalised aspects rather than on non-institutionalised forms of contestation and political agency. But political culture refers as much to collective political struggle as it refers to national discourse.

Historically speaking, we can distinguish significant events or contentious fields that have made up political culture. McAdam et al. have referred to these events as ‘contentious politics’ which they define as an:

episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realised, affect the interest of at least one of the claimants.

Thus political cultures are transformed into relatively brief episodes of political conflict and thereafter persist a longer period of ‘normal politics’. I consider this definition as a useful instrument for the analysis of processes of nation-building and the reactions to religious newcomers. The working hypothesis is that the diverging reactions to Islam in different European nations are best explained by the different discourses of nationhood, the disparate political cultures in those countries, and the different paths emancipation takes. If this hypothesis is correct, a historical and cross-national comparison of state formation, nation-building, and political cultures will explain the differences and similarities between countries, and in particular their responses to religious newcomers as well as their specific modes of making Muslim immigrants into citizens. With respect to these episodes of contention, one can think of the struggle for political empowerment of religious minorities/newcomers. An analysis of this process among Jews in the early 20th century may be crucial for the case of contemporary Muslims. One can also think of the school struggle as a contentious episode in Dutch history. Instead of treating the debate about Islamic schools as a migrant issue alone and as a unique case, we can consider
it as a phase in a long history of the struggle over the control of education.

To test the above mentioned hypothesis, I include three countries in the comparative analysis: France, the Netherlands, and Turkey.\textsuperscript{54} Despite crucial differences, all three countries can be considered as typical examples of homogenising nation-states.\textsuperscript{55}

**France, the Netherlands, and Turkey**

Political culture is thus both a discursive field in which certain narratives, values and exemplary events occupy centre stage and a script for political behaviour, rhetoric, and style. The nature of the 20th-century political cultures in European nations has depended on the outcome of the political struggles over the relationship between church and state and the competing definitions of the nation in the 19th century. This leads to two important insights. One is that nation-states can be depicted as ‘flows’, as an ongoing process of negotiation and struggle over meanings and power. The other is that those in power always try to present the nation as a fixed entity that rests on historical and institutionalised principles. These processes of flow and closure should be at the heart of any historical analysis of nation-building.

A comparison of the school conflict in France’s Third Republic and the Netherlands may illustrate this. In France, the struggle over the definition of the nation-state was played out between Catholic clericalism and a secular-Republican, ‘Enlightenment’ ideology of ‘\textit{laicité}’. The French liberals were thoroughly steeped in the art of mass politics and carried the majority of the nation with them. The conflict was especially bitter because it was linked to a more fundamental struggle over the political regime as such which had divided French society ever since the Revolution of 1789. It took as long as the early 20th century before the conflict was resolved with legislation that was designed to separate the church and the state: the so-called Combes laws of 1904-5. This marked a double triumph: of \textit{laicité} over clericalism, and of the Republic over its assorted enemies. As a result, the political culture of the French Republic became a militant secularism which tended to exclude the religious from all public spaces. This outcome enhanced the position of France’s two religious minorities, the Protestants and the Jews, but not as minorities. It was (and is) as individual citizens that Protestants and Jews played an important role in the Republic.\textsuperscript{56}

In the Dutch case, the school conflict evolved along different lines and the outcome was the reverse. Here, the Ancien Régime had not suppressed religious diversity but rather ‘tolerated’ and ‘channeled’ it under the tutelage of the political authorities and the Dutch Reformed
Church. The liberal 1848 Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion, including religious schools, in the framework of the separation of church and state. It was the attempt by the Liberals in the 1870s to impose a quasi-monopoly on the state schools that triggered fierce Calvinist and Catholic opposition. Where Catholics and Protestants were each other’s enemies for much of the 19th century, they now joined forces in the wake of a liberal victory over the control of education. The Dutch Liberal leader Kappeyne was not so far from Jules Ferry’s ideas in France, but it was somewhat less aggressively secularist. The outcome of the political struggle differed from that in France in two ways. First, the Liberals had to concede victory to the confessional parties who proved to be far more adept at mass politics than their rather elitist Liberal counterparts. Dutch Catholic, but more so Protestant, political actors with their extended networks in all layers of the population, were much better able to mobilise their rank and file than the once powerful Catholic Church in France. Second, this victory was more a compromise in that the 1848 constitutional settlement was never for a moment called into question. The upshot was a system of organised diversity in which all religious groups enjoyed the status of ‘minorities’ (even though Protestant culture, but not any particular Protestant denomination, retained a dominant position).

The political outcome of the church-state struggles shaped the party system and the political habitus of both the French and Dutch elites. These were then inserted into a dominant narrative of national history which explained the success and vitality of the nation in terms of certain arrangements and virtues which had proved their mettle over the centuries. A national political culture was grounded in deep certainties about ‘the way we do things in this country’.

Modes of discursive closure: Narratives of nationhood

Today, in the wake of the possible EU membership of (‘Islamic’) Turkey, we often hear about the ‘Judeo-Christian’ roots of European civilisation. Seventy-five years ago this would have been almost inconceivable, at least for the general public, as much as it is inconceivable to speak today of the ‘Abrahamic’ roots of European civilisation. This is a good example of the dynamics of flow and closure in the making of European identity. At each historical juncture nation-states ‘seal off’ their identity by formulating exclusive narratives about their being in the world. One way of inculcating these narratives is by teaching history. The narratives in history textbooks offer a selective representation of parts of national history. The narrative changes over time: every generation rewrites history. Nonetheless, certain patterns and values display a remarkable longevity. History, after all, is not only about facts
but also about how a nation should live, and how creative solutions to problems should be reached. It is through the history lessons in compulsory education that the idea of ‘what a nation stands for’ is transmitted from one generation to the next. National histories provide us with a central narrative around which national political cultures are organised. In all modern nations the teaching of history in elementary and secondary schools transmits a view of national history in which patriotic symbols and virtues are highlighted. Certain key events enjoy a paradigmatic status and certain men – or, more rarely, women – play the alluring roles of heroes or villains.57

In Dutch history, for example, the 16th-century revolt against Spanish absolutism which ushered in national independence is such a pivotal event. The villain of the piece is the sinister Duke of Alva who, in 1567, was sent to the Netherlands at the head of an army to crush the rebellion. Alva was traditionally depicted as cruel, Catholic, and tyrannical. He is everything a good Dutch citizen is supposed not to be: preferring violence over persuasion as his favourite political tool; instead of toleration he supports the inquisition; instead of collective rule and local autonomy he represents absolutism and centralisation. The great patriotic heroes are depicted as the opposite of this. William of Orange, the ‘founder’ of the Dutch Republic, was a tolerant and peaceful man who only resorted to armed force as a last resort. The other great stadhouder (governor), William III, is praised for his military skills but these are deployed in a series of defensive wars against the bid for European hegemony by the absolutist France whose king, Louis XIV, turns out to be a ferocious persecutor of the Protestants, a ‘second Alva’ one feels tempted to add.

French schoolchildren learn a very different story. In their schoolbooks, Louis XIV is the grand roi who unified France after a long era of civil wars, who promoted economic growth and protected scientists and artists, and during whose reign France became the dominant military and cultural power on the European continent. His persecution of the Calvinists is mentioned as a regrettable sideshow. However, the grand event of French history, comparable to the Dutch Revolt against Spain, is the revolution of 1789. Its protagonists are the true heroes of French Republican history. Men such as Sieyès, Mirabeau, Condorcet, and also Robespierre, are the great lawgivers, inspired by Reason and Virtue. Their ideas and values, the ‘indivisible’ republic, liberty, equality, and fraternity sum up the virtues and duties of the citizen. The figure of the revolutionary who innovates in a voluntarist and radical manner is thus a positive symbol in French history.58

An analysis of history textbooks further shows that France views itself as a ‘universal nation’, an important and pivotal protagonist of world history and universal values. The grande révolution proclaimed
the message of human rights not only to the French people, but to the world. French history is divided into a ‘before’ and ‘after’, the Ancien Régime and the Republic. The Ancien Régime saw a struggle between Enlightenment and clerical intolerance with Voltaire as the key hero: both his courageous fight against an oppressive Catholic Church, as in the Calas affair, and the way he used his literary skills in political causes deeply influence French political culture to this day. After the revolution, French history is depicted as an ongoing struggle for rationality and equality. The public sphere is the space where these values must be enacted, by means of legislation and also by the energetic contribution of the citizens of the Republic. The collective organisation of citizens on a religious or ‘identity’ basis, however, is suspect because it harks back to the anti-republican clericalism of the late 19th century and, beyond that, to the corporate privileges of the Ancien Régime. The republic is, or so it seems, always threatened by its clerical, obscurantist, and particularist enemies who are defeated from time to time, only to rise from their ashes anew. Again and again the Republic has to be saved by the resolute action of its virtuous citizens. Each episode represents a step forward in the march toward universal rationality.

While French history textbooks underline the creation of the new, Dutch historical narratives are much more concerned with the preservation of the old, and with the protection of the nation from the outside world. The Dutch history of nation-building is a sequel that attempts to build up something that can withstand the challenges from outside. Historical narratives tell us that the participation of the burghers in town governments was an old-established practice in Flanders and Holland. Urban self-government based on medieval privileges is a positive reference in Dutch national history. In the Dutch story, Philip II, the Spanish king, sought to introduce ‘innovations’ and to impose ‘foreign’ law thereby unwittingly igniting a revolution. But the term ‘revolution’ should be applied with care. In Dutch history a revolutionary political style is much less appreciated than in France. Many Dutch historians have managed to turn even the history of revolutionary episodes like the Batavian Revolution of 1795 into a series of consensual political arrangements. So the main lesson of history is that the Dutch always seek to proceed by piecemeal reform, building their society in a process of trial and error.

While the unity of the French state is always threatened by groups who place their own identity above their allegiance to the nation, the Dutch national narrative explains how diversity and national unity are successfully reconciled time and again. The ‘great men’ in Dutch history are not ‘heroes’ but steadfast and earnest men who can bridge differences by means of skilful bargaining and moral leadership. In comparison with French history, rhetoric is less valued and negotiation
more. Religious difference is seen as a question of organised tolerance and mutual accommodation. In this view of national history, the pillari-
sation model that emerged victorious out of the 19th-century conflicts
between liberals, Calvinists, and Catholics can be interpreted as a nat-
ural and typically Dutch development. Power-sharing and the peaceful
resolution of conflicts are the key to the prosperity and flourishing of
the Dutch nation. Subcultures do not constitute a danger to national
unity, so long as they play according to the Dutch rules of the game –
that is the lesson of this history.60

This is in no way denying that there are also important common ele-
ments in the Dutch and French national narratives: for example, pro-
gress, toleration, and human rights are core values in both cases. The
differences between French and Dutch political culture should not be
overstated. Since the late 19th century, both are liberal polities in which
individual rights are guaranteed by the constitution. But within the
limits of the liberal model of politics and society, the accepted manifes-
tations of the religious in public space and the political representation
of religious groups and their ideas have followed consistently different
patterns. To sum up the similarities and differences between French
and Dutch political culture in a brief formula: French political culture
is liberal-republican while Dutch political culture is liberal-communi-
tarian. Or to put it differently: France could well be depicted as a ‘na-
tion above (ethnic or religious) communities, while the Netherlands is
a ‘nation despite communities’. The similarity between the two lies in
the fact that both nation-states envisage a nation as an independent
‘thing’ unto itself. In Germany and Great Britain, for example, the con-
cept of the nation cannot be explained without referring to religious or
ethnic specificity.

This combination of similarities and differences is reflected in the
dominant national myths of the two nations. In history textbooks and
other national narratives the similarities between the two histories are
not denied or obliterated, but they are inserted in a master plot which
is organised around the differences. It is the differences that confer
meaning on the similarities, not the other way around. In the Nether-
lands, this is the myth of the eternally tolerant and diversity-loving
Dutch, living on a proverbial island amidst threats; in France, the myth
of the secular republic promoting equality, freedom and reason. These
national myths, in their turn, became part of the national political cul-
tures of the 20th century, and as such, they became causally efficient
in various ways: as parts of the curriculum in elementary schools, and
as national canons invoked as a matter of course by mass media and
politicians, in everyday debates as well as public ceremonies and com-
memorations. These dominant narratives of nationhood have conse-
quences for the perception of religious newcomers, whether they are
immigrants or not. They have influenced the way Catholics and Jews have ‘found their place’ in the Netherlands, and Protestants and Jews in France in the 19th and 20th centuries. And they are highly relevant to the cultural and political integration of Dutch and French Muslims in the contemporary period.

One of the reasons why Turkey is included in this analysis is because it offers us a compelling example of how the logic of nation-states operates. The republic was founded on the ruins of the once-powerful multi-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. Although many modern states in the Middle East were once part of that empire, Turkey can generally be considered as its principal heir. Many of the measures taken by the Kemalists in the 1920s and 1930s can only be understood in relation to the Ottoman heritage. The Kemalist program was not only a reaction against the dominant position of the imperial Islamic establishment, it was also a Turkish-nationalist reaction against the emancipatory movements of non-Turkish subjects during the last century of the empire. This alone makes the Kemalist revolution a typical nationalist one, comparable to the French Revolution. But there are also important differences. In the case of the French Revolution the abolition of the absolutist monarchy was the prime objective of the revolutionaries. The separation of church and state was of course something that played a role at the outset, yet it was only accomplished more than a century afterwards. It was the outcome of a struggle. In the case of the Netherlands, the actual separation of church and state took place in 1983 only after a period of long deconfessionalisation. It was an event that was of significance only to insiders. Hardly anybody in the country really understands the implications of the revisions to the Constitution in 1983. In Turkey, the Kemalist revolution was a total ‘Umwertung aller Werten’, that implied a series of fundamental reforms that radically changed the relation between church and state. In fact, it was not the outcome of a societal struggle or a gradual process, but of the radical measures of an authoritarian regime. But apart from that, the Kemalists borrowed some significant political ideas from European countries such as France, Switzerland, and Italy in the construction of their own model of the nation-state. Notably, there are some striking parallels between France and Turkey with respect to the relation between state and religion. Both France and Turkey subscribe to the ‘État-laique’ (the Turkish word is laiklik), and Turkey is well known for its thorough policies on the headscarf. There are several cases in which women wearing headscarves as a political statement in ‘public space’ were accused of subverting the foundations of the Turkish state. The way in which the revolution was enshrined in official textbooks and documents can be depicted as an extreme form of discursive closure. History was rewritten in an even more radical manner than in France.
Another way of analysing political culture is to look at the emancipation of religious newcomers and to contentious episodes, particularly in a cross-national comparative perspective. To wind it up let me offer just a few clues as to what is at stake in the three countries with respect to the position of Muslims in society. What are the lines along which collective action and emancipation finds a resolution and what are the specific elements that constitute the discourse about Islam?

As noted earlier, there is a strict separation between church and state in all three countries. This is important not only because it accounts for the secular basis of these nation-states, but also for the fact that no religious denomination can apply for a special status as religious denomination. In all three countries there is no recognition of religious denominations, nor is there any legal basis for public funding of religious activity. This alone makes the three cases interesting because, unlike in Germany where a form of legal recognition exists, or Belgium where the state recognised Islam already back in 1974, it implies that the emancipation of Muslims is most effective along the lines of community building and political empowerment. The same is true for the United Kingdom but for different reasons. There are also important differences between the three cases because the separation of church and state does have different implications, elaborations, and above all, different meanings, especially with regard to religious freedom. In Turkey, laiklik in fact implies control of the state over religion. At the time of the foundation of the republic in 1923, all religious institutions were closed down and later on replaced by state bureaucracies that handle all religious affairs. Thus the training of imams is a state affair and all other (private) initiatives in this respect are as yet illegal. The state thus has a powerful instrument in controlling religious activity by simply declaring all non-state initiatives illegal. This has caused a dramatic change in the position of the traditional Islamic clergy. More drastic for the position of Islam in Turkish society, however, has been the complete ban on political activity. This may sound strange for a country where the party with an absolute majority in Parliament since November 2002 is an Islamic party, it remains one of the most delicate issues in Turkish politics. As long as the Constitution stipulates that religion and politics should be separated, it remains possible for the judge to ban a party even if it has an electoral majority. When analysing Turkish politics over the past 60 years, it becomes clear that politicians have always been very aware of this. Despite all this, some important changes took place over the past 50 years in the post-war era. They have mainly to do with societal developments, but they did have an effect on legal
issues as well. Even more important is that the very meaning of laiklik has been contested on many occasions.\textsuperscript{66}

In France, there is religious freedom, but there are no legal provisions whatsoever that can be used by Muslims as a religious denomination. Muslims have no other option than French citizenship; their religious background is irrelevant. Muslims are free to set up religious institutions and there are even consultative bodies concerning religious issues, but they do not have a legal status. In order to take issue with something they have to resort to other means and other societal fields. In the Netherlands, the history of pillarisation, and particularly its legal provisions offer a crucial instrument for Muslims to gain access to resources. Despite hot discussions about the desirability of Islamic schools, there is still strong political support for the continuation of the Dutch state-financed pillarised school system. The same is true for a pillarised system of welfare.

Most comparative overviews stop at this point by merely stating that there is indeed an interpretative margin in all legislation. It is up to individual officials to use this margin in a particular way. It is my contention, however, that legal provisions are but one aspect of the structure of political opportunities that shape contentious politics. Legal provisions with respect to religion may work out differently in a struggle about schooling than in the case of headscarf affairs. Each contentious field has its own dynamics, its specifics actors and specific problematics. We must also bear in mind that there is a lot of religion without contention. General statements about the position of the Muslims in one country are meaningless as long as we do not access the specific circumstances and issues that are at stake.

**Concluding Remarks**

From the above a built-in paradox in the concept of political culture emerges. On the one hand, it both offers contenders the necessary argumentative repertoire for their case, and it sets the limits of the terms of negotiations. On the other hand, it is precisely the content of political culture that is at stake in contentious politics.

In Turkey, the post-Second World War period constitutes the most crucial era for the position of Islam in society and for the relation between ‘church’ and state. Two main factors account for that. The first is the democratisation after the Second World War and the second is massive urbanisation during the 1950s. It is the combination of these two important developments that set the stage for the debate about Islam in society. Islam gained a political foothold and it became a highly politicised and sensitive phenomenon, despite the strict anti-Islamic
legislation. There is every reason to treat the relation between the original city dwellers in the big cities of Turkey and the newcomers from the countryside as one between indigenous population and religious newcomers in Western Europe. We must bear in mind that the cities in Turkey were bulwarks of secular republicanism from the early 1930s until the end of the 1950s. There has been a huge cultural and societal gap between the cities and the countryside for centuries. Urban and rural populations had but a scant notion about each others existence.67 The massive urbanisation was as much a ‘culture shock’ for the urban population in Turkey as was the arrival of Muslim migrants to Western Europe for indigenous populations. And much in the same way as the arrival of Muslims in Western Europe triggered a debate about religion and society, it did the same in Turkey.68 The impact was even stronger since the urbanisation caused a fundamental demographic and power shift, whereas Muslims in Western Europe comprise only a tiny portion of the total population. In Turkey, despite the remaining strict legislation, Muslims managed to shift the power balance and to fundamentally change the dominant discourse from one that places Islam against modernity to one that considers Islam as a genuine and inherent aspect of Turkish civilisation, the so-called Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This was certainly not a ‘way back’ as many orientalists would like us to believe.

France and the Netherlands grant religious freedom to all denominations and religious activity is permitted as long as it does not contradict the Constitution. The crucial difference between the two countries is that in the Netherlands religion has always played a role in the process of nation-building,69 whereas in France the nation was initially constructed as an alternative to the dominant position of the Catholic Church. Another crucial element is the way in which the relation between Islam and integration is perceived. If we want to analyse the discourse on Islam and the presence of Muslims in France, we have to take the colonial situation into account.70 In the colonial era, France had always adopted a very strict assimilationist policy, much in line with the Republican political culture. Muslims from the former colonies now living in France did not have many problems integrating into French society as long as they emphasised their French citizenship and their willingness to assimilate into French society. The sharp increase in the number of newcomers since the early 1980s, the events in the Islamic world, together with the demands of the well-educated young Muslims in France have changed the general climate towards Islam. Those who assert their Islamic identity and request citizenship are met with suspicion.71 The net result is that there is hardly a remaining middle strategy between a radical rejection of French assimilationism and complete absorption.
In the Netherlands, the history of pillarisation has at least produced a discourse that ‘understands’ religious institutionalisation. Demands for cultural autonomy fit within the pillarisation ideology. As an organisng principle, pillarisation is of course no longer viable. More relevant in my view is the consultation model (poldermodel) in the Netherlands, which links the civil society to the political system. Although there is no official recognition of religion, there are numerous platforms, consultation boards, think tanks and other peculiarities of civil society in which Muslim organisation do play their part. They have at least led to an certain level of integration into civil society. The most crucial factor in my view is the mixing up of integration policies and religious issues. Particularly in the 1980s Muslims have been able to get access to vital resources, not so much as Muslims but as migrants. The emphasis of the backward position of Muslims was effective in that period. The present climate (particularly after the dramatic events in the past years) produces principally two different discourses among Muslims. On the one hand, there is a group, of which the aforementioned AEL is a representative, that rejects the conflation of Islam with ‘foreignness’ and backwardness. They demand citizenship and religious equality. In a way this is a pillarisation strategy. On the other hand, there are groups that comply with the increasing pressure to ‘privatise’ religion. Empirical evidence shows that the support for those who challenge the dominant discourse have recently begun to gain ground.

Notes

1 This paper is part of an Erasmus University of Rotterdam research project on citizenship, nationhood, and multiculturalism in Europe. It takes the arrival and subsequent settlement of Muslim migrants, predominantly from a Mediterranean background, as a thematic starting point.

2 Cardini 1999.

3 see Armour 2002.

4 Said 1978.

5 Said 1978; see also Hussain et al. 1984; Peters 1986; Van der Veer 1995a. The representation of Europe’s relation with ‘the Islamic world’ as a continuous historical sequence from the remote past to the present, instead of regarding these encounters as contingent events that are the result of specific historical junctures and circumstances, is a key feature of the ‘orientalist’ view about the presence of Muslims today. The very idea that it is an Islamic encounter implies some basic assumptions about the role of religion.

6 For an overview, see Djait 1985, 85; and Hourani 1991.

7 The thesis that modern (European) nation-states have effectively relegated religion to the private sphere, the so-called secularisation thesis has been widely criticised (see Van der Veer 1995b).
8 It is probably this specific combination of old and new that accounts for the intensity of the debate about Islam in comparison to, say, Hinduism, which is culturally speaking a greater 'distance' away from the West than Islam.

9 Huntington 1996.

10 Stuurman and Sunier, forthcoming


14 Peters 1993. It is precisely for that reason that a growing number of scholars argue that integration is simply an ideological construction that can be left out of the sociological analysis.

15 NRC March 1, 2004.

16 The distinction between 'civic' and 'ethnic' incorporation is closely related to this: two contrasting visions on how the nation-state is composed and what is required from its citizens (see Mortimer 1999).

17 Scheffer 2000

18 Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1995.

19 Sunier 1996.

20 See Van Roojen 1996; and Birnbaum and Katznelson 1995.

21 Barth 1969.

22 Billig 1995; see also Asad 1997.


26 See Auslander 2000.


28 I use the word nation-state here not in the narrow sense of the ideal of an ethnically and religiously homogenous political entity, but as a more general term to denote both the French Republic as well as the Belgian dual nation-state or the Federal German Republic (see Llobera 1997).

29 Rath et al 1996.

30 Stuurman and Sunier, forthcoming.

31 Almond 1956.

32 Almond and Verba 1963.

33 Formisano (2001) has shown that the concept of ‘political culture’ has become an over-used buzz word for which there has never been anything close to a consensus about its origin, actual definition, or workings. It’s status has ranged from an all-determining ‘missing link’ in explaining the culture of politics to an empirical category in comparative analysis without any explanatory power.

34 There is an abundance of literature on this subject. See, e.g., Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell 2001; Ireland 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000; Rath et al. 2001; Schiffauer 1997; Schiffauer et al. 2004; Soysal 1994; Vermeulen 1997; Walzer 1997; and Young 1991.


36 See also Modood and Werbner 1997; and Favell 2001.

37 Baumann 1999; Schiffauer et al. 2004; and Sunier 2000.

38 Paasi 2001; and Rose and Miller 1992.

39 It was, for example, only after the Maastricht Treaty that France added a clause to its Constitution stipulating that French is the official language of the Republic.

40 Many studies tend to describe policies on integration, modes of citizenship, or the relation between state and church as static models. Actual policies tend to become social engineering.
41 Gaillard 1989; and Hargreaves 1995.
42 Cesari 2002.
43 Wieviorka 2002.
46 Wieviorka 2002. A similar line of reasoning can be found among liberals in the Netherlands.
47 Bellah 1966.
49 Haas 1986.
50 Anderson 1983 and Billig 1990.
52 McAdam et al 2001.
53 McAdam et al. 2001, 5.
54 I treat Turkey here very explicitly not as a ‘supplier’ of Islamic migrants but as a modernising nation-state with a more or less democratic political system.
55 Unlike Germany, Belgium, or the United Kingdom, which in a way present themselves as federalist states, France, the Netherlands, and Turkey have adopted a clear conception of the nation that goes beyond religious or cultural differentiation.
56 Stuurman and Sunier, forthcoming.
57 See also Billig 1995.
58 Stuurman and Sunier, forthcoming.
60 Stuurman and Sunier, forthcoming.
61 Tapper 1991; Shaw and Shaw 1977; and Zurcher 1993.
62 Göle 1996 has described Kemalist reforms as a truly civilising mission.
63 In the Netherlands, this is the case since 1983 when the Constitution was revised and the so-called ‘silver cords’ were cut. From then on, there was no longer any formal relation between Protestant churches and state institutions and all religious denominations were formally equal vis-à-vis the state. The revision marked in some ways the symbolic end of the era of pillarisation although the two had little to do with each other.
64 Göle 1996; Shankland 1999; Yavuz 2000; and White 2002.
65 Sunier 1996.
66 There is a famous ‘headscarf’ incident in which a female professor was denied access to the university because of her headscarf. She took her case to court where both the state and the professor in question referred to the same Constitution. The state emphasised the non-religious aspects, whereas the claimant emphasised the religious freedom that should be granted to everybody in the Turkish society.
67 There are numerous Turkish movies that elaborate on this cultural gap, even today.
68 There is literature that takes issue with the notion of the ‘Islamisation’ of the cities.
69 Van Rooden 1996.
71 Khosrokhavar 1997.
During the years 1840-1930, the population of the United States grew more than at any other period in its history, largely because of the influx of immigrants from Europe. The newcomers, because of their background and their numbers, were considered a challenge to American national identity, and the movement to make the immigrants into Americans matured in direct response to their arrival. Consensus over what ‘American’ values were, proved elusive, though this did not diminish the zeal with which a large number of institutions, people, and communities became engaged in the massive attempt to teach ‘Americanism’ and ‘American citizenship’ to immigrants and to convert as many into ‘real’ Americans as possible.1 The movement for Americanisation which began as the articulation of a general mistrust of the newcomers’ ability to assimilate culturally and politically, became a highly organised attempt to educate, indoctrinate and convert immigrants to American modes of political behaviour, workplace docility and social conformity by the time the First World War reached its apex. But the official Americanisation movement disintegrated quickly after the war as Federal funding ended in 1919. Very little is known on the continuing Americanisation movement or its afterlife in the 1920s and 1930s. The following essay will show how Americanisation lived on in the two decades after First World War, within communities of immigrants largely outside the influence of Federal programs. During this period the structure and meaning of Americanisation for immigrants changed in important ways from something ordered by the government to a process immigrants, shaped for themselves. In many ways my essay will build on an emerging new historiography which has focused on the creation and re-shaping of Americanisation by those who were traditionally thought of as mere objects of the crusade: working-class immigrants. ‘Americanisation from below’ as my colleague James Barrett has called it, took less institutional forms. Instead, it was rooted in social and community life. Seen this way, Americanisation was a localised, evolutionary process, difficult to fix in terms of chronology or milestones.2 Acquiring political and legal citizenship through naturalisation, for example, was just one of the many ways that immigrants choose to respond to the call for Americanisation. Learning the lan-
guage, associating with other Americans and adopting other parts of what were considered American value systems were equally important. The immigrants’ understanding of America, its society, culture and citizenship will therefore also be a dominant theme in this paper.

The movement to Americanise immigrants was ideologically connected to two somewhat contradictory strands of political ideology at the turn of the last century. First, the movement began and continued to grow in close connection with the movement for social reform and the betterment of the working class and, secondly, it was linked to the movement to restrict immigration to the United States. In the 1890s, before the Americanisation movement acquired its name and the official imprimatur of state support, much of the effort at social and cultural assimilation and Americanisation took place in settlement houses and reform groups, such as the YMCA. Jane Addams’ Hull House attempted to teach Americanisation in part by guiding immigrants in their own discovery of how American culture merged with Old World traditions: Literature, theatre and crafts tended to be taught with an eye to re-gaining traditional connections. But health, hygiene, child rearing and cooking as well as US history were part of the ‘American’ canon of enlightenment, science and awareness of the larger world. In many ways, the work of settlement houses and other reform-minded Progressives was directed at freeing immigrants from both the shackles of confining traditions and from ignorance. Of course, Americanisation also meant teaching immigrants the rights of American citizens and explaining how a democratic state was supposed to function. Participation was encouraged but always voluntary, and, if one believes Addams’ accounts, debates about political and constitutional questions were often dominated by socialists and union supporters – neither of which was considered a core ‘American’ constituency.

The knowledge and ability to function in a new political and social universe was also intended to render immigrants less vulnerable to attacks by immigration restrictionists for whom Americanisation was also increasingly important. Restrictionists always considered Americanisation a mechanism to separate worthy from unworthy immigrants. In their scheme of things, US citizenship was closely linked to Americanisation, with the naturalisation procedure emerging as an important test and selection mechanism. The implicit assumption in US naturalisation law and practice, that every immigrant to the United States would eventually become a US citizen, disturbed the restrictionists who complained about the many unqualified, barely literate immigrant labourers who became naturalised US citizens and voters overnight with little knowledge of the English language and the US constitution. Restrictionists’ efforts to secure the Americanisation of prospective citizens therefore began as a push to make naturalisation
more stringent and add elements of Americanisation to the naturalisation examination. But this turned out to be difficult to realise. An English language requirement was added to the naturalisation procedure in 1903 — though what constituted competency in English was never defined. Beginning in 1906, a comprehensive Federal naturalisation law introduced uniform requirements to the naturalisation process, which rendered it somewhat less vulnerable to fraud and irregularity. While this law reduced the number of petitioners, especially in urban areas, it did not connect the acquisition of citizenship with Americanisation. The core problem of how to ensure not only that fewer immigrants became citizens, but that the right people would become Americans, was not resolved for the restrictionists, who henceforth concentrated their efforts on an immigration (rather than a naturalisation) restriction.

It was the First World War, which changed the equation of citizenship and Americanisation in fundamental ways. Americanisation moved centre-stage in the home-front effort to unite the nation, and ensure patriotism and to imbue immigrants with a sense of citizenship. This effort involved the Federal government, because it financed English language and American history instruction in countless venues. A wide-ranging partnership of reformers, patriotic groups, businesses and municipal, state, and federal authorities took up the campaign for Americanisation and institutionalised it in countless lectures, classes and evening schools. As an integral part of this campaign, cultural and social Americanisation of immigrants was linked to a campaign for naturalisation. The formal Americanisation campaign of the war years was built on a loose network of voluntary agencies and associations which organised patriotic-themed classes in Americanisation, Fourth of July ‘Americanization Day’ celebrations, and exhortations to take out US citizenship. By 1916, the Bureau of Naturalization, which had done little more than collect statistics on naturalisation for the prior decade, had also published an outline for a ‘Course on Citizenship’. This pamphlet, the first of many, was to be adopted by the voluntary agencies that continued to be responsible for the actual instruction of immigrants. The Bureau also began to forward the names of immigrants who had taken out ‘first papers’ to voluntary associations who would then be responsible for contacting the prospective citizens as potential students in their Americanisation classes. The Bureau also worked with the primary First World War propaganda agency, the Committee on Public Information. As it became visible to the larger public, Americanisation became an integral part of the propaganda apparatus of the First World War. It reflected a national agenda, not the needs or actual behaviour of immigrant communities.
But Americanisation, as recent scholarship has shown, was actually an internally quite diverse movement. In content and sponsorship, the Americanisation campaign of the First World War era continued to reflect the divided impulses of immigration reform and restriction. For the reformers, Americanisation still represented the emancipation of immigrants from ignorance and illiteracy. For employers, especially those who sponsored Americanisation classes, such as the Ford Motor Company, Americanisation promised a better educated and also more docile and disciplined labour force. Many businesses coupled the exhortations to Americanise with more substantial pressure: job promotions or even just getting hired was linked to the acquisition of US citizenship. Some made the attendance of citizenship classes mandatory for their immigrant employees. Federal and other state agencies used Americanisation in similar ways: Municipalities and states made US citizenship a prerequisite for public sector jobs from street sweeper to high school teacher. Congress mandated that the newly established income tax be twice as high for ‘non-resident aliens’ (though it provided no definition of what a non-resident alien was). Ultimately, Americanisation, it was hoped, meant not just political support for the political

Table 1  Immigration, Declarations and Completed Naturalisations, 1908-1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>First Papers Filed</th>
<th>Naturalised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>782,870</td>
<td>147,229</td>
<td>25,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>751,786</td>
<td>145,794</td>
<td>38,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,041,570</td>
<td>167,228</td>
<td>39,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>878,587</td>
<td>186,157</td>
<td>55,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>838,172</td>
<td>169,142</td>
<td>69,965</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1,197,192</td>
<td>181,632</td>
<td>82,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1,218,480</td>
<td>214,016</td>
<td>105,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>326,700</td>
<td>247,815</td>
<td>96,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>289,826</td>
<td>207,935</td>
<td>93,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>295,403</td>
<td>438,748</td>
<td>94,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>110,618</td>
<td>335,069</td>
<td>151,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>141,132</td>
<td>346,827</td>
<td>217,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>430,001</td>
<td>200,106</td>
<td>177,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>805,228</td>
<td>273,511</td>
<td>181,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>309,556</td>
<td>273,511</td>
<td>170,447</td>
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<td>1923</td>
<td>522,919</td>
<td>296,633</td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td>706,896</td>
<td>424,540</td>
<td>150,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>294,314</td>
<td>277,218</td>
<td>152,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>304,488</td>
<td>277,539</td>
<td>146,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>335,175</td>
<td>258,295</td>
<td>199,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>307,255</td>
<td>254,588</td>
<td>233,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>279,678</td>
<td>280,645</td>
<td>224,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>241,700</td>
<td>62,138</td>
<td>169,337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Commissioner of Naturalisation, Annual Report
establishment from those on the public payroll, and a compliant workforce in the private sector. It would hopefully also keep in check dissident social and political movements among the foreign born, in particular the socialists and anarchists among America’s immigrant working class.

The effect of the Americanisation campaign of the First World War can be measured in a variety of ways. The *Annual Reports* of the Commissioner of Naturalisation for the War and post-War years show no clear trend in most respects. Immigrants who wanted to become US citizens had to file a ‘Declaration of Intention’ (also called First Papers) after a minimum residence of three years. Two years later, they could apply to become naturalised US citizens (Second Papers), undergo the requisite examination and swear an oath to the Constitution. Thus the number of ‘First Papers’ taken out by immigrants served as a rough indicator of immigrants’ intentions, realised only two years later when the naturalisation petition was actually submitted and then granted by the courts. Despite the steeply climbing number of ‘First papers’ taken out between 1914 and 1917, the number of completed naturalisations actually decreased in that period. Completed naturalisations increased only in 1918 and reached their apex the following year. We can thus assume that the Americanisation programs of the War years had either a minimal effect on naturalisations or reached primarily those who were still years away from becoming US citizens and could therefore only file their First Papers in response to the Americanisation campaign. Anecdotal evidence suggests that both were true: Americanisation classes had a high dropout rate. Those who qualified for US citizenship did not usually need the help of classroom instruction. Those that did benefit from instruction, would take more than a couple of years to become US citizens.

The only program of wartime Americanisation which could be called an unmitigated success was military naturalisation. Introduced by a special Congressional law in 1918, it allowed members of the armed forces to naturalise without filing a declaration of intention first, and with a minimum of formality (no citizenship or English examination took place, in most cases). In all, over 287,000 men took advantage of this law until 1925. After all, soldiers on the American Expeditionary Force became the quintessential Americans during the War and could not be denied US citizenship on formal grounds.

The First World War Americanisation campaign was heavily criticised as soon as the War was over, however. Many immigrant groups found that the coercive character of many programs had had the very opposite effect on immigrants from what a conversion to the American creed was supposed to accomplish. The immigrant press and spokes-
men of immigrant organisations were almost universally critical of the programs. In an explicit comparison with what he considered the fundamentally different view and meaning of citizenship in non-democratic Europe, Carol Aronovici of the California State Commission of Immigration and Housing observed in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science:

To one who knows the soul and spirit of the immigrant who has passed through the painful experience of analyzing, sorting and accepting American life, the spectacle of the rabid and ignorant Americanization efforts was disheartening. It did not represent America as the foreigner had pictured it in his dreams before landing upon these shores. It flavored more of Hungary where the magyarization of several millions of people was attempted by means not consistent with American tradition or of Russia of the Tsarish days with the persecution of the Jew and the denaturalization of Poles.

Aronovici’s fellow reformer, Edward Hale Bierstadt, director of the Foreign Language Information Service, agreed. ‘The very word ‘Americanization’ is a dangerous choice. It reminds the immigrant too strongly of ‘Russianization’ or ‘Germanization,’’ he wrote. Bierstadt supported assimilation as an alternative and proposed extensive co-operation with immigrant communities to further this goal.

Because the close connection between Americanisers and their government sponsors had such a powerful negative effect, Progressive reformers began to reconsider the use of the state’s political and legal powers to further the goal or Americanisation. But before a consensus emerged on this question, Congress took the initiative. With nationalist fervour subsiding by 1920, the House of Representatives ended funding for Americanisation, and for the Foreign Language Information Service and cut to the funding of the Department of Naturalisation. Instead, Congress turned its attention to a comprehensive immigration restriction law, which it passed in 1924 (the so-called quota law). The Commissioner of Naturalisation continued his efforts to further Americanisation programs and instruction for US citizenship despite a much-reduced budget. Even though the Commissioner’s Annual Reports continued to paint a rosy picture, it became clear that community support for Americanisation classes dropped quite dramatically in the 1920s. While 1,299 classes were offered in 1921 to about 117,000 men and women, this number declined to 225 classes with correspondingly fewer students in 1931, the last year of the Bureau of Naturalization as an independent agency. During the 1920s and 30s, the Federal government clearly receded from its First World War role
of co-ordinating Americanisation and citizenship campaigns. Instead, it retained (indeed strengthened) its power to regulate the flow of immigrants through increasingly elaborate border controls and admission and deportation laws and practices.¹⁸

The Americanisation classes, which did continue on the community level, were only loosely connected to any Federal efforts from the 1920s on. YMCAs, public schools, and sometimes ethnic associations or parishes hired teachers, bought the citizenship manuals (the only connection to the Federal government) and staged patriotic festivals. Even though some Americanisers continued to press for instruction in everything from personal hygiene and child-rearing methods to constitutional history, most offerings were essentially English classes with some basic instruction in American history and politics to prepare immigrants for the ‘citizenship exam’, that is, the requirement that prospective citizens show familiarity with the principles of US government and the US constitution.¹⁹ Without the pressure of wartime, immigrants appreciated these offerings, especially if they were taught by fellow ethnics. The class could serve as a conduit for further education in night schools, or it would simply provide a socially approved institutional setting for the more socially isolated immigrants (especially women) when they wanted to venture out in public. Roland Damiani, an Italian shoe worker in Beverly, Massachusetts, was proud of the Americanisation classes conducted in his community.²⁰ In 1936, a WPA interviewer visited the citizenship classes conducted among Polish women in a New Hampshire mill town. She found few of the women able to speak sufficient English to be interviewed, but all eager to take out their citizenship papers, independently from their husbands. The classes, though badly taught, offered companionship as much as an introduction to an America in which these women had lived for over twenty years, but where they had few outside contacts. The women met and studied to affirm their place in their ethnic community and to negotiate their knowledge of the strange place beyond together.²¹ For a group of Polish and Jewish women interviewed at length by Chicago sociologist Sophonsiba Breckinridge a few years earlier, citizenship classes represented a first foray into the public sphere, a step sometimes undertaken with great trepidation. (Many women preferred to be instructed by husbands or sons for their citizenship exam). But once coaxed into the class – often attended only by women – they could become eager learners, though some never overcame their shyness or illiteracy.²²

The analyses and description of Americanisation programs and the ups and downs in the naturalisation figures provide us with only a limited perspective on the meaning of Americanisation and American citizenship for the immigrants themselves. For a close-up view of how
Americanisation was perceived by immigrants, we have to turn to oral histories and published autobiographies of immigrants during the late Progressive Era. In the few published reminiscences, which mentioned American citizenship and Americanisation before the First World War, Americanisation had a timeless quality, intimately connected with a robust sense of achievement and success for the immigrant authors. A more varied and less idealised picture of what becoming an American meant to immigrants emerges from the life histories collected by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) as part of its American Folklife project in the years 1936-1939. The experiences that these oral histories depict are usually fractured, in keeping with the difficult lives of the storytellers. But they also reflect strikingly on the fragmented nature of American culture and politics of their time and the awareness that the political and social unity that earlier Americanisers had sought, had remained elusive.

The experience of transformation from an immigrant’s tenuous grip on the country to a respected citizen’s firm place was rare in the oral reminiscences collected by the WPA. In these stories, other elements provided the building blocks for varied perspectives on integration and Americanisation. By and large, the focus lay on ethnic community, often embodied by the church and the voluntary association, the workplace and, to a lesser extent, the schools. Other elements of American life prominent in the 1920s and 30s, such as mass culture, political life and consumer culture were occasionally important in the narratives, but not central to the story. Age and, more importantly, race and ethnicity as we understand them today played a very important role in these immigrants’ perspectives of their own Americanisation.

Among the oldest of the interviewed immigrants was Fermin Souto, a Galician-born cigar-maker who had lived in Havana, New York, and Florida. The 77-year old told a WPA interviewer in 1936 that he had read about the United States first as a teenager when he devoured heroic stories about Lincoln and Washington. This motivated him to go to the US and become an American citizen at the earliest possible moment. While he had lived virtually his entire life within the close-knit and isolated Cuban immigrant community of Tampa, Souto saw himself as an American without reservations, albeit one with a special perspective on the United States.

Judge J. Faudie, a German-born Texas farmer, who had lived in the state since the 1880s, had similarly lived his entire life on the geographic and political margin of the United States. When he arrived in Texas, the memory of the Alamo was very much alive in a state where Yankee ‘Americans’ were still considered newcomers. But Faudie saw himself as part of a long line of German immigrants who had always lent their unwavering support to the American cause. ‘German settlers
assumed the duties and responsibilities of American citizenship. They took part in the Texas war against Mexico, the Spanish-American War and the World War,’ he declared proudly. Although they had not lived their lives at the centre of American society, these men considered themselves Spanish and American, German-American, Texan and American. Americanisation did not stand in the way of reconfirming their different origins and specific culture in the United States. Just like more prominent citizens of immigrant origin, they could consider themselves successful and well-recognised members of a local ethnic community and Americans at the same time.

Religious and ethnic volunteer organisations were anchors in immigrants’ lives and by the 1920s, their role as agents of Americanisation became recognised by reformers as well. But their position was full of ambivalence. After all, their very raison d’être was to prevent complete assimilation of immigrants into the US mainstream. Pressured by the movement in the First World War, many ethnic associations and churches had become part of the Americanisation movement. This was seen as a way to influence the kind of Americanisation their members would undergo. As a result, the immigrants most eager and most successful in taking out citizenship papers by the mid-1920s, were those connected to ethnic clubs. Some of the ethnic organisations encouraged their members to become US citizens, others did not even accept non-naturalised immigrants as members. ‘I am an American’ stated a Portuguese American fisherman to the interviewer, and added, by way of explanation, ‘I am a member of the Portuguese-American Club.’ Citizenship raised one’s status in the ethnic community of the 1920s. WPA interviewers recorded that the women immigrants in Manchester, New Hampshire were motivated to become citizens because this would make them eligible to become members of the ‘Polish-American Club’ and participate in the annual parade wearing special folkloric costumes. Here the completed conversion to a new citizenship was expressed by wearing ‘old world’ clothes. For Fermin Souto, his citizenship certificate – one of the most precious things he owned – was kept at the Tampa ‘Centro Espanol’ of which he had been secretary for decades.

Many of those interviewed in the WPA program or by Breckinridge were involved in the life of ethnic parishes. The Poles of Manchester, New Hampshire, for example, were all members of the same parish, headed by father Bronislaw Krupski, of the Polish National Catholic Church. Krupski was critical of the traditionalism of his flock and tried to replace it with a sense of obligation and patriotism to America. This was unusual, because, by and large, priests and other religious workers kept their distance from the narrative of citizenship, though, in other ways, they were openly engaged in negotiating American cul-
ture for themselves and their flock. Lizabeth Cohen has observed that for the Poles of Chicago, the 1920s brought intense pressure to Americanise from the church hierarchy, a pressure resisted in some ways (ethnic parishes were maintained) and absorbed in others (English became the language of the parishes in most cases).\(^{32}\) Caroline Ware showed that in the 1930s, Italian churches in New York tried to turn their precarious position around and ‘strove to place themselves in such a position that the process of Americanisation would bring the Italian people to them rather than drive them away’.\(^{33}\) The Reverend Wilfred Ouelette, a French-Canadian priest in Maine, was a key figure in the successful attempt to negotiate a position for his parishioners between French-speaking Quebec and the United States. He took great pains to explain to the WPA interviewer that French-Canadians in his community were not as French as the Quebecois, nor were they assimilated into Yankee New England. As he saw it, his parishioners treasured their mixed French-British-American heritage. This made them well suited to life in the borderlands. Their Arcadia was right here and he was not going to convert them but instead help them to maintain their language, and orient them within their history. ‘We are loyal to the country in which we claim citizenship, but we are also loyal to ourselves and our traditions.’ America allowed this and was therefore a good place to be.\(^{34}\)

The Reverend Elias Skipitares, a Greek Orthodox priest, largely self-educated and ordained in the US after life as a farmer, construction worker, and ‘phrenologist’ in the American West, presented a third vision for ethnic persistence amid assimilation. For him, America was a country of material plenty with a need to reconcile the needs of mind and body and follow traditional church rules, at least among his countrymen. ‘The Graecians are a people of faith and devout’ he told the WPA interviewer.\(^{35}\) His parish secretary, William Felos, a storekeeper, agreed.\(^{36}\) Both men saw no need to change their spirituality in any way, indeed they saw a need to maintain their traditional church ties even more in view of the obvious American deficiencies in this regard. The Italian stonemasons interviewed in Montpelier, Vermont, were not as articulate, but their involvement in the devotional life of their Catholic parish made this clear as well. The interviewer noted how closely interwoven family and parish life were for these men, traditionally not a given for the Italians (as it had been for the Irish). The granite cutters themselves saw no contradiction in this; America was the greatest country (although Italy was more beautiful); its realm was not a spiritual one, though, but a public and political sphere.\(^{37}\) In this sense, the Italians had, of course, accepted a very American role for their church – one that would give space to civic conversion, to a secular patriotism.
whenever that seemed necessary. But, in general, such concerns remained outside the province of the church and religious life.

The world of work was the public sphere for most immigrants. It reached into every immigrant’s home, especially during the 1930s, an era of high unemployment and lively unionisation. Trade unions had grown in Gilded Age America and during the Progressive Era because of their promise of an Americanism which blended individual prosperity and collective solidarity. Employers denounced this as un-American, offering paternalism and the possibility of success through individual achievement as alternatives. By the 1920s, with the unions greatly weakened, (in part because of the AFL’s failure to present a meaningful alternative vision to patriotic Americanism after the First World War) corporate Americanism became the dominant patriotic ideology in the workplace. This set of beliefs called for distance from leftist unions and socialist political activism and for abstention from confrontational tactics in the workplace. Employers continued to be ideological supporters of classic Americanisation which emphasised work discipline. Some helped organise citizenship classes but most just used persuasion to make their workers enrol, lest they lose their jobs or a promotion. This could be a powerful motivator at a time when jobs were scarce. Roland Damiani, an Italian-American shoe factory worker in Massachusetts, admitted that the major employer in town, the American Shoe Company, had exerted considerable pressure on their immigrant workers to attend Americanisation classes, promising them promotions and pay raises in return for their naturalisation as US citizens. But for Damiani this did not detract from the appreciation and deep bond he had for his employers. Perhaps Damiani felt such a close connection with his employers because to him it was not an anonymous factory but a world where community and labour were united. For many of the other immigrant workers interviewed, the world of work, whether it was the granite pits of Vermont or the cigar factories of Ybor City, it was the world of the craft shop where the ties of work and social cohesion were strong. For others, such as the many Greek restaurant owners interviewed in the Carolinas, the world of work was the small business anchored in the (non-Greek) community. In most cases, these men had not re-created the world of Old Europe in their workplace but entered a New World (they had been farmers or labourers before) and transformed it and re-interpreted it for themselves. Others sought independence on the land or at sea as farmers, vintners, or fishermen – a goal distinctly out of reach in the old country for most. Whatever their work situation, the men and women interviewed by the WPA, appreciated America above all because it had offered them the opportunity to find and keep a steady job. Having a job made enthusiastic Americans out of immigrants because, com-
pared to their homelands, work was so abundant and relatively well paid. Even in the late 1930s, the immigrants interviewed recounted few problems finding work – much in contrast to the world they had left behind. Work could kill, or at least tire you out, but its redemptive qualities in America were also ever present.

‘I suspect that with too many immigrants and their children, “Americanism” is too much a matter of prosperity, of being able to surround oneself with the symbols of material well-being and of being able to indulge in doings plainly indicative of your standing in the community’, wrote Louis Adamic in 1942, when the memory of the depression was already fading.⁴⁴ Adamic had picked up on something that ran like a thread through non-institutional Americanisation in the years between 1919 and the 1940s: the integration of immigrants into the world of consumerism. Frances Kellor, one of the original Americanisers of the First World War, was among the first who had argued that Americanised immigrants represented a lucrative consumer market. Since the early 1920s, her publications urged businesses to address the immigrants as consumers, earning the scorn of the more idealistic Americanisers.⁴⁵ Others took up her call, urging the Americanisation of the immigrants’ hard-earned money through American banks (in part as a way to prevent the funneling of the money into European economies).⁴⁶ After all, immigrants were now taxpayers, they should also become earners of interest. But the WPA interviews do not support Adamic’s and Kellor’s assessment that immigrants were or should be enthusiastic consumers. The interviewees admitted that earning money was important but that they refused to see the fact that they could earn good money as a transforming experience in itself. While some acknowledged that America was a money-obsessed place, they did not see this in positive terms. ‘America is a land of easy money. There is more money in America and, strange to say, more suffering than in the old countries’ thought Gus Geraris, a Greek immigrant.⁴⁷ Few admitted to owning much property or participating in the world of finance.⁴⁸ Ostentatious display was reserved for ‘traditional’ occasions, such as funerals or parades. Only one interviewee admitted to having dabbled (and being wiped out) in the stock market. Some women mentioned being well insured as members of ‘American’ insurance companies and ethnic voluntary associations. But such invisible forms of property (visible only after one’s death in the form of an elaborate funeral) were more acceptable than other forms of wealth. The more ostentatious consumerism seen by observers as inevitable part of Americanisation would be reserved for the next generation.⁴⁹

Work and community were at the centre of immigrants’ lives and their perception of America. Politics and participation in civic affairs, always at the centre of the earlier Americanisation movement, was of
secondary importance. Those interviewed often mentioned democracy, the right to vote and the rights of common citizens as ideals that seemed attractive about America and becoming a naturalised citizen. But the connection between the abstract ideals and concrete issues was rarely made. The Chicago women interviewed by Sophonsiba Breckinridge often stressed the pride they felt because they could vote, but it was not clear if the women actually voted or took any interest in politics. Many of the men who told their stories to the WPA workers had political opinions, but these mostly showed their profound alienation from day to day politics. Some were critical of Roosevelt, others supportive and a few were quite knowledgeable on some aspect of US foreign policy, but whether this actually translated into any active participation in American political life was unclear. American citizenship was certainly not central to the way these men experienced politics and was rarely mentioned.

In their 1929 classic, *Middletown*, Robert and Helen Lynd attempted to portray a typical American town as it struggled toward the modern age. Immigrants or members of visible ethnic groups or different races were absent from this story; even ten years later they had not yet made an appearance. In this sense, the WPA interviews with immigrants were all about people at the margins, even though many of the interviewees lived lives at the centre of their communities. Margins are relative, and the immigrants’ views of themselves offer some interesting insights into what constituted integration to them and to the Americans around them. Adam Laboda observed that he would always be a Pole in his home of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, but on a visit back to Poland ‘I was not called a Polack, I was always called an American and it made me very proud’. Mrs. Ruth Chinn recalled how Chinese boys from Seattle, sent back to be educated in China, behaved ‘like Americans’ and therefore had to be sent back to the United States. In the eyes of the Chinese they had become too American to tolerate, though American society would deny them political citizenship (if they were foreign born) and higher education as well as other forms of cultural citizenship because they did not ‘belong’ to the United States either.

The most adept at negotiating their truncated citizenship were African-Americans. WPA interviewers recorded a thing or two about African Americans’ status within and outside the American mainstream and their ability to see themselves within America and yet outside it. Among the African-Americans interviewed was Wilbur Roberts, a resident of Riviera, Florida, who at 84, after more than two decades in the US, had still not succeeded a US citizen. The interviews with him do not spell out why, but very likely, the disenfranchisement of nearly all African-Americans in the South played a role in the lifelong denial of citizenship to this immigrant. The 1930s found him and his family
mired in poverty with his daughter, like him born in the Bahamas, unable to get a WPA job. Still, the man admired America and preferred it to live under the British. ‘Americans help their poor, but them Britishers don’t; they’re always thinking how much better they are than folks like us, and they ain’t got no time to help us’. Wilbur Roberts was integrated into the world of African-American-Caribbean seaboard people, he owned land and a house, but the lack of legal and political citizenship hurt economically and politically especially during the 1930s.

Mrs. Juanita Hernandez-Garcia, a native of Mexico, also was forced to straddle more borders than she wanted to. She described her crossing into the United States from Mexico 60 years earlier, talking about the space in between the nations as ‘free country, everything free, pecans, wood, water, wild meat.’ Indians, encountered on the way, wanted to adopt the dark-skinned little girl. Once in San Angelo, the family settled and Mrs. Hernandez-Garcia became part of the ranching economy of West-central Texas where she worked as a cook and her husband as a ranch hand and skilled leather goods maker. But after 60 years, now an old widow, she felt that although she had become part of America as much as anybody else on the Texas range, important rewards had eluded her. ‘Me no citizen of the United States, no have same like citizen, no get pension, no have money but $1.70 per week to make me live, good people of San Angelo City give to me. Me father, me family, me husband give life for this good country, me work all life here but no get nothing but good talk and $1.70 a week’. As far as we know, Mrs. Garcia did not even try to file for US citizenship. However, if she had, in all likelihood the authorities would have been unimpressed with her accomplishments and would have excluded her from citizenship on the basis of her illiteracy. The connection between illiteracy and race was well known to officials, but few places offered the necessary educational support to remedy this situation in the 1930s and 40s.

The recorded observations of the late 1920s and 1930s represent, in a way, the most varied assessment we have of immigrants’ perception of Americanisation programs and ideas. No such data were collected for later decades, in part, because Americanisation faded from the cultural and policy landscape during the years of the Second World War and the Cold War. The War years themselves did not see a revival of the anxiety and anti-immigrant feelings of 1915-1919, with the significant exception being the deportation and incarceration of Japanese Americans. Ironically, at the height of Japanese deportation, the National Education Association launched a campaign for tolerance education, named ‘ Immigrants all, Americans all ’ in part to stem the tide of anti-Semitism. By and large there was very little Americanisation
education and citizenship training during the Second World War and only a slow and modest revival of it after the War. With a slowly growing stream of immigrants (still predominantly from Europe) in the late 1940s and early 1950s, citizenship classes experienced a modest revival, though, they were little more than instruction in the basics of English and US history. Anti-communism and Americanism became inseparable elements of official Americanisation instruction during these years.57

The low interest and participation in Americanisation programs in post-war America had a parallel in the low naturalisation rates of post-war immigrants. During the 1950s fewer than 1.2 million immigrants became US citizens. In the following decade, the figure was barely above 1.2 million (2.5 million people immigrated during the 1950s and 3.3 million during the 1960s). We must assume that these immigrants, like those interviewed in the 1930s, made their calculations about naturalisation based on their own life experiences. Increasingly, the emergence of a modern welfare state, which included immigrants in its programs, made naturalisation and US citizenship of secondary importance for immigrants. Foreign-born residents of the United States could participate in US society in every way except as voters, even if they did not become US citizens. The other substantial privilege for naturalised citizens, their ability to become preferred sponsors of relatives for immigration, declined in importance, as Europeans were less likely to emigrate to the United States after 1960. Non-Europeans, regardless of sponsorship, continued to face steep quota hurdles until 1965. Only after the quota system was lifted and Asian and Latin-American immigrants could come to the United States under the same provisions as Europeans, did the naturalisation of immigrants begin to increase steadily, especially among East Asians. Since the late 1980s, a similar increase in naturalisation rates has taken place among Latino immigrants in the United States. At the end of the 20th century, the large wave of naturalisation petitions was commonly seen as motivated by the desire to sponsor relatives as immigrants on the one hand and by the fear of losing possible Federal benefits for the needy on the other. The increase in the number of naturalised US citizens was therefore not the result of a higher degree of Americanisation or any Americanisation campaign on the part of the Federal government. Instead, this reflected a pragmatic re-assessment of the value of US citizenship immigrant groups.58

The WPA interviews with immigrants of various origins in the 1930s give us a many-faceted view of America and Americanisation. At first glance, the only characteristic they have in common is that they do not seem to reflect any sort of official ideology of Americanisation. Nor are the interviews united by a sense of resistance to official ideolo-
gies of patriotism, achievement and loyalty. Instead, what emerges is a wide array of interpretations of citizenship and what it means to be and to become an American. In many ways the ideas expressed by the interviewees are expressions of the individuals’ standing in an ethnic community, a generation of immigrants or a regional culture. But throughout, highly individual considerations also played a role. Even in instances where immigrants were assigned a racial status with large implications for social and economic inferiority (as African Americans, Chinese or even just as ‘Polacks’), the immigrants resisted that ascription. They claimed ‘American’ status anyway, even if that status was only recognised by those back in the old country – the family in Poland, the Chinese in China, for example.

The WPA narratives and the state of Americanisation in the post-First World War era also indicate that, in the American case, the government provided very little but it also demanded very little from those wanting to be American. Self-sufficiency, economic, social, and to a certain degree cultural, was the highest virtue in a country that presented itself as a highly individualistic society to immigrants in the twentieth century. The state demanded loyalty, service, and sacrifice during wartime, but in times of peace – even during an economic crisis like the Great Depression, the government did not supervise its citizens closely. Distance from the state was one of the reasons, immigrants were left to fashion their own America and their own Americanisation. This could mean a fragmented sense of nationhood at times, but it would also render the process of becoming American more resilient and open to very diverse group of newcomers in the future.

Notes

1 The most up-to date and comprehensive study of the Americanisation movement of the First World War is Herrmann 1996. Among older studies are Hartman 1948; Higham 1956; and Gavit 1923.
3 See, for example, Wald 1915; and Addams 1910.
4 From the turn of the 20th century until 1952, foreigners could first file papers for US citizenship after a minimum of three years of continuous residence in the United States. Naturalisation as a citizen could only take place two but no more than five years later. In the presence of two character witnesses (who had to be US citizens) the petitioners had to appear before an immigration judge and show their knowledge of the Constitution. The judge would then issue (or deny) a certificate of US citizenship to the immigrant. Married women automatically became citizens upon their marriage to US citizen husbands or their husband’s naturalisation prior to 1922. After 1922, they had to file for naturalisation on their own. Minor children of petitioners were made US citizens automatically. The naturalisation procedure is described in many manuals of the time. See, for example, Kalnay 1940, 36-62.
8 See note four on the naturalization process. Until 1919, the number of completed naturalisations was usually about half the number of first papers filed.
10 United States Dept. of Labor, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Naturalization*, (Washington DC 1918); Roberts 1920, 119-120; Gavit 1923, 255-294; aliens who had served in the military for a minimum of one year, or in the Navy for a minimum of two years, could be naturalised without having filed a declaration of intention previously.
13 Bierstadt 1922, 50.
14 Bierstadt’s Foreign Language Information Service would play an important role as a mediator between the ‘American’ public and immigrant communities through its monthly publication of *The Interpreter*. The slim monthly journal was the most informative periodical on American immigrant communities in the 1920s. It contained short factual articles on issues of concern to different immigrant groups, some of them excerpted from the immigrant press. *The Interpreter*, vol. 1-9 (1922-1930) published monthly by the Foreign Language Information Service. On the history of this organisation, see Weinberg 1973.
15 Other assessments of the Americanisation campaign prior to the Second World War were more academic than Bierstadt’s essays. Financed by the Carnegie Foundation, a series of social science monographs on such topics as naturalisation, immigrant neighbourhoods, immigrant schooling, and immigrants and the courts were published during the 1920s under the heading of ‘Americanization Studies’. Among the titles were Daniels 1920; Holaday Claghorn 1923; Breckinridge 1921; and Thomas, Park and Miller 1921. These books, some of them considered classics of immigration history to this day, found that Americanisation during the war and post-war years had been a failure by most measures.
17 Higham 1936, 300-330.
18 The Bureau merged with the Bureau of Immigration to form the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1932. See Smith 1926 and 1924.
19 The history of the Americanization and citizenship instruction movement in the inter-war years has not been sufficiently researched. The most useful and mostly unknown material can be found in Records of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group 85, entry 30 ‘Education and Americanization’ 1914-1936, entry 33 ‘Citizenship Education Programs’, 1935-54; entry 34 ‘Citizenship Training Texts’; all in National Archives, Washington DC
20 ‘Italian Shoe Machine Worker #7’ and ‘Italian Shoe Machine Worker #4’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940 Washington DC; see also below, note 24.
21 ‘The Polish of Manchester, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.
22 Breckinridge 1931, 71-74, 76, 79, 80.
23 For an example, see Gompers 1924; and Bok 1923.
The largest collection, available in the Library of Congress, consists of about 2,900 documents written by the staff of the Folklore Project of the Federal Writers’ Project for the US Works Progress Administration (WPA) from 1936-1940. The collection consists of drafts, interviews, and revisions, varying in form from narrative, to dialogue, to report, to case history. The collection has been digitised and was searched via its website (www.loc.gov.ammem) exclusively. Other interviews were collected by Breckinridge, Claghorn and Gavit in their studies, part of the Americanisation series described above in notes 15 and 22.

‘Life History of Mr. Fermin Souto’, American Life Histories, Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.

‘Judge J. Faudie’ American Life Histories, Manuscripts from the Federal Writers Project, 1936-1940.


‘Polish of Manchester’, ‘Here we Can be Glad’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.

‘Mr. Fermin Souto’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.

‘Polish of Manchester’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.

Cohen 1990, 97-83.

Ware, 1935, 316.


‘Giacomo Coletti’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.


Leiserson 1924, 65-79.

This assessment differs markedly from Gerstle’s and others (see note 38). By and large, the people interviewed by the WPA may have been reluctant to speak about their union involvement or sympathies. They were also usually from more isolated and rural communities than those described in Gerstle’s study.

Roland Damiani, ‘Italian Shoe Machine Worker #7’ and ‘Italian Shoe Machine Worker #4’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.


‘Giacomo Coletti’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.

‘Giacomo Coletti’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940.


Kellor in Immigrants in America Review, vol. 1 no. 1, Spring 1916.

Cohen 1990, 64-83.

‘Greek Restaurants’, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers Project, 1936-1949; see also ‘Interview with Vito Cacciola’ in the same collection.


Lynd and Lynd 1929 and 1937.


See for example the interview with Charles Gant, a native Kansan, who saw himself as a link between Africa and America. As a cook he had learned to make coconut stew and other dishes from ‘an old time cook who had been brought to America in the days of slavery’. Gant learned to alter the dish ‘to satisfy the taste of Americans’. Charles Gant, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers Project, 1936-1949.


Materials on Americanisation during and after the Second World War can be found in the files of the Foreign Language Information Service and the Common Council for American Unity at the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota, especially Record Group 2, Series 8, 9, 11 and RG 3, series 8, 10.

Schneider 2001, 65-68.
PART IV

CONCLUSION
This book offers an insight into the history of the settlement of immigrants in Western Europe. By displaying a wide range of experiences in different periods and countries it disaggregates the simple notions of migration and integration. Given the large differences in both the opportunity structure of the various European nation-states and in the characteristics of the migrants, this need not come as a surprise. Before shedding some light on the main paths of integration in Western Europe’s past and present, we should first return to the US, the origin of this specific historical comparison. Compared with the rather clear-cut distinction between old and new migrants in the current discussion among American migration scholars, transplanting this framework to Western Europe has proved to be both productive and problematic for at least three reasons.

First of all, defining the temporal limitations of ‘old’ and ‘new’ migration in Europe have proved difficult. Whereas in the US it is more or less agreed upon that ‘old’ refers to the period 1880-1920 and ‘new’ to the post-1965 era, the situation in the ‘Old World’ is much more intricate. Different states in Europe followed distinct political, cultural, economic, and demographic trajectories, which resulted in different migration rhythms and regimes. This is reflected in the dissimilar timing of labour migrations: high in inter-war France and the Netherlands and low in Germany and Great Britain. Moreover, migration from the colonies, predominantly after the Second World War, depended on the particular timing of the decolonisation process and on the existing colonial links in the British, Dutch, and French empires. Algerians in France, West-Indians in Great Britain, and Dutch Indonesians came in large numbers during the 1950s, whereas the immigration of Dutch Surinamese, and the Pakistanis and Indians in the United Kingdom peaked in the 1960s and 1970s. Descendants of erstwhile German emigrants to Eastern Europe, known as Aussiedler, ‘returned’ massively in the late 1980s and 1990s. Thirdly, the many political reconfigurations of large parts of Europe in the twentieth century, especially pertaining to Germany, resulted in people moving over borders and borders over people as Klaus Bade once put it. This produced huge migration flows in Central Europe, both after the First and Second World Wars.
The result of these different national pathways in Western Europe does not offer a clear cut periodisation as in the US case, where the period 1918-1970 (except for the internal migrations and the recruitment of Mexicans through the Bracero program) is characterized as one of low immigration. Instead, in Europe different chronologies present themselves, depending on the specific structure of the comparison and on the choice of countries. This is demonstrated by several contributions in this book. For example, whereas a classic (American-type) comparison is offered in the case of Poles then and Turks now, Barbara Dietz distinguishes old and new German Aussiedler in the post-Second World War era.

Secondly, in addition to the issue of periodisation, Western Europe diverges from the US when we consider the nature and activity of the state. Whereas the US constitutes a united federal state, Western Europe embodies different traditions of nation-building, state-formation, and citizenship. In the inter-war period France actively stimulated immigration for economic and demographic reasons, as the contributions of Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard and Laure Teulières illustrate, whereas other countries either discouraged or at best tolerated immigration. From a political point of view, we witness large differences in the definition of citizenship and the attitude towards immigrants, refugees or former citizens, demonstrated by the chapters by Jochen Oltmer on Weimar Germany and Karen Schönwälder on the post-war era.

Thirdly, in Western Europe the migration dynamics differed to a large extent from those in the American case, especially in the second half of the 20th century. Whereas since the First World War American authorities have tried to regulate immigration by legal means, albeit not always successfully, European countries had even greater difficulties when they tried to prevent or regulate immigration. Colonial migrants had virtually unlimited access to the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, as is illustrated by the Laurence Brown’s chapter on Caribbean migration and in Blanc-Chaléard’s overview of Algerian migration to France. Only after the bulk of the migrants had settled were restrictive legal measures put in place, often reluctantly. The case of Germany, which had no colonies, is only slightly different as descendants of former emigrants to Eastern Europe, who were perceived as part of the German people, were given the right to ‘return’ after the Second World War. Furthermore, various massive internal migrations took place, which were both unforeseen and unwanted, but impossible to prevent. Between 1840 and 1910, the migration of hundred of thousands of Irish and Polish-speaking German citizens within the political entity to which they belonged resulted in the large-scale settlement of Irish men and women in Scotland, Lancashire, London and elsewhere, with equally large numbers of ‘Poles’ settling in Berlin and the Ruhr.
area, as is shown in Dorota Praszalowicz’s and Leo Lucassen’s contributions. Here we can draw a parallel with the ‘Great Migration’ of African-Americans – as well as whites – from the Southern states to the North in the period 1918-1960, which remarkably has only sporadically been incorporated into the American discussion of old and new migrations.7

The failure to regulate migration effectively in post-war Europe is last but not least illustrated by the unexpected and unforeseen effects of the welfare state. As James Hollifield and others have demonstrated, the recruitment of guest workers since the 1950s in France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands resulted in the unintended and unwanted settlement of large numbers of immigrants and their families. As a result of their prolonged stay, Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, Yugoslavians, Turks and Moroccans built up both civic and social rights which made it virtually impossible to expel them. This was especially notable when, after the oil price crisis in 1973, most countries resorted to restrictive immigration policies. In this new context, many guest workers realised that it was better to remain in their country of residence, because by leaving they would jeopardise their rights to return.8

Although the situation of the Mexicans in the United States is to some extent similar, as is illustrated by the ongoing chain migration after the end of the Bracero system in 1964,9 the fundamental difference is that the ensuing – largely illegal – Mexican immigration was mainly determined by the demands of the American labour market.10 Only in the last decade Southern Europe and the Mediterranean are increasingly resembling the US-Mexican model, as hundred thousands of illegal African workers find work in countries like Spain and Italy without entering the social security system.11

The case of guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s, however, was quite different and their immigration and integration highlight the specificity of Western Europe. Especially the unforeseen effects of the liberal welfare state, combined with a restrictive aliens policy, produced a very different situation. Legal mass immigration through family reunification occurred in a period of recession (1973-1993) and economic reconstruction. The result was that millions of – on the whole – low-skilled migrants and their families settled in Western Europe in a period of mass unemployment and the disappearance of low-skilled jobs in the mining and industrial sectors.

Finally, the settlement process of migrants in the United States has been much more thoroughly studied than in Western Europe, where historical narratives of migration tend to be inwardly focused, describing certain case studies within national frameworks. We have not, therefore, forged a systematic comparison of how the different groups of migrants settled in various periods and countries. Nevertheless, we
have gained more insight into differences and similarities that enable us to understand the conditions under which different modes of integration have developed. In this way, *Paths of Integration* takes one step towards closing the knowledge gap between Western Europe and the US. Therefore, we hope it will advance the interdisciplinary and comparative study of the settlement and integration of immigrants in the long-term.\(^2\)

**A European Harvest**

*Migrants in the centre*

Although the migration history of Europe is more complicated than that of the US, this does not imply that the old and new scheme cannot be applied, only that the outcome is much more differentiated.\(^3\)

This differentiation is not only a reflection of the three factors mentioned in the previous section, but also because in this book (reflecting the historiography in general) we have decided not to restrict ourselves to ‘large and problematic groups’. The American historiography, by contrast, is – often implicitly – limited to such groups, at least where the ‘old’ part of the comparison is concerned.\(^4\) Our approach may be less focused and therefore offers fewer distinct patterns, the good news is that it draws attention to other less well-known paths of integration, making the concept less linear and more layered. Moreover, divergent cases of small and inconspicuous migrants, experiencing a silent integration process, cast an often revealing light on the more general conditions under which the settlement process evolved.

In this volume, we have distinguished three different paths of integration. The differences between these three can be systematised by differentiating between two dimensions of integration: 1) structural and 2) identificational. Whereas the structural refers to social and economic denominators, like the position in the labour market, school attainments and residential patterns, the identificational dimension is restricted to the question of with whom migrants and their descendants identify and how the ethnic group and the receiving society at large figure in this. To measure this, one can use personal contacts as a point of departure, ranging from marriage partners to friends and the adherence to ethnic organisations.\(^5\) This leads to four possible outcomes of the settlement process (table 1):
The first path resembles the one taken by many ‘old’ immigrants in the US: slow, bumpy, and only partly leading to upward mobility, whereas the salience of ethnicity decreased over time in Europe. As in the US, these migrants were initially perceived as a threat, because their alleged racial, cultural, social, or political characteristics would make them unfit for assimilation. Moreover, their human capital in terms of labour market skills and education were on average low. The best examples are the majority of the Irish who settled in Great Britain circa 1850, the Poles who migrated to the Ruhr area at the end of the 19th century, and part of the Italians who moved to France in the same period.

This route bears many similarities with the second path, taken by most ‘new’ coloured and low skilled migrants in the US from the 1970s onwards and the migrants in Western Europe who for various reasons are considered as fundamentally different, whether in racial, cultural and or religious respects. Colonial groups, such as the Algerians in France, West Indians in both Britain and France, as well as Muslim migrants in general (Turks, Moroccans, Pakistani and Bangladeshi) fit into this category. On average, their integration process takes a long time and is seldom linear. There are strong indications that a significant portion of the descendants of these migrants will experience little social mobility and become locked in the underclass. The main difference with ‘old’ migrants in both the US and Western Europe is that this partial underclass formation, or segmented assimilation, may go together with an ethnic stigma. Whether ethnic minority formation will indeed be the outcome in the long run, remains to be seen.

A third, much more silent and faster, path is represented by a number of smaller groups which were perceived as less threatening, and whose human capital was both higher and more diverse. A good example are German immigrants who settled in a number of countries in the 19th and 20th centuries. Many of them were skilled workers or
Shopkeepers and traders who already upon arrival can be classified as (lower) middle class. Furthermore, they were internally heterogeneous because of their diverse political and religious characteristics. Many among the first generation were active in ethnic associations, as the contribution of Marlou Schrover shows, but socio-economic, political, and religious differences prevented a homogeneous ethno-political mobilisation. Moreover, the adherence to ethnic associations was largely restricted to the first generation and was not accompanied by spatial segregation or concentration, as was the case in many American cities in the period 1850-1920. This relatively fast integration of Germans is also illustrated by the large proportion of immigrants, both men and women, who married indigenous partners. A special case is described by Laure Teulières concerning the Italians who settled in rural southwestern France. Here their relatively rapid integration was not only furthered by the human capital of the migrants, many of whom were lower middle class, but also by the regional opportunity structure. After the decimation of young French men in the First World War, Italian farmers and agricultural workers were in demand and could relatively easily procure land and small farms. Both immigrants and the indigenous French population shared a rural perspective and a common religion, which made it much easier to overcome initial linguistic and cultural barriers.

These German and Italian cases, however, also show that the integration process was not linear, because of intervening political factors. The outbreak of the Second World War turned these migrants and their descendants into enemies, which slowed down and partly reversed the integration trends begun in the inter-war period. In the long run, however, the war did not pose a structural barrier.

Finally a fourth, mixed pathway arises from the case studies in this volume. Looking more carefully at the Poles who settled in Berlin (Praszalowicz) and the Indian traders in London (Falzon), it is clear that they occupied a position in the local society different from the groups who followed the first two paths. Both Poles and Sindhis were not locked in the lower ranks of society, but – like the Germans and Italians in the second path – their social structure was quite diverse. What distinguished them from the Germans and Italians, however, is that they were to a certain extent seen as alien, a perception that was based on, respectively, a nationalistic and a colonial discourse. This stigmatisation was, however, less enduring than the discrimination experienced by Poles in the Ruhr area or by other colonial groups who entered Britain later, because of the specific interaction between a better-skilled immigrant group and a more diverse opportunity structure. Both Berlin and London were cities with many different economic sectors and a heterogeneous population. This made immigrants less visi-
ble, less numerous (relatively speaking) and it gave them more opportunities. The relation between the specific make up of local opportunity structures and the integration process has already been noted by Ewa Morawska in her book on Jewish immigrants in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. In this predominantly industrial town Eastern European Jews integrated much more slowly than did their co-religionists in cities like New York.

Institutions and the state

A significant characteristic of European migration studies is the strong focus on political and institutional opportunity structures in various countries and periods. Actors like the state, churches, and unions have been analysed extensively. Important questions include how and to what extent institutional factors have moulded the integration process of immigrants. It is not surprising that the comparative model is often applied, at both the national and local levels. Brubaker’s study on France and Germany, which highlights the differences in the definition of citizenship is well known. Other scholars prefer the local level in order to understand the workings of urban or rural opportunity structures on the settlement process of migrants. This research tradition is well represented in the third part of this volume. Barbara Schmitter-Heisler shows the effects that different union politics, both between countries and between periods, have on the way migrants have become integrated in Western European and American societies. In the last decades of the 20th century, German unions have been much more active than their Dutch counterparts, for example, in recruiting migrants and also in giving them political power. Whereas Schmitter-Heisler’s comparison is primarily between countries, Blanc-Chaléard’s chapter on the Algerians and Italians in France is historically framed, suggesting that in the past the ‘world of work’, which includes the workplace and union activity, was much more important in integrating migrants through the homogenising influence of the workplace than nowadays. A difference which may have a negative impact on the integration of Algerian migrants and their descendants.

Much more intensively studied than unions – or churches – is the state in its many manifestations, both with regard to migration and integration policies. In this volume, Oltmer and Schönwalder focus on the evolution of state practices within one country, in their case Germany, instead of employing the classical interstate comparison. Their contributions show the significance of both national traditions, as stressed by Brubaker, and the specific political regime. Moreover, as Oltmer makes clear, the attitude of the state towards its own dispersed ethnic population abroad has been important in shaping the ways in
which aliens at home have been categorised and treated. Schönwälder, on the other hand, stresses the dramatic changes in the power and character of the state concerning immigration. The emergence of the welfare state in particular has brought about a new dynamic, both with regard to the ability to regulate migration and to the way migrants are expected to integrate. She demonstrates that this had both negative and positive consequences for migrants. While their rights increased, the interventionist attitude of the liberal welfare state has generated more obligations and demands for migrants to fulfil. One might add that this changed relationship between the state and the migrants is also reflected in the constant monitoring of the integration process of migrants and their descendants, highlighting problems and failed integration. However understandable this is from the point of view of policy makers, this preoccupation with problems also gives ammunition to nativist feelings and may – willingly or unwillingly – give rise to the polarisation of the discourse on migrants, which increasingly distinguishes between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Since the late 1980s, this development has taken place with respect to migrants from Muslim countries, as is described in the contribution of Thijl Sunier. Starting with the Rushdie affair in 1989 and followed by the First Gulf War, the smouldering Islamophobic mood came to a breaking point in 2001 with the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, followed by attacks in Madrid (2003) and London (2005), the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 and the Danish cartoon affair in February 2006.

The role of the state is therefore ambivalent. Not only because its power is restricted and because its actions often lead to adverse and unintended results, but also because the state is only one actor in a rather busy arena. Applied to the migration policies over roughly the last century or so, we can see a clear increase in both the power and ambition of state institutions to maintain control. Until the 1950s, however, much of the integration programmes was left to private organisations, such as churches and unions and to migrants themselves. A pertinent example from the American situation is discussed in Dorothee Schneider’s chapter on the Americanisation movement. While many associate this movement with a top-down state-led assimilation program, Schneider shows that the reality was quite different and less coercive. In fact, in many cases it were the migrants themselves who helped those who arrived later. The initiative may have come from the state level, but the application of the policy was left largely to private initiative.
Western Europe and the US Compared

Despite vast changes in the opportunity structure of the receiving society, the integration process of migrants and their descendants in Western Europe in the past and in the present shows a number of remarkable similarities. Apparently, these long-term processes are at least partly independent of the specific context in which they arise. Therefore, we feel more comfortable with the premises of the ‘optimist’ school in the US discussion, which stresses the ongoing assimilation process among recent migrants. This book has made clear, however, that there are also significant discontinuities with the past. Partly these converge with the factors that are stressed by the ‘pessimist’ school in the American discussion; these scholars draw attention to (1) the greater cultural and racial differences between immigrants and natives, (2) the communication and transportation revolution that facilitated ongoing transnational ties, and (3) the more segregated nature of the (hour glass) economy, implying that in the past social mobility was easier than it is now.

The last two factors also play a particular role in the Western European case, albeit in a slightly different guise. Notwithstanding the many similarities with transnational practices from the past, the current situation seems to encourage migrants and their offspring to remain in contact with the world they left behind and to foster multiple identities. Whether in the long run this will fundamentally change the primary identification of the second and third generation remains to be seen. Closely linked to the transnational argument is the development of globalised collective identities, mainly in a religious form. In the European case, this is most manifest in the case of Muslim migrants from Turkey, North Africa, and Asia. Not only do some of them increasingly identify with Islam as a pan-ethnic religion, but, perhaps, even more importantly, Muslims all over Western Europe are seen as forming one coherent religious group, with alien and threatening values, despite the many differences among them. Also here a divergence from the past can be noted. Whereas in the 19th century, the anti-Catholic rhetoric against Irish migrants in Britain was confined specifically to the UK context, not spilling over to the Catholic Italians in France or the Catholic Poles in Germany (who were feared for other reasons), this is different from the case of Islamic migrants at the end of the 20th century. From the 1980s onwards – and especially after September 11, 2001 – they are increasingly perceived as problematic and non-assimilable. The anti-Islam discourse clearly affects the social positions of Turks in Germany and the Netherlands, the Algerians in France, the Moroccans in Belgium and the Netherlands, and the Pakis-
The changed economic climate, which offers fewer possibilities for upward social mobility, is to some extent also discernible in Western Europe. Many migrants, both colonial and non-colonial, tend to congregate in highly segmented parts of the labour market, with low pay and few chances of upward social mobility. This may have been the same for many ‘old’ migrants, but in the last half of century the ‘world of work’, to use Marie-Claude Chaléard’s expression in her contribution, went through profound changes. She compares the Italians then with the Algerians now, and argues that labour migrants in the past – those at the lower rungs of the ladder – integrated automatically because the workplace was much less segregated than in the second-half of the 20th century. Entering a quarry or factory meant being exposed to native workers and their organisations. Unions were hostile at first to the newcomers, but this opposition did not last and in time migrants became an integral part of the workforce. This is different from the present situation. Barbara Schmitter Heisler in her contribution points out, that unions have recently put more energy into recruiting immigrants, although the integrative force of the workplace has been severely weakened because certain jobs are now almost exclusively left to migrants.

What makes the position of the low-skilled newer migrants even more different from their predecessors before the Second World War, is the long-term mass unemployment which has characterised much of Western Europe since the 1970s. Coupled with the high unemployment rates among the second generation in Britain (West Indians and Pakistanis), France (Algerians), Germany (Turks), Belgium (Moroccans) and the Netherlands (Turks and Moroccans), this casts an anxious shadow on the future. To what extent this will affect the integration process in the long run, remains uncertain. Much will depend on the degree to which the second generation succeeds in attaining higher educational levels and getting jobs.

As we have seen, the three ‘classic’ factors which are central to the American ‘old’ and ‘new’ debate (different migrants, transnationalism, and segregation of the labour market) are insufficient to demarcate the differences in integration processes between Western Europe and the US. We would therefore like to finish by summarising what the consequences of the more interventionist nature of the state in Western Europe are. First of all, there is the increase in intervention and monitoring and the emergence of the welfare state. Although states were interfering with the settlement process of migrants long before the 20th century as, for example, the repression and forced assimilation of Moors and Jews in early modern Spain illustrates, it is undeniable that
the emergence of the nation-state in the 19th century and the welfare state in the 20th have greatly enhanced its interest in its citizens, and by implication in the migrants who settled within its borders.

Both the US and Western Europe have been worried by the assimilability of the ‘new’ migrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In the US this led to the installation of the Dillingham Commission, which created the Immigration Act of 1907 and whose report was hijacked by nativist forces after the First World War, when much more stringent immigration controls were introduced and migrants were confronted with Americanisation programs.32 In Europe, early examples of state interference are found in Wilhelmine Germany, where the Polish-speaking minority was exposed to extreme assimilationist politics. Both the use of the Polish language in public and ethnic organisations were suppressed and in the inter-war period various researchers tried to monitor the assimilation process of this internal minority, especially of those who migrated to the Western part of Germany.33 More generally, the state interest in immigrants is reflected by their increased statistical visibility in the form of censuses all over Western Europe and the growing interest of scholars in the position of immigrants.34

The monitoring process increased greatly after the Second World War when the state’s involvement in society in general entered a new phase of what Jim Scott has dubbed ‘making society legible’.35 With the new immigration from both the former colonies and from labour-exporting countries around the Mediterranean, state officials and scholars became increasingly interested in the developments of the integration process, both for the first and second generation. Although there are important differences between European countries when it comes to the way immigrants and their children have been categorised,36 the monitoring of migrants and their descendants has evolved into a general interest of the receiving societies. The initial intentions may have often been benign, aimed at preventing the formation of an underclass, but an important consequence was the identification of immigrants with social problems. The one-sided attention to their (slow or failing) integration in various domains (especially the labour market and the educational system) highlights the social problems of immigrants, and easily stimulates polarised anti-immigrant politics and ensuing nativist feelings. A good example is the use of the term ‘allochtones’ in the Netherlands, which, since the 1980s has come to denote problematic immigrant groups. The term, however, also includes their descendants, stressing the fundamental difference between them and the ‘autochtone’ Dutch citizens. Notwithstanding the fact that most ‘allochtones’ were born in the Netherlands and at this point have Dutch citizenship, in the collective perception of the receiving society they remain funda-
mentally different, reinforcing the notion that, in the end, they are different from the ‘real’ Dutch.

The emergence of the full-fledged welfare states in Western Europe after the Second World War not only stimulated monitoring, but also partly changed the dynamics of migration. Whereas before 1940, migration was primarily determined by labour market needs, in the last quarter of the 20th century, welfare benefits have become an additional attraction for potential migrants, especially after the economy took a downturn in 1973. Notwithstanding higher unemployment and reduced economic opportunities, immigration not only continued but also soared. Guest workers brought their families and in some cases, like the Surinamese in the Netherlands, a massive colonial migration occurred. This unfortunate timing was especially detrimental to the integration process, not only because many migrants became permanently unemployed and dependent on welfare benefits, but even more so because it affected their children’s chances.37

Most of the factors mentioned above were less significant in the US. The segmentation of the labour market may show some similarities, many new migrants in the US are skilled and do not start at the bottom.38 Furthermore, the problematisation of Muslims is less widespread and deeply felt, even with the Patriot Act which increased the stigmatisation of Arab-Americans. The most striking difference, however, is the role of the state. Although some researchers argue that American welfare benefits have a negative effect on the self-selectivity of migrants,39 these are insignificant by European standards and have not led to extensive long-term unemployment among major immigrant groups in the US. Furthermore, the US grants migrants more autonomy and is less concerned with ethnic subcultures, provided that those who do settle there for good identify with the basic principles of the nation-state. This book therefore not only offers fresh insights in paths of integration in Western Europe, but also puts the American experience, which is often studied in isolation, into a comparative perspective.

Notes

1 In the British case, the migration was not so much caused by decolonisation, but took place within the broader framework of colonial arrangements. West Indian migration preceded decolonisation, Indian and Pakistani migration came some time after independence.
2 Smith 2003.
3 Bade 1996b.
6 Hansen 2000.
7 A well-known exception is the seminal study by Stanley Lieberson 1980. More recently, see Gregory 2005.
8 Hollifield 1992; and Bade 2000. More general on the limits of state power to regulate migration and integration, especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain, see Bommes 2004, 212-216.
9 The Bracero system was a temporary labour program, introduced by the American government in 1942, at a time of severe labour scarcity, and terminated in 1964, which allowed millions of Mexicans, most of them farm workers to work in the US.
10 Borjas 1999. His neo-classical economic perspective has been challenged by scholars who stress the importance of networks which tend to ‘multiply’ migration and to perpetuate themselves over time (Massey et al. 2002, 98-100).
11 Massey et al. 1998, 115-117. See also Calavita 2005.
12 Other important comparative initiatives are Joppke and Morawska 2003 and Foner 2005, 206-224.
13 See also Foner (2005, 222) who rightly warns against focussing too much on differences between the U.S. and Europe.
14 Presently, low-skilled migrants like the Mexicans, Jamaicans, and Dominicans are also over-represented in the comparison, although the much more diverse composition of the recent immigrations has not gone unnoticed (Foner 2000).
15 A similar distinction is that between structural and socio-cultural (Penninx and Vermeulen 2000). See also Gordon 1964 and Alba and Nee 2003.
16 See also Lucassen 2005.
17 Panayi 1995; Schrover 2002; and Lucassen 2002.
19 Morawska 1996b. See also Lesger et al. 2002 on the difference between Germans in the small town of Utrecht and in the city of Rotterdam in the 19th century.
21 Vermeulen 2006.
22 A systematic comparison between unions now and then is offered by Haus 1999, who juxtaposed the stance of French unions versus immigrants in the interbellum period and in the 1980s and 1990s.
23 See also Lamont 2000.
24 A similar approach is followed in a recent Dutch study: Van Eijl 2005. See also Green 2005.
25 This event, along with the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 2002, was characterised by the Dutch journalist Marc Chavannes (NRC Handelsblad of 23 December 2005) as the 9/11 of the Netherlands.
27 See for Morawska 2003 who points to the more intensive transnationalist ties and Brubaker 2001.
28 Roy 2004. For a critical case study, showing the ongoing complex negotiating over multiple identities at the local level, see Werbner 2002.
29 It is difficult to predict what the effects of this Islamophobia will be. Moreover, it might be not that unprecedented. At least two historical case show striking resemblances both in Europe and the US involving Jewish and ‘coloured’ migrants, who were both seen as inferior to the ‘white’ race, largely irrespective of the specific national or local context.
30 As became clear to the larger public with the riots in the French banlieus in November 2005.
31 Crul and Vermeulen 2003.
32 See Dorothee Schneider’s chapter in this volume. For background on the Dillingham Commission, see Zeidel 2004.
See the chapters of Leo Lucassen and Dorota Praszalowicz in this volume.

Especially in France, as is exemplified by the work of Mauco (1932).

Scott 1998.

The French census only distinguishes between foreigners and French citizens, which makes it hard to identify the offspring of migrants (see Tribalat 1995), whereas in the Netherlands second and third generations are listed separately. More in general, see Lucassen 2005.

The extent to which this happened differs from group to group and country to country and makes Western Europe in the second half of the 20th century an extremely interesting laboratory for comparative research. For a very interesting initiative, see Crul and Vermeulen 2003.


Borjas 2002.
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